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**PROCEEDINGS**  
**OF THE**  
**EIGHTEENTH**  
**INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS**

**1943**

**PART II**



**EDITOR :**  
**DR. T. M. P. MAHADEVAN**



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## **INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS, LAHORE, 1943**

The Indian Philosophical Congress met at Lahore on the 21st, 22nd and 23rd of December 1943. The Congress was opened by the Hon'ble Sir Manohar Lal, Finance Minister, Punjab. After the welcome speech by Principal G. C. Chatterji and introduction of the president by Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan, Professor P. N. Srinivasachari, President of the Session, delivered his address in which he surveyed the progress made in the several branches of Philosophy and indicated lines on which fresh developments could be effected with synthesis as the guiding principle. On the 22nd and 23rd the Congress sat in its different sections and papers on a variety of subjects were presented for discussion. On the 21st there was a symposium on 'Has Philosophy a Method of Its Own?' and on the 23rd another on 'Is Beauty Subjective or Objective'? Each day of the session concluded with a public lecture. Professor A. R. Wadia spoke on "Sociology as applied Philosophy," Kwaja Abdul Hamid on "Iqbal—or the Ego as a Creative Being," Prof. P. N. Srinivasachari on "The Soul of India" and Dr. B. L. Atreya on "Psychological Research and its bearing on Philosophy."

At the General Body Meeting held on 23rd December with Rajasevasakta A. R. Wadia in the chair, resolutions were passed recording the deep sorrow of the Congress at the premature demise of Mr. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri who had been the secretary of the Congress for several years, and of Mr. K. R. Sreenivasa Iyengar who had also rendered distinguished service to the Congress. It was further resolved to perpetuate the memory of the late Mr. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri by the institution of a prize which will be awarded every year for the best essay on a prescribed philosophical subject written by a student of philosophy in an Indian University. The Executive Committee has been authorised to take steps towards collecting donations for this purpose from the members of the Indian Philosophical Congress and other friends and admirers of the late Mr. Sastri.





*D. M. Dutta,*  
**Prof.- PATNA COLLEGE.**

# THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS 1943

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

By

PROF. P. N. SRINIVASACHARIAR, M.A.

I am deeply grateful to the members of the Executive Committee of the Indian Philosophical Congress for their kindness in asking me to preside over this year's session. It is with great diffidence that I consented to accept this high office held with distinction in the past by eminent philosophers and representatives of Indian thought and culture. This Congress is held at the most critical moment in the history of the world when there is a life and death struggle for the preservation of the personal and social ideals of ethical and spiritual life. It is only in moments of such crises that men begin to think furiously and philosophise on the fundamental problems of life, justify the need for righteous warfare, and seek to establish the supremacy of the spirit. The Song on the Chariot in Kurukshetra, true to the synthetic genius of India, was a call to the philosopher to be not only a spectator but also a man of action participating in the battle of life and working for world welfare. In every world war, which is really a warfare of ideals, the Indian philosopher has always fought in defence of the ancient world heritage of spiritual culture and the re-establishment of its synthetic ideal.

The best way of retaining the soul power of India is to keep alive her synthetic philosophic outlook by removing the barriers of isolation and exclusiveness on the one hand, and the evils of the slavish imitation of alien ideas on the other. Science has destroyed distance only in the physical sense but not in the

philosophic and spiritual sense. It is only philosophy applied to practical life that can really bring men together and make them live a new spiritual joint-family life. Philosophy in India is not divorced from life but has always permeated the popular mind and irradiated everyday life. What is now required is not more philosophy, but more philosophers, who would, as heirs of India's cultural heritage, consecrate their lives to the pursuit of philosophic thinking and set an inspiring example to others in their views and ways of life. Contemporary philosophy in the East as well as in the West is anxious to integrate the different branches of knowledge like science, metaphysics, ethics and religion which have not been on cordial terms for a long time. To a student of synthetic philosophy, it is a fit and fascinating subject to watch the confluence of the various thought currents in modern philosophy. The need for synthesis is different from the manner of synthesis and it is proposed in this brief address to bring out the philosophic implications of this 'meeting of extremes', to use the happy words of a great philosopher, by avoiding technicalities as much as possible. Synthesis is discerning unity amidst diversity and is different from the 'eclecticism of soapy minds'. If the various sections of philosophy come to a common understanding without giving up their essential features, they can present a united front against the common foes of wisdom like ignorance and isolationism, win a spiritual victory and re-establish the kingdom of righteousness, in which the philosopher will play a leading part.

### SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

Philosophy seeks to integrate all kinds of experience—scientific, moral, aesthetic and religious—and to solve the problem of knowledge synthetically. It enables us to criticise all categories in the light of an all-inclusive truth which transforms our outlook on life, by going beyond the partial and the fragmentary. Though intellectual in its method, it has to consider all questions of abiding human interest in a disinterested way, think them together and arrive at a comprehensive unity. Science and philosophy which have been at arm's length so long owing to mutual distrust, are now anxious to appreciate each other's standpoint, and find out their common features. The dominant interest in contemporary philosophy is the integration of scientific knowledge with the totality of experience. The scientist has the advantage of focussing his attention on a particular section of knowledge, discovering the secrets of nature and arriving at the solidarity

and universality of knowledge in a disinterested way. His problem is, however, self-limited by the specific way in which he puts his questions to nature and approaches the study of reality. He, however, oversteps his bounds when he turns philosopher and mistakes sectional thinking for the spirit of totality. Even mathematics, on whose pattern metaphysics was long modelled owing to its accuracy, gives us only abstract truths and does not aim at concrete unity. The modern philosopher is fully alive to the needs of a realistic approach to reality and constructs his system on the concrete facts of experience and seeks to find out ultimate meaning and value of experience in all its aspects. Science and metaphysics have different subjects of inquiry, though they may adopt the same critical method. The scientist may use the logical method, but is not a logician. Likewise the philosopher may rely on the data of science for his enquiry, but is not a scientist. There can be no universal science just as there can be no scientific philosophy. Physics and biology have separated from philosophy; but epistemology, ethics and religion are still with philosophy. Psychology is on the border land between science and philosophy, and by its unique position in the Congresses of Science and Philosophy it can mediate between the two by reminding the scientist that every observation he makes presupposes the observer, and by telling the philosopher that in his introspection he should not forget the object and that his speculations should touch the earth and have solid foundations. Philosophy is both critical and constructive and it provides a corrective to the evils of sectional thinking and sterile or airy speculation.

#### EPISTEMOLOGY

What is valuable in current thought is the stress it lays on the ways of knowing truth or on the method of arriving at clear and distinct knowledge. The main contributions made to the Logic and Metaphysics Section of our Congress, especially those dealing with the antagonism between idealism and realism, reflect the modern tendency to seek more the points of convergence than those of divergence. Epistemology with the theory of the *pramanas* is the foundation of philosophy in the East as well as in the West and, as is crisply stated, if a man tries to break logic, logic will break him. The need is now felt for the co-ordination of the truths of rationalism and empiricism, or idealism and realism, from a higher point of view, which will do justice to both and

thus remove the feeling of estrangement. The chief postulate of knowledge is that reality is knowable. It is involved in experience and is neither prior to it nor deduced from it. The old rivalry between idealism and realism arose out of abstracting mind from matter, and regarding each as a thing in itself existing in its own right. The realist says that things alone are real, that experiencing makes no difference to the facts experienced and that the relations are external. The idealist says that a thing is only a mental construction and that there is no reality, but thinking makes it so. While subjective idealism ignores the reality of the external object, realism ignores the synthetic activity of thought. Modern thinkers are inclined to reconcile the differences between the two from various points of view. Neo-realism and traditional idealism affirm the existence of a world that is common to all minds. The principle of relativity recognises the activity of the observer of the space-time continuum, and is said to support idealism in the sense that it makes knowledge an internal relation. The duality of the subject-object relation is the bedrock of logical experience. The relations are not external to the terms related, but are relevant and organic. They are more like the relation between the hand and the fingers than that between the hand and a piece of paper held by it. When the realist says that thoughts subsist logically and are as real as the things that exist, he approaches idealism. The idealist has to recognise the reality of social objects and inter-subjective intercourse and thus fall into line with the realist. The view of certain modern realists who refer to the organic inter-relation of processes and explain objects as unities which are self-identical, is nearly the same as the view of the idealists who affirm the reality of the universal as the life-blood of rational thought. The modern realist tries to know the wood as well as the trees, and the modern idealist, the trees as well as the wood. Both of them agree in thinking that the judgments of fact and value are equally real from a higher standpoint in which reality and value coincide. The scientist as logician often mistakes realism for reality and the philosopher as mentalist mistakes idealism for mere ideas. Even in Indian epistemology there is a tendency to regard Sankara as a realist when he accepts the reality of the external world and Ramanuja as an idealist when he lays stress on internal relations. The relation between mind and matter cannot be dissected though the elements can be distinguished as modes of the All-Self.

## THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

The triumphs of the physical sciences constitute the chief glory of modern science and it is claimed that, in future, metaphysics will be in the hands of those who know physics and that it will be the handmaid of physics. The dominant truth of the physical science is the concept of matter with its principle of uniformity of nature. Matter is energy and a cluster of events; it is not merely what is, but what does, and the materialised energy includes radio-activity. But when science turns into naturalistic philosophy and makes matter the whole of reality, it goes beyond its limits, and philosophy as a criticism of categories is justified in examining the assumption of science and the claims put forward by the materialist, naturalist or realist. The visible and tangible universe has certainly its own stability and objectivity, and is the common theatre of all human activity, and both the neo-realist and the absolutist agree in saying that nature is real and not created by our thinking. Matter may have the quality of extension, but is external to the self and persists in its own being, and it cannot be spiritualised. The materialist is right when he insists on the reality of the physical world, but goes wrong only when he concludes that it is the only and the whole reality, and that life and consciousness emerge from the stuff of space-time as its off-shoots and that therefore it is prior to, and has primacy over them. Materialism often leads to mentalism. Even though matter is now thought of as less material, it can never be considered alive and conscious of itself. Life is spontaneous and self-active and different from radio-activity and physico-chemical changes. The promise and potency of self-consciousness are only in the living and not in the non-living, and the lower has to be explained in terms of the higher. The scientist explains the happenings in nature by the law of causation which is a methodological postulate and is true as far as it goes; but naturalistic metaphysics is one-sided as it ignores the reality of super-sensuous experience and creative evolution. Nature no doubt serves the purpose of life, but is not itself purposive. Matter is neither bare monad nor congealed spirit; it is only the garment of the spirit and not the spirit itself. The critical realist holds the view that the physical objects of science are self-contained existents which are unaffected by the percipient. The objects cognised by me are not created by me or constituted by the act of my cognition; but realism goes too far when, aided by the physical sciences, it leads to materialism and naturalism. The object is not a bare *that* without the *what*; if it

were, it would lead to scepticism. The pan-psychist goes to the other extreme when he denies the reality of inanimate things. Contemporary thought is anxious to avoid these extremes of materialism and mentalism when it insists on the stability of the physical universe known as *acit* in Indian thought, but denies its self-containedness, and thereby escapes from the pitfalls of scepticism and subjectivism.

#### THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SELF

Modern psychology, unlike physics and 'physiology, is an important section in the Science and Philosophy Congresses and has a unique value in synthetic philosophy as, in the treatment of the self, it can bring about an '*entente cordiale*' between naturalism and absolutism on the one hand and ethical religion on the other. Though naturalism and absolutism are opposed to each other in their method and conclusions, they agree in so far as they deny the meaning and value of personality. The naturalist depersonalises the self and treats it as a mere offshoot of matter or as an epiphenomenon. The absolutist thinks that the self suffers from self-contradiction and is a mere appearance or element of the absolute. The humanist and the personalist go to the other extreme in their revolt against naturalism and absolutism. The humanist makes man the measure of all things and the personalist denies the reality of physical objects. It is the prerogative of psychology to mediate between these extremes and establish the nature of the self and its value. Before it does so, its conflicting schools should come to a common understanding. Some psychologists explain mind as a response to stimulus and thus explain it away. Their view borders on materialism. Psychology is explained by them in terms of biology and biology in terms of physics. Others say that consciousness is a new quality that emerges from life. All biocis is said to be psychobiocis. Still others say that the self is only a series of sensations; but a sensation cannot be conscious of itself. Self-consciousness without selfhood is like the play of Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. To explain the mind without the self as its unity is to stultify its meaning. The psychologist as a scientist in his zeal for observing things forgets the observer or the experient, and thinks only of association of ideas, configurations, and complexes. Still others rightly recognise that purpose is the central fact of psychology and that the self is personal and self-directive, and has the factors of knowing, feeling, and willing. The life of reason has no origin in the animal life of man; but it is the essential quality

of the self in its gradual ascent from reflex action to reflective action. The spiritual self is different from the mind-body and has the freedom to achieve the highest ideals of truth, goodness and beauty. The self known as *cit* in Indian thought has its own worth and dignity and its freedom cannot be explained away in terms of the scientific law of causation or the omnipotence of God. Though the self exists by itself, it is not isolated or exclusive. It has its value only in a society of persons and as a mode of the Absolute.

#### ONTOLOGY

The chief question in contemporary metaphysics as the theory of Being, is whether Reality is one or many, or the one in the many, or whether it is the absolute experience, or Self; and though extremists are ranged in opposite camps in the solution of the problem, a distinct tendency to *rapprochement* is discernible in the leading exponents of the philosophy of today. The absolute idealist affirms the unity of the universe and the principle of totality as its vitalising thought and seeks to discover the one all-inclusive whole which is the ground of existence. He applies the principle of non-contradiction to discover the nature of the whole, finds that finite experiences and even God, self, and nature are self-contradictory and are mere appearances of reality, though there are different degrees of reality; he concludes that the absolute is a single all-inclusive experience which transcends all differences and embraces every discord in a transmuted form. A more moderate form of absolutism accepts the principle of immanence or identity in difference and says that reality is a systematic whole consisting of inter-related parts. Another form of absolutism interprets unity in terms of a totality of wills. The pluralist distrusts the monistic absolute as a colourless abstraction of thought or a static whole that stifles moral and religious experience and swallows up personality. He interprets reality as a pluralistic universe consisting of a multiplicity of monads or selves, each having its own exclusive existence. The personalist as an absolutist tries to compose the differences by accepting idealistically the existence of the absolute as supra-personal, but he denies the reality of external things. A true synthetic philosophy has to explain the reality of the system of nature as well as the society of selves and co-ordinate the realms of logic and metaphysics on the one hand, and ethics and religion on the other. It has to reconcile the claims of pragmatism and



humanism, which reject absolutism, with those of realism which attacks the subjectivistic trend. The contention of the idealist that reality is spiritual has to be accepted, whether he is a monist or a pluralist, or adopts a middle course, and the reality of the physical world has also to be recognised; this is satisfied by regarding the absolute as the All-Self immanent in all beings as their ultimate ground, and ethically transcendent as the home of all the eternal values of life. Absolute experience presupposes an experiencing Self known as Isvara in Indian thought, which is supra-personal in the sense that it is more than personal and is perfect. This view accepts the theory of organic relations and denies only the separate reality of individual things and not the reality of the separate individual things. It meets the demands of monism and pluralism and the claims of logic and ethics.

#### THEORIES OF EVOLUTION

The problem of change and evolution occupies an important place in modern thought, and in spite of the confusion caused by the principle of indeterminacy used in physics invading all ranges of experience, and in spite of the conflicting views held by extreme naturalists and absolutists, there is a tendency amongst some notable exponents to come to an understanding. The naturalistic view affirms the ultimate reality of matter and explains life, consciousness, and personality as its offshoots or by-products. The evolution of matter is an ascending movement having the promise and potency of spiritual perfection. According to the theory of natural selection the living comes from the non-living and mind evolves from life; life is an adjustment to the environment, and in the struggle for existence the fittest alone survive. Nature is red in tooth and claw and the world is like a huge gladiatorial show. Might alone is right and the supermen produced in the course of evolution reduce others to utter subjection by means of their tyrannic will-power. Some deny the law of progress and say that gradual degeneration and death are the end of human experience. The modern theories of emergence are variations of the theory of evolution and they explain the higher as emerging from the lower. According to one school, the matrix of space-time is the primordial stuff of the universe, from which new qualities like life and mind emerge, and the next higher stage in its growth is the *nisus* towards deity. Another theory goes a step further and accepts God as the *nisus* through whose activity emergents emerge and is therefore less naturalistic. A third theory refers to a realm of eternal objects which require God as

the principle of concretion for achieving actuality, abandoning naturalism altogether. This view is further developed by distinguishing between the absolute which is infinite possibility, and God who is one possibility actualised. It is pointed out by way of criticism that emergents may not emerge but get submerged. Absolutism in its transcendental aspect points to reality which somehow divides itself into finite centres and gradually becomes the world of empirical experience. Another well-known theory insists on the principle of evolution that what is implicit alone becomes explicit and that reality as idea is the gradual dialectic unfolding in a rhythmic way of the One that goes out of Itself and then returns to Itself. In this way naturalism and absolutism agree in destroying the autonomy of ethical religion and explaining away the existence of the self and God as mere emergents or appearances of the Absolute. But a true theory of cosmology has to recognise the reality of nature, self, and God by avoiding the extremes of naturalism and absolutism. This is rendered clear by distinguishing between the process of nature, the moral progress of man and the inner purpose of God which consists in soul-making. The events in nature happen, and form a medium for the progress of man due to his freedom; and God is the ground of the evolutionary process and the transcendent goal of moral life.

#### THE PROBLEM OF PROGRESS

Contemporary philosophy is deeply interested in the problem of progress and there are neo-realists and neo-idealists who insist on change as the very core of reality. Whether time is relative and variable, or uniform, it is a succession of events, and reality is endless becoming. Time is not change, but a form of changing things. The intellect dissects the free flow of time and makes sections of it; but when we rise to intuition we feel the throb of life as creative evolution. According to another view, there is emergent evolution and the world of space-time is reaching towards the new quality of the Deity. The Deity comes from the universe and not the universe from the Deity and there is no end to the becoming. Still others prefer the moral attitude to the religious, accept the historic view and say that humanity is ever progressive. Man is never satisfied with what he is, but aspires to be more, and his aspiration is never fully achieved. The humanitarian and the political idealist always think of perfection and not of the perfect. The idealist philosopher himself believes in dynamic

process and not in a block universe, and says that reality is not thought, but thinking. The good is to be won by the race as a whole and it lies only in the future. The pragmatist has the will to believe that the world is perfectible and that it can be made better by man co-operating with God who is also finite. The absolutist is justified when he allies himself with religion in rejecting this philosophy of progressivism on the ground that time and change are in the Absolute, which is timelessly complete, but the Absolute is not in time and change. There can be no universe without an underlying unity and no becoming without being. Infinite becoming or progression is self-contradictory and purposeless. The scientist's view of becoming and the moralist's view of progress are different from the philosopher's view of reality as the goal of life. All change is only in the whole and not of the whole. Likewise it is the living faith of the religious man that the values of temporal life are perishing and futile, and that the free self can enter into divine life by self transcendence and attain eternal security and stability. When man is deified without losing his own spiritual worth, he dies to live and attains immortal bliss. Immortality is not survival in life or eternal duration but is eternal life which is but the fulfilment of the temporal. The supra-personal self has no history though it gives a meaning to it.

#### INDIAN PHILOSOPHY TODAY

The dominant character of Indian philosophy today as of old is the synthesis of the theoretical and the practical sides of human nature. It is thus both speculative and spiritual and is truly called a *darsana*. It seeks to re-interpret the philosophic heritage of India in terms of the western methods of scientific and philosophic criticism and thus makes its own specific contribution to philosophy as a whole. Of the systems of philosophy, orthodox or heterodox, Vedanta is now the most popular *darsana* and it accepts the essential features of other systems in so far as they do not contradict its own truths; such as the *nyaya* ways of knowing truth, the *sankhya* principles of psychology and evolution, the *yoga* scheme of psychic discipline, the *mimamsaka* theory of duty, and even the moral ideas of Jainism and Buddhism. All the systems are said to have their philosophic completion in the absolute idealism of the Advaita type. In contemporary Indian philosophy, as expounded by many of its leading philosophers, Vedanta is often identified with Advaita, though Advaita itself is

variously interpreted. Of the three chief *pramanas* of Vedanta, namely, *sruti*, *yukti* and *anubhava*, or revelation, reason and intuition, the first is not very much stressed and it is presupposed in the presentations of Advaita. Vedantins as rationalists rely on reason or *yukti* in the development of their system and fall into different groups. Some insist on the analysis of the three states of consciousness and point to the state of dreamless sleep as the nearest analogical explanation of Advaita. Others refer to the science of the self or *atmavidya* and conclude dialectically that the 'I' is one, infinite, and eternal. The 'I' first poses itself, then opposes itself and finally reposes in itself. Still others speak of the philosophy of truth in which reality reveals itself as truth. The illusionists say that Brahman alone is real and that the world is false like a dream. Another group of Vedantins say that the Absolute is beyond the logical intellect but it is possible to have an integral intuition of Brahman. It is held by some that *mukti* will be complete only when there is *sarva-mukti*. There are Vedantic mystics who affirm the identity of thought and being by referring to a direct intuition of the self-identity of Brahman. The more realistic amongst the Vedantins say that the world of nature, self, and God is self-contradictory, but not illusory, and conclude that the real is not the real for thought, but is realised in the integral intuition of the Absolute. Advaita denies only difference, but does not affirm identity.

Indian philosophy is at present overweighted on the side of Advaita and unless the other Vedantic systems are equally well-known and come into their own, the balance will not be restored. This defect is mostly due to the default of the followers of those other systems. The criticism is often made that Indian philosophy favours illusionism and asceticism, is world-negating, and indifferent to the needs of love and social service. Though this charge is unfounded and refuted by our leading philosophers, the critic is fully disarmed only if he is made aware of the ethical and religious foundations of Vedanta in Dvaita and Visishtadvaita. Dvaita insists on the reality of absolute difference between God, the self, and matter, and defines God as the instrumental cause of the universe. The *jiva* is finite and can never become infinite, and the text construed as "Thou art that" really means by reference to the context "Thou art not that." God can be attained only by *bhakti* and, even in *mukti*, there are eternal differences in the experience of God. As good and evil are exclusive, good men alone attain God and there is no hope for

wicked men. Visishtadvaita is a philosophy of religion which does equal justice to the metaphysical needs of synoptic thinking and the religious needs of universal love. The Absolute of philosophy is the God of religion and He is defined as the ground of existence and goal of moral and spiritual life. He is immanent in all beings as the life of their life and light of lights and is at the same time eminent as the pure and perfect. The finite self has its own unique value as a monad, but at the same time it is a mode of the Infinite sustained by its life and dependent on its redemptive love. It is eternal as an entity, but is not external to God. Moral life presupposes the freedom of the self to give up its egoism and attain self-sovereignty. Spiritual life is the realisation of the self as different from the mind-body; and the knowledge that it belongs to God. Religious consciousness is awakened when the purified self sheds its selfish outlook and seeks union with God. The self-consciousness of the self is all-pervading and when the self is freed from the barriers of *avidya* and *karma*, it can intuit the Absolute. To the Visishtadvaitic mystic, God is essentially love, and religion is the life of God in the love of man, in which God seeks man and man seeks God, and the lover and the beloved become one in the bliss of the unitive consciousness. Self-loss is not the loss of personality, but is its enrichment by participation in divine life. The freed self sees God in all beings and all beings in God, and effaces itself in the service of humanity, till all human beings attain the highest ideals of spirituality, like truth, goodness and beauty and become one with God. Thus understood, Visishtadvaita occupies a middle position between the Dvaita ideal of *mukti* as service to God and godly men, and the Advaitic idea of *mukti* as the disappearance of the dual consciousness.

From the synthetic point of view, these three systems afford parallels to the Western theories of pantheism, theism and monism. But they are different from them as they dwell primarily on the relation between the finite self and the Infinite, and not on that between the universe and God. The tolerant spirit of Advaita is said to be brought out by the theory of degrees of truth and reality and the idea that truth is a passage from the lower phase of Dvaita to the intermediate state of Visishtadvaita till the higher stage of Advaita is realised. A more tolerant view is that expressed by a supermystic of India that the three are the three aspects of the supermind. Dvaita gives the delight of seeing difference; Advaita is the realisation of non-difference and Visishtadvaita, of the immanence of God in all beings.

## ETHICS AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

Ethics has to defend itself against the inroads of naturalism and absolutism into its domain, by insisting on the moral freedom of the self and its intrinsic and eternal value as a person and not as a thing. The self is not a by-product of matter, nor an emergence from it, nor again is it an appearance of the absolute. Freedom in morals is not mere spontaneity, but involves real choice or decision; and the self has the freedom to grow into godliness or lapse into animal life. The *Gita* contains the essentials of morals according to Hinduism and it does not favour a mood of escapism or fatalism. *Karma* from the scientific point of view refers to causality on the moral plane and *prarabdha karma* has a determining influence on conduct. Though we cannot undo the past, the future is entirely in our hands, and not even a god can enslave a man who has conquered himself. From the ethical point of view, *karma* insists on the freedom of the self or *purusha* to overcome the solicitations of animal inclination and the utilitarian impulse of success or gain. Every man can attain self-sovereignty and self-knowledge, and the true meaning of *karma* is disinterested action or freedom in action and not from action. From the religious point of view, *karma* implies consecrated service to humanity and to God or *Purushottama* who is the inner self of all *purushas* and the real actor and subject of all moral and spiritual life and His inner purpose is to make the *purusha* pure and perfect.

The social philosophy of today reveals the tragic fact that culture and civilisation are on the very verge of collapse owing to the decadence of faith in the moral values of life and the dignity of personality. The evolutionary theory of the survival of the fittest affords a scientific and moral justification for the growth of the evils of cut-throat competition in all walks of life, and dictatorships or the rule of supermen with their will to enslave humanity. The gospel of material progress based on the triumphs of modern science has reduced man to a machine and a mere item in the programme of exploitation. The machine created by man has become a menace to his very being. The idea that the State is an end in itself and is beyond moral laws and that the individual is only a means to an end has undermined the foundations of true democracy and self-rule. The theory of chosen races and religions has increased racial bitterness and religious fanaticism. Religiosity has taken the place of religion and dogmas and rituals masquerade as spiritual faith; and

religion itself is regarded as a morbid obsession. Psycho-analysis has exaggerated the meaning of the sexual instinct as an all-powerful but repressed feeling clamouring for satisfaction, and made training in sexual matters an education in nastiness and licence. Society itself is threatened with extinction by the total war that rages everywhere and some thinkers say that life is now decadent and will soon be destroyed. It is the supreme task of the philosopher to restore the higher ideals of life and reconstruct society on a moral and spiritual basis. The acquisitive instinct is very strong in human nature and it no doubt defiles the mind, clogs the spirit, and makes for division and hatred. But the solution lies not in the abolition of private property but in reconstructing society on the principle that riches may be hated, but not the rich man and that one should get wealth in a righteous way for giving it freely to others. The sex instinct is likewise irrepressible but it should be humanised and spiritualised by insistence on the need for marriage as a social opportunity for developing the virtues of fidelity, reciprocal love, and spiritual at-onement. War is no doubt a monstrous evil, but it is inevitable and even a necessary evil as long as man has the instinct of pugnacity. Man is no doubt now threatened with extinction by the very deadly weapons which he has created with his scientific knowledge. But a few living philosophers with a prophetic vision tell us that such destruction is but a prelude to a fresh construction of society and the founding of the kingdom of righteousness. Disarmament will be possible only when man is disarmed of his brutal instincts and his spiritual side is fully awakened. Behind the gloom of the present, there is visible to them the splendour of a new life of harmony and goodwill among mankind.

### RELIGION

The age-long feuds between philosophy and religion, especially in Western thought, are now coming to a close owing to the new synthetic movement in philosophy which seeks their integration in a true philosophy of religion. It has the double task of reconciling religion and philosophy and finding a *via media* between pragmatism and absolutism. Religion, relying on supernatural revelation, makes reason subservient to faith and formulates a theology deduced from such faith. Religion distrusts science and speculative thinking on the ground that they often lead to agnosticism and endless doubts. Philosophy subjects theology to relentless criticism and rejects it as blind faith based on myths,

rituals and irrational feeling. But the mere analytic intellect only dissects feeling and cannot enter into the heart of religion and intuit its truths. The modern philosophy of religion, however, seeks to avoid the evils of dogmatism and fanaticism characteristic of institutional religion on the one hand and agnosticism or free thought on the other by insisting on the authority of personal experience. Both pragmatism and absolutism deny the primacy of religious consciousness and explain away the existence of God. The former makes God a finite being fighting victoriously against evil, with our co-operation, but its will to believe tends to become a make-believe. Some realistic thinkers say that God is not yet born but will soon be born. The absolutist thinks of God as a person suffering from self-contradiction and therefore a mere appearance of the absolute. But the philosophy of religion refutes both these views and says that God is infinite and not finite and that the "absolute" is an all-devouring abyss. It rejects the theistic proofs of God by affirming that the best proof of the existence of God is the experience of God, and it is possible for every one who has the instinct for the infinite or the hunger for God to satisfy it by a soul-sight of God and by enjoying the bliss of communion. While the philosopher seeks unity and defines God as the all-inclusive unity, the religious man seeks union with the same God as the supra-personal. When the seeker after God sheds his self-feeling, he can contact God and enjoy the bliss of unitive consciousness resulting in the illumination of the intellect and the exaltation of the will by philanthropic service. This experience is testified to by the mystics of all great world religions including the Christian, the Sufi and the Hindu.

The philosophy of religion collects and co-ordinates varieties of religious experiences in a systematic way and evaluates them in the light of their immanent idea of perfection. An important feature of the philosophy of to-day is the increasing recognition of the inseparable relation between reality and value. While science is said to study the realm of facts, ethics and aesthetics are said to deal with values, and this distinction has led to a cleavage between the two kinds of studies and resulted in open hostility. But now there is a tendency in philosophy to recognise the inter-relation between the two. A true philosophy is as much interested in the apprehension of facts as in the appreciation of values. To be aware of a thing also implies the appraisal of its value. Value judgments are therefore said to have as much ontological significance as judgments of facts. The conative and affective sides



of experience are as important as the cognitive. Values are not variable and subjective, but are intrinsic and objective. The highest values of life are truth, goodness and beauty, and they are personal or spiritual experiences. If values are emptied of such spiritual or personal content they become abstract or meaningless. They are the highest ideals of life, and when they are realised they become ultimate and eternal. The philosophy of religion treats such ultimate values as the attributes of God in whom they are always self-realised. God is not only the ground of existence, but also the home of values. When the self is freed from ignorance, evil and ugliness, it has a soul-sight of God, becomes perfect and participates in divine life. The value and destiny of the individual consist in its ascent to God and attaining the eternal bliss of divine life. The ultimate values are trans-valued in that state and become eternal. Eternal life is the fulfilment of the temporal and according to one Indian philosopher spiritual life is not only an ascent from the stage of matter to the super-mind, but also a descent from the super-mind to matter and that the world is now approaching a stage when this harmony will be effected and there will be a new race of super-spiritual men. From the point of view of a true philosophy of religion, religion is one, though religions vary and it is possible for the world religions to come to an understanding and establish a fraternity of faiths as a first step towards a federation of peoples. India is no doubt the meeting ground of religions. But if the founders of world religions are understood in their mystic or personal aspects, the followers of each religion may then know inductively the best of the other religions and appreciate their common features.

Modern life suffers from racialism in social life, sectional thinking in science, nationalism in politics and fanaticism in religion. What is sorely needed to-day is a new synoptic outlook that will combine the seriousness of the thinker with the social virtues of the man of action, break down the barriers of departmental thinking and exclusiveness, heal all discords and give a new spiritual direction to society.

If ideals rule the world in their own silent way, Indian philosophy is still alert and alive as can be judged from the lives and teachings of our men of genius who have achieved international reputation in the aesthetic, moral, philosophical and mystic aspects. Our poet-philosopher who gathers wisdom from all sources by direct contact with reality freed from the tangle of self-interest and has

a direct vision of the kinship of nature and man speaks to us of the joy of beauty and the truth of love which he intuitively feels by self-forgetfulness and self-sacrifice. The moral genius of India has recognised the reality of moral evil in its individual and social aspects and has shown the way of overcoming it by love and by self-suffering. Evil by contact with good becomes sterile and self-destructive and thus gives rise to the reign of universal love. The modern *yogi* of India insists on a new integration of divine life in which there will be a gradual ascent to supra-mental life as well as a descent into the physical life with a view to spiritualise it. He has a vision of a universal transformation of society as a whole in the future by the descent of divine life on earth and the creation of a new race of super-spiritual men. The religious prophet of India lived and realised the truths of various religions and heralded a new age in which all religions will be harmonised without losing their individuality. The Indian philosophers to-day with their synthetic thinking and synoptic vision have already attempted a new orientation of Indian thought by utilising the best thoughts of the West and interpreting the West to the East and the East to the West and thus bringing about a better understanding between them. India's service to the world is the gift of her spirituality. In the words of one of India's leading philosophers, the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity have a deep spiritual meaning. The freedom of man is the freedom of the self-development of divinity in man. The equality of men implies the recognition of the same Godhead in all human beings, and the ideal of brotherhood is a unity of mind and feeling based upon the inner spirituality of man. Thus the political ideals of the west can be spiritualised. Freedom in the positive sense is to be utilised by the free man in the service of the ideals of world-welfare by his renouncing the egoistic and individualistic outlook. All men are equal in the sense that they have the same divine destiny. This view furnishes the most inspiring motive for intellectual co-operation and inter-religious understanding so necessary for realising the ideal of the federation of the world. Such a consummation can never be achieved unless mankind gives up its present antagonisms based on differences of race, culture and religion. It is up to the Indian philosopher with his age-long tradition for solving world problems to face the present confusion, examine its causes, and point the way out of it.

# “Madhva’s Absolute”

(Presidential Address to the Indian Philosophy Section)

By

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## I

Madhva lived in the 13th century A.D. He is the last of the originators of Vedānta Systems. Having studied both their merits and defects, he has propounded a system of Vedānta in which he shows that the whole universe with all its aspects is the work of a single principle. As his system forms the last phase of Vedānta thought, it has naturally become exceedingly complex.

At the outset I may say a few words about some important ideas that may help us in understanding Madhva. Throughout his teaching Madhva has a single point of view namely, the point of view of Brahman, the ultimate source of all. He says in V.T.V. “*Sarvotkarṣe deva devasya Viṣṇoḥ mahatātparyam naivacānyatra satyam*”—“The only aim of this Śāstra is the determination of the Ultimate character of Viṣṇu i.e., Brahman. The other things are only incidental.” We have any number of such statements in the course of his teaching. Further the words he uses have a definite meaning. If once we miss the meaning of any term we have missed his entire thought. We may take for example the word *adhīna*. Ordinarily this word is taken to mean ‘dependent.’ It may be the dependence of a servant on his master. But the term is used by Madhva in a technical sense. It is applied to a thing which is created by Brahman. He says in Ai. Bh. 37 “*Tadadhīnatvameva teṣāṃ sṛṣṭyādinā darśayati*.”—“Showing that the world in question is created by Brahman the Upaniṣad explains how the world is *adhīna*.’ Following him his great commentator Tīkācārya says in T. Pr. 2. 3. 13. “*Kiñcātaḥ tadadhīnatva liṅgena tatkr̥tonumīyate*.”—“Further for the reasons stated from the fact that the thing in question is *adhīna*, the fact that it is *kr̥ta* (produced) is inferred.’ So *adhīna* according to Madhva means *created* or *made*. Similar is the consideration with regard to all the words he specially uses in the course of his thought.

Madhva is a Vedic thinker not in the sense that he upholds anything that appears to be taught by the Veda, but in the sense that he accepts only the rational as taught by it. He says in the Bhg. T. "*Keralam vedaśabdēna jñānam vaidika ucyate. Vedam vināpi anubhavāt jñānamstu tyaktavaidikāḥ....Tattvam Vedānusaṅgeṇa cintayan vaidiko bhavet. Veda ūhām anusaredyasya saḥ tyaktavaidikāḥ.*"—One who depends on the Veda in order to obtain knowledge is called a *vaidika*. But one who knows the truth by *anubhava* even without the help of the Veda is *tyakta vaidika*.... One who understands the truth according to the Veda is a *vaidika*; but one whose enquiry is followed by the Veda itself is *tyakta vaidika*.' And in a previous passage Madhva calls himself "*Vaidikāḥ Tyakta Vedaśca*"—'though a *Vaidika* he is really a *Tyakta Vaidika*.'

In the above passages Madhva is bringing out the comprehensive significance of *jijñāsā*, philosophical enquiry started by Bādarāyaṇa in the first of the Brahmasūtras "*Athāto Brahma-jijñāsā*". Madhva arrives at the conclusion that there is ultimately only one source of knowledge and that is philosophy or *jijñāsā*. He respects only that philosophy which is free from every prejudice. He observes that prejudice of some kind or other is at the bottom of wrong philosophies, wrong because they deny the Absolute in some sense or other. He does not tolerate any kind of dualism in his system. To meet this demand he studies carefully the problems of psychology and epistemology. His conclusions are in fact far beyond the reach of the philosophers that preceded him. Even the modern and contemporary philosophy will be much benefitted if Madhva is properly studied and assimilated. He is the only philosopher in India who valued knowledge for its own sake. For him philosophy is the highest kind of *tapas* and the knowledge thus obtained is the threshold of *mukti*. He says in Anu. V. "*Jijñāsothhajñānajat tatprasādāt eva mucyate.*"—'One is liberated only by that grace of Viṣṇu which results from the knowledge resulting from pure enquiry.' According to him enquiry itself is a case of grace.

With these preliminary ideas, I hasten to indicate the final position that Madhva takes in his philosophy. As it is already indicated, he traces the whole world from a single principle, Brahman. *Svatantra*, Hari, Viṣṇu, etc., are the other Vedic names of the same principle. In the process of enquiry Madhva gives greater prominence to *Svatantra*. *Svatantra* signifies not only the self-established nature of the principle but also the fact that it is the

principle of all. It indirectly points out that all that is other than Itself is derived from It. Madhva calls that which is derived *paratantra*.

He respects the Vedic tradition because it teaches the truth of *Svatantra*. He illustrates this idea by a reference to a Vedic passage "*Sarve Vedāḥ yatpadamāmananti.*"—'All the Vedas really teach the truth of *Svatantra*.' He accepts *Smṛti* as valid only if it is based on this Vedic truth. In this connection he respects the *Bhāgavata* and the *Gītā* most, because they teach the same truth in an unequivocal language. The *Bhāgavata* employs the methods of agreement and difference and shows how *Svatantra* is the principle of all as "*Dravyam karmaca kālaśca svabhāvo jīva eva ca yadanugrahataḥ santi na santi yadupekṣayā.*"—'Substance, motion too, time also, nature, soul, etc., exist only because of His will and if He is indifferent to them they never exist.' The truth "*Aham sarvasya prabhavaḥ,*"—'I am the originator of all,' is the key note of the *Gītā* teaching. In view of these ideas Bādarāyaṇa defines Brahman as that which is the principle of all. This is his teaching in the second Sūtra "*Janmādyasya yataḥ*"—'That from which the production etc., of all this take place is Brahman.' This is how the Vedic tradition establishes what is called *Brahma Vāda*. If we understand the significance of this position we would see that it is more correct to say that the cause of all is Brahman than to say that Brahman is the cause of all. In the latter expression that Brahman is the cause of all, there may still be lurking the idea that the state of being the cause of all may be an accidental property of Brahman. This idea is perhaps the origin of non-philosophical theistic and theological ideas. But to recognise fully that the principle of all is Brahman is to fix the attention on the ground of all. So long as this attention is operating, there is philosophy in the real sense of the term. This is in fact the significance of *Brahmajñānāsā* which itself is the teaching of Bādarāyaṇa.

Madhva notes that the real significance of this truth consists in seeing that Brahman and Brahman alone is realised to be the whole cause of all that exists. He observes that this significance is lost sight of even by the other Vedānta thinkers who preceded him, in so far as they postulate something or other along with Brahman as the cause of the world. In interpreting him T.C. 770, illustrates this idea taking for example the *Māyā Vāda* of Śaṅkara and observes that in essence it is the denial of *Brahma Vāda*, as "*Kāraṇatvam pradhānasya nirasua sthāpitam yadi avidyādeḥ tadā*

*konu lābhosti Brahmanādināḥ?*”—‘Having denied that *pradhāna* (root matter) is the cause of all, if it is held that *avidyā* is the cause of all, then nothing is contributed to *Brahma Vāda*. It is like giving the sheep to a tiger after snatching it by force from a wolf.’ This passage reveals the vigour or spirit of Madhva’s *Brahma Vāda*.

## II

After the *Brahmasūtra* 2.3.1 “*Yāvadvikāramtu vibhāgo lokavat*”, Madhva holds that all that has change (*vikāra*) is limited (*vibhakta*) and all that is limited is a product (*kārya*). He observes that thought does not stop with a product. It is not satisfied unless the product is fully explained. When the *Taittirīya* said “*Yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante*”—‘From which do these things come?’, it put a proper question and this question has become the birthplace of all philosophies that followed it. Applying the ideas of change and limitation, Madhva sees that the whole world of experience is a product. In accounting for the cause of it he makes a reference to all degrees of pluralism and dualism. He shows how they are defective philosophies, because they do not see that the different causes they postulate in order to explain the world need inter-action; inter-action implies change and limitation and this means that they are themselves products. He further points out that their chief defect lies finally in their total denial of *Brahmanāda*. Materialism of any kind does not explain the spirit, the *cetana* aspect of the world. Further to hold that something like Brahman or *Īśvara* with something else such as *Prakṛti* or *Karma* is the cause of the world is a case of dualism or pluralism as the case may be and this position does not explain how there is inter-action of these different entities. Accepting *Brahmanāda* of a kind to hold that some aspect of the universe such as *Jīva* is not produced is again to make this aspect partly the ground of the world along with Brahman. This again results in dualism or pluralism. In any case these theories do not lead to the conception of the ultimate ground of all and the question put by the *Upaniṣad* is not answered at all.

Further to hold that the world is illusory is simply to give it names. It is not to solve the problem of finding out the first principle. Even supposing that the world is illusory, the problem of finding out the ground of illusion still persists. For these reasons Madhva holds that the world is a real problem. This is the significance of his conception of the reality of the world.

What does the reality of the world mean? Madhva answers that it consists of *Svarūpa*, *Pramiti* or *Pravṛtti*. *Svarūpa* means essence and it is that which gives individuality to the thing in question. Because of this aspect we understand a thing as being distinguished from the rest of the world. It is the thinghood itself. Without it a thing is inconceivable. *Svabhāva* is another name of the same. *Pramiti* means Knowledge. Following the objective sense of the term, it is taken to stand for *Prameyatva*, the state of being the object of knowledge. The significance of this idea is that a real thing is necessarily *Prameya*, object of correct knowledge and by correct knowledge is meant that which apprehends that object exactly as it is. From this it follows that that which is not the object of correct knowledge is not real. That that knowledge is essentially relative to object and is by nature apprehended by knowledge is the implication of this conception. It may be noted that *Svarūpa* or *Svabhāva* itself is a *Prameya*. For that which is not a *Prameya* is impossible. Similarly *Prameya* is an expression of *Svarūpa*, for it is *Pramiti* or *Prameyatva* that makes an object an object. Thus 'thing' and 'object' are completely the same. *Pravṛtti* means function. It is an activity. Without it a thing is inconceivable. A motionless thing is nothing. We commonly speak of an inactive entity (*jada*). But it has no philosophical justification. When we call a thing inactive, we have in mind a particular kind of activity according to our interest. If we can see, we have to recognise that even to lie is to do something. To lie is a verb and a verb is an expression of activity. With this comprehensive meaning of *Pravṛtti* we may now see that *Svarūpa* and *Prameyatva* are only the expressions of *Pravṛtti*. Further, *Pravṛtti* is *Svarūpa* because, it distinguishes the thing in question from other things. Similarly *Pravṛtti* is impossible unless it is a *Prameya*. Hence, *Svarūpa*, *Pramiti* and *Pravṛtti* are only different expressions of the same reality. Yet they are distinguished from the particular standpoints of discussion. Having these ideas in view, Tīkēcārya says in N.S. 431 "*Apūrva Viśeṣopajananēhi Viśiṣṭākāropajano avaśyam bhāvi Viśiṣṭākārośca vastu Svarūpābhinnā iti tasyaivāsau Upajano bhavati*"—"If there is a production of a change with regard to a thing, then the changing entity is produced. The *Svarūpa* of this entity is not different from it. Hence the production of a change meaning the production of the entity means the production of the *Svarūpa* itself'. This idea may be illustrated. Supposing a thing has a function, we have to admit that the function is produced. Function is the property of the functioning entity. The two may

be mentally distinguished. But in fact, they are identical. And we have to admit that it is the very nature of every case of identity to admit of distinct usages otherwise we cannot think of identity at all. Take for example the expression 'a case of identity'. In this expression every word signifies something with reference to the same case of identity and qualifies it. So whether we think that the change of a thing is produced or the changing entity itself is produced, all the same, we have, in fact, admitted that the whole circumstance is produced. To make a sharp distinction between change and changing entity is unwarranted. Such a distinction makes the so-called changing entity really changeless and to attribute change to it involves self-contradiction. Hence change and changing entity are identical. They are different expressions of the same identity. So to hold that the change of this thing is produced, or, that this thing having this change is produced is practically the same thing. It is only a matter of language. We make use of it according to our training. It may be asked, if the entity itself is produced along with the change, then what about our idea of an enduring entity? The answer is simple. Just as change is attributed to the thing, endurance is also attributed to it. To recognise it as enduring is to attribute a change to it. Hence endurance is as much a fact as change because both are equally given in experience.

So change and changing entity are the same and the production of the one means the production of the other. Further, the changing entity is distinguished from the rest of the Universe. This means that it has the characteristic or *Svarūpa* of its own. *Svarūpa* and the entity may be mentally distinguished from each other, but in fact, they are identical. Hence the production of change means the production of the changing entity and this means the production of *Svarūpa*. Thus change being universal production is universal.

### III

The foregoing considerations illustrate that of the three, *Svarūpa*, *Pramiti* and *Pravṛtti*, each implies the others. All these three are the cases of *Sattā*, being. Being as such is not superimposed (*mithyā*). The superimposition of being presupposes the same kind of being, for being cannot be superimposed on non-being. Nor is it sublated by any experience, because the fact of sublation itself posits some kind of being.



Further, to observe that being consists of these three aspects is to recognise that there is nothing else in the world of experience. These three stand for a thing. They are the expressions of change and they have therefore limitations of every sort. They exist at a point of space and at a point of time and limitation is their characteristic. They are therefore produced. The thing that is spatially, temporally and characteristically limited is not self-explanatory. It takes us beyond itself. It points to something that is unlimited as its cause. To hold that something limited is its cause does not solve the problem, as this something itself being limited requires an explanation. Hence ultimately something unlimited must be the cause of all. The force of this observation itself tells us that there could be no opposition between the limited and the unlimited. The two are distinct, because the former is a product and the latter is the cause. But they are not opposed to each other. One does not make the other impossible.

In concluding the discussion of this kind Tikācārya finally, observes in N.S. 335 “*Ataḥ Svatantra evāsau aṅgikaraṇīyaḥ. Sa eva ca Īśvaraḥ*”—‘Therefore this cause of all must be taken to be Unlimited and It alone is *Īśvara*’. By *Svatantra* as Unlimited Madhva means *anapekṣa Kartā* and *Kārayitā*. *Anapekṣa* means that which does not need the help of anything else. This word qualifies both *Kartā* and *Kārayitā*. The whole term stands for the idea that *Svatantra* does not need the help of anything else both in doing something and in making others do something. In this sense Madhva calls *Svatantra Sarvottama*. This word has a technical use. According to Madhva *Uttama* means Cause (*Kāraṇa*). *Sarvottama* means the cause of all. By its very nature this expression signifies *Svatantra* cause. At times Madhva uses the word *Eka* in order to signify *Svatantra*. According to him the word *Eka* does not merely mean number. Rāghavendra Thīrtha interprets it in the *Vivṛti* as “*E ekaḥ asahāya eva Kaḥ Kartā Kārayitācūtyekaḥ Sarvottamaḥ. . . Anya nirapekṣa Kartṛtvādimata eva Sarvottamatvāditī. Atra eka śabdaḥ Sarvottama parodhyeyaḥ*”—‘In the word *eka* there are two parts *E* and *Ka*. *E* means *Eka* and this means that which needs absolutely no assistance. *Kaḥ* means both one who does and one who makes others do. Thus the whole meaning of the word *Eka* is *Sarvottama*; for *Sarvottama* can only be one that does things absolutely without the assistance of other things. So in the present connection it must be understood that the word *Eka* means *Sarvottama*. With the same

interpretation Madhva accepts the validity of the Upaniṣads, "*Ekamevādvitīyam Brahma*"—"The cause that requires absolutely no assistance is *Sarvottama*' i.e., the cause of all and that is Brahman'. So *Sarvottama* means *Svatantra* and *Svatantra* means The Uncaused Cause of all.

## IV

Having arrived at the conception of *Svatantra* Madhva deduces certain important ideas which need a conscious recognition, if the conception were to have any value.

(1) If we have understood the truth of *Svatantra*, we must not bind it by the considerations which we ordinarily call moral. For our considerations moral or unmoral are so far not referred to *Svatantra*. They are therefore our own creation. And to bind *Svatantra* by these would be unphilosophical. The same is the defect of those positions which insist on defining the ultimate reality in terms of morality. But this should not be taken to mean that *Svatantra* is non-moral. Judging consistently with the foregoing considerations we have to admit that *Svatantra* is moral in the true or higher sense. For that which is consistent with the truth of *Svatantra* alone is moral. That is good which is an expression of *Svatantra* and that is evil which negates *Svatantra*. So Madhva concludes that it is wrong to consider that *Svatantra* creates things according to the *Karma* or *Adṛṣṭa* of the individuals. To give the help of *Karma* to *Svatantra* is to deny *Svatantra*. Not to give this help to It does not mean that Its creative activity is whimsical in an evil sense. If the so-called whimsical illustrates *Svatantra* then it is philosophically justified and it is therefore good (*guṇa*) but not evil (*doṣa*). Madhva says in Br. S. Bh. 2. 1. "*Īśo yato guṇa doṣādi satve*". "This passage explains how *Svatantra* is the maker of *guṇa* and *doṣa*. That It is the maker of *guṇa* and *doṣa* naturally means that that which is consistent with It is *guṇa* (moral) and that which is not is *doṣa* (immoral).

(2) Similarly, when once we have arrived at this conception, we must not judge it from the stand-point of our common ideas of laws. These ideas are our own creation and they do not bind *Svatantra*. We know that 7 plus 5 is equal to 12. This is of course, a scientific law. We may argue that because 7 plus 5 is 12, 5 plus 7 is 12 or 12 is equal to 7 plus 5. This is quite logical. But we cannot bind the power of *Svatantra* by these laws, i.e., we are not justified in thinking that even *Svatantra* must adjust itself to these laws. For these laws of Science or

Logic are as much facts of the universe as the other facts are. Though they appear to continue to be the same they are receiving continuous changes in so far as they are made use of in particular manners. They are therefore limited and they are items of the world of products. They therefore presuppose *Svatantra* as their author and they cannot bind their very source.

Further, we observe that the things that are produced have definite causes of their own. But this does not mean that *Svatantra* ceases to be the cause of them or, that its power is limited by them. For producing something is itself an expression of a change and this indicates that they are limited. The same idea can be applied to all those things that are said to be the world causes, such as matter (*Prakṛti*), Space, Time, etc. Though they are said to be causes they are products. They presuppose *Svatantra* as their author. Having all these ideas in view Madhva says in Anu. V. “*Sādhānānām Sādhanatvam yadātmādhīna miṣyate, tadā Sādhana sampattiḥ aiśvaryadyotikā bhavet*”—“The so-called causes, laws or principles have become causes, laws or principles because of *Svatantra*. For this reason their existence in the world points to the richness of *Svatantra*’s Creatorship. So the so-called causes, laws or principles that belong to the world are strictly speaking, no causes, laws or principles. For this reason Madhva calls them *dvāras*. This term signifies that they are just produced as causes, laws or principles when the particular products are produced. This idea may be illustrated. X is not the cause of Y when Y is not born. Nor is it the cause after Y is born. It is the cause of Y only as Y is being born. This signifies that along with Y the causeness of X is also produced. So production as it is explained now is not confined only to Y. It has a reference to the whole circumstance in question. And, in fact, it has a reference to the whole world, because change in a part means the change in the whole itself. Further, the existence of these *Dvāra* causes illustrates how the world of *Svatantra*’s creation is a system. This points to the all powerfulness (*Aśeṣa Śakti*) of *Svatantra*. The realisation of this aspect is to substantiate the conception of *Svatantra*.

(3) The all powerfulness or *Aśeṣa Śakti* consists in doing anything that *Svatantra* wills, undoing anything that is already done and changing anything into any other thing. Madhva calls this power *Kartum*, *Akartum*, *Anyathā kartum ca sāmārthya*. To negate any of these powers is to limit the power. It is, in fact, to deny the power itself. If after doing a thing *Svatantra* cannot

undo it, then the thing that is done marks the limit of *Svatantra* and with this limit *Svatantra* ceases to be *Svatantra*. In making use of this conception T.C. 379 “*Kīncākartum Anyathā Kartum Kartum cāstīśvarasya yat Sāmarthyam Tena tattantram anādyapi ca sādivat. Īśvarohi sarvatra apratihata Śaktitvāt..... Avyākṛtākāsādināpirahitam atītādikālam Kartum Śaknoti. Sankalpābhāvāttu tadakaraṇam. Tadabhāvaśca Kāryonneyaḥ Naca Saktiyabhāvādeva tadupapattiḥ. Svabhāva jīva karmāṇi ityādi tīkodāhṛta Śrutyādivirodhāt. Aīśvarya virodhācca Tathācānādiśvareccādhānū anādi svabhāvata kathamīśa tantratā-virodhinī*”—‘Further the power of not doing, doing otherwise and doing characterises *Svatantra*. From this follows that all things in the world are the creation of *Svatantra*. Some of the things of the world may seem to admit of no creation: For this reason they may be looked upon as *Anādi*, enduring. But if we understand the truth behind them they are not in essence different from those things that are readily observed to have origination. So, in so far as origination is concerned the so-called *Anādi* is as good as *Sādi*. This is proved by the fact that *Svatantra*’s power is in every sense and in every circumstance unopposed and unmodified. *This is the very significance of Svatantra!* (This passage intends to tell us that to hold that some part of the world is unoriginated is opposed to the *apratihata śakti* of *Īśvara*, *Svatantra*. From the same idea it follows that *Svatantra* can do the things which we consider to be impossible. For example, the things that are now passed existed in Space. This is a fact of experience. There is nothing more impossible than to make them spaceless. It is not possible even to think of this idea. (The past things existed in Space and they are gone now. It is impossible even to revive them. It is still less possible to make them spaceless. Even to think of this possibility is absurd). But *Svatantra*’s power is absolutely unopposed. It can make the past world spaceless. It may be asked why it has not made it spaceless. ‘Because it has not willed it’ is the only answer. (Any other answer would be to oppose Its *apratihataśakti*). How do you know that it has not willed it? The answer is this—that it has not willed it is inferred from the fact that we are still correct in thinking that the past world existed in space. Because we are correct in thinking that the past world existed in space, can we not infer that even *Svatantra* cannot make the past world spaceless? The answer is that it is impossible. This inference is sublated by many considerations that *Tīkācārya* has established including the position as expressed by *Śruti* that *Svabhāva*, *Jīva*, *Karma*, etc., are there

because of His will and they do not exist if He is indifferent to them. It is not merely this. The inference is also opposed to *aiśvarya*, *apratihata śakti*, *aśeśaśakti*, *Svātantrya* or all-powerfulness. The fact that something is *Anādi* and it forms the very essence of a thing is the work of the will of *Svatantra* which is in the true sense of the term *Anādi*. How can then the idea of *Anādi Svabhāva* be inconsistent with the truth that everything including *Anādi* is the work of *Svatantra*?

(4) A reflection on the idea that *Svatantra* can even make the past world spaceless indeed points to the truth that Its power is *acintya*, incomprehensible. *Āścarya*, *adbhuta*, etc., indicate the same idea. The recognition of *Svatantra* in this manner requires us to see in every work of Its the same *acintya* or *āścarya* power with its threefold aspect, doing, undoing and doing otherwise.

(5) In the light of the foregoing considerations every state that a thing comes to have is an expression of change and it indicates not only the production of the total circumstance but also the production of the fact that the thing in question is essentially identical with what is called itself at a previous time. For this reason everything becomes *nitya*, beginningless and endless in substance and *anitya*, having a beginning and end with regard to its state. *Tikācārya* says in N. S. "*Sarvam dravyarūpeṇa nityam, avasthābhedenā anityam*" The meaning of this passage is already explained. And in understanding this passage we must bear in mind that the substance and state or attribute are, in fact, identical but the nature of this identity is such that it enables us to think and talk of the thing as though it consists of different parts, substance, state etc. It must not be forgotten that even these ideas are the work of *Svatantra*.

(6) *Svatantra* thus signifies that it is the cause of all. It is, in fact, the whole cause of all. If this truth is really appreciated we can never hold that there is anything else as the cause of any entity. Because we make a sharp distinction between *anādi* and *sādi* things, we are led to think that the production of *sādi* is in some sense or other due to the *anādi*. We thus attribute some independent function to *anādi* forgetting at the same time the *apratihataśakti* of *Svatantra*.

But the truth is that the so called *anādi* is *anādi*, because of the incessant creative activity of *Svatantra*. Rāghavendra

Thīrtha says in Parimala 99—“*Sarvakāraṇa vākyānām Brahma-kāraṇatve virodhābhāva itivā Sṛṣṭi velāyām na sthitiḥ, sthitidaśāyām na sṛṣṭisamhārau samhṛtivelāyām na sṛṣṭyādi virodhāt. Kintu kālābhedenaiiva sṛṣṭyādīti Rāmānujādyuktadīśā nabhavati. Sraṣṭṛtvādayo guṇāḥ sadaivasanti Harau iti sraṣṭṛtvādi dharmānām sarvakālīnatvoktyā avirodhamitivārthaḥ*”—‘If we hold that all the statements of *Śruti* which describe the causes of the world really have in view only Brahman i.e., *Svatantra*, then there would be no contradiction between the statements. And in this case the statements do not support the different theories of the origin of the world. This is an idea presented by the *Sūdhā*. There is another idea presented in the same connection. The thinkers like Rāmānuja hold—‘At the time of production there is no maintenance. At the time of maintenance there are no production and destruction, at the time of destruction there are no production etc. For each is incompatible with the others. Hence we have to hold that of the three, production, maintenance and destruction each occurs one after the other.’—Their position is not correct. Hari is always characterised by the producing, maintaining and destroying activities. If we have this idea, namely, ‘Hari has always the activities, producing, etc., in mind, we do not see any contradiction in the *Śruti* teaching.’—In the light of these ideas we have to understand that *anādi* or *nitya* stands for an entity which is incessantly produced. The same author says in *Vivṛti* on the *Gītā* that a thing of the world, for example a *Jīva*, is called *Śāśvata*—always enduring, because of *atyaktapāratantrya*, incessant production by Hari.

(7) We have noted in connection with an inert thing (*jaḍa*) even to hold that it lies is to attribute a change to it. If so can we not think that to attribute incessant activity to *Svatantra* is to attribute incessant change to it? Does it not mean that the conception of *Svatantra* is impossible? Madhva answers this as “*Aśeṣaśakti yuktaścet Svātantriyāt doṣavān katham?*”—‘To recognise *aśeṣaśakti* (in the manner explained) is to understand the significance of *Svatantra*. If so how can things that negate *svātantrya* be attributed to *Svatantra*?’ What is meant is this. No doubt, to attribute anything to the entities of the world is to attribute change to them. But the same is not the case with regard to *Svatantra*. The truth of this statement is clear if we draw our attention to the circumstance in which we were bound to accept *Svatantra* as the cause of all. Thus *Svatantra* necessarily signifies that It is *nirdosa*, defectless.

(8) That *Svatantra* is the whole cause of everything in the world implies that it is the only source of all that is found in the thing. Madhva characterises *Svatantra* as "*Sarvabhūtaguṇaiḥ yuktam*"—"That in which all the *guṇas* of all creatures are found'. For this reason he calls *Svatantra* *Guṇapūrṇa*.

*Guṇapūrṇa* is an important conception because it brings out the full significance of Brahman. It does not merely mean the totality of all the *guṇas*; but it also means that each *guṇa* (property) is complete in itself. Being complete it is not essentially different from the other *guṇas*. Each *guṇa* is thus the creator of all. Each is thus by itself *Svatantra* full and complete. Madhva says in An V. "*Sarve Sarvagūṇātmānaḥ sarvakartāra eva*"—"All the *guṇas* are all the other *guṇas* and all are creators of all'. This is the conception of Brahman. This is the teaching of the *Śruti* "*Neha nānāstikiñcana*"—"There is absolutely no difference in Brahman'. This truth is proved by the truth of *Svatantra*. This is why the importance of the conception of *Svatantra* cannot be exaggerated in the teaching of Madhva.

(9) When once we have understood the truth of *Svatantra* and its significance in substantiating *guṇapūrṇatva*, philosophically or spiritually speaking, our first duty consists in interpreting all our experience to fix its limitation with reference to *Svatantra*. Failing in our duty simply means that what has been studied so far has only a verbal importance and we have not appreciated our own study. Our appreciation of the truth of *Svatantra* consists in recognising every aspect of our experience as *Paratantra* i.e., as being produced by *Svatantra*. Without the conscious recognition of the complete *Paratantra* character of the object of our experience, our knowledge becomes untrue. It is apprehending it as it is not. It is therefore a *tāmasa* case of knowledge in the language of the *Gīta*—"*Sarvārthān viparitamśca buddhiḥ sā pārtha tāmasī*"—So Madhva says in Anu. V. "*Svatantrasyāvirodhena yojayitvākhlāḥ pramāḥ. Siddheśatvena cāyuktamapi hiṣe na yojayet*" 'If *Svatantra* is really understood all items of experience must be interpreted consistently with the truth of *Svatantra*. It is only then there is '*Īśasiddhi*', the realisation of *Īśa* on the part of the individual. If once there is this realisation, that which is not consistent with *Svatantra* must not be attributed to it'.

One important question arises at this point. If *Svatantra* is really all doer and nothing is left to us where is the need for us

to do anything? And in fact, is not the conclusion that *Svatantra* is all doer itself wrong so long as we are able to do something?

The first question is illegitimate, because contrary to our own conclusion that there is no need for us to do anything, as everything is done by *Svatantra*, we are at least assuming for ourselves the need for questioning. The truth that *Svatantra*—is all doer being far from making us inactive makes us fully active, because it is only in our fullest activities that we can better realise the truth of *Svatantra*. *Svatantra* is necessarily *guṇapūrṇa*. Doing (*Karṣṭva*) and making others do (*Kārayiṣṭva*) of *Svatantra* are items of *Guṇa* and they are *pūrṇa*, Absolute and complete. This truth is to be realised as the source of *paratantra* world. The nearest *paratantra* in the case of a self is the self itself. This means that the truth of *karṣṭva* and *kārayiṣṭva* of *Svatantra* must be realised first in one's own self. Would this be possible in a self which is inactive? The more the self is active, the more it realises the truth of *Svatantra*. Hence the second question negates the very significance of the fact that we are active. Madhva says in *M.T.N.* "*Pratyakṣametad puruṣasya karma tenānumeyā prerāṇā Keśavasya*"—"That a self is active is actually observed. This proves that the whole circumstance of activity including the self is the work of Keśava". Madhva interprets *prerāṇā* as *svabhāva sattā dātṛva*—giving rise to very *svabhāva* of the whole circumstance. He notes further that this is the teaching of *Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad* "*Kurvanneveha karmāni jīviṣeṣet*"—"one ought to live fully doing *Karmas*", because "*Īśāvāsyamidam sarvam*"—"All this is because of the indwelling *Īśa*".

(9) To trace *Svabhāva* or the very essence of everything to *Svatantra*, according to Madhva, is in fact to recognise that there is nothing beyond *Svatantra*. He notes that the validity of *Śruti* consists only in establishing this truth when it says "*Puruṣamevedam sarvam*", "*Sarvam khalvidam Brahma*", etc. He interprets the first passage as "*Sarvam puruṣa eveti bhāṇyate bhedavajjagat tadadhīnantu sattādi yatohyasya sadā bhavet*"—"This world of multiplicity is said to be *puruṣa* itself, because the *Sattā* etc, of this is incessantly given by It. He interprets the second passage as "*Sarvam Brahmetyācakṣate tadadhīna sattāpratītitvāt*".—All this is said to be Brahman itself, because the very *svabhāva* and *prameyatva* of all this is given by It.

Madhva has in the whole course of his teaching steadily kept in view the final truth which he is never tired to emphasise.



His is the spirit which sees Brahman and Brahman only in everything which it comes across. He says in Bhg. T. 53, "*Sarvasattā pradatvāttu sarvaśattvām Hariḥ*". "Hari is determined to be all *sattva*, because He is the giver of *sattā* to all." In Bhg. T. 55, he says "*jīvasattā pradatvācca kathyate tadabhedena*"—"As Keśava is the Giver of *sattā* to *jīva*, He is said to be identical with it'. In Tai. Bh. 9, Madhva says "*Sarvam sarvapradatvāttu*" 'It (Brahman) is all, because it is the giver of all.' It may be noted that in this passage Madhva interprets what he means by *sattādāna*. To say that Brahman gives *sattā* to something and to say that It gives the thing to which *sattā* is given mean the same thing. In the words of Raghavendra Tirtha *sattālābha* is *ātmalābha* itself.

It may be noted that in the passages quoted now there is the use of the words *bhāṇyate*, *ācaksate*, *kathyate*, etc. They must not be taken in the popular sense. They do not mean that the thing in question is only said and it is not real. If they mean only this much, then all the reflection that is responsible for this conclusion would be meaningless. Madhva indicates by these expressions that the idea in question is philosophically justified by those that are competent to do it.

Having established that all is Brahman, Madhva further emphasises the pure transcendent character of Brahman. He says in Bhg. T. 21 "*Sattādi yatsvato Viṣṇoḥ tasmādanyaḥ sa sarvataḥ. Yatsattādiratonyasya nānyatvam bhedinopitu*"—"The *sattā* etc., of *Viṣṇu* are *Svatantra*. Therefore He transcends all. All else has *sattā*, etc., from Him. Hence though it is different from Him it is inseparable from Him.

(10) The truth of *Svatantra* is further carried on to prove various other ideas. In M. Bh. Madhva says "*Prabhavaḥ sarva-bhāvānām satāniti viniścayaḥ*." This is interpreted as—"The knowledge that Hari alone is the maker of the whole world consisting of spirit and matter occurs only to the good (the good here stands for *devas*, *Brahmā*, etc.). And from this it is concluded that this knowledge does not occur to the evil-minded'. What is meant here is profoundly different from the apparent meaning. What Madhva means is that those that can have this knowledge are good and those that refuse to have this are evil. This is the principle of Madhva's classification of souls as good, indifferent and evil—*Sāttvika*, *miśra* and *tāmasa*.

(11) Madhva notes that the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* says the final word when it says "*Ichhāmātram prabhosṛṣṭiḥ*"—"The creative

activity of Brahman which is changeless is mere *icchā*, will'. This implies that creation is nothing but '*līlā*' in the case of Brahman.

Madhva deduces from all this that Brahman, *Svatantra* is one complete Source of both good and evil in the world. He calls evil *dvaita* and it consists in not understanding that *Svatantra* is the ground of all. It is caused by Hari. Therefore it must be removed by him. For this reason Madhva calls Hari, *Svatantra*, *Advaita*. He says "*Tadadvaitam param Brahma tadeva jñātamanyathā, jīvena dvaitamuddiṣṭam mīthyā jñānam tadevaca*"—'Brahman which is the source of all is *Advaita*. If any person thinks that Brahman is not the source of all or that It is not the only source of the reality of all, then Brahman is wrongly understood by him. This wrong knowledge of a *jīva* is called *dvaita*. *Dvaita* means *Mithyājñāna*. This *Mithyājñāna* is caused by Brahman and it must therefore be removed by Brahman. "*Anyathā pratyayo dvaitam śamayettam yato Hariḥ, Advaitastenacoddiṣṭaḥ turīya puruṣottamaḥ*"—'Dvaita is wrong knowledge. As the remover of it Hari, the transcendent is called *Advaita*.

In illustrating the *Advaita* character of *Svatantra* Madhva observes certain important truths that no student of his philosophy can ignore. This is the process of his thought. (a) The world is real. It is actual. (b) The reality or the actuality of the world is given by *Svatantra*. (c) Therefore *Svatantra* alone is *paramārtha*, absolute. (d) From this it follows that the world does not exist as *paramārtha* i.e., in the absolute sense. He says in Bhg. T. 106 "*Svatantram paramārthākhyam svatantraikā-arermatiḥ...Pāramārthyena nāstyeva tadanyat tad vaśam yataḥ...anādyanantakāleṣu vidyamānamapi dhruvam, asvātantryāttu nāstyevetyevam vācyam jagat sadā*", etc.

(12) From these observations Madhva deduces the final truth of his philosophy. As *Svatantra* is the source of everything, given *Svatantra* the whole world is given. Negate *Svatantra*, the whole world is negated. Therefore Madhva says that *Svatantra* alone is real. But this conclusion is profoundly different from Śankara's final teaching. The truth that *Svatantra* alone is real signifies that everything else which is the work of *Svatantra* is real. It is real because of *Svatantra*. It is *nitya* because of *Svatantra*. Madhva notes "*Yaḥ satyarūpam jagadetadīdṛk sṛṣṭvātvabhūt satyakarmā mahātmā. Athainamāhuḥ satyakarmeti-satyam hyevedam viśvamasasṛjate. Athainamāhuḥ nityakarmeti nityam haivāsau kurute*" Br. S. Bh. 2. 1. 'Hence Madhva's

conception of the reality and the eternity of the world does not oppose his final teaching that *Svatantra* alone is real. In fact, It justifies this conclusion. In reality it is the only way how this conclusion can be justified. This conclusion is Upaniṣadic. "*Satyam jñānamanantam Brahma*" is the one Upaniṣadic conclusion and "*Ekamevādvītyambrahma*"—is the final justification of this conclusion. The whole Upaniṣadic teaching comes to have its true value when Madhva says in Bhg. T. 138. "*Tadicchāyāḥ satve etat sarvam asti, anyathānāstīyanvaya vyatirekau. Tadeva kevalam satyam iti sarvatra sambadhyate. Svātantryaṁeva satyatvam.*"

From this observation Madhva concludes that the real is one. It is *Paramātman*, *Svatantra*, *guṇapūrṇa* and *Brahman*. He says in Bhg. T. 3 "*Yasmāt paramātmaiva tattvam tasmātiameva paśyanti munayuh.*"—'Because *Paramātman* alone is real, the wise see Him only'. In this passage he tells us indeed that true wisdom, true spirituality consists in fixing our attention only on *Svatantra*.

To fix the attention on *Svatantra* is possible only with *Jijñāsā*, philosophical enquiry. The subject of philosophical enquiry consists of three aspects, revealed by the *pramāṇas*, *pratyakṣa anumāna* and *āgama*. As *Svatantra* is *guṇapūrṇa*, the enquiry that leads to the conception of it can never be final. The determination of an aspect of *Svatantra* which we have now must be the result of previous enquiry and it must form at the same time the basis of later enquiry. The process of enquiry is thus endless. Madhva tells us in T. S. "*Dhyānam nīcitātattvasya tasmāt śāstrāvamarsanam varam daśaguṇam tasmāt vyākhyāikasya śatottarā*"—'Meditation occurs to one who has understood the truth. But the study of philosophy (*Viṣṇu śāstra*) is ten times superior to meditation. Further, to teach philosophy even to one student is a hundred times superior to the study of philosophy. The teaching of philosophy must be continued even after the realisation of the highest truth, because the Absolute then is better expressed.' This statement implies how unconditioned is the importance he gives to reason. *Ṭikācārya* explains the spirit of Madhva in N. S. in connection with the conclusion of an important discussion as "*Iti upapatti siddhoyamarthaḥ Tathāpi āgāmāvaṣṭambhenu pratyavatiṣṭamāṇaḥ tathaiva bodhanīyaiti mantrau udāhṛtau*". In this context Madhva has purely philosophically justified a position. And in addition, in support of the same conclusion quotes a śruti text. But *Tikācārya* interprets Madhva's position consistently with his spirit as—"Thus the position in question is *upapattisiddha*, i.e., purely philosophically justified.

Yet one who wants the support of *āgama* must be taught in the same language. For this reason Madhva quotes *Śruti* text in addition'. In the presence of these ideas it is not impossible for us to see that for Madhva the study and teaching of philosophy are the best aspects of the spiritual discipline leading to liberation.

## V

This is in brief the whole teaching of Madhva. I may now consider certain misconceptions about his teaching.

(a) His teaching is popularly called *dvaita* and the term *dvaita* is translated as Dualism and then quite unconsciously of course, all the defects of Dualism are superimposed on his system even by the students of Indian Philosophy. Against this the following may be noted.

Madhva has never called his system *Dvaita*. In fact he means by *Dvaita* wrong knowledge, illusion, bondage, evil, the world of multiplicity, etc. Further, he calls Brahman *Advaita* and he says that this term brings out the *absolute* or *Svatantra* character of Brahman. There is of course the use of *dvaita vāda* and *advaita vāda* in certain texts: but these terms have in view only certain interpretations of some *Śruti* texts '*Tattvamasi*', etc.

Even supposing that his system may be called *Dvaita*, dualism is not the correct translation of this *Dvaita*. Dualism is a school of thought which explains the universe by assuming two independent and absolute principles. We have seen how this is far from Madhva. His teaching is in fact, a pure and unadulterated case of Monism, i.e., a philosophy which explains the universe from one single principle which is self-established and all explanatory, i.e., *Svatantra* and this has been already explained.

(b) If Madhva's teaching is Monism, then how is it different from Śaṅkara's *Advaita*?

The answer is simple. Just as Madhva's *Dvaita* is not Dualism Śaṅkara's *Advaita* is not Monism. Śaṅkara does not deduce the world from Brahman, because Brahman, according to him is *Nirguna*. Then how does the world appear may be a question. "The world comes from *Māyā* is his answer. But *Māyā* is *acit* and Brahman is *Cit*. Both are thus opposed to each other. Yet *Māyā* is said to be superimposed on Brahman. Thus Śaṅkara's thought ends in irreconcilable Dualism. But according to Madhva Brahman

and Brahman alone is the cause or ground of the whole world and as the ground of all Brahman is *Svatantra* and *Guṇapūrṇa*".

(c) If Madhva's position is Monism, then how is it possible to apply to his thought certain familiar or well-known definitions of Monism such as 'Monism is the philosophy that holds that there is only one reality' and so on. It is not possible to apply these definitions to Madhva because he holds that the world also is real.

The answer is this. Madhva's position is taken to be Monism having explained first what the term means in this connection. It is not necessary, nor is it possible to apply all possible and probable definitions of the same term. It may however be noted that this does not mean that a responsible definition of Monism cannot be applied to Madhva's thought. We may take for example the definition such as that Monism is the philosophy that holds that there is only one reality. If by reality is meant in this connection *Svatantra*, as Madhva would put it, then this definition can be safely applied to Madhva's thought because he holds that there is only one reality that is *Svatantra* and this we have already noted.

Further, there is no doubt that Madhva holds that the world is real. But we have seen in what sense he holds this position. He accepts this position to explain that *Svatantra* is really the basis of the world. And in fact, Monism does not require the unreality of the world; because if the world is unreal, then there would be no occasion to find out its source and further, to hold that the world is unreal is not to explain the problem about the origin of the appearance of the world.

(d) It may be asked further that if Madhva holds that the world is dependent and Brahman is Independent, then how is his position different from that of Rāmānuja?

The answer is this. Rāmānuja holds that the ground of the world is a *viśiṣṭa* entity consisting of subtle *cit* and subtle *acit* as attributes (*prakāra*) and Brahman as substance (*Prakāri*). But Madhva insists against Rāmānuja's position on the strict oneness of the first principle. If Brahman is said to be that principle, then there is no point in insisting on the *viśiṣṭa* character of the ground. And if Brahman is recognised to be the first principle, then the so-called subtle *cit* and subtle *acit* come down to the plane of the *Kārya* world. It is only with this clear understanding that

Madhva's term *Svatantra* can be applied to Brahman and *paratantra* to the world; and from this it follows that the reality of *Svatantra* is *Svatantra* and that of the world *paratantra* and this justifies the distinction of the two.

(e) It may be asked further that if there is distinction or *bheda* between *svatantra* and *paratantra*, then how can the position be called Monism?

In answer to this we must note the following. If *Svatantra* and *Paratantra* are identical both the conceptions lose all their significance. Each can be itself, because it is distinct from the other. A Monistic philosophy, as it traces everything to a single principle cannot ignore the distinction between the principle and the derived. A reference to Bradley would make the point clear. In his *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 486-487, he says "All is appearance, and no appearance nor any combination of these is the same as reality. This is half truth. We must at once turn to correct it by adding its counterpart. The Absolute is its appearance. That is the other half-truth. If you take appearances and assert barely that the Absolute is one of them or all the position is hopeless. Having first set these down as appearances you now proclaim them as the very opposite; for that which is identified with the Absolute is no appearance but is utter reality," and so on.

We shall now see how exactly the same is the position of Madhva. He says in Br. S. Bh. 2. 3. "*Yatobhedena tasyāyama-bhedenaca gīyate atahścāmsātvamuddiṣṭam bhedābhedau na mukhyataḥ*". As *jīva* is said to be both different from Brahman and identical with It *jīva* is taken to be *amśa* of Brahman. Hence it follows that neither *Bheda* nor *Abeda* is the whole truth. Consistently with this Tīkācārya says in N. S. 453. "*Jīva Brahmanoh bhedenaca abhedanaca vadantyaḥ śrutayaḥ tatvad vidyante. Yadi jīvaḥ Brahmanogataiva paṭāt atyantabhinna syāt tadā abhede Śrutayaḥ uparudhyeraṇ. Yadvā Brahmābhinnāḥ syāt tadā bheda Śrutayo bādhyeraṇ. Ato bhedābheda Śrutyan-yathānupapatyā jīvaḥ Brahmano amśaḥ angikāryaḥ ityeva sūtrārthaḥ iti*". "There are *Śrutis* which teach *bheda* between *jīva* and Brahman and there are other *Śrutis* which teach *Abheda* between the two. In view of both the *Śrutis* *jīva* is taken to be *amśa* or appearance of Brahman. If *jīva* is entirely different from Brahman even as a pot is different from a piece of cloth, then the *Śrutis* that teach *abheda* become invalid. And if *jīva* is identical

with Brahman then the *Śrutis* that teach *bheda* become meaningless. Hence with a view to justify the observations contained in both the *Śrutis jīva* must be taken to be an appearance of Brahman.

It may be noted now that just as the *bheda* accepted by Bradley does not affect his absolutism, Madhva's acceptance of *bheda* does not stand in the way of his establishing the highest and the best form of *Monism* in his conception of *Svatantra*. And in fact his acceptance of *bheda* gives a meaning to his Monistic truth. I submit that the popular conception that there is nothing but *bheda* in his teaching needs a correction.

Our determination that Madhva taught pure Monism does not end in saying that a merely theoretical curiosity is enough to understand the truth he taught. With a highly scientific spirit alone he can be understood. What he calls *jijñāsā* is thoroughly scientific estimation of all the facts of our experience which leads us to the correct conception of the Ultimate Reality which he calls *Svatantra*, Brahman. He says in Anu. V. "*Tasmāt śāstreṇa jijñāsyam asmadiyam guṇārnavam vāsudevākhyamadvandvam param Brahmākḥilottamaṁ*"—"For the reasons already stated the Absolute which forms the subject of my system namely the one principle of all which is called *Parabrahman*, which is secondless in the sense that there is nothing equal and nothing higher than Itself, which is also called *Vāsudeva* and which is *Guṇapūrṇa* is understood only through pure philosophy.'

#### ABBREVIATIONS

1. Anu. V.	..	..	Anuvyākhyāna by Madhva.
2. Ai. Bh.	..	..	Aitareya Bhāṣya by Madhva.
3. Br. S. Bh.	..	..	Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya by Madhva.
4. M. Bh.	..	..	Māṇḍūkya Bhāṣya by Madhva.
5. M. Bh. T.	..	..	Mahā Bhārata Tātparya Nirṇaya by Madhva.
6. N. S.	..	..	Nyāya Sudhā by Jayatīrtha.
7. T. C.	..	..	Tātparya Candrikā by Vyāsātīrtha.
8. T. Pr.	..	..	Tattva Prakāśikā by Jayatīrtha.
9. Tai. Bh.	..	..	Taittirīya Bhāṣya by Madhva.
10. T. S.	..	..	Tantra Sāra by Madhva.

# Freedom and Truth

(Presidential Address to the Logic and Metaphysics Section)

BY

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"Nirvana is not contingent on the truth that the world is eternal or on the truth that the world is not eternal"—*Gautama Buddha*.

"Meditation of the heart is understanding"—*Krishnamurti*.

Philosophers, however open-minded and receptive they may be to new ideas and new ways of thinking, invariably assume that the person who is addressing them should place before them a dialectical scheme, a theory of reality or some aspect of reality, an outlook on life, a system of morals or at least a clearly stated though not necessarily final conclusion regarding some object or some aspect of experience. The mind, they believe, if it thinks purposively, must move to a conclusion and this conclusion must be supported by arguments whose worth it is the business of the philosopher in his professional capacity to determine. Thinking is a process directed towards an object distinct from it, concerning which it is the intention of the thinker to reach certain definite conclusions. This is undoubtedly true of scientific thinking and it is assumed that all thinking conforms to this type and since science deals with isolated or loosely related portions of reality there must be a process of thinking which covers the whole of reality, not taken piece-meal but somehow as a single object of thought. Thus metaphysicians arise and with metaphysicians, divergent and eternally warring schools of metaphysics, since metaphysical propositions can neither be formally deduced from self-evident premisses nor confirmed or rejected by an appeal to experience of any kind. However much the metaphysical method may be said to differ from the scientific method it shares with the latter the characteristic that it is directed upon an object whose nature it attempts to reveal in a series of propositions brought together in a coherent system. Metaphysics, as much as science is a form of propositional thinking, by which I mean thinking in which some conclusion is arrived at and put up for general



acceptance. Metaphysical thinking however claims a freedom, a comprehensiveness and a finality which it denies to the sciences, since in some way it sits in judgment on them. Sciences rest on presuppositions which they do not question, with the result that scientific thinking is necessarily restricted and incomplete. The freedom of metaphysics is hampered by no such halting assumptions. It presupposes nothing with the result that it is exalted above all sciences by being described as a science of ultimate reality or Truth with a capital T. And since the light of Metaphysics penetrates to the heart of reality through the enveloping darkness, it not only gives us true and unconditioned knowledge, but also tells us how in the light of this knowledge we should shape our actions and model our lives. Knowledge of Reality alone gives us a comprehensive outlook on life, a pattern of living in which our impulses and desires are systematically ranged in a scale or hierarchy of values. An ethical system is but a corollary of a metaphysical system and though a philosophy of life is possible without a philosophy of Reality it is the latter alone which makes the former coherent and ultimately satisfying.

This is what the metaphysicians in all good faith think about their science. And hence if anyone talks to them about those things which they believe fall within their province he is hailed as a fellow metaphysician and is expected to expound his particular philosophical *credo* or outlook on life. If such a person prefaces his remarks with the statement that he is neither expounding nor groping towards a philosophical *credo*, that any such *credo* is really a hindrance rather than a help to a proper understanding of life his remarks are either swept aside as beneath contempt, or are twisted out of their original significance and endowed with a metaphysical subtlety amounting almost to mysticism, which, without adding in any way to their sense, makes them once again metaphysically respectable. Such I believe was the sad fate that met the words of Gautama Buddha. They were intended to awaken the minds of his listeners to the illusoriness of building systems of permanence in a world of eternal flux, especially a system of speculative truths about a permanent reality transcending all phenomena; but the darkness within was too great for the Light without, which passing through layer after layer of prejudice and preconception, became dim, flickered and finally died. Thus Nirvana, which to the teacher was a living reality and an ecstasy, was turned by his disciples into a sterile and joyless metaphysical concept.

And this perversion to my mind is inevitable so long as the illusion persists that there is an absolute or unconditional Truth or body of truths which the mind discovers by a dialectical process and in which it finally comes to rest—a supreme Truth which shapes our outlook on life and from which issue guiding principles which determine the moral choice we must make in the practical conduct of life. In a conviction, however well reasoned, concerning an unknown reality, in the hypothetical light of which our moral life is oriented, there is neither the depth of true understanding nor the intensity of purposive living. It matters little whether the pattern of living is fixed for us by tradition, religious or social, or woven by our subtle brains out of the materials supplied by the fragments of our experience, for in either case the pattern of living conditions and limits life and turns its movements into well defined grooves where it loses its spontaneity in a series of fixed and mechanical reactions to its environment. But theorising is an inveterate habit of the human mind and the theorising mind has been enabled by long practice to take everything in its stride, including just or even harsh strictures against itself, and with the invention of such terms as Anti-Intellectualism and Anti-nomianism, or to mention a Sanskrit term, *Aparokshanubhuti*, it believes it has effected a happy reconciliation between the claim of revelation transcending reason and its own ineluctable resolve to listen to nothing which does not have the form of reason. It turns into a Truth, albeit of a higher or mystical order, the findings of an experience which transcends the level of consciousness where truth and error are significant concepts. Metaphysics is in the blood stream of man. By training and upbringing he is led to evolve a belief or to accept in good faith the belief of another in some ultimate form of existence. Attempts have been made to ridicule and also to eliminate metaphysics, as by those who call themselves Logical Positivists, but these attempts are symptoms of the same disease, merely instances of unconscious and even bad metaphysics. For so long as the mind's quest for certainty or an ultimate Truth continues, whether it is confined to the limits of sense-experience or ventures beyond it, the mind is in the grip of a metaphysical fever, a deep rooted illusion or Maya, and it can no more theorize its way out of this illusion than can a dreamer shake off his dream by dreaming that he is awake.

There is, however, paradoxically, another school of deep-dyed, metaphysically-minded philosophers, who, far from branding my remarks as heretical, would on the strength of them welcome me

in their fold as an upholder of the true doctrine. These subtle philosophers who must be credited with the remarkable performance of standing on the very ground which they have cut under their feet are the sturdy Vedantins of the Advaita school in whose company I was privileged to move for a number of years and whose remarkable feat I had myself modestly performed in a thesis to the satisfaction of more than one eminent philosopher in this country. I now believe that the Advaita Vedanta is an attempt to reproduce at the level of discursive thought the structure of an integral experience which transcends this form of thought. The reproduction or translation of this experience in terms of abstract concepts is an utter impossibility. But to the metaphysician such translation is both possible and necessary. He argues that though the experience of the real is not the culminating point of a dialectical process, such an experience has to be presented and made intelligible and it can only be metaphysically respectable if its nakedness is covered in a metaphysical garb; and in evolving a well rounded system of ideas he slips into the comfortable illusion that he has made intelligible to himself something that cannot be grasped by the categories of his limited intelligence. He insists that there is an intellectual approach to reality while admitting graciously that it is not the only or even the highest approach. But he cannot see that all approach to an object implies to some extent familiarity with that object while the experience of reality is so unique that there can be no "approach" to it, intellectual or any other. The metaphysical point of view is the light within Maya which is darkness. It is not even a pale reflection of that self-luminous reality beyond the folds of darkness. It is perhaps the subtlest process of Maya that it produces in the limited and conditioned mind a theory of the unconditioned and a conviction of its own essential freedom. Those to whom Maya is a metaphysical idea do not realize that Mayavada is itself a creature of Maya, and more firmly the theory is held the deeper is the hold which Maya has over the person who holds the theory. There is no Mayavada; there is only Maya.

The title of my address is Freedom and Truth, but this freedom or Moksha about which I would now like to talk to you is not an abstract concept to be argued about though philosophers under the stress of Maya have argued about it; it is an ever-present reality, which can only be understood as a living experience. But if freedom is not a concept it is equally not an

achievement of any kind, for all achievement or endeavour to become implies the worship of an ideal which *qua* ideal is after all an empty concept, a conscious or unconscious piece of metaphysics, adherence to which destroys the freedom of the mind. Freedom then is not a condition of the mind or any form of adjustment of the inner life to outward conditions which we can bring about under the guidance of a concept. It is the perception of the illusoriness of attachment to a concept and all that such attachment implies. There can be no conscious or deliberately planned quest for freedom, for to seek freedom is to turn it into a concept and thus to deny it. Freedom is a rich and ever-present experience or a reality to which the mind becomes alive when through an intelligent awareness it spontaneously abandons the quest for Truth, for moral perfection or for any of the so-called lower forms of satisfaction. To a free mind it matters not at all whether a given proposition is proved true or false, however powerfully charged with emotion its acceptance or denial may be to other minds. It is indifferent to arguments that set out to prove and counter-arguments that set out to disprove the existence of God, the immortality of the soul and even the freedom of the will. Not because it can establish the truth or falsity of these concepts independently of argument but because these are concepts and an intelligent detachment from concepts makes their truth or falsehood matters of no concern. Buddha did not encourage metaphysical curiosity among those who gathered round him. And the reason to my mind is not that he was merely indifferent or that like Socrates he was absorbed in the moral rather than the metaphysical problem or even that he professed Agnosticism. Buddha I believe perceived that the pursuit of morality either in theory or practice led the mind not to a genuine and vital experience but merely into a groove, where it ceased to be "a lamp unto itself," while agnosticism was but thinly disguised metaphysics confessing its own partial failure. What Buddha's real intention was will perhaps never be known and will remain the subject of scholarly disputes which need not interest us. My reference to Buddha and the Upanishads was casual and not intended to gain support for my statements from sources universally respected, for one's own experience of life cannot be genuine till one ceases to depend on the experience of another. I have used too the Sanskrit term *Maya*, but without the associations it carries among philosophical circles. I have used it not as a metaphysical concept but as a name for those illusions and obstructions in the mind which hold it in bondage to changing

circumstances, which create all the conflict and chaos in our unhappy fitful and fevered existence. Maya creates in the mind the subtlest of all illusions that in formulating and preaching a theory of illusion it has in some way outflanked and triumphed over the action of Maya, or at any rate taken a decisive step towards its final emancipation. The dialectical path does not lead to reality, for reality, as has been said, is a pathless land. All paths, all approaches, all activities that are conditioned by an ideal are necessarily incomplete and result at best in a certain heightening of consciousness, as in the case of art, but not in a deep and lasting comprehension of things in which the movement of the mind is not the transient effect of a passing stimulus but is spontaneous and self-contained. The mind's ways of thinking are determined by its past history. With countless million years of the evolutionary process behind it the unawakened mind becomes a natural victim of the evolutionary urge, the clan vital or Nisus which ever presses upwards towards higher and more complicated forms of existence. The emergence of the human mind, conscious of its limitations, conscious too of values and of the conflict between the ideal and the actual is looked upon both as a result of the evolutionary process and an instrument for determining the next step in the upward march. But the evolutionary process terminates in the mind of man, which is its finest achievement, and is also its last. There is no seed of divinity still germinating in the womb of time, for the evolutionary urge is but an aspect of Maya, and awakened mind, passing beyond its influence, does not press forward to a new adjustment but returns to itself in complete self-recollectedness. The growing complexities of evolution are destroyed. There is a hint of this freedom from the tyranny of progress, and the illusion of achievement, in the creative moments of art, in the aesthetic enjoyment of a sunset splendour, for from a biological point of view, Art, as Roger Fry says, is blasphemy. But even in aesthetic delight the mind's nîsus is still present though temporarily appeased, for the mind's action is still dependent on a stimulus and is not self-sustained. Besides art is an abstraction and therefore in the last resort it is a means not only of enriching life but also of escaping from it. In a deep comprehension of the futility of both achievement and escape the mind truly loses its Nisus and comes into its own.

Maya I have said is attachment to an idea. The idea need not necessarily be an intellectual image of ultimate reality. It may reflect any part of our universe but if it is held and asserted

by the mind aggressively or in a spirit of partisanship, then the mind hardens and grows cold, it becomes destitute of the charity without which "though we speak with the tongues of angels our words are as sounding brass or tinkling cymbal". A mind frozen with theories cannot feel the warmth of life nor follow its swift movement. The attempt to give an intellectual description of ultimate reality is however in a different case. In the case of an ordinary idea the illusion consists not in the content of the idea but in the manner of holding it; but a concept of the absolute, whether the absolute is pictured as one or many as temporal or eternal, is in itself a frozen concept, for in it the mind necessarily takes shelter, regarding it as a final refuge and is thus once again cut off from the movement of life. It does not illumine the conflicts and the sufferings of life but at best affords to the mind a consolation and a form of vicarious satisfaction in the thought of a reality in which evil and imperfection are somehow absorbed and converted into elements of its own perfection. The metaphysician to my mind is like a man who standing on the bank of a flowing stream scoops out a little water in his hands in order that he might better understand the nature of the flow. Reality likewise ceases to live when imprisoned in a metaphysical system.

There is as I have said no freedom, no awakening from Maya, in the subtleties of Mayavada, no light, but only a greater darkness. Nor is there awakening in mystical trances or in states of consciousness induced by religious fervour or by any form of Yogic discipline. There is awakening when the mind begins to question, not intellectually, nor through a process of self-analysis, which can be a form of self-deception, but intelligently, in a moment of complete alertness, the worth of its fevered attachments and its insensate longings. This awakening is an integral awareness of the entire hierarchy of human values ranging from the lowest physical gratification to the highest spiritual exaltation, and of the futility of these processes of evaluation whether they be of material or so-called spiritual values. To understand this requires a tremendous and totally unbiased effort of the mind for it will be the easiest thing for a trained metaphysician at this point to chase off after a metaphysical theory of value. This reaction only betrays a mind dyed with the value consciousness and therefore a mind that is not clear, not intelligently alert. In this integral awareness the mind is not sporting with theories and explanations, nor formulating judgments of value. Both theorizing and evaluating

imply an ideal which is after all a rigid concept in which the mind becomes imprisoned. But there is a fundamental movement of the mind which is both an awareness of and freedom from its prison of concepts. Such a movement of the mind therefore cannot be arrested in a theory of value or in any explanation of life's experiences. The mind, in the process of liberation is a kind of detached though not indifferent, witness or *Sakshi* of its many subtle but vain efforts to find stability, certainty and security in this whirlwind of flux which is our world, to build walls around itself behind which it may shelter from the storm without, thus creating and sustaining an illusory idea of a 'self' seeking fulfilment in or salvation from the not-self which stands in opposition to it. But paradoxically the more tenaciously we cling on to what we consider to be ourselves the more estranged we become from ourselves. "He that loseth himself shall find himself". But this experience of losing oneself is neither negation nor salvation, in the sense of absorption in some higher self. It is not an ascetic denial or the will to control, for self-denial is but attachment to the idea of a hypothetical desireless self in which there is no more reality than in the self of desire; and while absorption in a higher self through the ideal of service implies a certain expansion and elevation of the self, the illusory attachment to the idea of a self still remains. This self is built up as an attempt to counter life with a bundle of *samskaras*, a set of defensive reactions organized into a world and in this the mind takes refuge because it is afraid that it will lose itself unless its identity were preserved in this organized world of *samskaras* which creates the illusory consciousness of a self, ever evolving, ever fulfilling itself and destined to move along with other selves to some far off divine event in which it will finally be perfected. This is once again the biological principle of Nisus converted into metaphysical concept, whose illusoriness is perceived directly in the *Sakshi* consciousness. The self is thus a refuge into which the mind escapes, a cave, to borrow a well-known image, unilluminated by the light without.

The Tabernacle is the self, the incoherent or systematically organized world of values to which we cling, but this deliverance however is the object of no quest for it is always with us, "closer than hands and feet, closer even than breathing"; it is the self-luminous light of our being which shines when the mind meets life fully, without preparation, without a background and ceases to react defensively to its changing manifestations. Freedom is

thus the pure action of mind or awareness not congealed in a set of beliefs. But so deeply is the mind steeped in the mists of its dreams that it will sooner seek consolation and satisfaction in concepts than find ecstasy in a freedom which in its fulness needs neither consolation nor satisfaction. It is like the man who to save himself from injuries clings on all the more firmly to a rope that is dragging him along the ground. But if there is a genuine desire to understand, the mind, in a moment when it is completely alert and completely alone, not attempting to escape, will look within itself and find out what it is that it regards as precious, as sacred and to which it clings as if it were the very rock of salvation; and having found it, it will give it up, not with an effort, but joyously, because its contemplation, its own awakening will be so immeasurably rich that it will have no desire for salvation, there being nothing that it will want to save.

This experience which I may describe as becoming alive to reality is unique; there is no analogy for it in our limited, value-ridden consciousness. Hence the ease with which the mind that is not alert falls into the comfortable illusion that by merely altering the pattern of life or substituting one belief or faith for another it has entered the sanctuary of reality, whereas it is merely caught up in the worship of an abstract formula. There is no external test for determining whether our experience is genuine or merely the limitation of a pattern and the very demand for such a test shows that the mind is not thinking but is trying to create that experience for itself by following a prescribed formula thus turning reality into a concept and an illusion. But though there are no aids or hints to a deep understanding of life, the mind that is truly awake will find in its depths an overflowing and yet serene joy which is not evoked by any circumstance, but which is simply there like the perfume of a flower. This serene perception lifts the mind beyond all partisanship filling it with a deep interest, devoid of curiosity, in all men and all things. And being completely invulnerable to what are regarded as life's most outrageous fortunes it seeks no refuge from them, and having nothing to receive from or lose to another, it does not corrupt its relationships with other minds by a spirit of exploitation, which breeds varying degrees of attachment or fear and prevents the opening of the mind in compassion and love. Finally the mind in true contemplation does not show emotional preference, or harden into a conviction or belief or move towards any conclusion, for its own movement and awareness and love are its own eternity.



You may ask, if the mind's contemplation of and freedom from its illusions is not a dialectical process leading to a conclusion and if the mind so awakened transcends the level even of the truth-seeking consciousness, how is it possible even to speak of this awakening, of this reality beyond the reach of concepts? For to do so is to break out into a judgment or series of judgments open to rational investigation and to hold up as the Truth a particular view about the nature of the real. This is a misunderstanding, but I shall not attempt to argue you out of it, for to me, in a perception based on argument, the mind cannot awake to reality. I can only ask you to make the effort to understand these things deeply and not superficially through the mere intellect. Whether the process of thinking is one that liberates the mind or one that holds it in the bondage of a belief cannot be determined by the form of words in which the mind's experience is narrated. All language is rational, but all thinking is not propositional. My thought would be congealed in a set of propositions if the purpose of my talking to you were to produce a conviction in your minds, to make you accept a point of view, or to sway your minds into the channel of a specific intellectual or emotional response to life. But as I have said the mind that is awakened is completely invulnerable and has no interest in defending itself or any statement it makes about the illusions that corrupt its action and its relationship. It does not ask for a recognition of the genuineness of its experience and is unaffected by an adverse judgment, not because it is secure in its own unshakeable faith, but because its experience is rich and free precisely in this that it perceives, without argument, the futility of seeking security in a faith or belief. Not being the development of an argument, its statements do not invite agreement or in intention provoke disagreement, all possible disagreement and even agreement for that matter being on one side alone, indicating that the disagreeing or agreeing mind is held in the bondage of its own beliefs.

And all this is not asserted as some form of Truth about the mind or reality. A living experience lapses into a truth-claim only when it is preached and converts are sought to it. The free mind has no missionary zeal, while the votary of the religion of Truth is eager to make converts and hardens his heart against those who will not consent to enter the walls of his prison-house. The missionary spirit does not die out through indifference but through fulness of love. In fact the meaning of love that is not mere attachment cannot be understood by the mind that worships a truth, however wide and tolerant, because this truth

conditions his mind and acts as a subtle barrier between himself and his fellow-men. There is no universal brotherhood in the hearts of those who belong to a Society for the bringing into being of universal brotherhood, for to them it will ever remain a pious formula and not become a living experience. Their very allegiance to a cause limits the free movement of their minds and defeats their purpose of bringing all men to the recognition of a common cause. They meet life with a resistance and thus provoke resistance in the minds of others. And when the mind's action is corrupted its love cannot be pure or lasting. In the absence of a spontaneous movement the mind needs to be stimulated into action by the driving force of beliefs and these beliefs are in turn kept alive by complicated ceremonies and mystical symbolism and the lure of spiritual hierarchies. But people who live in the sun have no need to light fires. In the complicated artifice of beliefs and ceremonies love, which rejoices in simplicity, can find no abode.

In Freedom there is only comprehension and no reaction, either positively in attachment or negatively in recoil. Though its action liberates it from the value consciousness it does not lead to a denial of values. To condemn a pattern of life is as unintelligent as to accept it as an ideal, for the mind condemns only when it is evaluating in terms of an ideal to which it becomes attached, so that all condemnation is really self-condemnation. Affirmation and denial are both an evidence of a partisan mind which creates and is in turn sustained by the conflict of opposites, but the *Sakshi* consciousness is beyond all pairs of opposites.

As I said before it is not my intention to bury metaphysics. The search for ultimate truth is to my mind an illusion, but this illusion cannot be dispelled by the merely negative act of refraining from or suppressing metaphysics, which is what condemnation of metaphysics would imply. The illusion is dispelled by an intelligent perception in which the habit of speculation is not checked or curbed but joyously outgrown.

In what way then is it even possible to talk about reality without covering it with the cobwebs of our theories or deriving from its contemplation an ideal pattern which serves as the motive force for moral exhortation? Language however has many functions and a deep comprehension of life is not necessarily a dumb ecstasy. The language of the *Jivan-mukta* is neither metaphysics nor science, neither rhetoric nor poetry. Its primary function is not to impart information or to instruct,

to move or to delight, though I am tempted to add, this does not make the jivan-mukta either a mystic or a modernist poet, between whom there does not appear to be very much difference, except that the mystic's utterances can occasionally be understood. The highest function of language is not merely to delight, for even in the deepest satisfactions of art there is merely an appeasement of *nissus* while freedom speaks with a voice in which the urge of *nissus* is absent and therefore its words come as a kind of revelation, a revelation not to be believed in or lived up to but to be heard, contemplated and understood. Their function is not to instruct or to delight but to awaken, not by luring the mind of the listener with a word picture of reality nor by prescribing a moral code or a form of discipline, but by pointing out how the mind needlessly burdens its self with attachments and prejudices and the fear of dissolution, thus creating the illusion of a self resulting in the inanities of self-aggrandisement and the cruelties of exploitation. The jivan-mukta speaks in words that carry their usual significance, but his words are in reality a kind of *mantra* that has a power to heal the mind and to make it whole. The awakening comes about by the action of his mind on the mind that is in some way alive to the pain in the heart of things and the poverty of its own experiences, though at what point and in what manner the awakening comes can never be determined. "Come, let us reason together" said the Lord of Israel. But it is not through a process of mere reasoning that the mind begins to feel the weight of its illusions. While reasoning together something is touched off, and some door in the mind is opened through which the light streams in as if a dreamer were suddenly to realize the unsubstantial stuff of his dreams; and from that point the awakening mind puts away the quest for truth and the consolations of philosophy. Paradoxically, the jivan-mukta's purpose is achieved when the person he is addressing realizes that there is nothing he can learn or gain from the experience of another. So long as he is merely accepting or rejecting what he hears there is no understanding, but only a mental resistance of prejudice and preconception. Imagine that a dreamer's attention is drawn in some manner to the unsubstantial pageant of his dreams. If he disagrees with you he will prolong the period of his dream, but the unsubstantial pageant will not fade through mere agreement, there will be merely a fresh orientation on the part of the dreamer and a subtle transition to a new pattern of dream imagery. This complicates his dream by adding to it the dream

that he is awake. And so through theories, through religious and social loyalties, through high endeavour and exaltation we dream that we are liberating our minds. In a deep and serene comprehension of all values which is not itself a process of evaluating, the spell of dream is broken and we arise joyous and liberated, even from the dream of liberation.

Freedom then is not a forsaking of the world. The *jivan-mukta* enters into the heart of all things, but his perception and his love remain undefiled by the dust of passion and partisanship. Having no mental treasure to guard or to cherish, his mind is not encircled by a wall of defensive reactions and the action of his mind is not prompted by fear. He meets every human situation fully without the desire for exploitation, and so spontaneously, without the compulsion of any imperative, treats humanity whether in his own person or in that of another always as an end and never as a means. He does not scoff at man's desire to evolve a form of society from which superstition, violence, greed and all forms of economic maladjustments are for ever banished, but as his rich perception transcends the scheme of values these values have for him a totally new and vital significance which is missed by the value-conditioned mind. He brings to human problems a dispassionate earnestness and complete sanity, because his vision comprehends both the distractions of time and the deep purposive movement of eternity. His awareness of all things is *sub specie aeternitatis*, but his eternity is not a static concept. It is an ever active experience of unimpeded contact with life. In him alone political greatness and wisdom can meet for, if I may borrow further from the same passage, so long as the mind continues to remain entangled in its own theories and explanations it will not rest from its evils nor perceive the light of day.

Throughout my talk I have used no argument, no persuasion on behalf of a truth or a cause, no invitation to dialectic, which is the recognized instrument of all philosophy. As trained philosophers then you have a right to brush aside all that I have said as containing nothing but heresy and confusion, but if on the other hand this heresy has had the effect of throwing a single mind into confusion, I would conclude by saying:—Do not reason your way back from this confusion into a state of philosophical complacency, but become alive to it, *witness* it with the whole mind, for if in this moment of deep confusion and anarchy the mind does not escape into a shelter there will emerge a deep comprehension of life.

# Public Opinion

## *A Psychological Analysis*

*(Presidential Address to the Psychology Section)*

By

PROF. S. N. ROY

I am extremely grateful to the Executive Committee of the Philosophical Congress for the honour they have done me by electing me as President of the Psychology Section. A Sectional President finds it to be a part of his duty to deliver an address on his own subject, but he feels some difficulty in choosing a subject of discourse. As I was wondering as to the topic on which I might speak, I found that at the present day much importance is attached to Public Opinion and thought that a psychological analysis of Public Opinion would be of some interest and value, and hence I have chosen this subject for my address.

In this war-racked world we have been listening to the incessant talks on armaments, land, sea, and air forces, and the supreme efforts for the mass production of huge and formidable war machinery. In the armageddon the contending nations have been making huge sacrifices of men and money, and all sorts of necessities as well as comforts of life for the attainment of victory. Each nation functions as a single organised whole, perfectly united in its aim, ambition and activities. The more the solidarity the better are the chances for victory. That is why each nation adopts well devised methods for acquainting the public with the war purpose and enlisting sympathy of its citizens in the successful prosecution of the war. One of the methods adopted is the effective use of propaganda by which a spirit of confidence is created and maintained in the body politic and attempts are made to drive in a wedge in the public opinion of the enemy country so that war efforts of the enemy may be slackened and confusion, dismay and hostile reaction may ensure to paralyse the enemy and its activities. In my article on the psychology of propaganda, which has been published, I have endeavoured to show that propaganda is the means of

creating make-believes to which individual men and groups react readily because most of us are extremely reluctant to come into close contact with actual reality. We do so because we are so trained from the very start of our life that we get accustomed to see things, not as they are, but from a certain angle of vision. A whole group of images and ideas, social, political and religious, circle round our experiences of the external world and they colour and modify our perceptions of things and events in the environment. The successful propagandist is one who has an intimate knowledge of the pre-conceived notions and prejudices and the cultural background of the society among the members of which he wishes to see his propaganda take root.

Propaganda then is one of the powerful weapons which are put into use in a war. The task of the propagandist can be said to be fulfilled when he is able to influence public opinion in favour of certain views which he wants the people to accept. Thus public opinion is a sort of plastic material which the statesman of a country intends to mould into shapes fashioned and controlled by him in his own interests. If a State is desperately autocratic it may function in complete disregard of the opinion of the public which it governs, but in modern times practically the ruler of every country knows that he will have very little chance of success in any sphere of administration if he ignores the public for whom the administration exists. The Fascist Dictator, no doubt, wields all power in the State and in times of war seems to behave against the wishes of the public, but in reality he is compelled to rally round him the public opinion of the country by threats or by force, and as soon as his power wanes, revolution breaks out.

I think I need not dilate upon the importance of public opinion in a modern State. Any country that involves itself in war without the consent of its citizens cannot hope to succeed in the long run because public opinion, if it is against war, will act not only as an obstacle but as a formidable force which saps the energy and undermines the order of any organisation for the prosecution of the war. In Political science the value of public opinion has been fully recognised especially in a popular government and attempts have been made to define its nature, growth and functions. I shall take liberty to speak for a while on the political significance of public opinion. Two questions have to be mooted before anything can be said as to the nature of public

opinion. What is opinion and when can it be said to be public? It has been said that a conviction formed in accordance with a system of beliefs present in the mind is called opinion. An opinion then differs from mere desire or wish because it involves a judgment of facts from a certain standpoint. An opinion becomes public when it is held by a community of people who have at least that amount of education which enables them to understand the common interests which form the foundation of that opinion. A subject in which a particular individual is interested and not a whole community, can hardly be the ground for the formation of a public opinion. The personal views of Mahatma Gandhi about his relationship to the Creator of the world cannot form the subject matter of a public opinion for they are his own and do not affect the interests of others. But his principle of non-violence as a political creed evokes a public opinion for it can be accepted only by those who realise that their interests will be fulfilled by an adherence to that principle, and it will be rejected by those who consider that principle detrimental to their interests.

It is generally believed that public opinion means the opinion of the majority of the people of a country, but this idea is wrong because an opinion held by a minority is a public opinion as much as that which is held by a majority. If 55 p.c. of the Muslims support the scheme of Pakistan and 45 p.c. be opposed to it, the view of the minority cannot be ignored on the ground that it does not reflect public opinion. A minority opinion has as much a claim upon public administration as the majority has, but it will be the duty of the majority to convert the minority to its own opinion either by force or by persuasion. If it is done by force the administration becomes tyrannical, and therefore an administration to have the sanction of public opinion must be able to convert the minority to the opinion of the majority by persuasion.

From what we have said it appears that a public opinion need not necessarily be the opinion of the majority. Does it then indicate that public opinion is the sum total of the views of a community with regard to a subject of common interest? There can be no such summation of views because the views are generally conflicting in nature and there can hardly be what is called perfect unanimity. So long as there is cleavage of race, religion or politics differences in public opinion must exist,

and therefore we cannot imagine the existence of a perfectly unanimous opinion in the presence of racial or other differences.\* What is important for the formation of public opinion is that the members of a community must be able to realise the common ends or aims of administration and the means adopted for their realization. The more the consciousness of a common end to be achieved the greater will be the strength of the public opinion, and this fact accounts for growing or progressive public opinion.

It must be observed further that there can be one public opinion with respect to one section of a community and another with regard to another section. For example, among the Hindus there is one opinion on the matters of temple entry with regard to caste Hindus and quite another with regard to the untouchables. Again, there can be division of public opinion with regard to different objectives or methods to be adopted for the attainment of such objectives. For example, the Indian opinion seems to be undivided with regard to the attainment of political independence, but so far as the methods to be adopted for reaching that goal are concerned the Indian opinion is divided. The Congressites hold one opinion, the Muslim Leaguers quite another. Such differences in public opinion must remain so long as racial or cultural differences exist in the body politic.

It may be held that differences in public opinion are not so much due to cultural differences as to the selfish interests of the different groups within a country or nation. But why is it that the different groups cannot have the same interests? Are the differences inherent in the cultural differences of the people in a country or do they spring from the mutual rivalry of the groups for prominence or power in the State or Society? The first alternative seems to be more justifiable than the second, because the people of a country have become divided into groups on account of their variance in cultural equipment and outlook. But it is just here where we must not lose sight of one very important factor which contributes to the growth of clash of interests. We may have the same social interests but in spite of that we may be divided when we are made to believe that our interests are not the same. Such make-believes are created by the leaders of our country. A leader is one who by reason of his social supremacy and authority is in an advantageous position

\*Cf *Public Opinion and Popular Government* by Lowell.



to secure a large following. He is able to create the belief in his followers that they must accept his views if they aspire to social prosperity and security. But his views will be accepted by those who find that the views are in consonance with the beliefs already present in their minds. Thus, although it is true that most of us are ready to act at the suggestion of a leader, it is equally true that suggestion initiates action in us only so far as the suggested ideas are in conformity to the traditions in which we have been born and bred up. Hence, the success of a leader depends upon his ability to control and guide the cultural influences which form the background of the mental equipment of group of persons whom he wishes to lead. Now, an able leader can make his followers believe that they must form a group by themselves and oppose themselves to others who belong to a different group. In other words he may foment opposition and clash between two groups by the help of make-believes. The cultural differences need not necessarily lead to opposition and clash but the leader takes advantage of such differences and causes enmity and rivalry between two parties. The followers of a leader become as much attached to him as the children to their father, and the prestige and power of the leader imply their own prestige and power, with the result that they begin to assert themselves against any other leader simply for the sake of prominence in the public eye. The leader's opinion assumes the status of public opinion so far as the followers identify themselves with the leader who is a living embodiment of the cultural forces to which the individuals have become adapted. The leader of the rival group may in reality be a friend and not a foe but he is imagined to be the probable invader of the continent of interests so dearly cherished by the members of the group. This seems to be the psychological situation which accounts for the formation of social groups and the rivalry between them.

From what we have said it appears that public opinion is to a large extent formed out of images which do not represent reality as such but a pseudo-environment. This seems to be the main contention of Walter Lippmann\* who in his work on *Public Opinion* points out that at the social level man's adjustment to environment takes place through the medium of fictions. By fiction of course is not meant a lie; it is a representation of the

\*Cf *Public Opinion* by W. Lippmann.

environment made by man himself. "This representation extends all the way from complex hallucination to the scientist's perfectly self-conscious use of a schematic model." He says that public opinion is like a play suggested to actors by their own experience, in which the plot is transacted in the real lives of actors. The pictures inside the heads of the human actors of their needs and purposes are the public opinion. Mr. Lippmann's analysis of public opinion is an important contribution to the psychology of public opinion, and it seems to me that his view is in accord with what the psycho-analysts say about our maladjustment to the environment. In most cases of mental derangement the individual adopts certain means of adjustment to the environment when there is failure to meet the real situation in the right way. But Lippmann suggests that the real situation is never revealed to any body except so far as it is known through immediate perception, and any judgment upon a situation involves a host of images, sentiments and emotions already present in the mind.

We move in a world which is partly our own creation, and the pictures of this world which we carry with us enable us to secure a position of safety in the society. Our habitual adjustments to this world form a number of patterns to which the instinctive equipment of our nature is accommodated. These patterns are the stereotypes and different races or societies have different stereotypes which are handed down from parent to child. They serve as defence mechanisms, that is, behind them we seek a position of safety in the society in which we live. If these stereotypes are disturbed we become upset and that is why any abrupt or wholesale social or political change causes resentment or revolt.

We may then conclude that public opinion is not the result of clear judgment but is largely the outcome of pre-conceived notions and persistent emotional moods or temperaments. At the same time we cannot overlook the fact that public opinion is not the same thing as public sentiment. Public opinion may be said to be the rational phase of public sentiment. Public sentiment is aroused by a reference to the tradition or custom of the people of a country, and underlies our estimate of fashion, propriety and decorum. But the real test of public opinion is sought through elections or referendums or plebiscites. We meet with the expression of public opinion in the press and on the platform. But it must be admitted that public opinion is considerably influenced by public sentiment.

It should be further noted that public opinion does not reveal the existence of a group mind or collective unconscious. It is the response of a group of persons to a social situation. In a psychological approach to the question of public opinion one must remember that reciprocal relationship of individuals in a group is the basis of our estimate of any group activity. The behaviour of the individual in the group is determined partly by instinctive urges and partly by acquired habits and customs. When a situation arises which affects the interest of the individuals of a group, the group as a whole reacts to the situation under the influence of physical and cultural forces. Thus, public opinion which is no doubt an articulate expression of the behaviour of a group towards a social situation is largely determined by cultural and innate dispositions of the individual members of the group. We may therefore use a simple formula to represent public opinion. If 'R' stands for public opinion which, as we have said, is a reaction to a social situation, 'S' stands for the stimulating situation, and 'O' stands for the physical and cultural influences of the group which reacts, then  $R=f(O,S)$  i.e. public opinion is a resultant of physical and cultural influences so far as they act in a particular social situation. It is a mathematical function of these two variables namely O and S. The reaction that takes place is either positive or negative, i.e., it is either one of approach or of withdrawal. If the stimulating situation is in accord with the physical and cultural influences at work it produces a response of approach or acceptance; if it is opposed to those influences it brings about a response of withdrawal or non-acceptance. If we take for our example the proposals of Sir Stafford Cripps and the reaction of the Indian opinion towards them, we may explain the whole behaviour by this formula. The Cripps' proposals offer the stimulating situation 'S', and the present political atmosphere, the prevailing notions about the present day administration of the country and the ideologies of the future constitution of India, the dominant cultural influences, social habits, customs or traditions—all these are represented by the 'O' factors. Now so far as the proposals were opposed to the 'O' factors, the resulting reaction was one of withdrawal or rejection. It is true that some Indians were ready to accept the proposals, and their reaction to the proposals was therefore positive. To explain why such differences in public opinion arise I have already referred to differences in racial or cultural elements. But here I draw attention to two laws of reaction namely the law of selection and the law of advantage. When a group of persons select one form of

reaction among others, the self-preservative motives play an important role. A complex reaction is determined by protective impulses which have an advantage over other impulses. The Indian public opinion, so far as it was opposed to the Cripps' proposals, was largely influenced by self-preservative motives, that is, those Indians whose sense of security was not satisfied by the proposals, rejected them. The origin of the sense of security is no doubt ultimately traceable to the dependence of the child upon the parent, and it may be said that Cripps' proposals were not so much reassuring as to call up a sympathetic response on the part of Indians.

We have already said that public opinion is not an individual reaction but the reaction of an entire group. The group functions through its leaders. Thus the leader of a group or community is not to be judged as an isolated individual but as a function of the group to which he belongs. The leader no doubt develops a personality which marks him out from the rest of his group, but so far as he voices the public opinion he is not to be considered as an individual but as a whole within a whole. His activities are determined to a large extent by the group ideas or group behaviour and therefore he represents the group as a whole. When one leader of a community is opposed by another leader of the same community, we must look for the cause of this opposition not so much in the conflict of personal motives as in the opposition of one set of group ideas to another set of group ideas.

It should be noted that public opinion evolves in the midst of interaction and development of personalities. Each personality may be regarded as a field property, that is, as a characteristic manifestation of the social organization. Just as in an electric field there are potential differences between one point and another, so in the social organization of individuals there are differences in the development of personality. Now an individual who has attained a high degree of personality comes forward to lead other persons who cluster round him. His voice prevails and is accepted as the public opinion of the group to which he belongs.

The leader by virtue of his social position and authority is able to control the activities of his followers. His opinion is accepted by every individual member of his group not because it is the result of deliberate judgment but because of the fact that in accepting his opinion each member finds a satisfaction accruing from the gratification of his sense of security. The members of

the group unconsciously identify themselves with the leader and accept his opinion as their own. But this state of affairs continues so long as the leader holds his power and prestige in the society. No sooner does he fail to fulfil his promises or carry out his own intentions than his followers begin to grow sceptic about his social position and invariably quit his group to form a separate organization by selecting another leader. This utter dependence upon the leader proves beyond all doubt the mental need for security which every follower feels and seeks to satisfy through his allegiance to the leader. So long as the leader is powerful he forces obedience of the followers to his will and in all their activities they feel bound to abide by the opinion of the leader. Thus the leader's opinion, which comes to assume the status of public opinion, acts as a social force which governs social relations of the individual members of a group. At this stage even if some individual members wish to break away from the group they fail to do so until they can select and depend upon another leader who can guide their activities.

Thus, it seems to be true that the relationship of the followers to the leader compares favourably with that of children to a powerful father. It is a matter of common knowledge that the leader is regarded as the father by his followers and it is only when the leader loses his power that the followers behave like a band of hostile children who rebel against their father. In Nazi Germany Hitler has assumed the position of a powerful father and all those who are his avowed followers have been behaving like timid children. They cannot override his orders or do any thing contrary to his wishes partly out of fear and partly because they are unable to set up a hostile organization under a different leader. Hence Hitler's opinion and for the matter of that the opinion of the Nazi party is regarded as the public opinion of the National Socialists of Germany. But this does not mean that there are no differences of opinion and the actions that may be attributed to Hitler's policy are approved by all Germans. Hitler's opinion will prevail so long as the power he wields in the country remains intact, but as soon as his position suffers deterioration, a hostile party will raise its head and wrest powers from his hands.

It is no wonder that many individuals will have many opinions, but the many unite their voices so far as the group interest prevails. Each group holds together the individuals by virtue of the dominant wish that seeks fulfilment. In a social environment there may be many such groups, each being dominated by the

prevailing wish of its individuals. Thus, in respect of any question of public interest the individuals of a country may fall into different groups and in this way differences in public opinion will arise.

The same social situation then can evoke different responses from the groups which lie separated from one another, by reason of their different interests and beliefs.\* Each group may be regarded as a separate unit which functions either in unison or at variance with other groups. If there is concord among the groups then the individuals can present a united front to any question of public utility or public administration. On the other hand if the groups fail to unite, each will try to adjust itself to the environment in its own way, and the result will be a hopeless division of public opinion so much so that utter chaos may prevail at a particular moment. But the general tendency noticeable in the groups is that they seek to co-operate with each other in the face of a common threat to their safety. Thus the groups must be regarded as so many functional units in a total situation. Each unit is liable to change at any time independent of the other groups, and therefore a public opinion which emerges as a result of the groups functioning in harmony with one another can never be taken as something immutable or permanent, but constant changes are taking place within it quite imperceptibly, and a time may arrive when there will be whole-sale change of the public opinion.

Differences in public opinion then are indicative of the vitality of the body politic and need not be considered as obstacles in the way of public utility. We are told that responsible government cannot be handed over to the Indians so long as they are not able to sink their differences and unite themselves for the purpose of public administration. But the differences in public opinion are not unfavourable to the growth of the political life of India. The differences psychologically understood are only phases in the progressive advance of public opinion. They are the natural outcome of the efforts of an enormous body of diverse people for the successful adjustment to the changing social situation. It is no doubt true that the differences in public opinion are not antagonistic to the union of the different sections of the Indian people for the achievement of a federal form of Government. We need not

\*Cf *The Psychology of Society* by M. Ginsberg.

make too much of the differences or regard them as plague spots in the life of the body politic. This does not imply that no union is desirable or is capable of being realised. There are differences even where there is apparent unity, for example, the differences in opinion among the different groups within the Congress fold.

What is needed is propaganda for the development of a unity among the people of India. Propaganda, as we have already said, is the means of making people accept a certain standpoint and see things from a particular angle of vision. Its chief use in the development of public opinion in India is to make people act before thought. If the individuals are left to think for themselves they will be buried in the depths of their traditional beliefs and prejudices, but if they are goaded on to do or think things which they would not immediately do or think if left to themselves they will unite. Here "end justifies the means" as Mr. Lambert suggests.\*

We have recently seen the effect of propaganda concerning the food situation in Bengal and other parts of India.. A word of caution is needed here. There is a current belief that whatever is a subject of propaganda is false. Nothing can be more erroneous than this view. False things are no doubt circulated through propaganda, but this does not mean that we cannot make use of propaganda in respect of a real situation. Scarcity of food and consequent famine are real facts but ordinarily these facts remained in the background or were utterly neglected. But to call attention to the serious situation prevailing in the country much effort had to be made to induce people all over the world to resort to quick action for the saving of the Indian people from utter destruction. In this direction propaganda has played its part. A belief has been created in the minds of men living in India and outside that the situation has become so distressing on account of the indifference or cold neglect of the persons responsible for the protection of the people of India. Thus, a strong public opinion has been formed against the governmental machinery, and people all over the world have joined hands to relieve the distress of the suffering population of Bengal and other parts of India.

Public opinion because it is public depends for its formation and functioning upon the instruments through which it is made public namely the press, the platform and the radio. Once generated

\*Cf *Propaganda* by R. S. Lambert.

public opinion acts as a force of social control.\* It guides the State in its activities of public administration. It functions as a general will although a general will cannot be said to be an existing fact. It is a general will in the sense of a will of the individuals for the common good.

We have already pointed out the importance of the voice of the leaders in the formation of public opinion. Dr. Rivers† has called attention to the distinction between a group with a leader and a leaderless group. He holds that in a leaderless group sympathy, mimesis and intuition are the three component factors of suggestion which guides the activities of the group, but in a group with a leader suggestion and faith in the leader work together. The followers have not only sympathy but also reverence for the leader, they show not only an intuitive appreciation of the views of the leader, but have an intellectual faith in him, and lastly they not only imitate his actions but voluntarily obey him. But Dr. Rivers has not given due consideration to the unconscious motive forces which play their part in the formation of public opinion. To these motive forces we have frequently referred in our present analysis of public opinion.

\*Cf *Social Control* by Ross.

†*Psychology and Politics* by Rivers



# Muslim Philosophy—Its Scope and Meaning

*(Presidential Address to the Section of Islamic Philosophy)*

By

MR. M. UMAR-UD-DIN

A few years ago the Indian Philosophical Congress instituted the Section of Muslim Philosophy to stimulate its study and research. The Indian Universities are according recognition to the subject, though it must be said, rather tardily. At the initial stages of the study of the subject in which it is in the Indian Universities, I would like to make certain observations on its scope and meaning, which will necessarily be of a desultory nature in the short time at my disposal.

Arabian Philosophy, Islamic Philosophy and Muslim Philosophy are the terms used interchangeably. But since our subject is not limited to the contributions made by the Arabs, the term Arabian Philosophy is too narrow for our purpose. It has been cultivated by the peoples of various races and religions. The term Islamic Philosophy will likewise limit its scope, meaning thereby the interpretation of the fundamental principles of Islam as enunciated in the Holy Quran. It will, therefore, exclude many important aspects of Muslim thought like Metaphysics, etc. Hence Muslim Philosophy seems to be the most preferable of the three terms, because it includes all the Philosophical system cultivated by the Muslims, and, by extension, the contributions made by non-Muslims to the development of these systems.

When Islam extended beyond Arabia, Muslims came in contact with various peoples and their cultures. The contact raised many religious, political and social problems which led the Muslims to study the literatures of these peoples. The study was prosecuted with zeal under the injunction of the Holy Quran and the Tradition of the Prophet (may peace be upon him!). The Holy Quran says, "To whom wisdom is given has been given a great good." The Tradition of the Prophet says, "Seek knowledge even if it be in China." What the Muslims produced after the assimila-

tion of different philosophies is a unique contribution with distinctive characteristics of its own, having its foundations in the Holy Quran . The Muslim philosophers, e.g., assimilated the ideas of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, in the light of the divine knowledge of the Quran, synthesizing these ideas into metaphysical theories, at once original and coherent. Muslim thought represents a stage in the development of human thought—philosophical as well as scientific. “The Arab has impressed his intellectual stamp upon Europe,” Draper says, “and not in too remote a future will Christendom concede this truth. He has left unfading traces of his finger on the sky, which every one can see, who reads the names of the stars on any ordinary celestial globe.”

In the course of its development Muslim thought came to express itself in the various systems of Dialectics, Philosophy and Mysticism. I shall make a very brief mention of these systems.

(1) *Dialectics*:—Dialecticians are those who express their contentions in logical forms. They differed amongst themselves as to the source of knowledge. Some considered it to be reason, while others revelation. The former may be called the Rationalistic and the latter the Orthodox or Scholastic Dialecticians:

(a) *Rationalistic Dialecticians*:—There never has been a set of Philosophers who exalted human understanding to such an extent as the Rational School of Dialectics. In their Metaphysics, Ethics, etc., they are thorough-going rationalists. The knowledge of good and bad, the real and the ‘not-real’ can only be attained through reason. No human action, in their opinion, has any value unless it is governed by rational motives. They regarded man as the creator of his own actions and the maker of his own destiny.

In Metaphysics their reasoning led them to a concept of God as wholly devoid of personality. They are Monotheists and their attempt to purify God from anthropomorphic elements, has shorn Him of all qualities which they thought man had bestowed on Him. No attributes can be assigned to Him other than negative qualities. Like Hegel, they identified in God the subject and the object, the knower and the known. God, they held, acts according to a plan, and is not a free creative force, as the Theologians believed. In short, their God is a sort of vague unity without any personality. Their God is eternal law bound by rational motives and aims.

These Dialecticians started as theologians but ended as metaphysicians. They discussed such problems as the nature of Thing. They defined Thing as a concept that can be known and can stand as a subject to a predicate. Even before the quality of existence is added to thing, it has both essence and accident. When the quality of existence is added to the essence, it becomes an actuality, while without this quality it remains only in a state of non-existence.

(b) *Orthodox or Scholastic Dialecticians*:—Many schools of Scholastic Dialecticians rose simultaneously in different countries as Ibn-Hazm's school in Spain, at-Tahawi's school in Egypt, Maturidi's school in Samarqand and Ashari's school in Iraq. Ashari's school surpassed all other schools. This school had for its exponents such original thinkers as Baqillani, Ghazzali, etc.

This school believes that revelation is the only source of knowledge. Secular knowledge may be gained through reason, but it is incompetent to know the really real. This school is a protest against the view that the mysteries of the Universe can be solved by human thought. They regarded God as an absolute power and a free creative agent directing the course of the Universe. He is not circumscribed by any aim or plan as this would limit His power. The solution they offered with regard to the freedom of the will and the thing in itself bears so close a resemblance to Leibnitz's theory of the 'pre-established harmony' and Kantian conception of existence that they may be regarded as their forerunners in the development of human thought. The earlier thinkers regarded existence as one of the qualities of existing things. The things were there. When the quality of existence was added to other qualities it became existent. Asharites refuted it arguing that existence was the self of the entity and not a quality added to it.

In their daring and thorough metaphysical schemes we find, in the words of MacDonald, that "Lucretian atoms raining down through the empty void, self-developing monads of Leibnitz, 'pre-established harmony' and all, the Kantian things-in-themselves are lame and impotent in their consistency beside the parallel Asharite doctrines. The object of the Asharites was that of Kant, to fix the relation of knowledge to the thing-in-itself. But in reaching that thing-in-itself they were much more thorough than Kant. Only two of Aristotelian categories survived their attack, substance

and quality. The others, quantity, place, time, and the rest were only relationships (*Itibars*) existing subjectively in the mind of the knower, and not things. Relationships had no real existence . . . all the categories had gone except substance and quality". (MacDonald. *Theology*, pp. 200 f).

Now qualities are of two kinds, negative and positive. There is always a change in the qualities but the qualities cannot exist without substance. Therefore substance also changes. The remaining two categories, *viz.*, substance and quality, also vanish. Thus their reasoning led them to Atomism. Their Atomism, however, is not only of space, but of time also, and like the modern physicist they introduced the conception of 'Leap'.

Ghazzali in his book, 'Deliverer from Error' anticipated Descartes in the Method of Doubt and passed through all the stages of doubt, discarding all authority and disbelieving even his senses. But Ghazzali went further than Descartes and seriously questioned the validity of thought as an instrument of knowledge. He finds certainty only in the 'will to believe', inspired by Divine Will. It is 'Volo ergo sum' with Ghazzali, whereas with Descartes it is 'Cogito ergo sum'. About his another book 'Revival of Sciences', in which Ghazzali has discussed at length the fundamental principles of his ethical and philosophical doctrines, a European writer observes: "This work, probably owing to its originality, was never translated into Latin during the Middle Ages, and remained a closed book to all but Arabian Scholars. It bears so remarkable a resemblance to the Discourse on Method of Descartes that had any translation of it existed in the days of Descartes, every one would have cried out against the plagiarism."

Ghazzali wrote another book to prove the incompetency of analytical reason. called 'Refutation of the Philosophers', in which, while discussing the law of causation, "he" in the words of MacDonald. "cuts the bond of causality with the sharp edge of his dialectic and proclaims that we can know nothing of cause and effect but simply that one thing follows another." Summing up the views of Ghazzali on causation Renan says, "Hume never said more than that."

In the same book Ghazzali has demonstrated, like Kant, that theoretical reason cannot solve the fundamental problems of religion and philosophy, such as the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, or the eternity of the universe.

(2) *Philosophers*:—There was a group of Muslim thinkers who had great faith in Plato and Aristotle's infallibility. Aristotle in their eye was the greatest teacher ever born. This group of Muslim philosophers may be divided into several schools, Peripatetics, Ishraqi philosophers and Natural philosophers.

(a) *Peripatetics*:—They are called Peripatetics after Aristotle. They believed in the capacity of human reason to solve the mysteries of the Universe. The main representatives of this school are Kindi, Farabi, Ibn Miskawaih, Ibn-Sina, Ibn-Rushd, etc. This school believed that Aristotle possessed the most perfect intellect. They regarded philosophy as a manifestation of Truth. They summed up their position as philosophers and Muslims in a syllogism: "Philosophy is truth; Quran is truth, but truth is one; therefore Philosophy and Quran must agree."

Greek Philosophy reached the Muslim thinkers not in its original form but full of inconsistencies and transformed out of shape. Neo-Platonists, who were mostly Christians, were responsible for shaping Greek philosophy in the light of Christianity. They represented Greek philosophers as great saints and mystics, and Greek philosophy as the truth compatible with the Christian doctrine. Rationalism of the Greeks was changed into Intuitionism. It took the Muslim thinkers a long time to free Greek philosophy, as it had reached them, of the accretions and inconsistencies that had crept into it. Besides, on the basis of Greek philosophy, Muslim thinkers made great advances. Farabi, known among the Musalmans as the Second Teacher, improved upon the system of Aristotle. With Aristotle Logic is merely a method to arrive at the truth, but with Farabi it is a method as well as the truth itself: it is a part of metaphysics. Unlike Aristotle, Farabi is a thoroughgoing Idealist, and Aristotle's theory of the eternity of matter had no place in Farabi's Metaphysics. Matter, according to him, is the adumbration of the mind which is the fashioning force in the Universe.

In his Ethics Farabi follows Plato; but he regards a philosopher as insufficient to guide the destinies of humanity, unless he is also a man of character, namely, a prophet.

Ibn Sina, who claims to be a humble follower of Aristotle, in his system embraces problems which had not been envisaged by Aristotle. He took Aristotle's fragmentary psychology and infused into it a dynamic principle. The void between man and God is filled with a hierarchy of spiritual agencies. Ibn-Sina

believed in the eternity of the Universe like Aristotle but differed from him in regarding it as the creation of God. Aristotle's theory assumed that cause always precedes the effect. Ibn-Sina argued that it is not necessary for cause to precede its effect in time. Cause and effect may be simultaneous *e.g.*, in the case of the movement of a key as it opens or fastens a lock. Love, according to Ibn-Sina, is an appreciation of beauty. It is the Universal force that exists in every thing from mineral world to the animal kingdom, impelling everything to become more and more perfect or beautiful. In the vegetable kingdom it manifests itself in assimilation, growth and production. It becomes somewhat conscious and unified in the animal kingdom, while in man it becomes fully conscious and can develop to an unlimited degree. In short, it is a spiritual principle which is striving to realize itself in various degrees of perfection through different strata of existence.

Most of the Muslim Philosophers advocated the theory of evolution of mind and matter. But the dynamic force of evolution was ascribed to mind, matter being only a by-product. It is from the primal mind that the world has evolved. The best representatives of this theory are Ibn-Miskawaih, Rumi and Ibn-Khaldun. Ibn-Miskawaih explains the evolution of matter as follows:—

“The combination of primary substances produced the mineral kingdom, the lowest form of life. A higher stage of evolution is reached in the vegetable kingdom. The first to appear is spontaneous grass; then plants and various kinds of trees, some of which touch the borderland of animal kingdom, in so far as they manifest certain animal characteristics. Intermediary between the vegetable kingdom and animal kingdom there is a certain form of life which is neither animal nor vegetable, but shares the characteristics of both (*e.g.*, Coral). The first step beyond this intermediary stage of life is the development of power of movement, and the sense of touch in tiny worms which crawl upon the earth. The sense of touch owing to the process of differentiation, develops other forms of sense, until we reach the plane of higher animals in which intelligence begins to manifest itself in an ascending scale. Humanity is touched in the ape which undergoes further development, and gradually develops erect stature and power of understanding similar to man. Here animality ends and

'humanity begins." (*The Development of Metaphysics in Persia—Iqbal*—pp. 33-34).

In their cosmology, Muslim Philosophers did not content themselves with presenting merely an intellectual conception of the Universe, but they also endeavoured to present a conception in which the whole being of man,—his moral, religious and æsthetic self, could find expression.

(b) *Ishraqi Philosophy (Philosophy of Illumination)*:—This school affiliates itself to Plato and the Platonists. They disregarded analytical reason as an instrument of truth. Observation, contemplation, intuition and ecstasy are the means through which this school tries to reach the truth. The greatest representative of this school is Shahabuddin Suhrawardy Maqtul, who has expounded his philosophy in a book called *Hikmatul-Ishraq* (Philosophy of Illumination). He conceives reality as light—all else being darkness or non-existence. Light creates darkness or non-light. All that is not light is the product of light, which is the fountain-head of all existence. Another representative is Ibn-Tufail of Spain who, though generally regarded as Peripatetic is an Ishraqi. Just as Suhrawardy's Philosophy is Iranian in content but Platonic in form, so Ibn-Tufail's philosophy is Aristotelian in content but Platonic in form. Ibn-Tufail has explained his philosophy in an allegory, '*Hayy Ibn-Yaqzan*', in which he imagines a man on an island where there are no human beings. Hayy through his own observation, introspection, contemplation and ecstasy attains to the highest form of knowledge.

(c) *Natural Philosophy*—Natural philosophy does not form part of modern philosophy, but the ancients regarded it as a part of philosophy. They confine themselves to the study of the natural phenomena. They believed that the knowledge gained through the senses can lead man to universal truth. The sciences which they cultivated were Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Astronomy, Geography, History, Medicine, Ethnology, etc. I shall mention a few of the chief representatives who left their impress on their successors.

*Abu-Bakr Mohammad Zakarya Razi*, (d. 932) cultivated almost all the natural sciences but his fame rests on medicine, ranking according to some, above Ibn-Sina as a physician. He based his investigations on experience, individual as well as

collective, which he believed has a greater value than logical deductions.

*Geber or Jabir*, the chemist, was the first scholar who employed the scientific method. He founded a Chemical School in the West; and just as Aristotle was regarded as the founder of Logic, Jabir was regarded as the founder of Chemistry.

*Ibn-ul-Haitham* (Alhazen) (d. 1038), a great scientist and mathematician, an acute thinker, is famous for his book on Optics, in which he discusses vision in a scientific way. Knowledge according to him is based on sense perception elaborated by understanding.

Another great scientist, perhaps the greatest of them all, was Al-Biruni, at once a mathematician, historian, astronomer and physicist. In his book '*Qanun Masudi*' he comes so near the modern astronomical researches that it must be said 'that modern methods are as old as genius.'

A great philosophical writer on almost every topic connected with human society was Ibn-Khaldun. He is the founder of the science or philosophy of History. In his famous Prolegomena to his Universal History he discusses such problems as the rise and fall of nations, inter-relation of the various grades of society, production of food, labour, etc.

(4) *Mysticism*:—The Sufis regard real knowledge as immediate and personal which is only gained by intuition in a state of ecstasy. In an ecstasy a Sufi sees realities and experiences the presence of God.

The Sufis regard human soul to be of divine origin, temporarily lodged in the human body, but restless to return to God—God being the only reality which they conceive as Will, Beauty or Light. On the basis of these conceptions they have built their Metaphysical systems. Sufiism in its development passed through ascetic, theosophic and pantheistic stages. Strictly speaking Muslim Sufis have never been pantheists, since they could never dissolve the personality of God. Similarities, though of a superficial nature, between Sufiism, Buddhism, Vedantism, Christianity, and Neo-Platonism have given rise to numerous theories regarding its origin.

"A Superficial resemblance exists" says O'Leary "between the Buddhist Nirvana and the *fana* or the re-absorption of the soul in



the divine spirit of Sufiism. But the Buddhist doctrine represents the soul as losing its individuality in the passionless placidity of absolute quiescence, whilst the Sufi doctrine, though also teaching a loss of individuality, regards ever-lasting life as consisting in the ecstatic contemplation of the Divine Beauty." (O'Leary, *Arabic Thought*, p. 91).

(5) *Muslim Thought and Europe*:—Muslim culture penetrated Europe through Spain and Southern Italy and Sicily. Muslims in Spain had reached a very high degree of culture when Europe was steeped in ignorance. Scholars from all over Europe flocked to Spanish Universities to study Arab sciences and philosophy. The second great factor in the spread of Muslim philosophy were the Jews, who translated works from Arabic into Hebrew, and being a mercantile community, carried philosophical knowledge wherever they went in Europe. They made a particular study of Ibn Rushd (Averroes) the greatest Muslim Philosopher of Spain, who was regarded by them as the greatest commentator of Aristotle.

After the re-conquest of Toledo by the Christians Raymond Archbishop of Toledo (1131—1250 A.D.) founded a College for the translation of Arabic scientific and philosophical works into Latin, and in a short time works of Ibn Rushd and other Muslim philosophers became available in Latin translations.

When Fredrick II of Sicily was crowned Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire in 1215 A.D., he, being a great admirer of Arab culture and Muslim sciences, established a college of translation at Palermo. He himself could read Arabic Philosophical works in the original. In 1224 he founded the University of Naples which became a centre for the spread of Arab sciences and philosophy into Europe. By the middle of the 14th century nearly all the important works of Ibn Rushd and other Muslim philosophers had been translated into Latin. "By the close of the 13th century Arab Science and Philosophy had been transmitted to Europe and Spain's work as an intermediary was done. The intellectual avenue leading from the portals of Toledo through the Pyrenees wound its way through Provence and the Alpine passes into Lorraine, Germany and Central Europe, as well as across the Channel into England." (Hitti, *History of the Arabs*, p. 589).

Throughout the 13th century Muslim Philosophy dominated in the Paris University.

Through Franciscan Friars Muslim philosophy reached England. As early as 1109 A.D. we find that a Latin translation of a book of Ibn Rushd was prescribed in Cambridge. Roger Bacon, the father of modern inductive method, studied at Toledo and could read and speak Arabic, and came directly under the influence of Muslim thought.

Many European universities were noted for their cultivation of Muslim sciences, *e.g.*, Padua and Bologna. It is from these centres that Averroism spread to North-East Italy. The professors of these universities under the influence of Muslim philosophy were regarded as free-thinkers. The influence of the Muslim philosophy was the precursor of the Renaissance. Muslim thought "was the direct parent of the Philo-Pagan element in the Renaissance." (O'Leary, *Arabic Thought*, p. 294), "It made a deeper impression on Christian and Jewish thought...., and attained its final evolution in North-East Italy, where, as an anti-ecclesiastical, it prepared the way for the Renaissance." (O'Leary p. 295). European culture in fact has been nursed and brought up on Muslim thought. Many a thinker like Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Dante, Spinoza, etc., were influenced by it.

In the words of Iqbal, "The Political fall of Islam in Europe unfortunately took place, at a moment when Muslim thinkers began to see the futility of Deductive Science, and were fairly on the way to the building of Inductive knowledge. It was practically at this moment that Europe took up the task of research and discovery. Intellectual activity in the world of Islam particularly ceased from this time, and Europe began to reap the fruit of the labours of Muslim thinkers. The Humanist Movement in Europe was due to a large extent to the force set free by Muslim thought. It is not at all an exaggeration to say that the fruits of Modern European Humanism in the shape of Modern Science and Philosophy are in many ways only a further development of Muslim Culture. (Extract from the letter of Dr. Iqbal to Sahibzada Aftab Ahmad Khan, dated 4th June, 1925).

I would conclude this hurried survey of the various schools of Muslim Philosophy with a brief reference to some of the chief characteristics which made the Muslim Philosophers worthy of their place with the greatest thinkers of the world. Muslim philosophers not only studied, commented upon and enlarged Greek philosophy but also discovered inconsistencies and weak

spots in it and endeavoured to remove them. They investigated regions which the Greeks had left unexplored, by introducing as problems, demanding serious enquiry such topics as phenomenon of dreams, miracles, future life immortality of the soul, Divine attributes, Divine unity, etc. They enriched the human self by proving that it was not only an intellectual self but also a moral and a spiritual self. In short, they made philosophy the instrument not only of solving the problems which confronted man in his everyday life but also of solving the riddle of the universe.

# The Pragmatist Theory of Truth and Error

By

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The pragmatist theory of truth and error is advocated with great force by William James, and Drs. F. C. S. Schiller and John Dewey. It is on the works of these three distinguished men that an authentic account of it should be based. All of them agree in their polemic against extreme intellectualism in philosophy, and insist upon the necessity of taking our personal ends and interests into consideration in any adequate theory of truth and error. There is, however, some difference among them with regard to specific details in the statement of the theory. So we propose to state separately their views on the problem of truth and error.

William James in his *Pragmatism* states the theory as follows:—  
‘Truth is a property of certain of our ideas. It means their agreement, as falsity means their disagreement, with reality’. But the agreement of ideas with reality does not mean, as it does with the realist or the intellectualist, that our ideas copy reality, or that there is a fixed relation of correspondence between ideas and objects which have a fixed nature and an independent existence of their own. While our ideas of sensible things do indeed copy them, those of their activities or works cannot be said to be copies of them in any sense. In the case of these ideas, therefore, we cannot say that they are true because they copy or correspond to reality. The truth of ideas depends on their verifiability. “True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and

verify. False ideas are those that we cannot".<sup>1</sup> Now to verify ideas is to see their practical consequences. If the ideas lead us, through the acts and other ideas which they instigate, to other parts of experience with which we feel that they are in agreement, i.e., if their connections with those parts of experience are progressive, harmonious and satisfactory, then the ideas become verified. This function of agreeable leading is what the verification of an idea means. An idea is not true by itself. 'The truth of an idea is not inherent in it. Truth *happens* to an idea. It *becomes* true, is *made* true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its *verification*'. This means that the truth of an idea is constituted by its verifiability, and its verifiability means its ability to guide us prosperously through experience. That is, if by following an idea we can obtain certain experiences which for practical life are useful and valuable, then the idea becomes true; if not, it turns out false. True ideas thus possess a practical value for us and we should have them for their practical value. The practical value of true ideas is primarily derived from the practical importance of their objects to us. The objects are not practically important at all times. An idea whose object is not important for the time being will be practically irrelevant, and had better remain latent. Since, however, any object may some day become important, there is obviously some advantage in having such an idea that shall be true of a merely possible situation. When the situation actually arises, the idea becomes practically relevant, it does its work and our belief in it grows active. Of such an idea it may be said either that 'it is useful because it is true' or that 'it is true because it is useful'. Both these phrases mean exactly the same thing, namely that here is an idea that gets fulfilled and can be verified. "True is the name for whatever idea starts the verification-process, useful is the name for its completed function in experience".<sup>2</sup> True ideas would not be considered true unless they had been useful from the outset in this way. An idea becomes true in so far as it leads to certain experiences which verify it and it is useful in so far as the experiences it leads to fulfil its function in one's actual life. In the case of a man who seeks shelter from rain, the idea of a house in the neighbourhood becomes true when it leads

1. Cf. *Pragmatism*, p. 201.

2. Loc. cit., p. 204.

to the experience of the house and thereby fulfils its function on that occasion. 'That we have a true thought means that sooner or later we dip by that thought's guidance into the particulars of experience and make advantageous connection with them'.

Verification by satisfactory experience which makes an idea true need not always be complete. Sometimes we accept our ideas as true even before they start the process of practical verification. The idea of the clock which I see on the wall is taken as true before I make any use of it or examine its inner working. Similarly, many of our thoughts and beliefs are treated as true when they are found to be consistent with previous truths or when they are not contradicted by anything. But even in such cases we are to say that the process of verification is indirect. It is because such ideas and beliefs are either based on certain actually verified truths or may, like them, lead to certain verifying experiences, that they are allowed to pass for true. The original and prototype of the process of truth-making is the verification of an idea by experiences and their practical consequences. All other processes of recognising truths may be explained as modifications or indirect applications of this original process. So in the end, all true processes must lead to the phase of directly verifying sensible experiences somewhere.

The pragmatic account of truth, it will be seen, is an account of truths in the plural. It does not admit anything like the Truth or Absolute Truth which is a static system in which there is no process or development. For James, truths are only processes of leading which possess only one common quality, namely that they *pay*. 'They pay by guiding us into or towards some part of a system that dips at numerous points into sense-percepts which verify them. Truth is simply a collective name for verification-processes, just as health, wealth, strength, etc., are names for other processes connected with life, and also pursued because it *pays* to pursue them. Truth is *made* just as health, wealth and strength are made, in the course of experience'.<sup>3</sup> Just as health is a name for certain organic processes as easy digestion, circulation, sleep, etc., so truth is a name for verification-processes by which ideas lead us prosperously through experience. In short, 'the true is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as the right

is only the expedient in the way of our behaving'. But expediency is a matter of degree and is subject to change and variety. What is expedient now in one way and relatively to present experiences, may not be so with reference to other ways and further future experiences. Hence what is now considered true may afterwards be considered false. Ptolemaic astronomy was expedient for centuries within the limits of experiences then available. But now in the light of further experiences, we declare it false or relatively true within those borders of experience. Truth thus grows from more to more and in this process the 'superseded truths contribute their quota to the making of higher and larger truths. We may here of course conceive the idea of a complete truth that will some day be established absolutely. But this truth is by no means the rationalist's absolute truth which is eternally complete and independent of human experiences. Rather, it has, like all other truths, to turn its face to the concrete facts of experience and take all future experiences into account. Like other truths, 'the absolute truth will have to be *made*, made as a relation incidental to the growth of a mass of verification-experience'.<sup>4</sup>

Dr. Schiller's theory of truth may be briefly stated as follows. The question of truth is primarily a practical one. Success in practical life depends on our ability to predict the course of events in the world in which our lot is cast. We want to 'discover the truth' that we may be able to predict and control the course of things in the world and thereby make our life better and prosperous. But we must distinguish between a prediction which comes true and one which does not. We cannot treat them as of equal value. Nor should we rest content with the formal consistency of predictions and of the deductions from them without considering the question of their application to the real. Predictions which are formally valid but practically inapplicable to reality are only truth-claims, but not truths. Every prediction claims to be true, but it becomes true only when it is attended with success. 'True' thus must be the term for the *positive* value of successful prediction and is opposed to falsity which is the *negative* value of a failure to predict. This is how the sciences distinguish between the true and the false. A logic, therefore,

4. Loc. cit. p. 224.

which is observant of scientific usage must treat 'true' and 'false' as logical values which are analogous to moral and aesthetic values. 'True' and 'false' are the valuations belonging to our cognitive enterprises; 'right' and 'wrong' those applicable to our acts; 'beautiful' and 'ugly' those indicative of aesthetic appreciation. The 'true' is the 'good' of knowing, and the 'false' its bad; the one means success, the other failure in a cognitive understanding.<sup>5</sup>

A cognition is not a passive mental state which reflects a reality outside or external to it. On the other hand, it is the means or mental way of dealing with the objects round about us. The value of a cognition lies not so much in its copying an object, as being the effective means of dealing with it. Hence no judgment or proposition is true or false in itself; its value is always dependent on its use in the context in which it occurs and bears a meaning. So far as the form of a judgment is concerned we may say that there is no distinction between its value-claim and value, or, which is the same thing, between its truth-claim and truth. Every judgment is a confident assertion and so far lays a claim to value and truth. Now if we go by the form alone and do not consider the question of practical use, all judgments alike are true and none is false. Hence, if we are to, as we must, make a distinction between true and false judgments that must be by reference to their use or purpose in a certain context. Having regard to this, we cannot equate what *further*s, with what *defeat*s, a cognitive purpose and ignore the distinction between positive and negative values, or between the 'true' and the 'false'. A judgment as such is a truth-claim; but merely to claim the truth, is not to be the truth. It becomes a recognised truth when it undergoes 'verification', 'validation' or 'confirmation'.<sup>6</sup>

The distinction between truth and truth-claim is not absolute. It is a matter of degree. While a truth-claim is not a *mere* claim without any ground or rational basis, a truth continues to be a truth claim inasmuch as it may be doubted and modified. "A verified truth may always be improved and revised by further verification, and no amount of verification ever renders it *absolutely* true".<sup>7</sup> Its truth is relative to the evidence that is

5. Cf. Schiller, *Logic for Use*, pp. 95-98, 103.

6. *Loc. cit.* p. 105.

7. *Loc. cit.* p. 106.



available in its favour at the time we raise it to the status of 'truth'. Hence all that we can say is that any truth actually enunciated is to be conceived as the best (i.e., most valuable) under the circumstances. We cannot treat any truth as absolute, for the process of verification on which it depends can, at least theoretically, go on for ever and progressively enhance its value for us. "Absolute truth will then appear, not as a presupposition which has to be granted before we can begin to know, but as the aim and ideal towards which our knowledge moves".<sup>8</sup>

Dr. John Dewey is most indebted to C. S. Peirce for his logical theory including the conception of truth. It was Peirce who first introduced the word 'pragmatism' into philosophy and gave the outline of a theory which is now known as pragmatism. Hence to understand Dr. Dewey's position we shall do well to recall the views of Peirce on the relevant points. According to Peirce, our beliefs are really rules for action and the significance of a thought for us lies in the mode of conduct that it is fitted to produce. The difference between one thought and another consists in a difference of practice. The thought of an object is just the conception of the conceivable practical effects for us.<sup>9</sup> The truth of a belief or of an opinion cannot, therefore, mean any fixed relation of its correspondence to a fixed object. In his later writings, Peirce defines truth as follows:—"The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented by this opinion is the real".<sup>10</sup> A more significant statement made by him with regard to the nature of truth means that it is 'the concordance of an abstract statement with the ideal limit towards which scientific belief tends through endless investigation, the concordance being essentially a matter of recognition of the inaccuracy and one-sidedness of the abstract statement'. This means that truth is the ideal which we are to attain by endless scientific investigation, and that a particular statement or proposition is true in so far as it is provisionally established by investigation and is open to correction by further investigation.

8. *Loc. cit.* pp. 106-7, 115.

9. Cf. Peirce's article on "How to make our Ideas clear", *Popular Science Monthly*, Jan., 1878.

10. Peirce, *Collected Papers*, Vol. V, p. 268.

Dr. Dewey's theory of truth agrees in the main with that of Peirce as explained above. For him knowledge or truth is the outcome of competent and controlled inquiry or investigation. 'Knowledge is related to inquiry as a product to the operations by which it is produced'. That is, knowledge or truth is the product of the operations which are involved in inquiry. Inquiry is a process of investigation which is evoked by a doubtful situation. It begins in doubt and it terminates in the institution of conditions which remove need for doubt. And as a process it consists in 'the directed or controlled transformation of an indeterminate or doubtful situation into a determinately unified one'. There are two kinds of operations by means of which the transition is effected. First, there is the formation of ideas as to the possible ways of resolving and ending the doubtful situation. There are certain anticipations of a solution or certain working hypotheses which instigate and direct new observations yielding new factual material. Secondly, there are certain activities involving the techniques and organs of observation. These are experimental operations which modify the prior existential situation, render some conditions prominent, and relegate to the background other aspects which were at first conspicuous. In this way new facts are provided with which to test the ideas that represent possible modes of solution. Ideas and judgments or reasoning as such cannot provide new factual material. Hence the transformation of the original situation must be effected by experimental operations under the guidance of ideas. It is only the execution of 'existential operations' directed by an idea that can bring about a transformation of the original uncertain situation into a settled and unified one. When this happens, there is a state of affairs which may be designated by the words *belief* and *knowledge* or *truth*. But these words being misleading, Dewey prefers the words "warranted assertibility" which he substitutes for knowledge or truth. That a proposition is true means, for him, that it is warranted by competent and controlled inquiry. It is better not to use the words *belief* and *knowledge* or *truth* in relation to it. Belief generally means a merely mental or subjective state. But as the outcome of inquiry it is a settled objective state of affairs. So also the word *knowledge* or *truth* is supposed to mean something fixed and eternal and to have this meaning apart from connection with and reference to inquiry. But this is a purely metaphysical preconception which has given rise to much confusion in logical theory. Every special case of knowledge is

constituted as the outcome of some special inquiry. Knowledge as such must, therefore, be said to be the product of competent inquiries. Now inquiry is a *continuing* process in every field with which it is engaged. There is practically no end to the process of inquiry with regard to any subject-matter. Hence it follows that any knowledge or conclusion of an inquiry may be subjected to further inquiry and modified accordingly. No knowledge can be said to be so settled that it cannot be subject to revision in further enquiry. All that we can say is that a certain knowledge is warranted by some special inquiry, that it is warranted assertion, although it may be revised in the light of the results of further enquiry. Hence when knowledge is taken as a general abstract term related to inquiry in the abstract, it means "warranted assertibility".

Dr. Dewey does not call his theory 'pragmatism', because the word lends itself to misconception and has been the centre of relatively futile controversy in philosophy. But he admits that his theory is thoroughly "pragmatic" in the proper interpretation of the word, namely 'the function of consequences as necessary tests of the validity of propositions, *provided* these consequences are operationally instituted and are such as to resolve the specific problem evoking the operations'.<sup>11</sup>

The pragmatist theory of truth and error has been severely criticised and rejected by many on the ground that it reduces the true to the useful and thereby obliterates the distinction between truth and error. It is a matter of common experience that what is true is not always useful and what is false may sometimes be useful for certain purposes. But if to be true is to be useful and not to be useful is to be false, then we have to treat many truths as errors and *vice versa*. According to many critics, the pragmatists are guilty of making such a confusion between truth and error. But this charge seems to be unjustified. It is not only repudiated by some leading pragmatists like James and Dr. Schiller, but it does not also appear to be justified by the exposition of the pragmatist theory given by its chief representatives. The pragmatist requirement for truth is not certainly fulfilled by

11. The account of Dr. Dewey's theory given here is based on his *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, Cf. Preface, p. IV; chap. I, pp. 7-9; chap. VI, pp. 104-119.

the merely useful or the pleasant. James in his *Pragmatism* repeatedly tells us that truth consists in the verification of an idea by sense-experiences. It is true that he speaks of truth as what *pays* or has the function of a *leading that is worth while*. Sometimes he even speaks of 'the true' as only *the expedient in the way of our thinking*. But all these phrases are explained by him as meaning the same thing, namely, the verification of truth by experiences. It is this verification that makes truth which, therefore, has no being or meaning apart from it. The idea that there may be truth apart from verification is thus repudiated. It is just this view of truth that seems to be advocated by Dr. Schiller, C. S. Peirce and Dr. Dewey. Dr. Schiller points out that no critic has yet been able to quote from a representative pragmatist any passage in which the logical fallacy of simple conversion of the proposition 'all truth is useful' was committed. No pragmatist, therefore, held that since the true is useful, the useful must be true. That truth is not identical with usefulness has been clearly explained by Dr. Schiller in his distinction between truth-claim and truth. Postulates, axioms, methodological assumptions and fictions are truth-claims and have their uses no doubt. Even fictions and lies make a claim to truth and are useful in their own way. But these are only truth-claims, and not truths. Truths are *verified* truth-claims. A truth-claim like a postulate is not true at all until it has received an adequate amount of verification. The necessity of verification in the making of truth is also emphasised by C. S. Peirce and Dr. Dewey. For the one, truth is the cumulative and convergent effect of scientific investigations. For the other, it is just the outcome of competent and controlled inquiry which is essentially experimental in character.

In justice to the pragmatists it should be admitted by us that they have not identified truth with usefulness. All that we seem to be justified in saying is that, on the pragmatist theory, truth consists in the verification of an idea by sense-experiences including both cognitive and conative ones. The pragmatists are not satisfied by the agreement between our ideas and their corresponding cognitive experiences. They insist further on the agreement of the ideas with such other experiences as result from our activities in relation to the objects represented by the ideas. Thus the idea of water is verified when we perceive it from a distance and get certain satisfying experiences by touching and drinking it. It is this complex process of verification by cognitive and

cognitive experiences that *makes* truth which, therefore, has no meaning apart from such verification. But while verification by different kinds of experiences is a test of truth, it does not seem to us to make or constitute truth. An idea or belief is *known* to be true when we have an experience of the facts or objects that are meant by it. But it will *be* true if the facts or objects really exist, no matter whether they are known by us or not. That there are such facts or objects, i.e., realities cannot be, and probably has not been, denied by the pragmatist. Like the man of common sense or the realist, he also admits that 'all our truths are beliefs about Reality, and that in any particular belief the reality acts as something independent, as a thing *found*, not manufactured'.<sup>12</sup> If this be so, we are to say that our ideas and beliefs are true even before their corresponding independent realities are found or known by us, although we know them as true only when we have experiences of the realities. My prediction of a future event is *now* true, if and only if the event actually happens afterwards as predicted. The prediction is of course verified or proved to be true when we have experience of the event. Hence we are to say that truth consists in correspondence to fact or reality and is *tested* by experience, be it cognitive or conative or both. If, however, we say with the pragmatist that truth is *made* or constituted by verification, we do not see how the truth of the verifying experience can be made out. A verifying experience does not usually require verification, although it is generally accepted as true. That I am now writing is an experience which may be taken to verify the truth of my perception of the paper I am writing upon. But the experience of writing is true and also known to be true apart from relation to any other verifying experience. This is so because the experience in question refers to or corresponds with an actual fact and the correspondence is directly known by me. Hence we conclude that truth consists in correspondence with fact and that, whenever necessary, it is tested or verified by experience of facts or of effects of the activities directed towards facts. In the light of these observations we may say that pragmatism gives us one among several methods of testing truth and has thus a rightful place in a comprehensive theory of truth.

12. Cf. James, *Pragmatism*, p. 243.

# The Logic of Scientific Verification

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It is very often argued by some that the truth of the Freudian theory stands proved by its successful application to the treatment of mental diseases. In a similar way other kinds of persons have argued in the past that astrology is vindicated by its successful predictions, the homeopathic system of treatment by its innumerable cures, and science, in general, by its power of successful prediction and application. The process of reasoning underlying such contention is that the truth of a hypothesis is established by its successful verification. It is the object of this paper to point out briefly a common fallacy involved in such thinking and incidentally, the real value of verification.

The word verification is derived from Latin, 'verus' which means truth. Most probably this leads persons to believe that, if an hypothesis is verified, its truth is established thereby. It is not realized that there are different kinds and degrees of verification, and truth is not established in all cases straightway. Hypothesis may be about a perceptible fact. As for example, by looking at a withering creeper one may suppose that its roots have been cut. This supposition or hypothesis about the cause of the withering can be verified by inspecting the roots and finding them actually cut. In such a case what the hypothesis supposes is itself perceived to be true. The hypothesis can, therefore, be said to be directly verified here (verified in cash, as William James used to say), and its truth is established.

But in most cases hypothesis consists in supposing some imperceptible or unperceived cause, law, collocation or process. The unconscious 'libido' of the Freudian, the '*similia similibus curantur*' law of the Homeopath, the stellar influence of the astrologer, or the law of gravitation formulated by ordinary science, are all hypotheses about the imperceptible. No direct verification establishing their truth by perception is possible here. We can only try to verify them indirectly by observing *perceptible* consequents

that can be expected to be perceived if they are true. But supposing that such expected effects are observed, can we conclude that the hypotheses are true? Ordinarily one would be apt to think that they are. But such conclusion would be logically precarious, so long as there remains the possibility of a plurality of causes producing effects of the same kind, same at least to perception. If H stands for an hypothesis and C for its expected perceptible effect, and if on perceiving C one concludes that H is true, the formal process representing his argument would be: If H, then C; C is; therefore H is. It will be at once found that there is the fallacy of affirming the consequent<sup>1</sup> or what modern logic designates as the confusion between a proposition and its complementary.<sup>1</sup>

It may be argued, against such criticism, that the doctrine of the plurality of causes is itself unsound and that though different causes (say different kinds of germs of disease) may apparently seem to produce the same kind of effect (say, fever), yet closer observation will disclose that the effect of each possesses some distinctive marks also along with the general ones (say, the fever caused by each kind of germs has a special time, range and nature of rise and fall). Though this reply may be theoretically acceptable, it is not of much practical use in cases like the ones cited above. One cannot, for example, feel sure that the cure of insanity following psycho-analytic or homeopathic treatment, or the happening of a predicted event after a special stellar conjunction is of such a nature that it could be produced only by those antecedents, and not by any of the other conditions accompanying the antecedents, such as changes in food, climate, environment and the like. The doubt, therefore, cannot be so easily removed, and the hypothesis concerned cannot be established to be true.

What further complicates matters is that in most cases the verification of an hypothesis about the imperceptible can be effected only through a long chain of antecedents and consequents. If this hypothesis is true, then a consequent like C can be expected, and if C happens, it will cause another consequent D, and if D happens it will generate E, but E is observed; therefore, the hypothesis is true. Put symbolically such an argument will be as follows. If H, then C; if C, then D; if D then E; now E is, therefore, H is. To make it more concrete, if the civilized son wishes the father to be

1. Vide W. E. Johnson, *Logic*, Part III, p. 55.

dead, the wish will be tabooed by the censor; if it be tabooed, it will be repressed to the unconscious; if it is repressed, it can be expressed in a symbolic dream like the collapse of the upper storey of the house, and such is really the dream of James; therefore, James wishes his father dead.<sup>2</sup> It will be realized at once how precarious such a conclusion is. As we proceed backward from each consequent to its antecedent we expose ourselves to the fallacy of affirming the consequent at every step, and the chance of reaching back to the true antecedent diminishes progressively with the increase of the number of links, as will be more clearly seen hereafter.

The purpose of this criticism is not however to underrate the value of the process of verification, but only to remove the exaggerated notion of its demonstrative value. The real value of verification consists in its capacity for generating a greater degree of certainty, making the hypothesis verified only more *probable*. When verification is by direct perception of the very phenomenon supposed by the hypothesis, as in the example of the withering creeper cited above, the probability of the hypothesis being true is *cent per cent.*, provided of course we do not doubt the veracity of normal perception. This is the ideal limit of verification. But in cases of indirect verification the degree of probability must necessarily fall short of complete certainty. Even in a very simple case, if *H* being *c* can be expected, and *c* is observed by the verifying process to be actually there, the probability of *H* being true is only  $\frac{1}{2}$  or 50%, if there is the possibility of even *one* other (independent) way in which *c* may be caused. But in most cases there may be three, four or even more other ways in which *c* may be caused, and the probability thus attained by verification in such cases would be only  $\frac{1}{3}$ ,  $\frac{1}{4}$  or even less.

Consider in this way the probability attained by the verification of an hypothesis by a series of indirect steps, as in the example of the dream cited above, the formal argument of which was symbolically represented as: If *H* then *c*, if *c* then *d*, if *d* then *e*; *e* is, therefore *H* is. It will be found possible in such a case to explain each consequent in more than one way. In fact, the last consequent, the dreaming of the collapse of the upper

2. Cf. Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, for a similar dream. (P. 305. of *The Basic Writings* of Sigmund Freud).



storey can be explained, in many more ways. But even if we take the most modest view and can entertain the possibility of explaining each consequent only in *one* other way, the probability of *H* being true will be  $\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{2}$  or  $\frac{1}{8}$  only. It will at once appear how poor the probative value of a process of so-called scientific verification may at times be. A scientist not to mention the semi-scientist and pseudo-scientist, can be deceived into a sense of complacency by the long and arduous chain of experiments by which his hypothesis is verified, while in point of fact he has been travelling only farther and farther from complete certainty.

It should be mentioned however that even indirect verification can generate complete certainty, if it is known that the antecedent which we infer from the consequent is the only cause of that consequent. The formal argument then will be, only if *H* then *c*, *c* is, therefore *H* is. No fallacy will arise here, just as no fallacy arises when we simply convert a universal affirmative, the subject and predicate of which are known to be equi-pollent (e.g. All men are rational animals). In terms of the language of inductive logic this amounts to the statement that if all rival hypotheses have been *exhaustively eliminated* one can infer that the hypothesis in question is the only explanation of the consequent. Full certainty will therefore be enjoyed in such a case by the inference from consequent to antecedent. The aim of every science is such exhaustive elimination; but in point of fact, in most respects, even the most firmly held doctrines of science fall far short of this ideal. The possibility of rival theories can never be exhausted. The proof of the truth of a theory based on indirect verification is therefore always open to the danger of the formal fallacy of affirming the consequent.

It may be felt that in all the previous arguments while criticizing the fallacious nature of reasoning from consequent to antecedent, we have assumed the consequent to be the effect, and the antecedent (supposed by the hypothesis) to be the cause. But the relation between the logical antecedent and the logical consequent in a formal reasoning like "if *H*, then *c*," is one of implication, and such a relation may exist either between a cause and its effect, or between an effect and its cause (or a part of the cause), or between two co-effects, or between any two phenomena known otherwise to be related by some necessary relation. Does the fallacy arise in all such cases? We should, therefore, consider also these other cases. Let us call the imperceptible factor, supposed by

the hypothesis,  $x$ . Now can we infer  $x$  from the perceived  $c$ , if  $c$  is the cause of  $x$ ? We can, if we can feel sure that  $c$  is the cause of  $x$  in the sense of being the sole and sufficient condition of the the happening of  $x$ . But such a cause can nowhere be found except in the full sum of positive and negative conditions necessary for generating  $x$ , and we can never be sure, in any particular case, of the presence of all conditions which combined together bring about  $x$ , and sure also of the absence there of all conditions the presence of any or some of which will frustrate the happening of  $x$ . Consequently in any actual case we never eliminate doubt completely when we infer from  $c$  to  $x$ . And if  $c$  is admittedly only a part of the cause of  $x$ , then the inference will clearly be precarious. If again the relation between  $c$  and  $x$  be that of co-effects, such relation, being dependent ultimately on a causal relation, will be liable to the same objections. As for some other kind of necessary relation between  $c$  and  $x$ , we cannot think of any, if  $c$  and  $x$  represent two *different* spatio-temporal facts. Necessary relations (even if they are admitted, disregarding Schiller's wholesale denial of them) can be conceived only between *a priori* ideas, and not among empirical facts. The most intimate and reliable relation in the region of facts is of the causal type, or some other relation based on it. Therefore we cannot here hope for anything more reliable.

We find then that we cannot have any absolute certainty from any kind of verification, if it is indirect. The maximum probability attained by such verification cannot be more than fifty *per cent*. This calculation, of course, presupposes that the other way in which a consequent,  $x$ , can be explained is expected to be as frequent as the first. Moreover such calculation presupposes also what J. M. Keynes<sup>3</sup> pointed out to be the assumptions behind all scientific procedure, namely *the Principle of Limited Independent Variety*, and the *Principle of Atomic Uniformity*. If however any of these assumptions be not made, the probability cannot be calculated, though there would remain still the vague doubt or feeling that the consequent in question might be otherwise caused or accounted for.

We may consider one more point before we conclude. Does not the probability of an hypothesis, say  $H$ , increase if, not one, but many consequents which can be expected to follow from it,

3. In his *A Treatise on Probability*.

say  $f_1, f_2, f_3 \dots f_n$ , are all actually observed?<sup>4</sup> The answer must be in the affirmative. It must be admitted that the probability of an hypothesis goes on increasing with the number of expected consequents observed. For this is really the process by which rival hypotheses are eliminated. Another hypothesis,  $H_2$  can perhaps explain  $f_1$  and  $f_2$  but not  $f_3$ , nor  $f_4$ . We are entitled to reject  $H_2$  with formal rigour since the denial of a consequent enables us to deny its antecedent. For an example, if the earth were like an ellipsoid, in shape, rather than like a globe, we could quite explain why a ship sailing in the same direction should come back to the starting point, but it could hardly explain why the shadow of the earth seen during a lunar eclipse is *always* observed to be circular and never to be elliptical. Therefore, the rival hypothesis is rejected as being incompatible with this crucial observation. Similarly, the supposition that the earth is like a flat plate cannot explain why a ship sailing away from the observer should gradually disappear, bottom first and top last, though it may explain the circular shadow. But the hypothesis of the earth being a globe explains all of the many expected facts, and, therefore, it is far more probable than these rival suppositions.

But even this relative increase of probability does not amount to absolute certainty. The formal argument behind it is: If  $H$ , then  $f_1, f_2, f_3, \dots f_n$ ; but  $f_1, f_2, f_3 \dots f_n$  are (all observed), therefore  $H$  is. We have here the same precarious conclusion, open to the fallacy of affirming the consequent (and thence the antecedent). The factual or material significance of this situation is that there remains still the possible doubt that there perhaps may be another hypothesis which can explain the whole of  $f_1, f_2, f_3, \dots f_n$ . Such a doubt is countenanced by the constant progress of science itself, from less satisfactory to more satisfactory hypotheses. The Copernican hypothesis explains all that the Ptolemaic one tried to account for, and also certain other newly observed facts which the earlier theory did not consider. Thus indirect verification always falls short of complete certainty.

To remember this, is to give up the air of cock-sureness and self-sufficiency which often characterize the assertions of many scientific writers of to-day, and it is to retain the Newtonian humility of a genuine scientific mind, which does not shut the door to unseen possibilities and, therefore, to further progress.

4. Vide L. S. Stebbing, *A Modern Introduction to Logic*, p. 306.

# The Nature of Philosophic Thought in Hegel

By

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Pre-Kantian rationalists conceived of sense-perception as confused thought and so thought and perception did not represent for them two different kinds of knowledge, but the same kind of knowledge, only in different grades of clearness. Kant pointed to the distinction of matter and form in knowledge and supposed that the matter was supplied by intuition and the form by thought. Post-Kantian thinkers tried to overcome this Kantian dualism of matter and form, intuition and thought, and 'deduce' or rationalise the given element in knowledge entirely without leaving a residue. Hegel may be supposed to have carried to its utmost limit this attempt at all-round rationalisation, at the reduction of the sensible given to a moment in the process of rational thought.

Hegel defines Philosophy as "the thinking consideration of things". This definition would appear to be both too narrow and too wide, too narrow, because only the thinkable content would seem to come under philosophy, leaving out the contents of intuition, feeling and volition; and too wide, because every thought, of whatever object, even of our daily life, would be philosophy. This difficulty is removed when we consider that whatever is given in other modes of consciousness can also become an object of our thought and that there is a distinction between every-day thought and philosophic thought. The same content may be felt, perceived and thought, and the task of philosophy is to render in terms of pure thought or concept what is immediately experienced in the form of feeling or perception or whatever other modes of consciousness there may be. The entire realm of all possible objects therefore falls within the scope of philosophy, but only as conceived in their proper philosophic form.

From philosophic thought Hegel distinguishes *nach-denken* or reflexion over any object given in experience. Such reflexion leaves the object partly as given, even while formulating it with the aid of intellectual categories. This happens in judgements of

our daily life as well as in judgements of empirical science, as for instance when we say "This leaf is green". Here the object, although it is thought, does not appear in the pure form of thought; it is still one with sensible material. A content is only then conceived in the form of pure thought when there is nothing in it which has to be accepted merely as given or presupposed. To pure thought the object is no longer given as to *nach-denken*, or reflexion, but in the forward movement of thought itself the object is created and constructed. For an analogy to the dialectical generation of objective concepts, we may refer to mathematical thinking which constructs and creates its own objects.

Thought has thus in Hegel a wide and a narrow significance. In the wide sense every act of consciousness, even perception or feeling, is a thought. If it were otherwise, if there were an absolute distinction, for instance, between perception and thought, the perceived content would be incapable of being rendered in terms of thought. In the narrow sense thought is one among other intellectual activities, such as perception, feeling and volition, but at the same time it is the highest of these, in which all others culminate and attain their end and truth.

If we start with the ordinary fact of consciousness, we find that relation to an object is involved in the phenomenon of knowledge. Knowledge distinguishes itself from the object, and with this distinction the object becomes a thing in itself and knowledge something which is there for the object, in relation to which knowledge gets its truth. If however we are to judge of the truth of our knowledge we cannot compare our knowledge with the object *in itself*, but only with the object as it is for *us*. That is, we can only compare our knowledge with our knowledge. Doubt in the truth of our knowledge is not occasioned by any known incongruence between our knowledge and the object in itself, but by some inner ground, some felt inadequacy of our knowledge, some inner contradiction. This contradiction drives knowledge forward through the series of its various successive and more and more adequate formulations. Looked at from the succeeding and higher stage, the preceding and lower stage appears to give only an imperfect, false or merely subjective picture of the object, contrasted with which the knowledge now attained appears to represent the object in its true form. In the last stage of knowledge in which contradiction finally disappears

and the movement of knowledge comes to its end, the object in itself or the absolute coincides with absolute knowledge. For the distinction between the object in itself, and the mere subjective knowledge of it, which is possible and significant only when we look back from a higher standpoint, disappears altogether when we have reached the highest stage.

At the lowest stage of knowledge, there is yet no distinction between knowledge and its object and so there is no distinction between the knowledge of the object and a deceptive appearance of the same. Knowledge and object appear as one. This is the stage of sense-awareness or mere sensation, in which the data of outer and inner perception appear in their simple givenness. In this primitive immediate consciousness, in which error has no meaning, there is coincidence between content and consciousness, the sensed object and the sensing self. However in this immediate givenness of the content there is an inner dialectic or contradiction which does not allow us to remain at this stage. When we carefully consider the matter, we find that the knowledge of the given content consists in a look or a mere 'pointing', which fixes the given object, as a 'this' or a 'here and now'. But the 'this' at the very next moment becomes a 'that' and the 'now' becomes a 'then'. As soon as I go to cognise the content of immediate perception as such, it is no longer a content of immediate perception, and in place of the concrete manifold, which the given appeared to be, I am left with a very abstract and empty concept, the concept of 'this'. Every other and more concrete determination of the given would appear to be false, as it would no longer be knowledge of the given, but would have for its object something else.

We seek a fixed self-identical object in the given, in the passing here and now, which is at the time different from it. This object we call a thing and its multiple appearances its qualities. But this consciousness referring to a thing is no longer the immediate consciousness. In place of the immediately given, we have a 'thing' and in place of givenness or immediate awareness, we have perception. The standing self-identical thing has taken the place of an ever-changing this, and to this thing the passing contents are referred as to a supporting and unifying medium. From the standpoint of perception, the firm, persisting identical thing is the truth or reality, the passing, changing, unfixable and indeterminate content of sense mere unreal appearance. In observing and describing the persistent characters,

we seek to grasp the real thing which persists and remains identical with itself. Observational description is the form which knowledge assumes when the standpoint of perception is developed. We attempt to fix upon the real being of the thing and separate it from what unessentially belongs to it. But observational description fails to attain its end and is itself cancelled. We fail to find anything in the thing that remains identical with itself. The thing conceived as persistent and self-identical turns out to be for our knowledge an empty thing in itself. In fact the self-identical thing is no more than a mere appearance and its supposedly self-identical qualities are found to be themselves changing and dependent on various factors. Just as, earlier, the immediate given content turned out to be a subjective appearance, the qualities of the thing now appear merely as so many reflexes in our subjective consciousness of the thing. It is only for the eye that the thing is white, for the palate sweet, for the touch hard, etc.

The inner contradiction, to which we are thus led by perception, its attempt to discover the true reality in its object, is resolved in the concept of law and energy. There are no self-identical things or qualities. What remains identical with itself is the unchanging law of change. The standing realm of law, in a sense beyond the perceptual world, but nevertheless present in it, is the true reality, the inner essence, and the perceived world its external appearance. The concept of law first brings to us the concept of force or energy residing in things, but it is very soon found out that the persisting thing or, what is the same thing, the relatively permanent sum of qualities corresponding to the thing, is the product of the pure law which is devoid of sensible being. Concepts of law and force are concepts of the understanding and not of perception. They are not seen but are merely understood. Knowledge of reality thus passes from sensible perception to ratiocinative thought which supports itself on experience, formulates its law on the basis of experience and again explains experience by means of the law.

Contradiction reappears at the stage of ratiocinative thought. The attempt to grasp the truth in the concept of the persistent law leads at first to the formulation of a plurality of empirical laws and these are then sought to be reduced to as few a number as possible, and ultimately to one fundamental law. Truth for the

understanding, the essence of things, is contained in one such self-identical law which holds good universally.

As we rise to higher and higher laws, we get more and more abstract concepts, ultimately we are left with nothing but the universal concept of law as such, which expresses itself in all particular laws. But this abstract universal, the mere concept of law as such, corresponds to the empty 'this' and the 'thing in itself' of the earlier stages and we have to oppose to it its concrete filling or content and regard it as its appearance.

At this stage contradiction is resolved when ratiocinative thought passes over into conceptual thought and the understanding gives place to speculative reason. The transition is made possible in this way. Law itself is not thinkable without an other which it relates. Law thus posits a distinction which remains one with itself, an identical relation, in which really the meaning of law consists. Law contains within itself a distinction which is transcended in the unity of the law, a division which thus shows itself to be merely apparent. When the law in its essential nature is thought out to the end, it turns out to be a concrete universal, a true infinite which does not stand outside the finite particulars, but takes them up in its own being, limiting and determining them by one another, and at the same time reconciling their mutual opposition in its higher unity and thus making them contributory to its own rich content. The object of knowledge, truth or reality is no longer the abstract general law, but the infinite in this sense, the self-developing and self-maintaining whole of creative processes. In speculative thought, the universal concept becomes the fully concrete idea, the closed thought-system which comprehends and contains within itself all the richness of all actual objects. At this stage the separation between knowledge and truth or knowledge and object is completely overcome. It is only for knowledge of a lower stage that the object is some being in itself, not wholly taken up and absorbed in knowledge. This complete coincidence of knowledge and object characterises speculative thought as the highest stage of knowledge. Knowledge being completely identified with its object, at this stage it can no longer appear as illusory or subjective from a higher stage. Indeed no higher stage is possible.

I cannot pretend that what I have said in the above summary of Hegel's view is all very clear to me. There is no doubt however



that philosophic thought, as Hegel takes it, is very different from thought as it is ordinarily understood by common sense, science or logic or even by Kant. Thought is ordinarily taken to be quite formal, and dependent for its matter on another source of knowledge, viz. sense. Hegel makes thought self-subsistent and for him the distinction of matter and form is a distinction within thought itself, between a lower and a higher stage. Thought is thus both intuitive and discursive. Its content arises from within itself and is not a gift from any alien source. This represents the main idealistic position according to which the object of knowledge is a function of knowledge itself.

I can well understand that when I think truly, my thought is impersonal and not merely subjective; and if the ultimate reality is self or spirit, any adequate thought or category may be regarded as the self-definition of the spirit. But even so, the position is not without many serious difficulties and it is not my design to discuss them in the present paper. I may however refer to two or three points which appear very perplexing.

(i) If the matter of thought is thought itself at an earlier stage, then how does thought begin at all. It seems that thought has no matter to begin with; and if it can be without matter, why should it not remain so forever?

It may be said that there is no beginning or ending for thought. Thought, being one with reality, is always there. But what kind of thought is it that is one with reality and always there? It must be perfect and highest thought. What then about thought in the lower stages? In the highest thought, can there be any room for the lower stages. It is no use telling me that the thoughts of the lower stages are retained in their truth in the highest stage, because any thought in its truth, or as corrected, would not be thought of a lower stage. These stages then are mere subjective appearances. But reality being thought, which is objective, we can find no basis and no explanation for these subjective appearances.

(ii) What moves thought in its forward movement is supposed to be some inner contradiction. But can there be any contradiction in reality. If not, then there is no ground in reality for the supposed movement of thought. Contradiction is found in false thinking and is a mark of irrationality. If the real is

completely rational, how can there ever arise any contradiction? If thought has a tendency to produce contradictions how can we credit it with the opposite tendency to overcome them? We seem unable to provide for contradiction either in thought or in reality, and so we can discover no possible ground for any movement in pure thought.

(iii) Lastly, can we really understand the self-developing and self-maintaining whole of a creative process? If it develops how does it remain identical with itself; and if it is in process how is it a whole which must be completed thing? All these difficulties may be supposed to be due to our sticking to the standpoint of the understanding. But do we resolve these difficulties or merely confirm them, by referring them to the standpoint of the understanding? If the standpoint is real, the difficulties also stand there. If the standpoint is not valid, how is it even allowed within reality which is wholly rational?\*

\*In the preparation of this paper, the writer has been specially indebted to von Aster's *Geschichte der Neueren Erkenntnis-theorie*.

# What is Living and What is Dead in Hegel's Philosophy of History

By

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The critical investigations of Kant had sedulously shown that a finite mind is necessarily subject to limitations which are immanent in its very nature. The speculative spirit of Hegel believed in all seriousness to have broken through the confines of human intelligence by a movement of thought which sustains itself on its own contradictions. No doubt he must be given credit for having successfully asserted the rights of thought. Thought is not confined to the fetters of an analytic and discursive understanding but is the life of the real itself. Hegel knew that feelings have no philosophical worth unless they refer to something beyond themselves. But the dialectical movement has worked with a terrible nemesis on Hegel's own system. It has once again brought home a truth which is all but ignored that in every great system of thought there is something living and abiding and something that is exposed to the changing fortunes of time. This is tantamount to saying that though truth qua truth has supra-temporal validity, it is often mixed up with elements of momentary import. All the pragmatic prejudices of our century notwithstanding, who can gainsay that truth is life? The life, as we empirically experience it, is itself not the pure life but is given to destruction. Death is always lurking in it. But life in its ideal significance is perennial and undying. Though fully believing then in the eternal character of Truth and in the absolute values subsisting over and above the relativity of history and change, we can still with justification try to disengage the living from the dead in any system of speculation.

What is then living and what is dead in Hegel's Philosophy of History? No justice can be done to the stupendous work of Hegel save in relation to the work of his Great predecessor Immanuel Kant. An adequate appreciation of history was not given to this Philosopher of *apriori* thought. He was a philosopher of stereo-

typed categories and had hardly any sense for the flux of life. The antinomy of duty and love which was later resolved by Schiller in the conception of a beautiful character remained always unreconciled in his thought. The formal element of his ethics could not by its nature do justice to world-history whose portals are ever closed to those who cannot reckon with super-individual values and universal forces. It was in Herder that philosophical consciousness fully awakened to its own historical mission. But only in Hegel was it possible for it to do away with all the bias of a naturalistic outlook. History was to Hegel, in the words of R. Eucken, a logic and a dialectic on a cosmic scale. He rightly saw that the philosophy of history cannot bind itself to the category of change. A great panorama of nations and states passes by. Nations leave and quit their hegemony, centres of culture shift and change and the vicissitudes of national fortune greet our eye at every step. They awaken melancholy. "Who could stand in the ruins of Carthage, Palmyra, Persopolis, Rome without being led to contemplation on the evanescence of empires and men, without dis-interested melancholy on the fall of the brilliance and culture of human life". Hegel was further justified in his historical teleology. It was not after all in vain that the nations told their story for a while and passed away; they had to subserve some purpose. What was wrong in Hegel's contention was the pre-supposition that a general evolution following in time necessarily realises values which were lacking in the preceding culture. Thus from this stand-point the civilizations of India and China, Peru and Egypt are simply passing moments for the Greek world: the spirit rests immature. It could only reach its maturity in that consciousness of freedom which was characteristic of the Germanic World. Even the Greek, Hegel thought, could not elevate himself above the beautiful, the unity of the natural and the ideal; he could not attain truth, the ideal in its ideality. \* Hegel, thanks to his philosophical and national prejudices, could not see that civilizations and cultures, irrespective of their place in the temporal series, have realised super-temporal value in their own way. They have a cultural style of their own and their civilization has also something unique and irreplaceable in character. Every culture had a grandeur and glory of its own, a scale of values which it alone could realise. Moreover to think that it was in Greece alone that man became fully conscious of himself is to ignore those mystical and speculative traditions of the East where the consciousness of oneself ultimately merges in the consciousness

of one's own divine essence. Even Socrates who called upon man to know himself did not go much beyond psychological absorption. Borrowing the language of Hegel, we can say that even in Greece the spirit could not become in and for itself, could not move further than psychological realization.

But Hegel has not ignored the psychological laws that obtain in effecting the ruin of a civilization. A nation achieves greatness by its own incentive and initiative, by hard struggle and toil. But slowly nations lose the impetus and the urge, and the habit of life sets in. Habit, the memory and routine of life is pernicious, rather fatal in the long run. Once habits are completely formed no trace of the initiative remains, the springs of life and vitality dry out. The spirit of a nation dies and on its ruins another flourishes. Look at Nature. "The tree grows and blossoms forth in leaves, flowers, bears fruits and begins always anew. The one year old plant does not outlive its fruits. The tree survives the fruits for decades but it dies however. The renewal of life in Nature is only the repetition of one and the same; it is the monotonous history with the same cycle. Under the Sun happens nothing new but with the Sun of the spirit it is different". The principle of spirit is development and progress. It does not lose but gain in the never-ending process of lives and deaths. Every death is a stepping stone to a life more exuberant.

Notwithstanding the rationalistic attitude of Hegel which expresses itself in every page, he is not blind to the working of irrational forces in the world-history. Reason and passions are the warp and woof of the world-history. Even passions, the so-called irrational forces of psychic life are not so negligible as they might look,—they are the active forces which bring into realization the universal. Apart from their subjectivity, passions can also become the driving forces of deeds having a universal character. Taken in this sense nothing great has been brought about in the world without the working of passions. The harmony of universal ends with the particular interests of passions is the hall-mark of the state reaching the flower of its life.

Nor has the great truth escaped Hegel, that history is led by super-individual values. The Reason working in and through history exploits the nations for its own ends. It is the trick (List) of the Reason that it lets the nations bleed and die in its own interest. The spirit is in itself what it is, it unfolds itself in time and comes to the consciousness of its own essence. The

dialectic of history shows itself in the transition of the imperfect to the perfect, i.e., of an imperfect which has already the perfect in it as a tendency and urge. The opposition of the perfect against itself constitutes the dynamic of spiritual life. But here the same error mars the philosophy of Hegel, namely, that a culture following in time is a transition from the imperfect to the perfect. It is difficult to see in history any such progress, rather history shows infinite varieties of values imbedded and realised in cultures with a mission of their own and with unique and irreplaceable worth. They reflect the Divine from their own standpoint and their standpoint is the last word in history. Though Hegel assigns to the universal all the significance in history he could not totally ignore the working of the individual. The idea has to reveal itself in existential and substantial forms; the universal can incorporate itself in the world-history within the category of process. Recently the late Max Scheler and N. Hartmann have made much of the fact that the higher categories of values are wanting in power and need that energy from lower spheres of value and being to make themselves felt in life and history. The universal ends must embody themselves in historical individuals. Unlike Kant's conception of genius as an inborn talent which works as nature and is essential both for the appreciation and creation of art, the Hegelian heroes are the demoniac personalities who have the right on their side. But it is just in keeping with the spirit of Hegel's thought to consider the individual divorced from the particular interests of its empirical life and subservient to the aims and interests of the concrete universal.

It is painful to note that in modern times just this metaphysical character which makes for the greatness of Hegel has been neglected. Nicolai Hartmann who hails Hegel as the discoverer of objective spirit tries to purge his thought of its association with historical finality. The fate of the nations knows no transcendental guidance but is given to chance, the play of unknown factors. Over and above individual consciousness no other consciousness is known to Hartmann. Hence the objective spirit, the spirit without consciousness, the spirit in itself, is not an aggregate of individuals but something above them. The autonomy of the objective spirit, is all that Hartmann is prepared to accept as the abiding essence of Hegel's thought. Our differences with Hegel and Hartmann are equally profound. The great error of Hegel lies in the fact that he thinks that history is moving

for the realisation of a definite purpose, the idea of freedom and all the movement of history is unintelligible without it. The error of Hartmann lies in the fact that no consciousness beyond the individual and the finite is recognised by him. We are given to the conviction that the spirit as such can only be a subject and can never be an object, that the so-called objective spirit belongs to a totally different ontological status, that historical teleology, though the indispensable pre-supposition of the philosophy of history is only a limiting concept and cannot be rationally worked out to its last consequence. History is not moving towards one far off divine event, towards a predetermined goal, but rather the historical process is revealing itself in a multi-dimensional world of values. The 'in—itself' of history, the ultimate understanding of the motives playing in the processes of the world-history is not given to us. Faced with the mighty movements of history we can only stand with a religious sense of awe. To awaken to a sense of rationality in history and freely acknowledge the irrational in it, is the point of view which associates us with Hegel and leads us beyond him.

# Is Bergson a Monist ?

By

REV. E. GATHIER, S. J.

Since the publication of "The Creative Evolution" in 1907, Bergson has been enlisted by many philosophers among the tenants of a Pantheistic evolution, "Dynamical Monism", or as Jankelevitch puts it, "Bergsonism appears to us like a monism of substance and a dualism of tendencies".<sup>1</sup>

We must admit that texts could be quoted which might seem to bear this interpretation. Such is for instance the celebrated passage about the idea of the genesis of matter. "I simply express a probable similitude when I speak of a centre from which worlds shoot out like rockets in a fireworks display, provided however that I do not present this centre as a thing but as a continuity of shooting out; God, thus defined, has nothing already made. He is unceasing life, action, freedom".<sup>2</sup> And again: "The Absolute thus revealed is very near us, and in a certain measure in us. It is of psychological, and not of mathematical or logical essence. It lives with us. Like us, but in certain aspects infinitely more concentrated and more gathered up in itself, it endures."<sup>3</sup>

And as regards creation he affirms "Everything is obscure in the idea of creation, if we think of things which are created and a thing which creates. Things and states are only views, taken by our mind, of becoming. There are no things, there are only actions".<sup>4</sup>

We understand easily how Sir Radhakrishnan has been able to characterize the main tendency of Bergson's philosophy as "Monistic". "For there is a universal principle, spiritual in nature, in which all existence is gathered, an initial psychical movement

1. Jankelevitch "le Bergsonisme" p. 244

2. Creative Evolution (English Translation by Arthur Mitchell), 1911, p. 262.

3. C. E. 315.

4. C. E. 261.



which is responsible for the whole of evolution. Creative evolution may be literally compared to the spreading of different branches of a single root. The 'elan vital' goes on spreading out new branches...Matter, life, consciousness are such branches".<sup>5</sup>

But with his usual acuteness, Sir Radhakrishnan has shown the difficulties of Bergson's position, interpreted from a monistic point of view. "If to save his monism Bergson makes matter unreal, he cannot account for the evolution of the world. If to account for the drama of the universe he makes matter an independent existence, then his monism is affected. If dualism, God is opposed to matter like life to darkness. He is a suffering deity. God is the author of life and matter. Bergson's logic requires him to make it an impersonal principle from which both matter and life spring"<sup>6</sup>... "The God of Bergson is not only immanent in nature, but completely identical with it".<sup>7</sup>

But is the Monistic interpretation the only explanation? The difficulties to which it gives rise make us suspect that it is not the real key to the understanding of Bergson's theory.

This impression is reinforced when we see Bergson himself affirming, "The present essay does not aim at resolving at once the greatest problems. It simply desires to define the method, and to permit a glimpse of some essential points of the possibility of its application". If so, we are perhaps asking too much of Creative Evolution, which is a Cosmology, when we look to it for a solution of the essential problems of Theodicy. All the same we may gather already some affirmations about God: "He is freedom, unceasing life. Life as a whole, from the initial impulsion that thrust it into the world, will appear as a wave which rises, and which is opposed to the descending movement of matter".<sup>8</sup> So life is the result of an impulsion; then it must be distinct from it, as an effect from its cause.

Bergson thought it necessary to answer the charges levelled against him, in two letters which have generally not been translated fully into English. In the first one he affirmed: "I speak

5. *Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 150.

6. *Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 212, 213.

7. *Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 215.

8. *Creative Evolution—Introduction*, p. 105.

of God as the source from which spring by turn, and by an effect of His freedom the currents or 'the elans' of which each one will become a world. God remains distinct, and it is not of himself that it can be said that "oftener he turns short, or he is at the mercy of materiality, which he has been obliged to give to himself". The argumentation by which I establish the impossibility of the Idea of Nothing, is not at all directed against the existence of a cause transcending the world...I have explained on pages 299, 301, and 323 that it is directed against the Spinozist concept of being. It ends in affirming that something has ever existed. About the nature of this something it brings, it is true, no positive conclusion, but it has never said in any way that what has always existed is the world itself. The rest of the book says the contrary".<sup>9</sup>

And in a second letter he said: "I have nothing to add for the time being, because the philosophical method, as I understand it, is absolutely moulded on experience (interior and exterior), and does not allow me to go further than the empirical conclusion upon which it is founded...the considerations of Creative Evolution present creation as a fact. From all this we derive the Idea of a God creator, free and generating at once matter and life, whose creative effort is continued in a vital direction, by the evolution of species and the construction of human personalities. From all that, springs consequently *the refutation of Monism and Pantheism in general*".<sup>10</sup> We see a similar affirmation in Louis Levine's interview in N.Y. February 22, 1941 (quoted by Sir S. Radhakrishnan) "the source of life is undoubtedly spiritual. Is it personal?—Probably. Of course, personal in a different way, without all the accidental traits which, in our minds, form parts of personality, and which are bound up by the existence of a body. But personal in a larger sense of the term, a spiritual unity expressing itself in the creative process of evolution". Except for the word 'probably' such a statement could be accepted by theists. They have never dreamt of limitation as the essence of the divine person. A free centre of activity and love is what is essential in a person.

In his second letter Bergson affirmed that "to say more on that subject of God, one should touch problems of another kind, moral problems. I am not sure to publish anything on that subject, I

9. C. E. 284.

10. Etudes 1912, p. 515.

shall do it only if I reach results which seem to me as 'demonstrable' or monstrable as those of my other works".<sup>11</sup>

Even after these clear affirmations, which do not leave any doubt about the intimate conviction of the author, all shadows have not disappeared. What is the distinction between God and the vital elan? Is it a distinction of nature, or only the one between the source from which the river springs and the river?

"The two sources of Morality and Religion" will give us a more adequate answer. We have not to see there a re-statement of the position taken in *Creative Evolution*. He himself has said it. "No doubt we are here going beyond the conclusions we reached in *Creative Evolution*. We wanted to keep as close as possible to facts. We stated nothing that could not be confirmed by the tests of biology. In fact the conclusions we have just set out, complete naturally though not necessarily those of our former work".<sup>12</sup> In what does this progress consist? In affirming the existence of a God creator, who is love.

The method by which he comes to that conclusion will be taken from the experience of the Mystics. "Mysticism ought to furnish the means to treat experimentally the problem of the existence and of the nature of God". For Bergson there is no means to start the inquiry in any other way, "because an object is real in so far as it can be given in an existence real or possible".<sup>13</sup> On account of this anti-intellectualism the reasoning which reaches the God of the philosophers does not reach the real God of whom the rest of mankind is thinking".

"The mystical experience comes to correct all the conceptual mistakes of the philosophers. In our eyes, the ultimate end of mysticism is the establishment of a contact, consequently a partial coincidence, with the creative effort of which life is the manifestation. This effort is of God, that is if not God himself".<sup>14</sup> There we find again a distinction between the creative effort, the cause—and the manifestation, the effect: life. "The great mystic is to be conceived as an individual who is capable of transcending the

11. *Etudes* 1912 p. 515.

12. *C.E.* p. 219.

13. *C.E.* Pp. 206, 216.

14. *M.R.* p. 210.

limitations imposed on the species by its material nature, and continues and extends the divine action. To the objection that the experiences of the great mystics are individual and personal, he replies, that "it is by no means certain that a scientific experiment, or more generally an observation recorded by science can always be repeated and verified".<sup>15</sup>

There is also the fact "that mystics generally agree among themselves. This is striking in the case of Christian mystics. To reach the ultimate union with God they go through a series of states. These may vary from mystic to mystic, but there is a strong resemblance between them".<sup>16</sup> Then "probabilities may accumulate and the sum total be practically equivalent to certainty".<sup>17</sup>

"However the mystical experience alone could not convince altogether the philosopher, if he had not another way to come to know that man can enter into contact with the principle of life".<sup>18</sup> But this proof has been given: there is the possibility of intuition. We must not be astonished if we first reach probabilities.<sup>19</sup> "Probabilities may accumulate, and the sum-total be practically equivalent to certainty. We have alluded elsewhere to those lines of facts, each one but indicating the direction of truth, because it does not go far enough; truth itself will be reached if two of them can be prolonged to the point where they intersect".<sup>20</sup> That God exists is a fact which is reached in the mystical experience.

But what is the nature of God? Is he a neutral principle from which the world necessarily flows?—No, "God is love, is a person". Such is the gist of Bergson's affirmation. "The mystic does not care about the attributes that reason thinks it discovers in God. He affirms one thing, which contains everything: God is love and the object of love. What he does state clearly is that divine love is not a thing of God, it is God Himself".<sup>21</sup> But love supposes intelligence, supposes that the one who loves is a person; Bergson affirms the truth. "It is upon this point that the philosopher must

15. M.R. p. 211.

16. M.R. p. 188.

17. M.R. p. 212.

18. M.R. p. 212.

19. M.R. p. 216.

20. M.R. p. 212.

21. M.R. p. 216.

fasten who holds God to be a person, and yet wishes to avoid anything like a gross assimilation to man".

*God and Creation.*—Creation, and consequently distinction of God and creatures is affirmed. "Granted the existence of a creative energy which is love, and which desires to produce for itself beings worthy to be loved, it might indeed sow space with worlds, whose materiality, as the opposite of divine spirituality, would simply express the distinction between being created and creating, and the indivisible emotion from which they sprang.

Beings have been called into existence who were destined to love and to be loved, since creative energy is to be defined as love. Distinct from God who is this energy itself, they could only spring into being in a universe.....<sup>22</sup>

*No Real Identification with God.*—The English edition speaks of the ultimate identification with God, in which mystics go through a series of states. One might question the rendering of the words: "La defication definitive". They present another possible meaning, that of union through grace, where creatures and God keep their own personalities.<sup>23</sup>

But since "grace" has not to enter the frame of Bergson's experience, we are obliged to consult other texts which will make clear the thought of the author, and where the distinction of the mystic even in the act of the mystical union is affirmed.

"There comes a boundless joy...God is there, and the soul is in God."<sup>24</sup>

To be in God is a distinct state from being God. The distinction is clearer when we read that "though the soul becomes, in thought and feelings, absorbed in God, something of it remains outside. This something is the will."<sup>25</sup> Since in this text the mystic has not yet reached the final consummation, let us turn to a text which speaks of it. And in the supreme state "the mystic soul yearns to become God's instrument. Now it is God who is acting through the soul and in the soul. The union is total, therefore final".

22. M.R. p. 220.

23. M.R. p. 211 (Eng. Ed.) p. 263 (Fr. Edit.).

24. M.R. p. 196.

25. M.R. p. 197.

"Yet effort remains indispensable, endurance and perseverance likewise...But they come of themselves, they develop of their own accord, in a soul acting and acted upon, whose liberty coincides with the divine activity. They represent a vast expenditure of energy, but this energy, is supplied as it is required, for the superabundance of vitality which it demands flows from a spring which is the very source of life....Nothing remains to distinguish such a man, the mystic, from the men about him. He alone realizes the change which has raised him to the rank of *adjutores Dei*, patients in respect to God, agents in respect to men".<sup>26</sup>

"How could he be aught but humble, when there has been manifested to him, in mute colloquy, alone with Him who is Alone, through an emotion in which his whole soul seemed to melt away, what we may call the divine humility?"<sup>27</sup> For the love which consumes him is no longer simply the love of a man for God, it is the love of God for all men. Through God, in the strength of God, he loves all mankind with a divine love".<sup>28</sup> This final stage corresponds to the first. All along we find that if there has been moral union, intimate penetration of the will and intelligence of man by the action of God, there has never been an identification of nature. Both of them have kept their ontological reality, the iron has been penetrated by the fire, the light has passed through the crystal, one has not been dissolved into the other. "The soul would be content to feel itself pervaded, though retaining ITS OWN PERSONALITY, by being immensely mightier than itself, just as iron is pervaded by the fire which makes it glow".

The similitude taken from the instrument also shows this distinction; the instrument is distinct from the person using it, although it receives from him an impulse which makes it co-operate in producing effects which are beyond its ken, if left to itself. The chisel which cuts the marble under the hand of a Michael Angelo and helped to the creation of the Moses, received an impulse which made it so to say intelligent, and elevated it to the plan of intellectual realization. Entitatively it remained distinct in the making of the master-piece; each one (sculptor and tool) had its

26. M.R. Pp. 198-199.

27. M.R. p. 199.

28. M.R. p. 181.

own activity; the sculptor, the principal cause, the instrument, the chisel, both co-operated in a work, but the principal cause sustained its superiority and distinction even when it moved the instrument.

We do not insist on the fact that for Bergson Christian Mystics are the complete realization of Mysticism. His method of taking them independently from the theological context would not lead us to any certain conclusion about the distinction of the mystic and God. But one may question the legitimacy of this dichotomy which considers the affirmations of the mystics without any reference to their intellectual back-ground—this intellectual and dogmatic back-ground has prepared and sustained the mystical experience. If, as we ought, we take into consideration the context of the lives of the Christian mystics we shall see that the most authentic representatives, a St. John of the Cross, a St. Teresa of Avila had their whole life impregnated, with the ideas of creating, of absolute ontological separation between creature and Creator.

Other flaws can be pointed out in Bergson's reasoning. Some expressions like "partial coincidence", if the stress is put on coincidence, divine humanity, "machine to make gods", seem at first sight startling; but the texts in which Bergson has exposed *ex-professo* his theory allows us to affirm that he was not the dupe of his own words. He knew too well the difference between the idea and its expression: namely even when he likens creation to a literary composition or to the creation of a symphony. There, as often in Bergson, the images are notations, suggestions which have to lead his reader to the intuition of truth. They remind one of Plato's Myths, which were used to make people suspect what clear concepts could not clearly convey. We may regret, without exaggerating it, the anti-intellectualism of Bergson; but we have to take it into account when reading his text. One proof more can be given. Rev. Fr. P. Gorce O. P. in the Review 'Sophia', Rome 1935 gave what he thought represented the chief tenets of Bergson. They were as follows: God is not a phantom of the human mind, but an all powerful creator. Each human creature is free and capable of morality.

Bergson replied on the 16th August, 1935. "You have put in bold relief with great force the significance of my works....As to the question between realism and idealism, if it is necessary

to choose between those two 'isms', I shall not hesitate a single moment; it is to realism, and to the most radical realism, that I attach the totality of my views. I have never been able to consider knowledge as a construction".

And he adds: "My approbation of your study is complete". And this study had placed as one of the cardinal points, creation.

In these few pages we have let Bergson speak for himself, because it seems to us that the texts quoted show that little doubt can be entertained about the thought of this great philosopher, who has summed up his ideas about God in "God is love", and so a person.



# Intellect and Intuition

By

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The concepts of intellect and intuition have been discussed threadbare in past philosophical and religious literature. But in the fog and mist of controversy their true import is not as yet realized. Whether one assigns the post of honour to intellect or to intuition as the final arbiter of truth appears to depend on temperamental differences. Those who are highly emotional, of the artistic and the religious way of life, swear by intuition, while those who are imbued with the cognitive spirit of cold logic are unwilling to give even a patient hearing to things beyond logic. Further, the question of *method* in philosophy has engaged the attention of Philosophers of all ages. Curiosity, the basis of our intellectual framework is regarded as the parent of all philosophy in Europe, while in ancient India Philosophy took its birth in the attempt of man to escape from the perils of life by a realisation of the ultimate reality which is described as intuitive experience. Descartes and Locke, Kant and Hegel, and the contemporary philosophers of the West have been predominantly intellectual. It is only Bergson in France that opened the eyes of Western thinkers to the limitations of the method of reason and pointed to the need for supplementing reason by intuition. In this essay it is proposed to throw some light on the concepts of intellect and intuition and estimate their value in leading us to the heart of Reality.

The necessity of correct definition of concepts is easily brought home to us; but correct definition is by no means easy. Words are proverbially ambiguous. They more often conceal thought than reveal it. The same words are used but different thoughts are meant and further investigation reveals them to refer to totally different experiences. No wonder that philosophical thinking is in chaos. The fate of the problem of intellect and intuition is no better. There are a good many definitions of intellect as of intuition and more views as to their relationship. We are lost in the maze of definitions and views. One would like to step aside

and try to be clear of the maze by attempting to understand the concepts in the light of one's own thinking and experience.

The term intellect is described as a "Faculty of knowing and reasoning".<sup>1</sup> But this is vague and highly misleading. It suggests the old faculty psychology. The term 'Knowing' is so comprehensive that it includes the process of perception and intuition. The method of intellect is the method of 'reasoning'. But what exactly do we mean by reasoning is just the problem. When Hegel describes Philosophy as a 'thinking consideration of things' he means by it a cognitive process, a process of analysis of human experience. Science no less than philosophy employs the method of reason (or intellect), for the determination of truth. The cognitive process involved in the method of science is the same as that of philosophy. But the point of view and the goal to be reached are entirely different. Science analyses aspects of experience and the boundaries are marked by the scientist himself. But philosophy analyses *experience as a whole*. It is an intellectual attempt at *grasping* the nature of the *Real*. The method of intellect both in science and philosophy is marked by the spirit of disinterestedness, persistent inquiry, and involves observation, experiment, investigation and argument. The intellectual process is a process of analysis and synthesis.

The term intuition is equally vague. It is regarded as a name for the ignorance of the causes at work. It is regarded as a mysterious faculty which takes some gifted persons to the highest flights of mysticism. It is generally set in opposition to intellect. It is none of these. The term intuition implies immediacy or direct awareness. But sensuous perception also gives us immediate knowledge. Intuition gives us knowledge which is non-sensuous (or not purely sensuous) and immediate. The knowledge derived by intuition is not confined to any one aspect of the human personality. It is not mere perceptual knowledge nor is it merely a set of concepts formulated by the intellect. It is the knowledge gained by the entire personality. It is of the nature of an insight or Darsana. The entire self or Atman must be in tune with the universe. The knowledge gained by intuition gives the possessor a feeling of absolute certainty because of its immediacy.

It is clear that intellect and intuition are the two processes of grasping the nature of reality. What exactly is the role of each in the knowing process? In this connection no body can afford to neglect the views of Henri Bergson. Bergson, in his work "An introduction to Metaphysics" expresses an absolute contrast between intellect and intuition. He points out that "Philosophers in spite of apparent divergencies, agree in distinguishing two profoundly different ways of knowing a thing. The first implies that we move round the object; the second that we enter into it. The first depends on the point of view at which we are placed and on the symbols by which we express ourselves. The second neither depends on a point of view nor relies on any symbol. The first kind of knowledge may be said to stop at the *relative*; the second, in those cases where it is possible, to attain the absolute".<sup>2</sup> Intellect is purely analytical in character, takes only the snapshots of the reality. It cuts the concrete reality—change—into bits of matter and the knowledge given by intellect is not real knowledge. Intellectual knowledge is only useful; but not true. It is only intuition that can give us a knowledge of the absolute—the '*elan vital*'. "By intuition is meant," says Bergson, "the kind of *intellectual sympathy* by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible."

This opposition between intellect and intuition is thoroughly unjustifiable. If the knowledge given by intellect is false and unreal the entire field of scientific knowledge becomes mere moonshine. But scientific facts have at least as much reality as the facts of ethical life or aesthetic enjoyment. An intuition which lacks an intellectual foundation is utterly empty and contentless even as a spiritual universe without a *terra firma* is an unreal abstraction. Bergson under-estimates the importance of intellect in the knowing process. He is wrong in thinking that the intuitive processes are absent in scientific knowledge. Many of the greatest inventions of science are due to the intuitions of scientists who have equipped themselves for their calling by a strenuous process of intellectual discipline. The mind of man can never be compartmentalised into the intellectual and the intuitive. Though the predominant tendency of Bergson is to oppose intellect to intuition,

he himself recognizes the kinship between the two in another connection. "If it (Metaphysics) is a serious occupation of the mind, if it is science and not simply an exercise it must transcend concepts in order to reach intuition. Certainly, concepts are necessary to it, for all the other sciences work as a rule with concepts, and metaphysics cannot dispense with the other sciences".<sup>3</sup>

The Bergsonian emphasis on intuition as the only method of reaching philosophic truth finds its analogue in the Vedantic doctrine of intuition as expounded by Sankara. According to Sankara "Intuition is the final result of the inquiry into Brahman". Sākṣātkāra is a process of knowing distinct from perception or inference. Sankara dissociates himself from the view that intellect is opposed to intuition. He believes that the Yogin, "whose mind is restrained by the practice of yoga sees the self, the highest which is wholly spirit and essentially light by means of the purified inner organ",<sup>4</sup> while intuition is a mode of knowing distinct from intellect there is no opposition between the two. As Sir S. Radhakrishnan observes, "For Sankara, it is a fulfilment of it. Intuitive experience is the crown of intellectual knowledge *Anubhavāvasānam Brahmajñānam, anubhavārūḍha eva ca Vidyā-phalam*. Intuition is not a substitute for rational knowledge but a supplement to it. It is rational thought matured to inspiration". While one can agree whole-heartedly with Sankara that self-discipline, study, and reflection are the necessary stages in the development of knowledge by intuition, it is not easy to accept his view when he describes the nature of such knowledge. According to him intuition is not so much a means of knowing as the ultimate result itself. Intuition is the crown of all intellectual activity. It is the end and not the starting point. Intuition is the experience of the supreme Brahman or the Absolute. It is that state of supreme bliss in which the Atman and Brahman cease to be different. In the revelatory experience of intuition the Brahman stamps its authentic mark of truth on the experiences of the Atman. Such an experience is ineffable and non-communicable. The intuitive experience is the silent witness to its own truth or reality. One is in the midst of mysticism which cannot be proved and, as the mystics assert, which needs no proof. Brought to such

3. Ibid, p. 17.

4. Quoted by Sir S. Radhakrishnan. Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress, Mysore Session, 1932, p. xi.

a pass philosophical thinking signs its own death warrant. As J.L. Stocks rightly observes: "An intuition which claims sacrosanctity and declines the test of reason is, as Locke and Mill both protested, a moral and social offence, a mere misnomer for blind prejudice and crass superstition".<sup>5</sup>

Philosophy can be saved from dogmatic theology and mystic silence by viewing intellect and intuition as processes of knowing. Both are mental processes leading to certain results. The knowledge gained by intuition may be true or false even as the knowledge gained by intellect may be true or false. There can be no intuition, however sublime, which can free itself from logical criticism. Every intuition must be tested by logic as well as by life. Sankara appears to be wrong in thinking that intuition is only the last stage or the final result. The process of intuition is with us all the time of our knowing life. As Spearman says "any lived experience tends to evoke immediately a knowing of its characters, and experimenter",<sup>6</sup> and the process of knowing is intellectual as well as intuitive. H. H. Price in his careful analysis of the process of perception points out that the perceptual act has a 'pseudo-intuitive' character. Further he points out that for him 'genuine intuition' is the result of active thinking. We may analyse an act of simple apprehension of a 'rose', for instance. The object is presented in sensation and the mind perceives the whole of the 'rose' and not any particular part of it. This 'totalistic' or synoptic vision may be described as intuition. What the mind has grasped as one unit is analysed and dissected. This process of analysis is inevitably accompanied by a process of synthesis. The knowledge that emerges is certainly more concrete and more real than the knowledge at the stage of simple apprehension or the first intuition of the rose. Such an analysis should not lead us to the conclusion that intellect and intuition exhibit temporal succession in the knowing process. Both may be present simultaneously in any act of knowing. There is no reasoning process, which is entirely devoid of the intuitive element, nor can there be an intuition which is absolutely irrational. What is intuited may be reasoned about, and any process of reasoning may yield an intuition. Intuition is pervasive of all intellectual processes. It

5. Indian Philosophical Congress, Mysore Session, 1932, p. 11.

6. Reason and Intuition, and other Essays, p. 10. Cf. Perception, by H. H. Price.

may be possible to have the Absolute or Brahman reflected in the unity of a self or Atman by a single act of intuition when the mind is intellectually alive and equipped with a complete store of facts. Even such an intuition must pass through the Fire of Philosophical criticism. It is true that philosophical activity which is at the stage of mere discursive understanding is engaged in a process of severe analysis. But such fractional thinking is futile if it does not pass into an integral experience, an experience which becomes the basis for further thinking, and in this fashion the quest of reality moves forward till the attempt is crowned with success. In the words of Sir S. Radhakrishnan "Intuitive insight, whatever be the line, is a whole-view where the mind in its totality strains forward to know the truth. The realisation of this undivided unitary life from which intellect and emotion, imagination and interest arise is the essence of the spiritual life".<sup>7</sup>

7. *An Idealist view of Life*, p. 211.

# Aristotle's Theory of Causation

By

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*Baroda*

Generally speaking, Aristotle was more empirical and realistic than Plato, that is to say, he had more respect for the world of sense, but he was not blind to other aspects of reality, and actually shared some of Plato's fundamental views. Aristotle agreed with Socrates and Plato about the importance of general ideas or concepts for knowledge. But he declined to accept a world of Platonic "Ideas" more or less aloof from the world of sense. He regarded ideas as necessary in order to explain or to understand the world of experience, and he endeavoured to reconcile ideas with percepts, universals with particulars, as jointly constituting the world of reality and of knowledge. His attempt was based on the notions of "matter" and "form", which had hitherto been divorced from each other, but which he joined in a new harmony. Whereas the early Ionians had stressed "matter" only, while the Pythagoreans and Plato stressed "form" only, Aristotle maintained that they belong to one another, that "form" is immanent in "matter", the universal is immanent in the particular—they may be distinguished, but not separated from one another. Plato's "Idealism" was largely the outcome of his pre-occupation with pure geometry and its ideal figures. Aristotle's interests were mainly biological, and his study of the phenomena of growth and development gave no encouragement to the conception of immutable "Ideas." In fact by his use of the conceptions "form" and "matter", Aristotle attempted to reconcile the opposite views of those who, like the Eleatics, treated changes as illusion and identified the real with the immutable, and those who, like Heraclitus and his followers, identified the real with the "flux" of change or process. Aristotle tried to do justice to both. He recognised in all ordinary things both matter and form, or a comparatively raw stuff and some finishing touch which made it a comparatively finished product. The nature of the distinction varies in different cases. In the case of a statue the marble is the matter, the shape imposed on it by the sculptor is the form. In the case of a plant or an animal, or

a man, the bodily structure is the matter, while a certain function or combination of functions (nutrition, sensibility or reason, respectively) constitutes the form. In the case of human character certain impulses and instincts constitute the matter, while the way in which they are organised, drilled or "licked into shape" constitutes the form. Moreover nothing is without some form. Even the most elementary kinds of matter recognised in his time (fire, air, water, earth) were regarded by Aristotle as different forms of primary matter resulting from different combinations of ultimate qualities (dry, moist, hot, cold).

Intimately connected with Aristotle's doctrine of matter and form is his doctrine of the four kinds of cause. If we are to understand certain objects fully, then there are four things we must ascertain, namely, (a) their material cause, that is the matter or stuff of which they consist, (b) the formal cause, that is the form or law of their constitution or composition, (c) the efficient cause, that is the agency through which the matter took on that form, and (d) the final cause or the purpose which they serve. Aristotle explained that not all these kinds of causes are to be found or sought in all things; some things are sufficiently explained by reference to the material and efficient causes alone.

Aristotle reduced these four principles to two viz. Matter and Form. He showed that formal cause, efficient cause and final cause all meet in the single conception of Form. In the first place the formal cause and the final cause are the same, for the formal cause is the essence, the concept, the idea of the thing. Now the final cause or the end is simply the realization of the idea of the thing in actuality. What the thing aims at is the definite expression of its form. It thus aims at its form. Its end, final cause, is thus the same as its formal cause. Secondly, the efficient cause is the same as the final cause, for the efficient cause is the cause of becoming. The final cause is the end of the becoming, it is what it becomes. And in Aristotle's opinion, what causes the becoming is just that it aims at the end. The striving of all things is towards the end, and exists because of the end. The end is thus itself the cause of becoming or motion. That is to say, the final cause is the real efficient cause. The end or final cause of the acorn is the oak. And it is the oak which is the cause of the acorn's growth, which consists essentially in a movement by which the acorn is drawn towards its end, the oak. We see this even more clearly in the case of human productions. The efficient cause of the statue is the sculptor. It is he that moves the marble,



but what moves the sculptor and causes him to act upon the marble is the idea of the completed statue in his mind. The idea of the end present in the sculptor's mind is a motive. This is possible only in the case of human productions. In Nature there is no mind in which the end is conscious of itself, but nevertheless Nature moves towards the end and the end is the cause of the movement. Thus of the four kinds of causes which Aristotle enunciates viz., the material, formal, efficient and final causes, the last three melt into a single notion which Aristotle calls the "form" of the thing. And this leaves only the material cause unreduced to another. So we are left with the single antithesis of matter and form.

Matter and form are the fundamental categories of Aristotle's philosophy by means of which he seeks to explain the entire universe. Matter and form are inseparable. The distinction between matter and form is relative. But this relativity has its limits. Material objects cannot have less form than the so-called four elements. Nor can the forms of ordinary things exceed certain levels. A block of granite may assume the form of an image of some kind, but it cannot develop into a plant; an acorn may eventually assume the form of an oak-tree but not an animal. Such considerations induced Aristotle to assume the fixity of species, though this did not prevent him from comparing the rich variety of things and noting what a wonderful ascending series, or "scale of nature" they constituted. The conception of such a "scale of nature", beginning with the limiting case of formless matter and ascending through richer and richer forms to the highest forms of life, led him to the conception of an upper limit or apex, a being so perfect that he cannot be regarded as matter for further development, and so could be conceived as form only. This being is God whom (and whom only) Aristotle conceived in the manner of an immutable Platonic "Idea". God, according to Aristotle, is not the Creator, for matter and the forms are eternal, there being no break in the embodiment of the forms in matter. Yet, in some way, all things feel drawn towards God. He is the object of the world's desire, and by His mere presence lures objects to higher stages of development. He is the "unmoved mover" of the universe, and "it is love (for Him) that makes the world go round".

# The Conception of an Idea—and an Ideal World

By

PROF. J. K. SARKAR

*Introduction.*—The idea stands for, means some physical object. The material enters into the mind in the form of ideas. When the mind wakes up to the meaning of sensations, it knows the object. The mind comes to *an awakening* in the case of understanding the physical world. The mental life contains a long succession of ideas uninterrupted by any sense experience. The starting-point of the series of ideas is always sensory experience. But the train of ideas, once started, can go on for a long time without the help of perceptions or sensory experiences. This shows that every idea has a tendency to release itself from physical existence. The idea in relation to the world wants to stand out of all relation to it. It tends to pass to a new world, e.g., the world of generalisation. This new world of independent ideas is purely mental in nature, bearing no counterpart whatever in the physical world. It is the mental world, the realm of independence or autonomy.

The demand and aspiration of the mind is to pass beyond physical existence and to gain more and more in its latent autonomy. Its deeper nature comes to a greater and greater awakening the more it rises to the level of pure inwardness and independence. The idea seems to find its own real nature and live in a world of its own, as soon as it becomes pure and free from its physical roots.

There are some difficulties that do not allow 'the idea in relation to the physical world' to pass to the idea-in-itself. The idea-in-relation is rooted in an order which is empirical. The idea-in-itself is something more than or above the empirical series. The constant reference of the idea to its physical basis is a great obstacle to a universal completion of itself. The material relations of the idea may throw some light on it but cannot give a clue to the idea in its totality and purity. The idea perceives the material world, understands and interprets it, divides and

recombines it, but *also passes beyond it*. In the movement of an idea to a new and independent world there lies the deep urgency of the mind to pass beyond physical existence. So, one may conceive of the world of ideal existence by the side of the world of physical objects. Or, one may think of psychical reality alongside of the physical reality or a second world beyond the first or physical world.

The problem is: Does the idea lead us away from or towards reality, as it leaves the physical world behind?

The march of the idea in its intellectual or interpreting enterprise casts some light on the problem.

1. The idea develops into a principle or law. As such it is the interpreter of the world. It carries us from the individual object of perceptual judgment into the realm of the general notions of conceptual judgment. It goes beyond particulars to universals. It develops into factual-judgments and value-judgments. The principles give us norms and criteria for the classification and appraisal or evaluation of all things physical or mental. Some meaning is made out of the things and some value is given to them only in the light of some principles or laws that have unfolded by means of concepts and ideas. It is in describing and appraising (i.e. understanding) the world that the reality of the idea lies.

General concepts or ideas, principles or laws are generally called universals, and the special objects of the particular judgments are called particulars. Particulars may be taken as the copies or appearances of which the universals are the originals or the reality. Here, also, the ideas which are 'the wholes or totalities of individual particular concepts' pass the barriers of physical existence.

The principles or laws are transcendental in character. According to Eddington the genuine laws which control the physical world are of a transcendental character.<sup>1</sup> The principles which ideas have brought into the human mind or experience contain something more which is totally different from anything of the physical world. The world of principles or laws acquires a new quality (or reality) and also attains autonomy. The autonomy of the idea in the form of the principles increases with the increase

1. Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World*, Pp. 244-246.

of its break from its physical world. In understanding the world the idea (or the mind) passes beyond it and at the same time creates a new world. It is not only the interpreter of the physical world but also the creator of a new world of principles or laws. In describing and evaluating physical existence the idea causes the emergence of a new reality with a change of character.

2. The idea transforms the impressions made by the objects upon the senses and the object gains the meaning. The object becomes the meaning itself. As such it is removed from bare physical existence to a level other than the physical one. The object as meaning is quite different from the object of the physical world. It is transformed into an ideal fact. It is resolved into the subject or drawn in by the mind to form a meaning. In fact, the object, if it is found to remain outside the mind, cannot become a meaning. It must lose its 'thing-hood' before it can have a meaning. "To know the object is to identify, to overcome its otherness." To detach the object as the ideal fact from the mind is to miss its true nature and existence.

The impression coming from the object is transformed into particular limited concepts and these concepts are again merged into an idea. By means of mental manipulation of abstraction and generalisation the object is transformed into an idea and acquires meanings. The idea is independent and transcendent. In the transformation of physical existence into the mental existence there is a real break with the physical order. The idea forms a new and unique world. In understanding the physical object (or world) the mind creates a second or unseen kind of world. It is this ideational world, i.e., the world of concepts and ideas that must come in order that a knowledge of any physical object becomes possible. To interpret is to create. The second world of ideas is a reality as it is the only thing that can interpret the first world. It is a new and unique world by itself as it has no counterpart in the physical world.

3. As the idea marches on it creates more. The idea creates the ideal objects, viz., perfect triangles, perfect angles, etc. It solves empirical problems and passes beyond the empirical series. This is also true in other departments of knowledge viz. Logic, Ethics, etc. The creation of such pure Mathematical conceptions point out that the idea yearns towards its ideal form. This is but the creation of a world as an Idea, showing the real break of the idea with physical existence and entry into a new realm of experience. The

world of ideal objects created by the idea possesses a reality or existence of its own, though not the reality or existence belonging to the physical world. In brief, the idea has an existence of its own and the physical grounds are not sufficient to explain the reality of the idea.

4. The idea proceeds further in its ideal creation and attempts to complete itself in its ideals of life. However, the creation of a perfect second world is the ultimate end of the idea.

The reality of the second or ideal world:—

(a) The mind is an activity not only as a type of reaction but also as a type of creativity. The object, in order to be known, must be in a cognitive relation to the ideas created by it. In fact, the mind is already working in the ideal world even when, at lower levels, it is creating particular concepts and ideas. It is working in the ideal world when, at higher levels, it is creating ideal objects like perfect figures. It is also going further into the ideal world when it is creating values and ideals. It cannot stop short of passing into the ideal world. But at every phase of its development from sense-perceptions to the formation of ideals the idea (or the ideal world) is gaining in transcendence and autonomy and becoming a larger and larger 'critical novelty' with a change of character. The idea finds its roots in the physical objects but at the same time transmutes and transcends them and thereby interprets them. They are moulded and explained by what is beyond them. So, the reality of the idea or the ideal world implies the reality of the empirical world. It is only when it is cut off from the ideal world that the empirical world is wrongly understood or not understood at all.

(b) The mind shows the tendency to create greater universes or wholes. Each whole is a mental universe assuming a new quality. For instance, in the passage from the object to the idea or from the idea to laws and ideals a new form of the mental universe or a new order of dimensions or reality emerges.

The emergence of newer and larger universes in the mind bears a resemblance to the emergence of newer and larger wholes in the physical world. The creative imagination of the mind bears all the marks of critical evolution of the physical world. "The works of Nature bear all the ear-marks of creative imagination." The workings of one are akin to the workings of the other. The

mind uses the same sort of power or expedient to evolve reality as the physical Nature uses. On the whole, there is an affinity between the structure of the world and the mind. And what is created by Nature is true for her, and the criterion of truth is within her creator. Similarly what is created by our mind is true for it, and the standard of truth lies within it. A straight line created by the mind is true for it, though it is not in nature.<sup>2</sup> The mind understands, it, because it constructs or creates it. So the ideal world is true, and we can understand it by constructing it.

(c) From the above it follows that the ideal world is a reality by itself. It is not a faint adumbration or reflexion of the physical world and so it is not a pseudo-reality. From its very start it is removed from physical existence. It is really independent and transcendent. When the idea turns to itself it finds a world of its own. It extends more and more in the direction of any particular object that is found outside us. The idea stretches itself to the universe and has no fixed terminus of it. The journey of the idea towards the universe (or tending to be more and more universal) makes us aware of its universal reality. It tends to pass beyond the physical world and lives more and more in 'the total universe.'

Perhaps in this sense Plato regards the idea or the ideal world as having its ground in the supersensuous world. William James speaks of the religious view-point of the universe in this way: "The so-called order of nature which constitutes the world's experience, is only one portion of the total universe, and..... there stretches beyond this visible world an unseen world of which we know nothing positive, but in relation to which the true significance of our present life and mind consists. A man's religious faith means.....his faith in the existence of an unseen order of some kind in which the riddles of the natural order may be found explained. In the more developed religions the natural world has always been regarded as the mere scaffolding or vestibule of a truer, more eternal world".<sup>3</sup>

In fact, the idea possesses the reality of its own. It is a reality which exists in the universe, though it does not exist as a

2. Cf. Gentile. *Theory of Mind as pure Act*, p. 15.

3. *The Will To Believe*, p. 51.

physical object. And in a sense the ideal world precedes the empirical world, for the mind cannot understand the latter without creating the former. To know is to create. The knowledge of the first world presupposes the creation of the second world. Thus the ideal world is the logical prius of the physical world and not the temporal consequent of the latter. So the idea is prior to the object but not in any temporal sense. On the whole, the knowledge of the one world involves the knowledge of the other. There is an inner relationship between the two worlds, each being involved in the other. So if one is real, the other is real. So if one exists the other exists too. If the physical world is real because it exists the ideal world is real as it exists too. But what really exists can be determined by the mind or the idea that can think it and at the same time goes beyond. Further the knowledge of the physical world is not a fruitless affair. The mind can overcome and transcend it by passing through it in obedience to its immanent nature. The knowledge of the empirical series gives us a clue to the reality of the ideal world. It enables to catch a glimpse of the total universe of psychical and physical reality (Bhuma) of which the physical is only one portion. In fine, the idea gives us the glimmerings of something more or what is beyond the physical order.

# Subjectivism in Kant

By

SREENIVASA SAHU

According to Kemp Smith,<sup>1</sup> there is a conflict between subjectivism and phenomenalism in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. When the former tendency is in the ascendent, the phenomena are considered by Kant as purely subjective in character. When on the other hand, Kant's thought is dominated by the latter tendency, the phenomena gain an independent existence. As against Kemp Smith, whose opinion derives support from Adamson and a number of other Kantian critics, both British and Continental, it is contended by Paton<sup>2</sup> that there is no such conflict in the *Critique* and that "Kant's doctrine is a whole and humanly speaking a consistent whole." We find ourselves in agreement with Kemp Smith, and venture to think that Paton's description of the *Critique* as a "consistent whole" is far from correct. The very fact that Kant found it necessary repeatedly to warn his readers against confusing his philosophy with subjective idealism, shows that he was not entirely unaware of the subjective trends in his thought. Subjectivism is where the inexorable logic of his teaching leads, although he makes phenomenalism his aim. No wonder therefore that Jacobi in his perplexity remarked that "without realism it is impossible to enter Kant, and with it, it is impossible to stay with him."

If Kant's purpose was to expound a type of phenomenalism, was he able to achieve it without being involved in inconsistency? The answer must be in the negative. Starting with a metaphysical dualism that was common to almost all philosophers of his day, he had succumbed to its consequences in spite of all the subtlety he could summon to his succour. When the *Critique of Pure Reason* was first published, it was reviewed by Feder and Garve. Both of them accused Kant of out-Berkeleying Berkeley. That is why in the second edition of the *Critique* Kant introduced

1. *Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 83.

2. *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience*, Vol. 1, p. 16.



a new section entitled *The Refutation of Idealism*, which unfortunately added nothing new to his previous arguments. The very fact that post-Kantian philosophy became ego-centric in the hands of Fichte and Schopenhauer, and that philosophers like Schelling, Hegel and Herbart felt the need of modifying the master's teaching, shows that there is a weak spot somewhere in Kant. Paton<sup>3</sup> says that Kant is now understood much better than he was in his own day. But as a matter of fact, even among the critics of our own time the general opinion is that Kant's philosophy reduces itself to subjectivism. "Kant," says Caird,<sup>4</sup> "emphasised the relativity of objects to the unity of the self, but he still maintained the reservation that the objects so related are not in any ultimate sense real apart from the subjectivity to which they are related." In regard to Kant's attempts to escape from Berkeleyian idealism, the same critic observes that "he was unable to achieve this end except by an argument which if carried to all its consequences, would have been fatal to the distinction of phenomena from the things-in-themselves and would thus have transformed the most fundamental concept of his *Critique*." Paton<sup>5</sup> does not however, attach much value to Caird's criticism. He accuses him of interpreting "Kant in terms of Hegel." But what about Adamson, Ward and other modern critics of Kant? According to Adamson<sup>6</sup> "though Kant never definitely accepts subjective idealism,..... yet it is hardly possible to distinguish his view from that of the subjective idealist..... The whole still appears, as in the corresponding view of Berkeley, to be a mode in which the subject is somehow affected." Whilst Ward<sup>7</sup> very modestly calls Kant's philosophy "anthropomorphic," Joseph<sup>8</sup> is of the opinion that if we understand the real nature of Kant's phenomena, the difference between Kant and Berkeley whittles down. Their similarity, says Joseph, consists in "their accounts of what the reality of things consists in and again of their distinctions between reality and illusion within experience." Prichard<sup>9</sup> also takes a similar view,

3. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 464.

4. *Idealism and the Theory of Knowledge* (Proceedings of the British Academy, 1903-04, p. 96).

5. Op. cit., Pp. 17 & 65.

6. *The Development of Modern Philosophy*, p. 233.

7. *A Study of Kant*, p. 87.

8. *A Comparison of Kant's Idealism with that of Berkeley* (Proceedings of the British Academy, 1929, p. 217).

9. *Kant's Theory of Knowledge*, p. 13.

though Paton<sup>10</sup> accuses him of confusing between exegesis and criticism. No wonder that Kant was driven to subjective idealism much against his own will, for philosophers like Ferrier and Green who took their stand upon Kantian grounds were driven to the same ego-centric predicament; and, to put it in the words of Caird,<sup>11</sup> "it is apt to be the case with those who go back to Kant and take their start from him."

Paton, Ewing, Cushmann and others assign to Kant's phenomena the status of a *tertium quid*. Though constructed by the mind, the phenomena are not states of the mind. If according to Kant, the mind constructs the phenomena out of suitable material given by reality, it must be admitted that he is not a subjective idealist. But do we have any evidence of such a view in Kant? The fundamental tenet of his philosophy is that we can never know the real. As a concession perhaps, he says that the things-in-themselves "influence" our senses. But the word "influence" has no intelligible meaning in his system. In the absence of a real that is given, so much stress has to be laid on construction, so much upon the synthesis of the mind, that the distinction of the phenomena from the mind becomes nothing but a distinction without difference. Why should the "influences" of the things-in-themselves, which result in intuitions, fit into the moulds prescribed by our understanding? This question put to himself by Kant in a letter to Herz, less than two years after his Inaugural Dissertation, is adequately answered neither by Kant himself nor by his defenders. No doubt Kuno Fischer's famous saying that "the mind does not create but constructs 'nature,' " has cleared a vast amount of misinterpretation of Kant. But the question remains, "construct out of what?" The difficulty is not peculiar to Kant alone, but to all representationists, and is found in later thinkers like Clifford, Karl Pearson and others. In the sequel we shall see how this same representationism is responsible for another conflict in Kant namely, between problematic idealism and subjective idealism.

There may be objection to our calling Kant a representationist. It is true that Kant being an empirical realist maintains

10. Op. cit., p. 105.

11. Op. cit., p. 17.

that the objects of experience are directly presented to us. But the question arises, what are these objects? They are as already stated what the mind constructs from the "influences" of the things-in-themselves. This description of the nature of objects is intelligible only if we understand the word "influence," (einfluss) in its literal sense of something flowing into the mind. But the unknowability of the things-in-themselves stands in the way of our interpreting the word in its literal sense. If the things-in-themselves are unknowable, how is it possible for them to "flow into" the mind? And if it is not possible for us to have a direct knowledge of the things-in-themselves, does it not follow that the objects of our direct knowledge can only be mental representations of the things-in-themselves?

Kant's central problem as formulated in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is, How are synthetic a priori judgments possible? The problem corresponds to that of mediate inference, namely how the conclusion is novel and at the same time necessary. The *Aesthetic* in which Kant discusses how the propositions of pure mathematics and geometry can be synthetic and at the same time a priori, is one of the most flagrantly subjective parts of the *Critique*. Paton<sup>12</sup> justifies the subjectivism by saying that Kant while writing the *Aesthetic* did not want to introduce what he was going to prove in the *Analytic*. But unfortunately, the *Analytic* is no more phenomenalist in character than the *Aesthetic*.

Now, how are pure mathematics and geometry possible? They are possible only if Time and Space are a priori. The characteristics of apriority are necessity and universality. But they are never given to us from outside; and this is what perplexed Hume and made him a sceptic. Kant attacked the problem with his transcendental method, and it is to his credit that he found the answer in the apriority of Space and Time. But is the apriority of Space and Time temporal or logical? Over this question there is difference of opinion among Kant's commentators. The weight of evidence is, however, in favour of the latter alternative. From the logical priority of Space and Time it does not necessarily follow that they are subjective in character. But Kant asserts the subjectivity of Space and Time repeatedly in the *Aesthetic*. If

12. Op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 52.

they are subjective, the question arises, Are they of the nature of an illusion? Kant answers the question by drawing a distinction between appearance and illusion. "When I say that the intuition of outer objects and the self-intuition of the mind alike represent the objects and the mind, in space and time as they affect our senses, that is as they appear, I do not mean to say that these objects are mere illusion.....For in appearance the objects, nay even the properties that we ascribe to them are always *regarded* as something actually given." But are not the objects of illusion also *regarded* as something actually given as long as the illusion lasts? To meet this objection Kant puts forward his other test of truth, which has come to be known as the coherence test. But this too does not give us any guarantee of reality existing outside us. It only converts a small-scale illusion into an illusion on an organized scale. Indeed, Kant himself says that the coherence is due to *Bewusstseins Ueberhaupt* the common nature of our consciousness or understanding.

The problem in the *Analytic* is different. In Kant's own words, "a difficulty such as we did not meet with in the field of sensibility is here presented, namely, *how subjective conditions of thought have objective validity* (Kant attributes receptivity to the sensibility and spontaneity to the understanding. But have they not both a common root? Do they not both act together?) The same problem is more clearly formulated in his letter to Herz. It is an extremely difficult problem, specially so, to one in the position of Kant who starts with a dualism that keeps the self and the not self in two air-tight compartments, and who yet tries to escape subjectivism. It is this difficulty that taxed Kant's ingenuity to its utmost limits. Nevertheless, he failed to defend himself against the charge of subjectivism, because his explanation of the "object" was nothing more than a "reification," to borrow an expression from MacDougall, of the subjective state. "It is easily seen," says Kant, "that this object must be thought only as something in general, since outside our knowledge we have nothing which we could set over against this knowledge as corresponding to it." Thus nothing is knowable about the transcendental object except that it is necessary, because without it there can be no representation. But is there any need of positing the transcendental object after it has been said that the objects of knowledge are constructed with the "influences" of the things-in-themselves, which come in the form of intuitions? The only justification lies in Kant's dualistic predilection. "Noumena or things-in-themselves,"

to put it in the words of Windelband,<sup>13</sup> "are therefore thinkable in the negative sense as objects of non-sensuous perception, of which to be sure, our knowledge can predicate nothing—they are thinkable as limiting conceptions of experience." But even such negative attitude involves positive knowledge however partial. As a matter of fact, Bergson<sup>14</sup> contends that a negation has more content than an affirmation, because it is an affirmation plus a negation. Even idealists like Bradley and Bosanquet argue that a negation involves at least the suggestion of an affirmation. The thing-in-itself may not be known to us in all its aspects. And perhaps some of its characteristics that are perceived by us now may disappear when we have a more adequate perception of it, or when we perceive it under different circumstances. A coin, for instance, appears oval when looked at from a distance, and round when looked at from above. When it appears round, does it mean that my experience of it as oval from a distance was all wrong? Roundness and ovalness are among the different aspects under which the object is presented to the subject. A complete severance of the object from the subject, of the not-self from the self, has therefore hardly any justification.

Further, as we have already pointed out, Kant's dualistic metaphysic involves him in a conflict between problematic idealism and dogmatic idealism. The problematic idealism of Kant is hinted at by a number of critics. As Adamson<sup>15</sup> observes, "the general notion of the thing-in-itself sums up in its own way the reflexion as knowledge which is common to Kant and the Cartesian School; that it is subjective and therefore *indicative of something not itself*." "Might not," asks Ewing,<sup>16</sup> "reality consist entirely of human minds? Any casual argument for the existence of anything else is out of the question; since even if we *think* things-in-themselves in terms of the categories, we certainly cannot according to Kant *prove* anything beyond the realm of experience by means of the categories". Prichard,<sup>17</sup> though not so plainly, expresses the same opinion. "If," says he, "as the theory supposes the cause of sensation is outside or beyond the mind, it cannot be known."

13. *History of Philosophy*, p. 547.

14. *Creative Evolution*, p. 304.

15. *Op. cit.*, p. 231.

16. *Op. cit.*, p. 193.

17. *Op. cit.*, p. 31.

Kant, in trying to escape subjectivism and to posit the phenomenon as something which is dependent on the mind and yet which is not a state of the mind, had to go beyond his own critical principles. In the *Dialectic* Kant says that when we have a sensation, all the conditions that are responsible for it are not given with it. To discover all the conditions is an impossible task for the pure reason. Hence when we posit the transcendental object as being responsible for the sensation, we are assuming more than we are warranted to. We can at most say that the transcendental object is possible. But according to Kant, the possible and the actual coincide in their denotation. That being so, all that I posit to be possible, as not self-contradictory, will become actual. If the existence of men in Mars is posited as a possible fact, it becomes an actual fact (and through a similar transition it becomes an apodeictic certainty) which is absurd. If however the possibility of the thing-in-itself is denied, Kant's theory of knowledge becomes indistinguishable from subjective idealism.

There is a similar difficulty in connection with the doctrine of the affinity of the manifold as expounded in the first edition of the *Transcendental Deduction of the Categories*. Affinity is not a contingent but a necessary fact, in the sense that it is a "principle to which all phenomena must necessarily conform because otherwise, they could not be experienced by us at all and would not therefore be phenomena". In which case, however, the affinity will be, as Ewing<sup>18</sup> says, "contingent in a more ultimate sense," and Kant's deduction of the affinity of the manifold from that of our experience must remain problematic.

Kant felt that his argument in the first edition failed to demonstrate that the categories constitute the unity which is necessary to knowledge. In the second edition this defect was rectified to some extent. Still Kant's argument remains obscure. This is due to his laxity in the use of the term "object." Sometimes it is identified with the noumenon, sometimes with the transcendental object, sometimes with the determined object, and so on. According to Prichard<sup>19</sup> there is a vicious circle in the argument of the *Transcendental Deduction*. "First, the possibility of self-consciousness is deduced from the possibility of experience

18. Op. cit., Pp. 110-111.

19. Op. cit., p. 191.

and then the possibility of knowledge is deduced from the possibility of self-consciousness." We, however, venture to think that there is no circle here. Perhaps it would be more correct to say that there is here a confusion of psychological and epistemological accounts. The first part of the argument, namely, the deduction of the possibility of self-consciousness from the possibility of knowledge is epistemological in character. It starts with our experience of knowledge as a fact, and by means of the transcendental method, deduces that this involves self-consciousness, because unless "I think" accompanies and holds together all our perceptions, experience will not be possible. The second part of the argument, namely the deduction of the possibility of experience from the possibility of self-consciousness is psychological, for what is said here is that knowledge is possible because there is the "I think", the transcendental unity of the subject which accompanies all perceptions, giving all of them the self-same stamp. All perceptions are taken up in self-consciousness and synthesised according to the categories of the understanding. This part thus shows the genesis and development of knowledge. Of the two parts, evidently the first is more in harmony with and more essential to the critical philosophy. But the argument reduces itself to subjectivism by throwing its weight on the side of self-consciousness.

Thus here is in Kant a tangle of threads, and we must pick the proper one carefully. The general rules of the unity of apperception are the categories. "All sensible intuitions are subject to the categories, as conditions under which alone the manifold can come together in one consciousness." Kant could say this with confidence because the object is after all constructed by the understanding with the help of the categories. On Kant's own grounds, we do not know why the rose is red and not blue, though our perception of it as possessing some colour may be explained as due to the category of attribute which is one of the ways in which the mind works. Further, the pure categories are not applicable to objects without being schematised by Time; and Time, as we saw in the *Aesthetic*, is subjective.

What then is error due to? An answer is found in Kant's *Introduction to Logic*.<sup>20</sup> "The origin of all error must be sought

20. Abbott's trans., p. 44.

solely in the *unobserved influence of the sensibility on the understanding*, or to speak more exactly on the *judgment*." Although it is not clear how the sensibility, which is passive can influence the understanding, nevertheless Kant's intention is plain. Truth and error are both in the mind. We have truth, when the understanding is enabled to function without any unobserved influence of the sensibility; and error, when the sensibility introduces something clandestinely into the understanding. In spite of all this explanation of truth and error, Kant sincerely believed that he is not a subjectivist!

Kant's argument in the *Refutation of Idealism* is as follows: — "I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time. All determinations of time presuppose something *permanent* in perception. But this *permanent* cannot be an intuition in me. For, all grounds of determination of my existence which are to be met with in me are representations; and as representations, they themselves require a permanent distinct from them, in relation to which their change and so my existence in time wherein they ~~change~~ may be determined. Thus perception of this permanent is possible only through a *thing* outside me and not through the mere *representation* of a thing outside me; and consequently the determination of my existence in time is possible only through the existence of actual things which I perceive outside me." I perceive certain changes in time, within as well outside me. But the perception of change presupposes something permanent with reference to which the change is perceived. This *permanent* cannot be in me, because I have only representations, which themselves change. Hence these representations presuppose a *thing* outside me, a *thing* which is permanent and with reference to which they change. Against this argument of Kant we may urge several objections. First, as some commentators have rightly asked, why should not the permanent be the *self*? We have already pointed out how the "I think" accompanies all representations, and thereby gives them a unity. It is something more than representations. Kant could not however persuade himself openly to admit that the *permanent* was the self, because such a proceeding would brand him as an out and out subjectivist. So he simply evaded the question by declaring in general terms that "all grounds of determination of my existence which are met with in me are representations." Secondly, by creating an unbridgeable gulf between the self and the not-self, Kant forfeited his prerogative of looking beyond the self for the *permanent*. Thirdly,



the *thing* that Kant refers to is, as he himself says, *regarded* as the object of the self. In other words, the distinction of the *permanent* (or the object) and the mere representation in the self (or the subject) is one within experience. That within experience there is the distinction of subject and object is not denied by Berkeley or any other mentalist. As long as the self is functioning as a subject, there are objects for its experience. It is only when Berkeley and others come to the question concerning the nature of the objects that they designate them as mental. If Kant, as he calls himself, is an empirical realist, so too are all philosophers. Experience is always of something distinct from the thinking self no matter whether it is introspective or extra-spective. It is however to be noted that empirical realism cannot be sustained without presentationism, which is the only means of bridging the gulf between the knower and the known.

Presentationism is deriving considerable support from idealists as well as from realists of our own day. Even dualists like MacDougall now believe in interactionism. The antiquated theories of parallelism and occasionalism should now be cast into the lumber-room; and the problem of knowledge and reality attacked with more effective instruments. Our knowledge is knowledge of the real, however partial and distorted it might be. And when the real is known in its fullness, this partial knowledge is not sublated but sublimated. We know the real; but "not only has the real object many qualities, probably which are unperceived; the object as perceived has qualities which it does not possess when it is not being perceived".<sup>21</sup> In contemporary philosophy helped by the sciences, this type of explanation of the relation of knowledge to reality is bringing idealism and realism closer together.

We should not blame Kant for not having achieved more than what he did. In spite of his towering genius, he was like every other individual, a child of his age; and the defect from which his philosophy suffers is attributable to the dualism so rampant in his time among empiricists and rationalists alike. The transition from Locke to Berkeley finds its parallel in the development of Kant's own doctrine. Knowledge is like a spring that stretches from the knower to the known. It is hooked on both sides. Once it is unhooked on the side of the known, it remains stretched no more, but falls back into the knower. It results in mentalism.

21. Macintosh, *The Pilgrimage of Faith in the World of Modern Thought*, p. 211.

# The Present Position in Inductive Logic

By

MR. W. LILLIE

In his 'Outline of Philosophy', published in 1927, Mr. Bertrand Russell wrote, 'The best examination of induction is contained in Mr. Keynes' "Treatise on Probability". There is a valuable doctor's thesis by the late Jean Nicod, "Le problème logique de l'induction", which is very ably reviewed by R. B. Braithwaite in "Mind", October 1925. A man who reads these three will know most of what is known about induction'.<sup>1</sup> Our ordinary elementary teaching of inductive logic has been very little influenced by these three writings containing 'most of what is known about induction', and in the elementary courses in our Indian Universities at any rate, we tend to follow with little questioning and few additions the doctrines of Mill and Jevons. The purpose of this paper is to suggest a background for the teaching of elementary induction in the light of these modern studies. With the mathematics of probability, and with the more profound epistemological implications of the subject, the elementary student, or for that matter the ordinary teacher of general philosophy, like the present writer, can hardly expect to make a thorough acquaintance, but there are aspects of the subject, which might find a place even in an elementary text-book.

## I

It is convenient to begin with the conclusion of inductive arguments for it is there that modern logic has made its most definite

1. B. Russell: An Outline of Philosophy, p. 280.

and revolutionary finding. Mill and the earlier logicians seem to have considered that induction should lead to true universal statements as its conclusions; even when they realised that the practical difficulties were so great that it might never be possible to reach such certain conclusions, the true universal statement remained the goal at which all induction aims. On the other hand, modern logicians are all agreed that inductive arguments can only lead to probable conclusions. The term 'probable' has been applied to events in the real world, to propositions and to beliefs. It may be agreed that the probabilities which we study in induction do not belong to events, although the applications of probability in the quantum theory in physics may suggest that those who ascribe probable relations to events are expressing, however inadequately, a true fact about the nature of things. There has been more confusion between the view that probability is logical and objective, so that propositions are probable, altogether apart from our attitude of belief or disbelief towards them, and the view that probability is psychological and subjective, so that the probability of a proposition merely expresses the strength of our belief in it. If, as a logical treatment of the subject would seem to demand, we take the view that propositions are probable, apart from our believing them, it would still be the case that our beliefs, which are themselves propositions, are more or less probable; only their probability would not depend on the strength of our belief. Strictly speaking the term 'probable' refers not to a proposition itself but to a logical relation between two sets of propositions, a relation by which knowledge of one set of propositions, (in this case the data or premises of the induction), while not proving the truth of a second proposition or set of propositions, (in this case the conclusion of the induction), provides some rational ground for believing it. The emphasis in this account, taken from Lord Keynes' *Treatise*, is on the word *rational* and not on the word *belief*.<sup>2</sup> Lord Keynes goes on to point out that the term 'probable' is applied derivatively to the degree of rational belief in statements asserting this relation, and also to the proposition related to the original propositions by the probability relation;<sup>3</sup> it is in this third sense that we speak of the conclusion of an induction as always probable, and never certain. Lord Keynes holds that probability

2. Keynes: *A Treatise on Probability*, p. 6.

3. Keynes: *Op. cit.*, p. 11.

is indefinable,<sup>4</sup> so we must regard the above account as a description, with a reference to belief that would not be admitted in a strict definition.

Lord Keynes also suggests that certainty is 'a special case of probability, as being, in fact, the *maximum probability*'.<sup>5</sup> This suggestion seems to be misleading, and likely to increase the confusion, (which it is very difficult to get rid of), between psychological certainty and logical certainty or between psychological probability and logical probability. As a matter of experience we often feel certain about propositions that are not really certain at all; at certain stages of the present war, Hitler may have been certain that Britain was about to be defeated. Similarly a person may hold that a particular proposition is probable, which is not probable at all in the strictly logical sense; many a gambler has been ruined by hazarding a stake when his estimate of the probabilities had no logical justification. If we confine ourselves to psychological attitudes there can be little dispute that certainty is the maximum probability; and, in so far as logical probability is a matter of *belief*, even rational *belief*, it shares this characteristic. There may be other ways, and I shall suggest one in a later section of this paper, in which certainty seems to be the maximum probability, but, in certain respects, some of which are especially important for logic, the two seem to be of a different order altogether. These include the following:—

(1) A logically certain conclusion based on true data is, when reached, independent of its data, and can henceforth be used without reference to these data. A logically probable conclusion continues to be dependent on its data; it is only probable relatively to these data, and only in this form can it be carried on to the next stage of the argument.

(2) It follows from the view of probability as a relation that the same probable conclusion may have at the same time different probabilities in relation to different sets of data; but it is inconceivable that a certain conclusion should be certain and uncertain, except in the psychological sense, at the same time.

(3) Probability is a matter of degree; and a probable conclusion may be more or less probable, although we may agree with

4. Keynes: *Op. cit.*, p. 8.

5. Keynes: *Op. cit.*, p. 15.

Lord Keynes that in most cases the probability cannot be measured. There are no degrees in the case of logical certainty.

(4) In a logically certain inference, the conclusion refers indifferently either to 'all' or 'any' of the members of the class of its subject. If it is certain that 'any A is B', it is also certain that 'all the A's are B's, so that the two forms *all* and *any* differ only verbally. Nicod points out that in cases where it is merely probable that any A is B, it may at the same time be improbable or even impossible that all the A's are B's.<sup>6</sup> Even after meeting with a single white crow, and so definitely refuting the statement that 'all crows are black', I can still maintain that there is a considerable probability that any crow, such as the next crow I shall see, is black.

(5) Even an infinite probability is not equivalent to certainty. It is infinitely probable that any number taken at random, to quote Nicod's example,<sup>7</sup> will not be 1324, but it is by no means certain that it will not be so. It is conceivable, although not at all likely under our present conditions of knowledge, that the conclusion of an induction might attain to infinite probability; it would still be in a different category from a certain conclusion.

Those who regard certainty as a special case of probability may point out that the 'law of contradiction', which is the foundation of all certain inference, has been proved by Lord Keynes by the same type of argument as he uses to prove the fundamental theorems of probability.<sup>8</sup> Mr. H. W. B. Joseph considers that the Law of Contradiction is proved by Lord Keynes only on the stipulation that 'no contradictions shall be admitted into the groups of propositions whose logical relations we are to study how to determine';<sup>9</sup> in other words, the argument is circular. Even if the proof were accepted, it would not establish the fact that certainty is one case of probability. The same type of argument even dealing with relatively similar data may lead to very different conclusions, different in order or even in kind as well as in degree.

6. Nicod: *Le problème logique de l'induction*, p. 16.

7. Nicod: *Op. cit.*, p. 21.

8. Keynes: *Op. cit.*, p. 142.

9. H. W. B. Joseph: *Mr. Keynes on Probability*. 'Mind'. N.S. Vol. XXXII, p. 423.

The fact that logical probability is so different from logical certainty is important, because the pursuit of an elusive certainty after the fashion of deductive logic has certainly been one of the tendencies that has led inductive logic astray. Mr. Braithwaite quotes with approval a statement by Nicod that if certainty is lacking, the probability remains to be established, and the whole theory of induction must be done over again.<sup>10</sup> That induction can never establish certain universal conclusions after the model of deduction has been demonstrated in a very simple way by Dr. C. D. Broad in an article in 'Mind' October 1918.<sup>11</sup> Dr. Broad points out that any attempt to establish a certain universal conclusion from a particular premise, (however large the extension of the subject of that premise might be, short of universality), would break the rule that from a particular premise, only a particular conclusion can be established. A critic might reply that we are now using a different kind of proof altogether from the deductive syllogism; and that is just the position that we accept. We are dealing in induction with a type of proof that leads by the relations of probability to a universal statement that is probable to a certain degree on the basis of particular data, a conclusion very different from the conclusion established as certain by deductive reasoning. The main resemblance between them is that it is generally rational to believe and to act on both.

## II

How is the universal probable conclusion reached from the given premises or data? The older text-books sometimes distinguished inductive logic as material logic, which deals with the observed world, from deductive logic as formal logic, which deals with the conditions of valid thinking apart from observed material altogether. Others maintained that inductive logic was also formal in character, as it dealt only with the methods or forms used by scientists in their investigations, and never with the world observed by the scientists. The question is whether induction depends on the real world for the validity of its conclusions in a way that deduction does not. It would be generally agreed that the syllogism, 'All Y

10. *Mind*. N.S. Vol. XXXIV, p. 484.

11. *Mind*. N.S. Vol. XXVII, p. 390.

is  $Z$ , All  $X$  is  $Y$ , *therefore* All  $X$  is  $Z$ ' is valid in all possible universes, whatever may be denoted by the symbols  $X$ ,  $Y$  and  $Z$ . Is this true also of an inductive argument, such as the argument by simple enumeration, that given the premises, 'This  $x$  is  $y$ ': 'This  $x_1$  is  $y_1$ ' 'This  $x_2$  is  $y_2$ ' . . . . . 'This  $x_n$  is  $y_n$ ', *therefore* the proposition 'All  $x$  is  $y$ ' has a certain probability in relation to these data. Such a probability would be very low indeed, if we treated the argument as purely formal, for we then could have no indication whatever as to whether the  $n$  cases examined are a fair sample of  $x$  generally, or what proportion  $n$  bears to the total denotation of  $x$ . When modern logicians say that the principles of induction must be the laws of probability,<sup>12</sup> we are apt to think that they are asserting that the principles of induction do not depend on the nature of the real world for their validity, because we feel that the principles of probability are entirely mathematical and formal in the sense that the principles of deduction are formal. This may not be the case; the 'relevance' which Lord Keynes includes among his definitions does not seem to be an entirely formal notion,<sup>13</sup> but actually all inductive logicians have assumed that we are able to reach our probable conclusions in induction because of some characteristics of the natural world. Lord Keynes and Nicod both point out that abstract numbers must have the same or equivalent characteristics, as we use inductive arguments with equal success about them.<sup>14</sup>

The identification of the principles of induction with the laws of probability, however certain, does not by itself take us very far. Lord Keynes has drawn attention to the very definite and restricted conditions under which a principle like his Law of Indifference, (the law of non-sufficient reason of other students of probability), is applicable, and to the fact that other principles, like Berouilli's theorem, (that, in a like series of events, the *à priori* probability of which is  $p$ , the proportion to occur is not widely different from  $p$ ) are perhaps never rigidly applicable at all.<sup>15</sup> In actual experience, the principles of probability have been most successful in their application to the 'urn' or box from which balls of different colours may be drawn, but we have little evidence that the conditions of the real universe resemble the conditions under which balls are

12. e.g. C. D. Broad in *Mind*, N.S. Vol. XXXI, p. 71.

13. Keynes: *Op. cit.* p. 138.

14. Keynes: *Op. cit.*, p. 244; Nicod: *Op. cit.*, p. 56.

15. Keynes: *Op. cit.*, chs. IV and XXIX.

drawn from an urn, or, to use Lord Keynes' réversion of an expression of Quetelet's, that '*la nature que nous interrogeons, c'est une urne*'.<sup>16</sup> Indeed nature appears to be very different from an urn. In spite of the odd resemblance of the proportions as determined by Mendel's law<sup>17</sup> and those determined by the principles of probability, what could we make of an urn in which the balls not only reproduced themselves in unpredictable numbers, but in which a ball sometimes appeared with the characteristics of a Shakespeare or a Napoleon?

There are then some characteristics of the real world, in virtue of which we can so apply the principles of probability as to make inductive inferences. The older logicians labelled these characteristics causality and uniformity, and we shall come back to these later. Modern logicians however are all agreed in giving the first place to another principle,—the Principle of Limited Variety. This is a principle of long standing in inductive logic, for it was certainly suggested by Bacon, and it has the merit of being to some extent comprehensible even to an elementary student of logic. Lord Keynes states this in the form that the qualities of an object are bound together in a limited number of groups, a sub-class of each group, (that of the generator properties) being an infallible symptom of certain other members of it also.<sup>18</sup> Nicod points out that what is necessary for induction is not that the number of groups is limited or finite but that it is less than some number given in advance.<sup>19</sup> One may doubt with Dr. Broad whether the notion of 'generator properties', however much it may be in harmony with the findings of modern science, is really necessary for induction,<sup>20</sup> it seems enough to assume that the perceptible qualities of objects tend to occur in bundles. Dr. Broad himself in examining Bacon's philosophy refers to four kinds of limited variety, suggested by Bacon<sup>21</sup>:—(1) that a small group of the qualities of a substance, (Lord Keynes' 'generator properties') determines the others; (2) that the number of different kinds of material substances is comparatively small; (3) that the various differences of quality found in the species of the same genus can

16. Keynes: Op. cit., p. 428.

17. c.f. Keynes: Op. cit., p. 419.

18. Keynes: Op. cit., p. 252.

19. Nicod: Op. cit., p. 75.

20. Mind. N.S. XXXI, p. 71 ff.

21. Broad: Philosophy of Francis Bacon, pp. 37-39.



be reduced to a single principle, for example, differences in colour to wave length; (4) however incompatible the qualities of different genera may be, there is still a unity among the underlying principles or 'forms', as Bacon called them, of these genera; for example colour and heat are both explained in terms of motion. Modern science would accept all these statements, if they were expressed in more accurate terms, and all of them would serve to some extent as a basis of inductive argument, although Lord Keynes' form, as modified by Dr. Broad and Nicod, seems the most useful. This is the one fundamental assumption of induction; 'the hypothesis that nature is fundamentally finite has a finite antecedent probability'.<sup>22</sup>

The other principle commonly accepted as a postulate of induction is that of determinism or causality, although about it there is more difference of opinion. Nicod considers that Lord Keynes does not recognise that elimination presupposes determinism as a postulate.<sup>23</sup> It is true that Lord Keynes does not examine the hypothesis of determinism; in fact, he deliberately avoids the metaphysical difficulties which surround the true meaning of the term 'cause'.<sup>24</sup> Yet there is much in his Treatise to suggest that he would be prepared to accept the postulate of determinism in some form; it is difficult to imagine what '*generator* properties' could mean without some such assumption. It may be that Lord Keynes uses the wider conception of 'negative analogy' rather than the narrower conception of 'elimination' just because elimination in the ordinary sense of the word does seem to assume determinism of a very definite kind. What Nicod points out rightly is that there is no need to assume, as most logicians have done, that the causal principle is universal, that *every* event in the universe has a cause; all we need to assume is that the event about which we are making a generalisation has in some sense a cause.<sup>25</sup> Moreover even in such cases, we need to assume only the probability and not the certainty of determinism. Mr. Braithwaite thinks that it is necessary to any reasonable theory aiming at the justification of the proposition that any generalisation has some *à priori* probability to assume that a 'thorough-going determinism' is certain. To accept this in any full sense would give an inductive argument in theory at least all the certainty of a deductive argument, and to do

22. *Mind* N.S. XXX, p. 71 ff.

23. Nicod. *op. cit.*, p. 28.

24. Keynes: *Op. cit.*, pp. 263, 275.

25. Nicod: *Op. cit.*, pp. 28-30.

so would contradict all we have said of the difference between the two. The older logicians landed themselves in un-necessary controversy and difficulty by assuming the universality and the necessary certainty of the law of causation. A more modest postulate will suffice.<sup>26</sup>

With regard to the other commonly accepted postulate of induction, the law of uniformity, Lord Keynes maintains that this law is simply the assertion that mere position in time and space is always irrelevant to generalisation.<sup>27</sup> Generalisations which specifically refer to space or time are, of course, exceptions to this rule. It may be doubted whether every-one would make this universal judgment of the irrelevance of position in space or time, and so whether it is an axiom known intuitively. In any case, in dealing with concrete events or things, differences in position of space and time always seems to be accompanied by other differences, some of which *may* be relevant to the generalisation under consideration. The principle of uniformity is not one of the assumptions required for induction, and most logicians will gladly abandon a principle, the careless use of which has had a most baneful influence on human thought by giving a pseudo-scientific support to the Preacher's pessimism, when he said, 'That which is done is that which shall be done, and there is no new thing under the sun'.<sup>28</sup>

### III

The methods of induction can, it is generally agreed, be reduced to scientific induction or elimination and simple enumeration. Nicod uses more general terms, which might well come into general use as names for the two classes of induction, 'induction by infirmation' and 'induction by confirmation'. The 'infirmation' which is the main subject of Lord Keynes' section on Induction, and of Nicod's section called by this name is not the elimination of the methods of scientific induction, as taught by Mill and Jevons. Nicod indeed points out that Mill based his doctrine of scientific induction on the law of causality obtained by simple enumeration.<sup>29</sup> It is however possible to imagine a universe where Mill's methods of scientific induction would give certain universal laws as their

26. *Mind*. N.S. XXXIV, p. 488.

27. Keynes: *Op. cit.*, p. 226.

28. *Ecclesiastes* I. 9.

29. Nicod: *Op. cit.* p. 17.

conclusions; only the methods used would then be deductive or mathematical and not inductive. Let us suppose that at any moment there happens in the universe a finite number of independent events, unrelated to one another; each of these events causes after a short interval of time another event, and the events at this second moment of time are also independent and unrelated; the same effect is always preceded by the same cause; there are no complex causes and no plurality of causes; only after a longer or a shorter time, each series comes back again to one or other of the events with which we started, so that history frequently repeats itself. In these circumstances, the methods of scientific induction would give us a complete knowledge of the universe expressed in certain universal propositions. The older logicians seem consciously or unconsciously to have cherished the hope that a fuller knowledge of the universe would show that, in spite of the appearances to the contrary, the universe is really a universe of this kind; this alone would be what Mr. Braithwaite calls a 'thorough-going determinism'. Unfortunately for this view, the universe which we study seems to modern science very different from the universe which we have imagined. But may it not be the case that certain parts or aspects of the universe show more resemblance to the completely determined universe which we have imagined than others? May it not be the case that in some parts, causes are less complex, there is less plurality of causes, and there are more cases where a single cause produces a single effect? It may be suggested for example that in physics we study facts with more simple causal relations than we do in biology, and that in biology we study facts with more simple causal relations than we do in psychology. Or, in other words, there is more complexity of causes and more plurality of causes and perhaps even more events which cannot be fitted into the deterministic scheme at all among the data of psychology than there are among the data of biology or of physics. It may be argued that, if this is the case, we are away from the deductive certainties of a 'thorough-going determinism' aided by the methods of scientific induction, and back to the probable relations of inductive inference. That is true, but a probability is a relation between a conclusion and certain relevant data, and one of the relevant data in any statement of probability about the real world is the extent to which that part or aspect of the world shows the characteristics of thorough-going determinism. If our suggestion about the sciences is correct, a conclusion in physics has its probability increased, in comparison with a conclusion in biology, in virtue of the fact that one of the data or

propositions on which the conclusion is based is that the part of the universe with which physics deals shows more of the characteristics of thorough-going determinism than the part with which biology deals. When Nicod maintains that the law that  $X$  entails  $A$  can never have a probability greater than the probability of  $A$ 's determinism,<sup>30</sup> he bases this statement on the utterly false view that a conclusion in induction can never have a probability greater than that of its most uncertain premise; Nicod is here confusing the nature of inductive and deductive argument. It may be the case however that Nicod is expressing in his statement about determinism the truth that, other factors being equal, the probability of a conclusion will vary to some extent with the amount of determinism among those events, which are referred to in its data.

There is a parallel argument in the case of the syllogism, and it has been the contention of the last paragraph that in a universe of a certain kind Mill's induction by elimination would be just as deductive as the syllogism. In the syllogism, 'all men are mortal, Socrates is a man, *therefore* Socrates is mortal', let us suppose that we had to substitute for the major premise either of the following, (a) 'In my experience, ninety-nine out of every hundred men are mortal' or (b) 'In my experience, fifty out of every hundred men are mortal'. In both cases the argument would no longer be a syllogism, and the conclusion would not be certain. It would be the case however that a statement about Socrates would have a greater probability with (a) as one of the premises on which it is based than with (b) as one of the premises on which it is based. Incidentally this seems to be the truth on which the frequency theory of probability is based. Both these arguments may be interpreted in such a way as to suggest that certainty is the maximum probability; in the argument by elimination probability increases with the amount of determinism among the data, until it reaches certainty in the case of a 'thorough-going determinism', which would admit of a deductive argument; in the syllogistic argument, the extension of the subject of the major premise becomes greater and greater until in the real syllogism this term is completely distributed, and we have a certain conclusion. It is to be noted that in both cases the degree is not primarily in the probability of the conclusion; in the one case it is in the amount of the determinism

30. Nicod: *Op. cit.*, p. 30.

given as a premise; in the other case it is in the extension of the subject of a premise; and only under certain conditions of the other premises would these increase the probability of the conclusion in an inductive argument.

Both Lord Keynes and Nicod deal mainly with the repetition of instances which Lord Keynes calls *pure induction* and which Nicod calls induction by repetition. Lord Keynes argues that in such repetition of instances, a process of 'infirmation' or elimination goes on, by means of what he calls 'negative analogy', and this appears to be the main source of the probability of any conclusion derived from the number of instances. Nicod holds that such invalidation can lead only to a law of 'mediocre probability',<sup>31</sup> and that it is in 'confirmation' by additional instances that the main source of probability lies. Nicod admits that, even after his own criticism, Lord Keynes' argument by elimination would give some probability to its conclusion, and in his section on confirmation, he accepts with certain criticisms Lord Keynes' proof; Nicod himself seems to exaggerate the extent of the differences between his own view and that of Lord Keynes; both seem substantially valid, provided that we do not expect too much probability in the conclusion.

When we are dealing in this way with a series of instances in order to discover those characteristics which are universally connected, the appropriateness of Lord Keynes' term 'negative analogy' in connection with characteristics present in some instances but absent in others is evident. The clearest statement of Lord Keynes' view known to the present writer is found in a review in 'The Philosophical Review' by Mr. C. I. Lewis.<sup>32</sup> If we have a given set of objects, their characteristics may be exhaustively classified into (1) those which are common and connected, (2) those which are common but irrelevant, and (3) those which are present in some but absent in others. The first class are those expressed by  $g (\varphi \psi)$ . The probability that this holds not only for the cases examined but for all cases is what is in question. This is the same as the proving that, if all cases were examined, the properties under (2) and none under (1) would be disclosed as genuinely irrelevant by being sometimes absent, so that all the properties would be divided into those of class (1) and those of class (3).

31. Nicod: Op. cit. p. 78.

32. Philosophical Review. Vol. XXXI, p. 184.

Assuming then that when a connection holds in the first  $n$  cases there is some a priori probability of its holding in all, this probability is increased when the examination of new cases reduces the common properties regarded as irrelevant, Mr. Keynes calls this increasing the negative analogy, and finds in it the chief significance of induction'. To take the familiar text-book example, the conclusion 'All men are mortal', might be based on the propositions, 'Fielding died; Scott died; Dickens died; Thackeray died. 'In this case the characteristics of 'humanity' and 'mortality' would fall under (1); the characteristics of 'mortality' and 'being English' or of 'mortality' and 'being a novelist' or of 'mortality' and 'being male' would, to begin with, fall under (2); as the number of instances increased to include men, who were neither male nor English nor novelists, these would all fall under (3) and by so increasing the negative analogy, according to Lord Keynes, the probability of all men being mortal would be increased.

The question now is whether, if we assume the principle of limited variety, the principles of probability can give to the conclusion of this type of argument by elimination a tendency towards infinite probability with an increase in the number of instances. Nicod considers that at best we can reach only a mediocre probability,<sup>33</sup> but Nicod's argument is based on the view that the probability of a conclusion can never be greater than the probability of the least probable of its premises. This is only true, as Mr. Braithwaite points out,<sup>34</sup> in the case where this premise is *necessary* for the conclusion; it is not true in those cases with which we are most concerned in induction where the premise supports the conclusion without being necessary to it. At another point Nicod's argument rests on the distinction between the relatively high probability of an event being determined by an antecedent and the relatively low probability of a character being entailed by one of its concomitants,<sup>35</sup> this is a distinction that most people would admit, but, it may be the case that by avoiding the analysis of determinism, and so a distinction between sequence and concomitance, Lord Keynes has escaped from the force of Nicod's criticism. Mr. Braithwaite too draws attention to an error in Nicod's probability arithmetic.<sup>36</sup> In spite of these defects in Nicod's

33. Nicod: *Op. cit.*, pp. 30, 71.

34. *Mind* N.S. XXXIV, p. 485.

35. Nicod: *Op. cit.*, pp. 52, 53.

36. *Mind*. N.S. XXXIV, p. 486.

argument, one wonders whether a similar argument might not be reconstructed without the assumption of the false view of the probability of a conclusion being limited to the probability of its least certain premise. It is difficult to judge what kind of determinism, if any, is implied in Lord Keynes argument. Mr. Braithwaite says, 'Determinism, *of course*, comes in the establishment of the *a priori* probability of any law by the Principle of Limited Variety' (my italics), but it may be suggested that it comes in also in other places in an argument by elimination, and that the probability of the conclusion will depend to some extent on the kind of determinism postulated, whether it be the very limited determinism postulated by Nicod, or the 'thorough-going determinism' of Mr. Braithwaite, or the complete determinism that we imagined in an earlier section of this paper. Both Lord Keynes and Nicod wish to avoid being drawn into metaphysics, but it is most desirable that agreement should be reached among logicians as to the kind and degree of determinism which we may assume as a postulate in induction.

In dealing with induction by confirmation there seems general agreement that, given the principle of Limited Variety, as modified by Nicod, and given the principles of probability, it can be demonstrated that the mere increase in the number of instances can give an increase in the probability of the conclusion tending to infinity, under certain conditions. These conditions are (a) that the conclusion or law has some initial probability and (b) that, on the hypothesis that the law is false, the probability that the law should be confirmed in  $n$  instances tends to 0 as  $n$  tends to infinity.<sup>37</sup> As Mr. Braithwaite points out,<sup>38</sup> Nicod's main criticism can be avoided here, and we have a statement of the conditions of a valid simple enumeration that can be understood even by the elementary student, however incomprehensible he might find the theorems of probability on which it is based. There is difference of opinion as to whether the accumulation of identical instances adds to the probability of the conclusion in an induction by confirmation. It does not do so in an argument by elimination, but identical instances would seem to have the same usefulness as other instances in an argument by confirmation. In any case, the argument seems merely academic, because in the real world it is

37. Keynes: Op. cit., p. 236.

38. Mind. N.S. XXXIV, p. 490.

unlikely that absolutely identical instances ever occur, and, even, if they do, it is unlikely that we should know that they are identical.

#### IV

There are two matters relevant to induction which seem to call for a more adequate treatment than they have so far had from the inductive logician,—the place of intuition in induction and corroboration.

Lord Keynes quotes with approval a statement of Leibnitz that in dealing with probability there is need not so much of mathematical subtlety as of a precise statement of all the circumstances.<sup>39</sup> To know which circumstances are relevant is largely a matter of direct judgment or intuition. The application of the Principle of Indifference depends necessarily on judgments of relevance, and although 'these judgments may be limited and controlled, perhaps by logical rules and principles which possess a general application',<sup>40</sup> they are ultimately intuitions or judgments of direct insight. This is no surrender of the validity of inductive arguments, for we use a similar direct insight in judging the validity of a deductive argument. It is this direct judgment which sees those characteristics where there is positive analogy and where there is negative analogy in the argument by elimination. There are other places where intuition enters an inductive argument. The presentation of a set of data may arouse in a subject as his response an 'intuitive induction', which Dr. Broad describes as 'the intuiting of necessary and universal connections between characteristics when conjunctions of these characteristics are presented to the mind's attention'.<sup>41</sup> Here intuition comes into closer connection with induction, for the result of the intuition is not merely a particular statement as in the direct judgment of relevance but a universal (and perhaps even necessary) proposition. Nicod suggests that, besides the probability which a statement has in virtue of its relation to another set of statements, (the view of Russell and Johnson and Keynes), a statement has a 'plausibility' or 'intrinsic probability by which a proposition recommends itself more or less to the mind without being related to any other of the propositions which

39. Keynes: *Op. cit.*, p. 369.

40. Keynes: *Op. cit.*, p. 53.

41. Broad: *Five Types of Ethical Theory*, p. 105.



happen to be given'.<sup>42</sup> Such plausibility can obviously be known only by intuition. There are two observations that seem worth making in this connection. (a) The intuition of an expert is itself sufficient to give to a generalisation that *a priori* probability which can be increased by the observation of instances. This appears to be the common scientific practice; the expert sees, perhaps on the ground of already accepted propositions, perhaps by a mere intuition of plausibility, the probability of some new generalisation; the experimenter goes on confirming this by repeated experiments, producing new instances. (b) The place of intuition in logical thought has been obscured by a widespread view that the statement based on intuition has about it a mysterious certainty, so that to doubt it seems a kind of sacrilege. This attitude to intuition undoubtedly comes from the place given to intuition in mystical and religious experience, but the kind of intuition used there is very different from that which we use in inductive arguments, although it too might benefit from a more critical analysis. Dr. A. C. Ewing points out in a recent lecture on 'Reason and Intuition' that we may have 'an intuitive conviction of the truth of a proposition not amounting to certainty'.<sup>43</sup> Such an intuition is the beginning of an inductive investigation into the truth of the proposition, not the end. And even the intuition that appears to give us a certain proposition may err; there is nothing infallible about any of our psychical processes, even intuition. All this suggests that we require a much fuller treatment of the conditions in which intuition has a part, and in which it is likely to have some validity.

One of the special features of inductive argument is that, with the help of additional premises, there is the possibility of reaching a conclusion of a higher probability than that of the least certain of the premises. An attempt to use an analogous but by no means identical type of argument in deduction would certainly lead to the fallacy of illicit process. The use of corroborative arguments is one of the most common forms of reasoning in practical life. If a proposition A has a probability  $p$  on the ground of a certain set of propositions B, a probability  $q$  on the ground of another set of propositions C, (independent of B), a probability  $r$  on the ground of another set of propositions D, (independent of B and C), then, provided that B and C and D are independent of one another, the

42. Nicod: *Op. cit.*, p. 19.

43. A. C. Ewing: *Reason and Intuition*, p. 31.

probability of A becomes very considerable indeed, at any rate far beyond its initial probability with any one of the separate sets of propositions. The classical and later arguments for the existence of God illustrate this type of argument; the probability that God exists based on each of them separately is very low indeed; and, when one argument is largely identical with another as in Descartes' proofs, the probability remains low; but, when the various arguments are more or less independent of one another, then the probability of the conclusion that God exists becomes very considerable. Perhaps a more familiar example at the present day would be the clues in a detective story; separately they give a very low probability to a statement about the identity of the criminal, but, when taken together, they give a conclusion which the not too careful reader will accept as certain. Lord Keynes' theorems on the combination of premises would be applicable here, but he himself admits that his results here are not very valuable, and he refers the reader to Johnson's Cumulative Formula, which, as far as the present writer understands it, and that is not very far, shows that such co-operating data continually strengthen their own mutual probabilities. Here, as elsewhere in the realm of induction, the probability of the conclusion does not depend on the principles of probability, but on the limited variety of that real universe to which the principles are applied. It is because the sets or 'groups' of propositions which can be truly made about the real universe are limited in number that a proposition based on a number of such independent sets has such a high probability. This needs investigation by those skilled in the principles of induction, but the hope of a sound metaphysical basis for our subject seems to lie in the direction of limited variety.

44. Keynes: *Op. cit.* p. 149 ff.

# Some Problems of the Mandukya-Karika

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## I

In the course of his introduction to *The Āgamasāstra of Gauḍapāda*,<sup>1</sup> Professor Vidushekhara Bhattacharya makes the following salutary remark: 'When there is no contradiction nor any incongruity, why should we not accept the tradition, as far as possible?'<sup>2</sup> In spite of this observation of his he rejects the evidence of tradition on many points apparently because he finds contradictions and incongruities. Yet it is worthwhile examining if there are real and insurmountable difficulties in following the Advaita tradition regarding the composition and character of the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*.

The traditional Advaita view is (i) that the twelve mantras beginning with 'om ity etad akṣaram' constitute the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, (ii) that the *Kārikā* consisting of four chapters is the work of Gauḍapāda, an early teacher of Advaita, (iii) that the 29 verses of the first chapter form a commentary on the Upaniṣad, and (iv) that the following three chapters seek to establish the truth of non-duality through such reasoning as may be found in support of Scripture.

Professor Bhattacharya accepts whole-heartedly only one of these propositions, viz., that Gauḍapāda is the author of the *Kārikā*, and calls in question the others. After briefly noticing his partial agreement with tradition, we shall consider the grounds on which he feels constrained to differ therefrom and see if they really warrant disagreement.

1. Published by the University of Calcutta (1943). We shall refer to this book in the foot-notes as *Āgamasāstra*.

2. Ibid., p. lxxi.

## II

As against Walleser who thinks that there was none named Gauḍapāda who is believed to have been the author of the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, that there existed long before the time of Śaṅkara a philosophical school in the country of Gauḍa and in the same district in which Buddhism flourished till the eighth century, and that this school for the first time put the traditions of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads in the form of a *sāstra* (a school doctrine) and embodied it in a collection of sayings consisting of the four *pādas* of the *Gauḍapāda-kārikā*. Professor Bhattacharya believes that tradition is right in ascribing the work to Gauḍapāda, for the reason that a work cannot be the production of the whole people of a land, though, written by a single individual, it may represent the views of the entire country to which he belonged. In this connection he quotes the view of *Bālakṛṣṇānanda Sarasvatī* (17th century A.D.) that in the country of Kurukṣetra there was a river called Hīrarāvātī on whose banks there were some Gauḍa people, the pre-eminent of whom was Gauḍapāda, and that as the Ācārya was absorbed in deep meditation beginning from the *Dvāpara* age, his proper name is not known to modern people and so he is celebrated by the class-name of the Gauḍas.<sup>3</sup>

Though Professor Bhattacharya grants that Gauḍapāda was the author of the *Kārikā*, he is not prepared to believe that the *Kārikā* is a single work in four chapters. He is of the view that the four prakaraṇas are independent treatises which were put together in a volume under the title of the *Āgamaśāstra*.<sup>4</sup> According to him, the attempt of the commentator, whom tradition identified with Śaṅkara, to show the interconnection of the chapters is a miserable failure. Introducing the second prakaraṇa Śaṅkara<sup>5</sup> says that though it is declared in the first chapter that there is no duality, yet as it is merely an expression of *āgama*, the second chapter is written to support it by reasons. Professor Bhattacharya finds fault with this statement, because though the second chapter advances various arguments, the first is not devoid of them. And he asks, "If the connexion between Books I and II is really as it is shown by Ś [Śaṅkara] to be, then why is it that

3. *Ibid.*, pp. lxiii-lxxi.

4. *Ibid.*, p. lvii.

5. Or whoever the commentator was; the identity is of no consequence for the present discussion.

the author of Book II himself does not say so just at its beginning though he could do so easily?" At the commencement of the third chapter, Śaṅkara says that non-duality can be understood not only by *āgama*, but by reasoning (*tarka*) as well, and that consequently to exhibit the reasoning the third chapter is required. The Professor's objection to this is that if Śaṅkara were right, the object of the second and third chapters must be the same, viz., to formulate the arguments for non-duality. But, then, why should there be two chapters at all? Cannot all the arguments be included in one? The fact, according to Prof. Bhattacharya, is that non-duality is mentioned only incidentally in the third chapter, and as such is not discussed. The purpose of the fourth chapter, as stated by Śaṅkara, is the establishment of the system of Advaita through pointing out the contradictions that vitiate the schools that are opposed to it, viz., those of the Dvaitins and the Vaināśikas. As against this, Prof. Bhattacharya contends that there is no detailed criticism of the Dvaitins' view in this chapter, that there is no allusion to the Vaināśikas, and that the views of the Vaināśikas are accepted and endorsed by Gauḍapāda, who cannot therefore criticise them. As regards each succeeding chapter the Professor wants us to ask these questions: does it presuppose the preceding chapter somehow or other? What do we lose if we take it as an independent work on Advaita Vedānta? Do we find in reading it in that light anything improper, non-sensical or unintelligible without assuming its connection with the preceding chapter? Professor Bhattacharya's answer to these questions is in the negative; and he regards the four prakaraṇas as independent manuals of Advaita.<sup>6</sup>

Let us gather afresh Śaṅkara's statements about the nature of the work as a whole and about the purpose of each chapter. In his introduction to the first prakaraṇa, Śaṅkara describes the argument of the four-chaptered *Kārikā* thus: "For the purpose of determining (the sense of) Omkāra is (written) the first prakaraṇa which abounds in Scriptural passages (*āgamapradhānam*) and which is the means for knowing the true nature of the self. When the world of duality is resolved, the non-dual is known, as when the serpent, etc., imagined in the rope are resolved the rope which is real is cognised. In order to explain through reason the illusori-

ness of (the world of) duality there is the second prakaraṇa. When there occurs the contingency that non-duality too may likewise be illusory, the third prakaraṇa shows through reasoning that non-duality is not so. There are views which are *avaidika* and opposed to non-duality being absolutely real. For the purpose of refuting them on rational grounds, by showing that those views cannot be true as they are mutually contradictory, is commenced the fourth prakaraṇa".<sup>7</sup> At the beginning of the second prakaraṇa Śaṅkara says: "It was said, 'When (Reality) is known, there is no duality' (I, 18), and this is supported on the basis of such *śruti* passages as 'One only, without a second'. That is only Scripture (*āgama-mātram*). It is possible to determine even through reasoning the illusoriness of duality. For this purpose the second prakaraṇa is commenced".<sup>8</sup> At the beginning of the third prakaraṇa Śaṅkara remarks, "While discussing the nature of *Om̐kāra* it was stated 'The self is the cessation of the world, blissful, without a second', and 'When (Reality) is known there is no duality'. That was only as a premise. Of these (i.e. the two propositions 'the self is' and 'the world is not'), the non-existence of the world was explained in the *Vaitathya*-prakaraṇa by illustrations like dream, magical show, and *fata morgana*, and through reasoning on the ground of *probans* such as 'because it is seen', 'because it is with beginning and end', etc. Is non-duality to be known through Scripture alone or through reasoning also? Asking thus, the teacher replies: it is possible to know through reasoning also. How is that? To show how the *Advaita*-prakaraṇa is commenced".<sup>9</sup> Explaining the connection of the fourth prakaraṇa with the preceding ones, Śaṅkara observes, "By way of determining *Om̐kāra* non-duality was stated (in the first prakaraṇa) as a premise known from Scripture. The same was established (in the second prakaraṇa) on the ground that the external world of objects is illusory. Again (in the third prakaraṇa), of the non-duality which was ascertained directly from Scripture and through reasoning, it was conclusively stated, 'This is the supreme truth'. At the end (of that prakaraṇa) it was indicated that the views of the *Dvaitins* and the *Vaināśikas*, which are opposed to the view of non-duality, the sense of Scripture, are wrong because of their mutual opposition and because

7. Vani Vilas Memorial Edition, Vol. 5, p. 89.

8. Memorial Edition, Vol. 5, 122.

9. Ibid, Vol. 5, 144.

they give rise to passions like attachment and aversion. Non-dualism is praised as the right view on the ground that it does not give rise to passions. Now, the *Alātaśānti-prakaraṇa* is commenced for showing in detail the falsity of those views which are opposed to one another, and for establishing finally through negative reasoning non-dualism".<sup>10</sup>

Now let us return to Prof. Bhattacharya's questions. The relation between the first and the second 'prakaraṇa, according to Śaṅkara, is that while the first chapter states as a premise the non-reality of the world of duality, supported by Scripture, the second chapter establishes the illusoriness of the world through reasoning. The first objection raised by Prof. Bhattacharya is that the first chapter is not devoid of arguments. He cites *kārikās* 16-18 to show that arguments are advanced for proving the illusoriness of the world even in the first chapter. But a comparison of the method and the contents of the first chapter with those of the second will clearly reveal that while in the former Scripture is the main source of evidence, in the latter various reasons are given for the illusory nature of the world. This is all that the commentator means when he says 'āgamamātram tat'. The word 'mātra' here has the sense of 'prādhānya', for that is how Ānandagiri interprets it. Śaṅkara himself says in his general introduction at the head of the first chapter: 'prathamam prakaraṇam āgama-pradhānam'. To the next objection that if the relation between the first and the second chapters was as it is declared by Śaṅkara, why does the author himself not say so at the beginning of the chapter, we need only reply that it is not necessary. What we should consider is whether Śaṅkara has correctly understood the teachings in the two chapters and their connection, if there be any. Let us turn to the contents of the chapters themselves to find an answer. The āgama-prakaraṇa begins with a summary of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*.<sup>11</sup> Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña are described; different theories of creation are mentioned with a view to show that they are unsatisfactory, as the world is in truth the very nature of the *Deva*; in the Turiya which is the absolute non-dual reality, there is neither cause nor effect; Prajña, the self in sleep, is conditioned by the cause of world-manifestation, viz. nescience;

10. Ibid., Vol. 5, 180.

11. The view that the Upaniṣad must have been composed later than the *Kārikā* we shall examine below.

Viśva and Taijasa, the self of the waking state and the self of dream respectively, are conditioned by both cause and effect, i.e., nescience and its product. The Turiya is not to be confused with Prājña, for while Prājña is associated with dreamless sleep, in the Turiya there is neither sleep nor dream; as a corollary from this it is said that the universe does not really exist; the non-dual self (Turiya) is the sole reality; the world of duality is illusory (māyāmātra); then, following the Upaniṣad, Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña are identified with the three letters of Om, *a*, *u* and *m*, and the Turiya with the soundless culmination of Om; lastly, meditation on Praṇava is prescribed, as it leads to the supreme. From this brief outline of the contents of the Āgama-prakaraṇa it will be evident that the main subject of study is the teaching of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. No doubt it is declared there that the world is non-real. But that declaration is based on such words of the *śruti*, as 'prapañcopaśāmanam' and 'advaitam'. Thus it is clear that Śaṅkara is not wrong in characterising the first prakaraṇa as 'āgama-pradhāna'. The second chapter, Vaitathya-prakaraṇa begins with the statement that the wise declare all the objects seen in dream to be illusory; and then it is argued that the objects perceived in waking also must be illusory because of similarity with those seen in dream. Now, does not this line of reasoning presuppose the discussion of *avasthās* in the previous chapter? Is it not an elaboration through logic of what was premised on the authority of *śruti* in the Āgama-prakaraṇa? After showing in detail how there is parity between waking and dreaming, the author of the *Kārikā* proceeds to say that the entire world is a mistaken reading of the non-dual self. As when the rope is seen the snake-illusion is removed, so also when the self is known, the world of plurality disappears. Then follows a catalogue of different views about the self. The truth is, there is nothing other than the self. A few more illustrations are given to prove that the universe is illusory; the final truth is proclaimed as the non-dual reality which knows neither dissolution nor origination, neither bondage nor release; and lastly how the *yati* could know the truth and after knowing how he should live in the world. Here again Śaṅkara seems to be substantially correct in his statement that the purpose of the second chapter is to establish through reason the illusoriness of the world of duality.

As regards the relation between the second and the third chapter, Prof. Bhattacharya's objection, as we have already seen, is that if the object of the third chapter was what Śaṅkara regards



it to be, then there should be no need for this chapter at all, as all the arguments for non-duality could be included in one chapter. As a preliminary observation we may point out here that the treatment of the same topic in two successive chapters is not uncommon even in modern books. But that apart, does Śaṅkara say or mean to say that the object of the second and the third chapters is the same? Is it not his view that while the Vaitathya-prakarana establishes through reason the illusoriness of duality, the Advaita-prakarana seeks to show the non-illusoriness of non-duality? The two are related topics, no doubt; but they are not identical. The contention of Prof. Bhattacharya is that non-duality, though mentioned in the third chapter, is not its main topic, but something else. And this will be clear, he says, if one examines the contents with some amount of care. The following is his own account of the contents of the third chapter: "Here at the beginning (III, 1-2) the author tells us about 'non-origination' (*ajāti*) and having established it concludes in the end (III, 48) that it is the highest truth (*uttama satya*). In doing so he discusses the Vedānta and in that connexion the absence of difference between Jīva and Brahman. He treats also of a *samādhi* 'intense abstract concentration' called *asparśayoga* meant for the realization of the Truth".<sup>12</sup> We have no quarrel with this analysis. But what does it show? How is *ajāti* a topic different from *advaita*? Why is non-origination the truth? Is it not because the truth is non-duality alone? Prof. Bhattacharya admits that Gauḍapāda asserts in this chapter the absence of difference between jīva and Brahman. If this is not *advaita*, what else is it? And what is *asparśayoga* if it is not the path to the realisation of non-duality?

The fourth chapter, in the opinion of Śaṅkara, points out the mutual contradictions that are to be found in the systems opposed to Advaita and establishes non-duality by a process of negative reasoning. Where in this chapter is a detailed discussion, asks Prof. Bhattacharya, of the views of the Dvaitins and the Vaināśikas, assuming that they are wrong because of their mutual contradiction? And secondly where is the allusion to Vaināśikas as opponents, whose views Gauḍapāda accepts by implication throughout the book? Before we make an attempt to answer these questions we may notice in passing the argument that the

Alātaśānti-prakaraṇa must be an independent treatise as it commences with a *maṅgalācarāṇa*. Prof. Bhattacharya himself dismisses this argument as not carrying much weight. In a Bauddha work, the *Pañjika* of Prajñākaramati on the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* which consists of nine chapters, there is *maṅgalācarāṇa* in the first and the last chapters, and not in others. But where is *maṅgalācarāṇa* in the first prakaraṇa of the *Kārikā*? It has been answered by the commentators that OM with which the Upaniṣad begins is itself the *maṅgalācarāṇa*. Not only at the beginning of the fourth chapter but also at the end there is *maṅgalācarāṇa* in the form of obeisance. Does it not imply, asks Prof. Bhattacharya, that the prakaraṇa is an independent work and complete in itself? We do not, however, see the implication because there is nothing unintelligible in a book ending with an obeisance. Now about the other questions. The Alātaśānti-prakaraṇa just immediately after the *maṅgalācarāṇa* refers to the disputants who uphold the reality of origination and quarrel among themselves. Then there is an elaborate and detailed dialectical criticism of the category of origination, the concept of cause. Is not the notion of cause one of the cardinal doctrines of the pluralists (dvaitinah), and in criticising it in detail, is not the author of the *Kārikā* examining the view of those who are opposed to *Advaita*? The next question is about the reference to Vaināsikas. In his notes on *Kārikā*, III, 3, Prof. Bhattacharya says that among the Buddhists the Vaibhāṣikas maintain satkāryavāda, and the Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras hold asatkāryavāda. The verse in question maintains that the two views regarding the causal relation are mutually contradictory, and in subsequent verses Gauḍapāda provides a critique of the causal category and rejects it finally. Is this not an implicit criticism of the Vaināsika views, at any rate of the three schools of Buddhism mentioned above?<sup>13</sup> There is one more question raised by Prof. Bhattacharya. A number of *kārikās* from the second and third chapters are repeated in the fourth; the *ajātivāda* discussed already in the third chapter is discussed again in the fourth. Why is this repetition? Is it not useless? In reply it need only be pointed out that repetition is not a defect in an *upadeśa-grantha*.

That the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* was considered to be an *upadeśa-grantha* will be evident from the colophons in some of the

13. We shall examine the question of Bauddha influence later.

manuscripts.<sup>14</sup> The main object of the work is to teach students of Advaita the essentials of non-dualism. And the teacher, Gauḍapāda grades his lessons in an intelligent manner. After setting forth the purport of Scripture in the first chapter, he justifies it through reasoning in the next two chapters. The *Māṇḍūkya upaniṣad* teaches the illusoriness of the worlds of waking and of dreaming and the absolute reality of the Self, the Turiya. The second chapter is concerned with the former and the third with the latter. Having expounded the philosophy of Advaita through Scripture and reasoning, Gauḍapāda examines in the fourth chapter the views opposed to Advaita, exhibits their contradictions and shows the excellence of his own system. Such a view of the *Kārikā*, we submit, is the most rational one to take, having regard to the nature of the work and the topics dealt with therein.

### III

Contrary to the traditional Advaita view which holds the 29 verses of the first chapter to be Gauḍapāda's commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* consisting of the 12 prose passages, Prof. Bhattacharya thinks that the verses or *kārikās* must have been already in existence before the prose passages came to be composed. The reasons offered for his view by the Professor are these: (1) After the 6th, 7th 11th and 12th mantras of what is called the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, the *kārikās* are introduced in the words 'atraite ślokā bhavanti' (here are these ślokas). In other Upaniṣads like the *Bṛhadarāṇyaka* and the *Chāndogya* similar expressions are employed to introduce ślokas in support of the prose passages that precede them. It follows, therefore, that the prose portions must have come into existence after the verses, and not *vice versa*.

(2) A comparison of the contents of the prose passages with those of the corresponding verses bears out this view. If the *kārikās* were really explanations of the prose passages, they should throw light on those portions of the latter which are difficult or obscure and should not omit the most important words of the original. But what are the actual facts? (a) The *kārikās* 1-5 which are supposed to explain the prose passages 3-5 omit altogether the words '*saptāṅgaḥ*' and '*ekonaviṃśatimukhaḥ*' the most difficult

ones which require explanation. (b) In the prose passages 3 and 9 we have the word *vaiśvānara*; but in the corresponding *kārikās* the word *viśva* is used. The business of a commentator is to explain the original word and not introduce a word which is not identical or synonymous with it. (c) The terms *jāgaritasthāna*, *svapana-sthāna*, and *suṣuptasthāna* of the prose passages 3, 4 and 5 respectively are not found in the *kārikās*. (d) That the so-called Upaniṣad, instead of being the original, is really a commentary on the verses will be evident from the fact that taking a word or two from the *kārikās* it expands and explains the idea contained therein. For instance the terms *ghanaprajña* (1), and *ānandabhuj* or (3) *ānanda* (4) are explained in prose passage 5. (e) The *kārikā* I, 19 says that Viśva is identical with *a* the first letter of Om because each of them is the first (*ādi*) in its series and each is pervasive (*āpti*). The corresponding Upaniṣad clearly says that the identity is *either* because of each being the first *or* because of each being pervasive (*āpter ādimattvād vā*). This option seems to be a later development. (f) There is divergence as regards two words between *kārikā* I, 21 and Upaniṣad 11. In the former there are the word *māna* 'measure' from *mā* 'to measure' and the word *apīti* 'disappearance' from *api-i*, while in the latter there are *miti* 'measure' from *mi*, and *laya* 'disappearance'. (g) The *kārikās* (I. 10-15) make a distinction between Turiya and the other three, viz. Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña; but no such distinction is found in the Upaniṣad. (h) The Upaniṣad (1) says that Brahman or Ātman has four quarters (*catuspād*); but there is no such mention in the *kārikās*.

(3) Lastly, there is the view of Ācāryas like Madhva that the 29 verses of the Āgamaprakaraṇa form part of the Upaniṣad, and that the verses are older than the prose passages. On these grounds Prof. Bhattacharya concludes that the *kārikās* of the first chapter are not a commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, that the Upaniṣad is mainly based on the *Kārikās*, and that it must have been composed later 'with a tinge of the language used in the Brāhmaṇas'.<sup>15</sup>

Let us examine the points raised by Prof. Bhattacharya *seriatim*. (1) There is nothing unintelligible in the *Kārikā-kāra* introducing his explanatory verses in the words 'atraite ślokā

bhavanti'. In some manuscripts these are said to be the words of the Vārttika-kāra.<sup>16</sup> The Vārttika-kāra here referred to is Gauḍapāda, for the Kārikā is also known by the name *Māṇḍūkya-vārttika*.<sup>17</sup>

(2) Before answering the next set of questions, it may be useful to ask ourselves as to what sort of a commentary we hold the 29 verses of the Āgama-prakaraṇa to be. Certainly they are not meant to be a word-by-word gloss on the Upaniṣadic passages.<sup>18</sup> They re-arrange the concepts found in the Upaniṣad in a more logical manner with a view to show that the Turīya is the absolute non-dual reality; and this again is only a foundation for the succeeding three chapters. Those expressions in the Upaniṣad which are not materially useful are passed over, and certain implications which are not expressly stated in the Upaniṣad are explained because they are regarded as important by the author of the Kārikā for the development of his thesis. A case in point is the mention and criticism of the several creationistic theories. Without departing from the spirit of what is declared in the Upaniṣad, the Kārikā-kāra prepares his own *precis* of the passages and makes it the nucleus of his subsequent philosophical construction. Now we may turn to answer the points raised by Prof. Bhattacharya against regarding the Upaniṣad as the earlier text. (a) Since the object of the first five verses is to analyse the three manifestations of the self, Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña, and to show that Reality is one in the three states though the contents and types of enjoyment vary, the verses leave out expressions which are not useful for this purpose. Viśva and Taijasa being endowed with seven limbs and nineteen mouths is of no metaphysical consequence subserving the purpose Gauḍapāda has in view. It is points of contrast that are important; for the philosopher wants to show that inspite of apparent differences there is an underlying unity. Hence it is that to the differences in objects of consciousness and modes of enjoyment mentioned in the Upaniṣad, Gauḍapāda adds the differences in principal locations and types of satisfaction. The reason we

16. See Ānandāśrama edition of the *Kārikā* with Ānandagiri's *Tikā*, p. 25; atha vārttikakāroktamvākyam.

17. Rāmakṛṣṇa Paṇḍita in his commentary on the *Pañcadaśī* (II, 29) refers to the Kārikā (III, 39) as Vārttika. Whether the name Vārttika as applied to Gauḍapāda's work is proper or not is not germane to the present discussion.

18. See S. K. Belvalkar: *Vedānta Philosophy*, Part I, p. 193.

have just given will also explain why the author of the *Kārikā* has nothing to comment on the first two mantras of the Upaniṣad, though at a later stage and in its proper place he refers to Oṃkāra and its *mātras*. (b) The terms *Viśva* and '*Vaiśvānara*', whatever be their etymological significance, have come to mean the same in Advaita usage. Probably, Gauḍapāda's intention is to show the identity of the self of the waking state with the all-consciousness which has the manifest universe for its object, the identity, in short, of the *adhyātma* and *adhidaiiva* forms of the self. Hence it is that he describes '*Viśva*' as all-pervading (*vibhu*). The suggestion, however, comes from the *Śruti* itself. The Upaniṣadic passage 6 describes *Prājña*, the self in sleep, as the Lord of all, the knower of all, the controller of all, etc. Since it is the same self that persists in and through the changing states, the *Kārikā-kāra* identifies the apparently individual soul that is awake with the self of the universe. (c) The terms *jāgaritasthāna*, *svapnasthāna* and *susuptasthāna*, need not be repeated in the *Kārikā*, because the verses, as we said, present only a summary of the Upaniṣadic passages for a set purpose which their author has in view. They are not, however, unnoticed, for the fifth verse refers to them together in the words 'in the three states' (*triṣu dhāmasu*). (d) That a prose passage is longer than the corresponding verse or verses can be no argument for its subsequent composition. In the Upaniṣad 5 the state of sleep is explained and the self of that state is described. In fact, we have an independent passage for each of the three, *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña*. Gauḍapāda adopts a different method. The first four *kārikās* speak of all the three, and the trio are compared in respect of their objects of consciousness, types of enjoyment, locations and kinds of satisfaction. Viewed in this light, it may be seen that Gauḍapāda has incorporated in his verses all the terms that are necessary from the Upaniṣadic passage 5. (e) The *kārikā* I. 19 identifies *Viśva* with *a* because each is the first in its series and each is pervasive. The Upaniṣad calls them identical for either of the two reasons. From this alleged difference between the *Kārikā* and the Upaniṣad Prof. Bhattacharya concludes that the latter must have been composed later. But what is the force of 'or' (*vā*) in the Upaniṣadic text? Is it used in the sense of a disjunction either of ignorance or of exclusion? We do not think that the Upaniṣad means to say that '*Viśva*' and *a* are to be identified either only because each is the first or only because each is pervasive. Both are equally valid reasons for identification. And it is this meaning that is expressed by the word 'and' (*ca*)

in the *Kārikā*, 19. (f) We have already said that the verses of the first prakaraṇa do not constitute a word-by-word gloss on the Upaniṣadic passages. And so it does not matter from which root a particular word is formed in the *Kārikā* provided it expresses the same idea. Prof. Bhattacharya himself admits that there is no difference in meaning between *māna* and *miti*, and between *apīti* and *laya*. (g) The *kārikās* 10-15 make a distinction between the *Turiya* and the other three *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña*. The *Turiya* is the changeless lord of all, one without a second; it is unconditioned eternal consciousness; in it there is neither the veiling of the true nor the projection of the untrue. Prof. Bhattacharya holds that there is nothing corresponding to this idea in the Upaniṣad. But what do the two Upaniṣadic passages, 7 and 12, which set forth the nature of the *Turiya* mean? Do they not declare that the *Turiya* is trans-phenomenal (*prapañcopaśama*) and thereby distinguish it from the three, *Viśva*, *Taijasa*, and *Prājñā*? (h) There is no mention in the *Kārikā*, says Prof. Bhattacharya, of the four quarters of Brahman or *Ātman* declared in the Upaniṣad. This, however, is not the case. The *Kārikā* 24 makes mention of the *pādas* (quarters); and that they are four will be evident from the description of *Viśva*, *Taijasa*, *Prājña*, and *Turiya*, in the preceding verses.

(3) As for the rival tradition which regards the prose passages and the 29 verses of the first prakaraṇa as constituting the Upaniṣad, it must be noted that it does not lend countenance to Prof. Bhattacharya's view that the prose passages came into being after the *kārikās*. If the entire prakaraṇa is *śruti*, in the sense in which the orthodox schools of Vedānta accept the term, its different parts cannot be dated in sequence. It is not our task here to examine the *rationale* of the tradition which holds the *Kārikās* of the Āgama-prakaraṇa to be part of the Upaniṣad. We are only concerned with pointing out that the Advaita tradition is an old one—at least as old as Śaṅkara—and that it is not either un- plausible or unjustifiable. That the tradition is an ancient one is admitted by Prof. Bhattacharya himself. Even if the evidence of the commentator on the *Kārikā* is set aside as that of a spurious Śaṅkara, there are unmistakable references in Śaṅkara's *Sūtra-bhāṣya* and Sureśvara's *Naishkarmya-siddhi* from which one may gather that according to these two Advaitins, master and pupil, the verses of the Āgama-prakaraṇa are not *śruti*. Śaṅkara quotes the *kārikā* I, 16 in his commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtra*, II, i, 9, and

says that it is a statement made by the teacher who knows the tradition of the Vedānta.<sup>19 20</sup> Sureśvara quotes the Kārikā I, 11, in his *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, IV, 41, and says that it is stated by the worshipful Gauḍas. It is no doubt true that some of the verses of the Āgama-prakaraṇa which are cited by Advaita teachers are declared as *śrutis*. But this only shows that in their view the verses were composed *after* the *Māṇḍūkya-śruti*. The term Upaniṣad is rather loosely employed by the old teachers. For instance, the *Bhagavad-gītā* is called 'Upaniṣad'. In some of the manuscripts of the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* all the four prakaraṇas are called 'Upaniṣads'. Kamalaśīla, a disciple of Śāntirakṣita (705-763 A.D.) quotes in his *Pañjikā* some verses from the Vaitathya—and Advaita-prakaraṇas and speaks of them as belonging to *Upaniṣat śāstra*.<sup>21</sup> And so, the verses of the first prakaraṇa, when they are characterised as *śruti* or Upaniṣad, must be considered so in the secondary and not the primary sense.

#### IV

There is one more problem of the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* which we shall discuss here in brief. It is believed that Gauḍapāda, if he himself was not a Bauddha, ought to have been greatly influenced by Bauddha views which he accepted and incorporated in his *Kārikā*. Especially the idealist schools of Buddhism, Vijñānavāda and Mādhyamika, it is thought, must have appealed to him as sponsoring views very much like his own, and so without any hesitation or scruple he made use of the arguments advanced by these Bauddha schools to prove his thesis of the non-reality of the world and its absolute non-origination. The contents of the fourth chapter are indistinguishable from those of any Mādhyamika work. The terms and phrases employed there are those of Nāgārjuna. Even the title of the chapter, '*Alātaśānti*', is borrowed from Bauddha terminology. Though the first three chapters cite here and there the authority of Scripture, no Upaniṣadic passage is quoted or referred to by Gauḍapāda in the last prakaraṇa.<sup>22</sup> Probably the great teacher was so much struck with the close

19 & 20. atroktaṃ vedānta-saṃpradāya-vidbhir ācāryaiḥ.

21. See *Āgamaśāstra*, p. xxxviii n.

22. Ibid., p. lxxxiii.



parallelism between his Vedānta view and the views of the Bauddhas that after finishing the third chapter he wrote an independent work calling it 'Alātaśānti', advocating therein the Bauddha views and thereby preaching non-hostility to them.

The question of Bauddha influence is a vexed one, and we do not propose to enter into the details here. Certain general considerations will suffice to show that Gauḍapāda's main object in the *Kārikā* is to expound the philosophy of the Upaniṣads. It is true that in accomplishing this object he presses into service some of the arguments of the Bauddha idealists and even their terminology. But that does not prove his Bauddha leanings or agreement with the conclusions of Buddhism. In the first place, it must be remembered that those teachers of Buddhism who came after Gauḍapāda and who refer to his *Kārikā*, do not regard him as a Bauddha or as having been influenced by Buddhism. Śāntirakṣita quotes in his *Mādhyamakālaṅkārikā* verses from Gauḍapāda's work, while discussing the views of the Aupaniṣadas. Kamalaśīla refers to the *Kārikā* in his *Pañjikā* as an *Upaniṣat sūtra*. That the metaphysical position of the Mādhyamikas is nihilism in the primary sense is urged not only by Advaitins but also by Jaina writers.<sup>23 24</sup> The Mādhyamikas themselves do not refute the charge of nihilism brought against their view, though they carefully distinguish their philosophical nihilism from 'common or vulgar nihilism'.<sup>25</sup> No one denies a certain measure of similarity between Advaita and the idealistic schools of Buddhism, especially in the matter of their negative logic. Śaṅkara the commentator himself says that the *kārikās* IV, 25-27 employ the arguments of the Vijñānavādins for the purpose of refuting the views of those who maintain the reality of external objects.<sup>26</sup> The procedure is exactly similar to that adopted by the Absolute Idealists of the West in their criticism of Realistic doctrines. But it does not follow that either Advaita or Absolutism is identical with Subjectivism. Gauḍapāda is faithful throughout to the Upaniṣads. Even in the *Alātaśānti-prakarana* where he employs Bauddha terminology to a great extent, he does not cut himself away from the Upaniṣadic moorings. It is not true to say that there is no

23 & 24. See Prof. M. Hiriyanna's *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, p. 8.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 222.

26. *Mem. Edn.* Vol. 5, p. 196.

reference to Upaniṣadic passages in the fourth chapter. As Dr. Belvalkar, has pointed out, familiar Upaniṣadic expressions are employed in IV, 78, 80, 85, and 92. That these expressions are used by Bauddha writers also can only show that they were borrowed by them from the Upaniṣads. And it is significant that Gauḍapāda should have used such expressions as 'brāhmaṇyam padam', and 'amṛtatva' in the concluding portion of his work, and that he should have stated at the end 'naitad buddhena bhāṣitam' (This was not declared by the Bauddha).<sup>27</sup> Thus it will be clear that Gauḍapāda's Kārikā is essentially a work on Vedānta inspired by the Upaniṣads. The exigencies of his time must have made him employ Bauddha terminology, even as the Hindu monks who preach Vedānta in the countries of the west to-day feel the necessity for clothing their thoughts in Christian expressions.

It would appear that Prof. Bhattacharya agrees with this view to a large extent when he says, "It goes without saying that our teacher, Gauḍapāda, is a Vedāntist and he mainly deals with the Vedānta in the present work declaring its conclusion", "And among the Vedāntists Gauḍapāda is an Advaitist, the highest truth to him being Advaita 'non-duality'".<sup>28</sup> The Professor even grants in one place that "Gauḍapāda, though much influenced by the Buddhist thoughts, maintains his position as a Vedāntist".<sup>29</sup> But we do not find our way to agree with him when he says that there are two schools of Vijñānavādins, (1) Vedāntists headed by Gauḍapāda and (2) Buddhists with Maitreya at the head.<sup>30</sup> He himself sets forth the distinction between the two schools in clear terms. The real difference between them, he says, is with regard to the intervention of the Ātman with whom *māyā* is connected in the first, and his denial in the second where the *vāsanā* is with the *citta*.<sup>31</sup> Even where Gauḍapāda applies the term *citta* to signify reality, he uses it as a synonym for *Brahman*. While to the Vijñānavādin, the Ālayavijñāna is momentary (*kṣaṇika*) and continuous like a current (*dhruva*), to the Advaitin Brahman-Ātman is eternal (*nitya*). Therefore it helps in no way philosophically to call

27. Prof. Bhattacharya gives a novel interpretation of this sentence. See *Āgamaśāstra*, p. 212.

28. Ibid., pp. cxxvii and cxxviii.

29. Ibid., p. cxxxii.

30. Ibid., p. cxxxii.

31. Ibid., p. cxxxiii.

Advaita a school of Vijñāna-vāda. And tradition is not wrong in regarding Gauḍapāda as a stalwart Vedāntin, the philosophical progenitor of Śaṅkara.

## V

In conclusion we repeat that the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* is a single work of Gauḍapāda setting forth the quintessence of Vedānta, the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, and that its first chapter, the *Āgama-prakaraṇa*, is a verse-summary of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* which is made the nucleus for the rational exposition of the system of Advaita in the subsequent three chapters. We hold no brief for tradition. Yet we cannot help pointing out that the Advaita tradition as regards Gauḍapāda and his *Kārikā* is essentially sound, neither taxing our credulity nor involving us in contradictions.

# Some Aspects of the Philosophy of Buddha

By

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*Ceylon*

Gazing forth, like the sage of Lucretius, from the serene heights of wisdom, over the varied world of life, but radiating forth, unlike that sage rays of kind feeling and love in every direction; calm amid storms, because withdrawn into a trance of dreamless unconsciousness, undisturbed because allowing no external object to gain any hold on sense or emotion or even on thought; owing nothing and wanting nothing; resolute, fearless, firm as a pillar, in utter isolation from all other beings, except by feeling kindly to them all, such is the ideal conquerer of Buddhism.

There are three things that I intend to do in this paper : (1) To try and compare Gautama Buddha with Jesus Christ; (2) To expound Nirvana. Not only the Oxford Dictionary, but also innumerable writers and speakers, more especially Christians, have done a grave disservice to Buddhism by their imperfect understanding and erroneous representation of Nirvana; (3) To seek to explain why Buddhism died in the land of her birth—India.

## FIRST THEN THE STUDY IN CONTRASTS :

Gautama and Jesus ! The Buddha and the Christ ! Comparisons of this kind seldom serve any useful purpose; they generally involve too much simplification of human character; and they are at times even odious. But in the present case the comparison has so often been insisted upon that today it is almost impossible to avoid it. To mention only the more familiar instances, the comparison is implicit in Edwin Arnold's "Light of Asia", which purports to be 'the Scripture of the Saviour of the World'; Thoreau himself 'named the Buddha beside Christ' though he was aware that in so doing he was laying himself open to the censure of devout Christians.

The problem, however, needs some clear definition. In fact, it is not one problem: there are two. Firstly, there is the question whether there are any points of similarity between the Buddhist

and the Christian legend. To this question the answer seems to be in the affirmative. The parallels established by Seydel, Vanden Bergh, Van Eysinga, Pischel, A. J. Edmunds, M. Aneski, and others are unmistakeable. Some of <sup>of</sup> them—for instance, the story of Simeon, the Temptation, Peter walking on the sea, and the Miracle of the loaves and fishes, which Garbe regards as obvious examples of borrowing by the writers of the Gospel from the Buddhist legend—are so striking that they cannot be explained purely as cases of accidental coincidence in religious legends. Even if there were no direct contact between India and Palestine in the first century A.D., the possibility of indirect contact through the Persians was very considerable; and there is no reason why Evangelists should not have known the Buddhist legend in some of its Near-Eastern variations. Actually there has been far more diffusion and inter-penetration of legends, both secular and religious, current in different parts of the world, than is admitted by most people who seem to take a proprietary interest even in legends!

The second question is whether the personalities of Gautama and Jesus, after they have been divested of their obviously legendary and mythological attributes, have anything in common; whether, that is to say, there is any measure of identity between their respective world-views. This is a very complicated question. For it is difficult to obtain any agreement as to which parts of the Buddhist and the Christian stories are historical, and which are not; what pronouncements can be attributed to Gautama and Jesus, and what is to be regarded as the improvisation of later commentators. The question that we should ask ourselves is whether the integral personality which emerges from a critical analysis of the Pali Canon, on the one hand, and from the Synoptic Gospels, on the other, points to any common basis of experience, or resultant attitude.

To this question one can only return a negative answer. Gautama and Jesus were as different from one another as it is possible for any two human beings to be. The difference is not merely, as Canon Streeter has it, 'that the Christ was a carpenter, the Buddha was a prince, they experienced life from different angles. The Buddha was a philosopher; Jesus had the mind of a poet'. That is unduly simplifying the issue. It is by no means *certain* that Gautama was a prince, though it is true his people were comfortably off. On the other hand, though there is no doubt

as to where Jesus's own heart lay, it remains open to question—in spite of Kautsky—whether he personally had any intimate knowledge of poverty; Dean Inge goes to the opposite extreme suggesting that 'Christ and his apostles belonged to the prosperous peasantry of Galilee, a well-educated and comfortable middle class! And the difference between a poet and a philosopher is, to say the least, rather difficult to define.

A somewhat novel interpretation of the contrast between the personalities of Gautama and Jesus has also been put forward by those who, presumably, subscribe to what Papini calls 'the exhausting mercantile superstition of our day'. With varying degrees of refinement, they enlarge on Mr. Bruce Barton's conception of Christ as 'a precursor of the modern man of business, an apostle of outer action and even as a 'go-getter'. Against this they assess the Buddha as a typical oriental, a passive dreamer of dreams. The querulous Buddhist, of course, could protest that, as far as action goes, his catechism insists on 'strenuousness' and 'effort' with such vehemence that it might serve as an excellent text for the modern men of action, whose exploits are normally limited to meditations on Stock Exchange reports, and who are wise enough to have their work done for them by paid slaves. Further—Since by their deeds shall ye know them!—they might point to the prodigious achievements of their Japanese confreres who, even Mr. Bruce Barton would admit, have been anything but dreamy and passive in recent years. To see the difference between the two men in this light is to miss the significance of what seems most central in their world-views. The range of our knowledge about them is limited, but one thing may confidently be asserted that Gautama was as far from being a lotus-eater as Jesus from the glorified slave-drivers of Big Business and High Finance.

Dr. Reichelt, a German missionary of very wide sympathies, who founded 'The Society of Religious Friends' in China, informs us that in his conversation with 'really religious Buddhists' he was able to extract from them the admission that 'in the story of Calvary the Bodhisattva doctrine has reached its perfection'. This must have been due to some misapprehension on the part of our 'really religious Buddhists! For one thing, the Bodhisattva is nowhere represented as bearing his cross through crowded streets. And the reason why he is not so represented is, partly at least, because Gautama was above all a prudent man, like Confucius, and lived the kind of life which could by no stretch of imagination on the

part of his followers be interpreted as martyrdom. He scrupulously avoided getting into trouble with the temporal powers, who would doubtless have given him 'short shrift' as did Pontius Pilate to the 'Messianic agitator' from Galilee. His concession with regard to the admission of runaway slaves, domestic servants, soldiers, etc., may be mentioned as one example of his desire not to get himself involved in any struggle with Law and Order. Because of this prudence on his part, Buddhism has remained lacking in 'the tremendous fact' which forms the nucleus of the Gospel Passion Play—the fact of a supreme martyrdom. But, on the other hand, for this very reason Buddhists have been spared from having their bowels of compassion moved to the point of excruciation by subtle stabs of remorse. On the whole, Gautama seems to have had more consideration for his votaries: they are not reminded of the man who died and suffered for them every time they visit their shrines; nor do their temples everlastingly echo the silent but agonizing refrain of, 'is it nothing to ye, is it nothing to ye, all ye that pass by?' The idea of dying and suffering for others in the Christian sense is, broadly speaking, alien to practically every form of Buddhism. It was certainly alien to Gautama's teaching; he quite frankly told his Brethren that they must not expect that ultimate self-sacrifice of him: for 'by oneself is evil done, by oneself one suffers. By oneself is evil left undone; by oneself is one purified. Purity and impurity belong to oneself; on one can purify another'. There is no vicarious atonement available to a Buddhist.

To the Buddha the supreme problem was the problem of pain. To Christ, on the other hand, this problem and its solution was bound up with that of moral evil. And to Christ the problem of moral evil was prior to that of pain. In this respect again the outlook of the Buddha is temperamentally more "modern"—a fact to be noted without prejudice to the question whether his view is the more profound.

But the Buddha and the Christ are at one in this that their attitude alike to suffering and to sin is wholly *practical*. Their primary aim is not explanation but *deliverance*.

Concerning the inward experience of Jesus, tradition is dumb. We are only told that, at about the age of 30, as he rose from the waters of Baptism on the banks of Jordan, he saw the vision and heard the heavenly voice "Thou art my beloved Son", which assured him that he was called to be Christ, and this was followed by a period of temptation.

So far as personal experience is conditioned by external circumstance, the Buddha and the Christ would seem to be, each the complement of the other. Jesus lived in daily contact with things which to a prince like Sakyamuni could only be known through the capacity of sympathetic interpretation of the experience of others; he and his had knowledge at first hand of the ills of poverty. On the other hand, of the disillusionment that follows a surfeit of life's good things, which the Buddha felt so keenly, Christ had no first hand experience. Yet the possibility of disillusionment was not outside the range of his sympathy and understanding.

In the book of Job, Jesus would have found discussed an aspect of the problem of evil which lay outside the philosophic and ethical purview of the Buddha—the problem, why in this world merit and reward are not more nearly commensurate? Why so often do we see the righteous suffer, while the wicked flourish like a green bay tree? For the Buddha, this problem did not exist; or rather, it was completely solved by the doctrine of Karma, which solves it by the simple method of denying its existence. For according to this doctrine, there is no such thing as innocent suffering, since all suffering in this life is punishment justly earned by misdeeds in a previous incarnation; and similarly all present happiness is the reward of previous though forgotten merit. Of course if this Doctrine is true, the problem is solved. If not, we have an example of the way in which the acceptance of a belief traditional to his countrymen artificially narrowed the range of sympathy and thought of India's greatest prophet.

Jesus takes occasion to deny the theory, upheld by Job's friend, that his world misfortune is proportionate to desert, and he frequently asserts that God will vindicate his faithful servants.

The existence of suffering is the supreme challenge to Theism, but to stress the problem of the suffering of the righteous as such, is tacitly to assume that righteousness is a meritorious achievement of the individual for which he deserves reward. Christ will not tolerate the idea of merit in this sense. Again he was not concerned to administer cosmic consolation to persons who conceived themselves to be righteous; rather he taught, the mere fact that man supposes he had achieved righteousness, means that he had missed the way to it. In his valuation of merit, Christ is more "modern" than the Buddhist. The educationalist and the criminologist of today, knowing something of the influence on character of heredity and environment and of the possibility of psychological



mishap in infancy, hoping to make men better, are often inclined to echo that word of Christ, "Neither do I condemn thee; go and sin no more". Christ is "modern" too, in that he aims at producing the good life, not by mere repression or suppression of the bad but by enkindling enthusiasm for the good.

Christ speaks of pain much less than does the Buddha, but he knew more about it. And for him there was a graver problem. The history of his people as interpreted by a long line of prophets had concentrated attention again, to an extent unique in human history, on the problem of moral evil, both in the individual and in the social life.

To the Buddha, we have seen the problem of moral evil was incidental to the problem of pain: Immoral action tends to increase the will to live; therefore the overcoming of evil impulses in the soul is a precondition of deliverance from pain. It was impossible for a Jew either to explain suffering by means of Karma or to think of sin as something incidental. Thus to Christ the problem of evil had been posed on a larger scale than to the Buddha; and paradoxically enough, it was a problem made at once more difficult and more hopeful of solution because it had been written 'God saw that it was good'.

There enters into later Buddhism a fresh conception of what sin means. The commission of sin grieves the divine spirits and saviours of the world. To be good is to please them, to be sinful is to pain them. It is wrong to do wrong, because it wrongs divinity!

This is an entirely new conception to the Buddhist, though it is not so remote from the Vedic notion that sin makes divine beings angry. The idea, however, in the Buddhist's mind is rather that the Bodhisattvas are pained, because every sin adding to a sinner's demerit increases the debt assumed by the Divine Power, who redeems all sin by assuming that sinner's demerit. The argument is that the sinner must suffer for his sin unless another assumes the burden; the Bodhisattva assumes it in taking upon himself the vow to assume the sins of the world and so redeem sinners. Being divine and having an infinite store of merit this divine being can easily give the sinner enough merit to counterbalance the demerit incurred by sin, so that his divine suffering is more theoretical than real. But the net result religiously and ethically is that the

human sinner believes that in sinning he causes grief to the divine beings to whom he prays.

The original Buddhist has been called an egoistic hedonist. The term is harsh, but at any rate, his whole concern was with his private salvation which lay in his own hands. To secure that salvation he became moral, serene, kindly disposed. Self-development was really his aim, from a practical point of view. Karma, the working out of the act, was alone responsible for the result of acts, which acts it was in his power to do or avoid. He recognised no supreme divine power interfering with Karma. He could not say with the negligent Brahmin jurist, "malformations result from faults induced by Fate or by Karma or by maternal faults". To him it was the act alone that decided his Fate, the act comprising what is thought, said and done. But to the later Buddhist the matter had eventually become a divine matter and this Buddhist, in the gradual decadence of the primitive belief, invented the most extraordinary excuse for sinning. Originally celibate, the friar now married because "it gave pleasure to another", which in general is what a good friar ought to do. Moreover, sin actually became a virtue because it is a joy to the divinity to forgive sin and a good friar ought to give joy to the divinity. Such aberrations are found in other sects where ethical decadence has gone hand in hand with devotion and mysticism; but in no other case is there so marked a contrast between the early and the later stages of religious evolution. However little religion, in the ordinary sense, inspired the primitive Buddhist, he was yet deeply imbued with ethical belief and was a consistently moral person. But the belief in transfer of merit which was at first heterodox but finally became as general a belief as it was in Brahmanism, paved the way for the idea of redemption through divine mercy and led to the slow undermining of reliance upon our own need of ethical behaviour, so that in a measure religious devotion destroyed the fine ethical sense of the early church. It did not entirely destroy it for the idea that sin pains divine saints and that the only way we can recompense them for their goodness to us is to give them pleasure by being good (and by being good to others) was a very real support of morality, but it loosened ethical moorings and sent the ship of Buddhism abroad on strange waters. Incidentally it brought the Buddhist near to the belief in predestination which crops up in the Rig Veda, "Whom I will, I make powerful", and in the Upanishads, "whom He chooses, by him is He obtained", ending

on the one hand in the belief in Fate, and on the other in the belief in the personal Saviour-God, who grants salvation to the true believer. Hence the prayer to the Buddha or Bodhisattva as to a merciful divinity in whose power lies man's fate.

Contrast with this the Christian conception of the suffering of God: the problem of pain is conceived dynamically as one to be solved in terms not of explanation but of battle and of hope. Such a solution will seem shallow and precarious unless related to a concept which is the most characteristic contribution to the problem made in the New Testament, the doctrine of divine participation in the world's pain.

Let us ask then, what precisely are the implications as to the Divine contact with pain involved in St. Paul's statement that we may see "The light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ". To Greek philosophy, as to Indian, it was axiomatic that divinity is intrinsically incapable of pain and the classical Christian theology inherited this axiom of the "impassibility" of God. But in the Old Testament we find the idea that God enters into the sufferings of his people. "In all their affliction he was afflicted....and he bare them...." The relation of God to the woes of the world is not that of a mere spectator. The New Testament goes further and says that God is love. But that is not love which, in the presence of acute suffering, can stand outside and aloof.

The Philosophical objection to ascribing pain to God, is, I would argue, one more example of the fallacy of intellectual abstraction. If God is life he cannot be immune from feeling. But we miss the emphasis of the New Testament if we push our reaction against the idea of the "impassibility" of God to the point of letting pain overshadow joy. The Life of Christ shows forth the eternal quality of the divine; nevertheless this is done under the conditions of time, and no one moment of the time series can sum up the whole. And if there is one moment more representative than another, that moment, in the New Testament view, is not that of the cry, "My God, My God! Why hast thou forsaken me", but that of the resurrection. The historic starting point of Christianity was not the cross, but the conviction that Christ had risen—a conviction which in no way involves acceptance of belief in the resuscitation of the physical body of the Master. It was the conviction, "Death is swallowed up in victory". Were it possible to form an adjective, capable of expressing this idea, then that adject-

tive rather than the classical "impassible", would be an appropriate one to God.

Death is swallowed up in victory but the victory is at the cost of pain to god. Suffering is not explained; it is shared. And what is shared by God, man may be content to leave unexplained.

It is remarkable that the Buddha's eightfold path, considered as a series of ethical precepts, resembles the Sermon on the Mount more than does any other moral system. Such differences as there are between the moral teaching of the Buddha and the Christ are directly related to, and are logically necessitated by their contrasted views of the nature of ultimate reality.

Why, then, we may ask, do those modern intellectuals who share both the pessimism and the agnosticism of the Buddha deduce from them an ethic of such a very different character? To this question the theoretical answer is clear: they do not share the Buddha's acceptance of the Law of Karma. It is possible for a modern agnostic to eat and drink, in the belief that to-morrow he dies, it is also possible for him to contemplate suicide as a way of escape, should life's evils become too acute. To a believer in Karma death is no escape, it is only a preliminary to a new series of rebirths—perhaps in Hell, for an aeon, perhaps on earth as an animal, as a woman, as a pariah or as a man whose life is more crowded with disappointment and disaster than that from which death seemed a refuge. If death is no escape from human misery, but merely a portal to rebirth, something must be found to break the chain of cause and effect which makes that rebirth necessary. This, to the Buddha, can be done by the eradication of desire, that is of the will-to-live, which is the primal cause of birth and continued rebirth, and it can be done in no other way. To this end a man must realise that his individual self belongs, like other phenomenal objects, to the realm of "Maya", and he must know the individual self to be illusion not merely with the pure intellect, but also with that deeper realisation which can be achieved only by a long discipline of negating every personal desire.

With this same belief in Karma are logically connected the differences between the precepts of the eightfold path and the teaching of Christ. In Buddhist ethics the supreme virtues have always been compassion and self-control, more especially shown in the conquest of anger and lust. But detachment is no less fundamental, for the aim is the eradication of all desire, desire of things

good as well as evil. Hence the Buddhist may not let pity pass the borderline which separates it from love; to love is to readmit desire, it is to jeopardise the tranquility which is the goal for the attainment of which the ethical discipline exists. At the lower stages of the upward climb, the love of wife or child or friend is good, but it must be shunned by him, who would attain Nirvana at this life's end or after only a few more rebirths. The need of detachment explains the inclusion in the Eightfold path of right meditation. Undoubtedly this refers to some variety of the technical discipline known as Yoga, the aim of which is to disengage the mind from all consciousness of temporal things and focus it on absolute existence.

Thus the Buddha's acceptance of the belief in Karma explains the difference of his ethics alike from those of Christ and from the epicureanism which is taken for granted by so many moderns. But suppose the Buddha had not believed in Karma? In that case his teaching must have moved nearer either to the teaching of Christ, or to that of Epicurus. In which of these directions would it have moved? That question he himself answered not by word but by deed, at the great temptation, when he renounced Nirvana and chose a life of sacrifice and labour in hope thereby to bring to suffering humanity his message of salvation. For the philosophy of religion it is of the first importance to realise that the barrier which separates the Buddha from Christ is due in the last resort more to the intellectual theories which he inherited than to disagreement in the findings of his own very original moral insight. Where the Buddha was most himself, there he was most like Christ.

Yet in the result the divergence is one that matters; for it has not been without practical consequences, ethical and psychological, that the Buddhist bows before a figure that sits rapt in eternal meditation, the Christian before one that hangs bleeding from a cross.

### *Nirvana*

Before we understand Nirvana, let us for a moment look at *Samma Samadhi*:—"Right Self-concentration"—the eighth and final stage of the eight-fold path, which is sometimes defined as "the bringing to a focus of the mental field". As sometimes stated it is very similar to the samadhi of the Hindu Patanjali Yoga,—a trance-like state in which all consciousness of individuality is lost.

But it is also often called "Right ecstasy or rapture" and is described as a state of bliss far different from the utter quiescence just referred to. The "*Psalm of the Brethren*" are full of this wonderful sense of freedom, peace and ecstatic joy. "Free indeed, gloriously free am I". "When the 5 Hindrances have been put away, he looks upon himself as a free man, rid of disease, out of jail and secure. And gladness springs up within him, and joy arises to him, . . . and he is pervaded with a sense of peace, and in that peace his heart is stayed".

"In very bliss we dwell, who hate not those who hate us;  
In very bliss we dwell, in health amid the ailing;  
In very bliss we dwell, care-free amid the care-worn:  
Midst men of worries, we continue calm".

Sometimes, perhaps into these raptures there seems to enter a touch of that most clinging of all sins, self-complacency:

"When the wise man by earnestness hath driven,  
Vanity far away: the terraced heights  
Of wisdom doth he climb, and, free from care;  
Looks down on the vain world, the careworn crowd—  
As he who stands upon a mountain top  
Can watch serene himself, the toilers in the plains".

But there is also a real depth of spiritual experience such as we look for in vain over large stretches of Indian religion.

Samadhi is said to lead to *Nibbana*, the final goal. But just as there is a double conception of samadhi as yogic trance and moral rapture, so there is a double conception of nibbana as extinction and as perfected bliss. Nibbana means "putting out". But what is it that is put out?—self-conscious existence or the fire of desire? Primarily, certainly, the latter.

"Cool am I now, knowing Nibbana's peace", is a constant refrain in the songs of the emancipated.

But was not the ultimate end extinction of personal existence? Buddha apparently refused to answer this question directly. But it was certainly understood by most of his early-thinking followers to be the logical result of his teaching. And with regard to himself, the Pali scriptures show that he held out no hope to his followers of his continuing existence to help and to bless. When,

as he lay dying, he was asked by Ananda what would happen to them after his death, he replied, "The Dhamma will be your teacher". And again, "Therefore Ananda, be ye lamps to yourselves. Be ye a refuge to yourselves. Betake yourselves to no external refuge, but hold fast as a refuge to the Truth (Dhamma) looking not for refuge to anyone besides".

The path of the Holy Ones, more accurately, worthy ones, Arahatas, in which the saint becomes free from desire for material or immaterial existence; from pride and self righteousness, and ignorance. He is now free from all sin; he sees and values all things in this life at their true value; evil desires of all kinds being rooted up from his mind, he only experiences right desires for himself, and tender pity and regard and exalted spiritual love for others. "As a mother, even at the risk of her own life, protects her son, her only son: so, let there be goodwill without measure among all beings. Let goodwill without measure prevail in the whole world, above, below, around, unstinted, unmixed with any feeling of differing of...opposing interests. If a man remain steadfastly in this state of mind all the while he is awake, whether he be standing, walking, sitting or lying down, then is come to pass the saying "Even in this world holiness has been found".

The ten sins, or evil states of mind, thus conquered in the course of the four paths are the ten (Sangyojanas or) Fetters, which are :—

1. Delusion of self; 2. Doubt; 3. Dependence on rites;
4. Sensuality, bodily passions; 5. Hatred, ill-feeling; 6. Love of life on earth; 7. Desire for life in heaven; 8. Pride; 9. Self-righteousness; 10. Ignorance.

When the first five fetters are completely broken, the converted Buddhist has become an Arahata, and has entered the fourth path; when the other five are broken, he has become Asekha, and thus put an end to all delusion and to all sorrow.

One can speak for hours on the ecstatic praise which is lavished in Buddhist writings on this condition of mind, the Fruit of the fourth Path, the State of an Arahata of a man made perfect according to the Buddhist faith. But all that could be said can be included in one pregnant phrase—THIS IS NIRVANA.

"To him who has finished the Path, and passed beyond sorrow, who has freed himself on all sides, and thrown away every fetter,

there is no more fever of grief. He whose senses have become tranquil; like a horse well broken-in by the driver; who is free from pride and the lust of flesh, and the lust of existence, and the defilement of ignorance—him even the gods envy. Such a one whose conduct is right, remains like the broad earth, unvexed; like the pillar of the city gate, unmoved; like a pellucid lake, unruffled. For such there are no more births. Tranquil is the mind, tranquil the words and deeds of him who is thus tranquilized, and made free by wisdom”.

“They who, by steadfast mind have become exempt from evil desire, and well trained in the teachings of Gautama; they having obtained the fruit of the fourth Path, and immersed themselves in that ambrosia, have received without price, and are in the enjoyment of Nirvana. Their old Karma is exhausted, no new karma is being produced; their hearts are free from the longing after future life; the cause of their existence being destroyed, and no new yearnings springing up within them, they, the wise, are extinguished like this lamp”. “That mendicant conducts himself well, who has conquered (sin) by means of holiness, from whose eyes the veil of error has been removed, who is well-trained in religion; and, who, free from yearnings, and skilled in the knowledge, has attained unto Nirvana”.

What then is NIRVANA, which means simply going out, extinction; it being quite clear, from what has gone before, that this cannot be the extinction of a soul? It is the extinction of that sinful, grasping condition of mind and heart, which would otherwise, according to the great mystery of Karma, be the cause of renewed individual existence. That extinction is to be brought about by, and runs parallel with, the growth of the opposite condition of mind and heart; it is complete when that opposite condition is reached.

Nirvana is therefore the same thing as a sinless, calm state of mind; and if translated at all, may best, perhaps, be rendered ‘holiness’—holiness, that is, in the Buddhist sense, perfect peace, goodness, and wisdom.

To attempt translations of such pregnant terms is however always dangerous, as the new word, part of a new language which is the outcome of a different tone of thought, while it may denote the same or nearly the same idea, usually calls up together with it very different ones. This is the case here; our word holiness would



often suggest the ideas of love to, and awe in, the felt presence of a personal creator—ideas in-consistent with Buddhist holiness. On the other hand, Nirvana implies the ideas of intellectual energy, and of the cessation of individual existence; of which the former is not essential to, and the latter is quite unconnected with, our idea of holiness. Holiness and Nirvana, in other words, may represent states of mind not greatly different; but these are due to different causes, and end in different results, and in using the words it is impossible to confine one's thoughts to the thing expressed, so as not also to think of its origin and its effect.

It is better, therefore, to retain the word Nirvana as the name of the Buddhist "*Summum bonum*", which is a blissful holy state, a moral condition; a modification of personal character; and we should allow the word to remind us, as it did the early Buddhists, both of the Path which leads to the extinction of sin, and also of the break in the transfer of Karma, which the extinction of sin will bring about. That this must be the effect of Nirvana is plain; for that state of mind which in Nirvana is extinct (*upadana*, *Klesa*, *trisha*) is precisely that which will, according to the great mystery of Buddhism, lead at death to the formation of a new individual, to whom the Karma of the dissolved or dead one will be transferred. That new individual would consist of certain bodily and mental qualities or tendencies enumerated in the five *Skandhas* or aggregates. A comprehensive name of all the five is *Upadi*, a word derived (in allusion to the name of their cause, *upadana*) from *upada*, to grasp, either with the hand or the mind. Now, when a Buddhist has become an *Arahat*, when he has reached Nirvana the for that state of mind which in Nirvana is extinct (*upadana*, *klesa*, but he is still alive; the *upadi*, the *Skandhas*, his body with all its powers that is to say, the fruit of his former sin remains. These, however, are impermanent, they will soon pass away; there will then be nothing left to bring about the rise of a new set of *Skandhas*, of a new individual; and the *Arahat* will be no longer alive or existent in any sense, at all; he will have reached *Parinibbana*, complete extinction, or *Nir-upadi-sesa-Nibbana dhatu*, extinction so complete that the *upadi*, the five *Skandhas*, survive no longer—that is, in one word, Death.

The life of man, to use a constantly recurring Buddhist simile or parable is like the flame of an Indian lamp, a metal or earthenware saucer in which a cotton wick is laid in oil. One life is derived from another, as one flame is lit at another; it is not the

same flame, but without the other it would not have been. As a flame cannot exist without oil, so life, individual existence, depends on the cleaving to low and earthly things, the sin of the heart. If there is no oil in the lamp, it will go out, though not until the oil which the wick has drawn up, is exhausted; and then no new flame can be lighted there. And so the parts and powers of the sinless man will be dissolved, and no new being will be born to sorrow. The wise will pass away, will go out like the flame of a lamp, and then Karma will be individualized no longer.

Stars, long ago extinct, may be still visible to us by the light they emitted before they ceased to burn; but the rapidly vanishing effect of a no longer active cause will soon cease to strike upon our senses, and where the light was, there will be darkness. So the living, moving body of the perfect man is visible still, though its cause has ceased to act; but it will soon decay, and die, and pass away; and as no new body will be formed, where life was, there will be nothing.

Death, utter death, with no new life to follow, is then a result of Nirvana, but it is not Nirvana. The Buddhist heaven is not death, and it is not on death but on a virtuous life here and now, that the Pitakas lavish those terms of ecstatic description which they apply to Nirvana, as the fruit of the fourth Path of Arahatsip.

Thus, of the Dhamma-pada, Professor Max Muller, who was the first to point out the fact, says, "If we look in the Dhamma-pada at every passage where Nirvana is mentioned, there is not one which would require that its meaning should be annihilation, while most, if not all, would become perfectly unintelligible if we assigned to the word Nirvana" that signification.

The same thing may be said of such other parts of the Pitakas as are accessible to us in published texts. Thus the commentator on the Jatakas quotes some verses from the Buddhavansa or History of the Buddhas, which is one of the books of the Second Pitaka. In those verses we have, (inter alia), an argument based on the logical assumption that if a positive exists its negative must also exist; if there is heat, there must be cold; and so on. In one of these pairs we find existence opposed, not to Nirvana, but to non-existence; whilst, in another, the three fires (of lust, hatred, and delusion) are opposed to Nirvana. It follows, I think, that to the mind of the composer of the Buddhavansa, Nirvana meant not the extinction, the negation of being, but the extinction, the absence,

of the three fires of the passion. From the most important passages, from the Ceylon fifth century commentators, and from other later books, both Sanskrit and Pali, it would seem that the word was used in its original sense only, even as late as the time of Buddhagosa; after that time we occasionally (but very seldom, and only when context makes the modification clear) find Nirvana used where we should expect anupadisesanibbana or parinibbana,—just as the word “bow” is actually used for “rainbow”, where the word heaven, or some such expression, is in the context; and it is conceivable that the word ‘phrase’ might come to be used for ‘paraphrase’. In these cases the general sense of the context has the same force as the qualifying prefix, or prefixed word, would otherwise have had; and so far from this usage being a proof that Nirvana, without the qualifying prefix, meant the same as Parinirvana, it is very striking that such a use of the word should not occur in books even much earlier than those in which it is actually found.

So little is known of the books on the Northern Buddhist canon, that it is difficult to discover their doctrine on any controverted point; but so far as it is possible to judge, they confirm that use of the word Nirvana which we find in the Pitakas. In the *Lalita Vistara* the word occurs in a few passages, in none of which the sense of annihilation is necessary, and in all of which I take Nirvana to mean the same as the Pali, Nibbana. The Tibetan rendering of the word is a long phrase, meaning, according to Burnouf, ‘the state of him who is delivered from sorrow’, or, ‘the state in which one finds oneself when one is so delivered’ (*affranchi*). This is confirmed by Mr. Beal’s comprehensive and valuable work on Chinese Buddhism, where the Chinese version of the Sanskrit Parinirvana Sutra has the following passages—“Nirvana is just so. In the midst of sorrow there is no Nirvana, and in Nirvana there is no sorrow”. “I” (Gautama) “devote myself wholly to moral culture, so as to arrive at the highest condition of moral rest (the highest Nirvana)”.

And so again, in the verse quoted from the *Pratimoksha*.

‘The Heart, scrupulously avoiding all idle dissipation,  
Diligently applying itself to the Holy Law of Buddha,  
Letting go all lust, and consequent disappointment,  
Fixed and unchangeable, enters on Nirvana’.

If we can trust these translations through the Chinese,—and I think we may, as far as our purpose requires,—the early Sanskrit

texts of the Northern Buddhists, like the Pali texts of the Pitakas, look upon Nirvana as a Moral condition, to be reached here, in this world, and in this life.

Dr. Ven Vajirana Thero says, "It is this final emancipation and eternal Peace, unruffled by the illusion of phenomenal existence that *matters* to us Buddhists, and it is our Nibbana. The very word, Nibbana, is sacred to us, it is our last aspiration at the end of all our good action. Nibbana is not to be discussed, committing it to our dead words, but to be realised for oneself by oneself. Words are but imperfect manifestations of the thoughts of mundane minds, and Nibbana cannot be touched by them".

3. Thirdly, why did India reject Buddhism? The Buddhist doctrines are Godless, and Buddha preached Ethology and not Theology or the science of religion. He was an Atheist; and in no original Buddhistic scriptures has he shown himself God-fearing or God-loving. Just as a shapeless body or a colourless flower is incomprehensible, so the paradoxical Godless-ism of Buddha is unnatural, and failed to satisfy the hunger and thirst of the God seeking souls of the Aryans. Morality divorced from piety is a lifeless carcase. Morality, it is true, makes man, but it is piety that feeds and clothes the inner selves. Dry morality cannot quench the spiritual thirst of man. Man needs God, and a religion of humanism, however noble, can never long prevail. So in India Buddhism was ultimately wiped out by the New Hinduism of the great personal gods, Vishnu and Siva, while the Buddhism which conquered China and Japan was not the religion preached by Gautama but the Mahayana faith in which Buddha himself was deified, and was viewed in such scriptures as the Awakening of faith and the Lotus of the Good Law, as becoming repeatedly incarnate to save the world, through Grace.

b. The second cause was the Buddha's non-belief in Vedic or any other revelation, which literally means taking off the veil or cover, from the unknown or undiscovered Law of God. Laws are modes of action, and modes of action reveal the nature and character of the actor. So that every law, physical or moral, which is discovered by truth seekers and proclaimed to the world is a direct and trust-worthy revelation of God himself. There is not a nation or a race that does not believe in some kind of Revelation. Dr. Salzer M.D. a very learned man, says concerning revelation that it is the process by which man may and often does attain to the privilege of grasping and revealing truths far beyond the

ken of human reason. Buddha has left us quite a new revelation of his own. According to Buddha, revelation that comes to man from extraneous sources, however high and exalted, is not the highest attainable by man. And yet Buddha's inspiration of revelation was from the Vedas, the most sacred and the greatest repositories of knowledge. The pure and unadulterated teachings of the Vedas are to be found in the teachings of Sakya Muni. The teachings of the Upanishads in their condensed form may be read also in the Sutras of Buddhism.

Buddha repudiated the Vedas. But in the four great religious congresses that were held between 500 B.C. and 143 B.C. the necessity of Revealed Books and Records was established.

All the Buddhist works, though full of beautiful moral gems, were chiefly borrowed from the Vedas and Upanishads which the Buddha claimed to have undermined. Eminent Orientalists having compared the Upanishads with the Ethics of Buddhism have come to the conclusion that there is hardly any difference between the two. Prof. Barth one of the most cautious of Orientalists goes further and says that the Sutras of Buddha and Upanishads are "identical in thought".

(c) The third cause was the prominence given by Buddha to the doctrine of Bhikkusim or Mendicancy. Reformation of Society was not Buddha's mission. Sever all social connections and live an ascetic life was his object. As social inclinations are absolutely necessary to the well-being of the world, it is the duty and interest of every individual to cherish and improve them to the benefit of mankind. Society is the work of men. There is nothing in society which is not also in man. But Buddha was otherwise convinced. He did not know that poverty never regenerated a nation. Poverty is the nurse of grief, sorrows and anxieties. His followers at best retraced their steps and divided themselves into 38 different sects or societies.

(d) The fourth cause was the revival of Vedantism by the world famed Sri. Sankarachariyar, who being a profound scholar in Sanskrit, conversant with the esoteric teachings of the Vedas and Philosophies boldly checked the further progress of Buddha's Materialism in Aryavarta. He defeated in public discussion the principal disciples or Missionaries of Buddha.

The Buddhists began to lose their hold and became demoralised with the touch of Orthodox Hindus. They commenced to worship

the tooth and the bone of Buddha. In Buddhagaya they still worship Hindu Gods and Goddesses. The same sort of thing took place elsewhere too. The great Gautama Buddha, who started his mission with the banner of Agnosticism was at last cunningly incorporated by the Brahmin Priests with their Avathars and proclaimed Sakiya Muni as the 9th Incarnation of God !

(e) The last blow that the Buddhists received was from their brother Jainism proclaimed by Mahavira of Anathaputtra between the 7th and the 10th centuries. The Buddhists wisely conciliated their Hindu neighbours and professed their belief in 136 hells.

(f) I mention as a last reason the fact that Buddhism was expelled from India by violence. Although this is believed by many to be the main reason for the death of Buddhism I deliberately put it last because I find that the reason is not as strong as it is made out to be. The last Buddhist Missionaries Punna Mitra and Prognatta died in the years 381 and 457 A.D. The Buddhism of those days was banished from India and had a refuge in China in A.D. 516. Kumarila Bhatta, a great Sanskrit scholar, subsequently took a prominent part in the expulsion of Buddhists from S. India in the 7th century A.D. His mission of Buddhistic destruction was successfully made over to the celebrated Sri. Sankarachariya in the beginning of the 8th century A.D. King Sudhanna with the support of Kumarila, proclaimed a general crusade and massacre against Buddhists and urged upon his subjects that all Buddhists young and old, should be killed from the South to the North, and whoever would give them shelter should meet the same fate. This massacre went on till the 13th century A.D. Buddhism suffered at the hands of Mohammedan persecutors too. Both Buddhism and Hinduism were exposed to the attacks of the same Mohammedan invaders. Buddhism succumbed with massacre of the monks; Hinduism survived because it had struck root in the family system of the country and its extermination was tantamount to the extermination of the whole population.

# An Examination of Ramanuja's Criticism of Ego-Less-Consciousness

By

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According to Rāmānuja, self-consciousness is an essential and inseparable feature of consciousness. Self is a conscious subject which never loses its selfhood,<sup>1</sup> or, 'Ahampratyaya'. The 'Ahampratyaya' is present even in deep sleep, though in a dim degree.<sup>2</sup> This theory of the eternal presence of the self-consciousness comes in conflict with Śankara's theory of the eternal presence, not of a consciousness of self-hood, which is an illusory superimposition, but of a self-less, and distinctionless presence of consciousness and Rāmānuja offers the following criticism of it.

Rāmānuja's criticism against ego-less consciousness is, that egoity is not something illusorily superimposed on the self, for if that were so, there would be such a consciousness as 'I am consciousness', and not as we have in our daily life, 'I am conscious'.<sup>3</sup> This should clearly prove that self is a subject of consciousness. The one and unitary consciousness cannot be divided into two parts of 'I-ness' and 'consciousness', the one being held illusory and the other as the only reality. But this criticism of Rāmānuja is true, but irrelevant. If there is an empirical consciousness, it invariably involves the duality of subject and object and the upholders of the distinctionless consciousness never deny this phenomenal aspect of consciousness, which must necessarily be in the form of 'I am conscious', and cannot possibly be in the form of 'I am consciousness' which would be meaningless. It is admitted on all hands that empirical knowledge reveals in the distinction of the knower,

1. R.B. 1. 1. 1. p. 29. 'Ahampratyaya siddho hi asmadarthah.

2. R.B. 1. 1. 1. p. 35 'Susuptavapi naham bhāva vigamah'.

3. R.B. 1. 7. 1. p. 31. 'Anubhūtiraham iti pratīyet na anubhavāmi aham iti pratītiḥ'.

the known, and knowledge. What is affirmed is that this distinction is not final and ultimate.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, if by consciousness is meant the pure duality-less consciousness it could not possibly be in the form of 'I am consciousness', for the 'I'ness is as unnecessary to it, as 'thisness'. It can be only in one form and that is subject-less objectless consciousness. The witnessing self which is 'Saksi', 'Kevala', and 'Nirguna' cannot be identified with the 'jīva' which is actually undergoing the modifications of experience.<sup>5</sup> But Rāmānuja could never see the need of just such a consciousness. To him, consciousness or the self could never be without egoity. He asks, 'Do you mean to say that knowledge appears to itself? The Self is not mere knowledge but the subject of it'. And the general principle is that whatever appears to itself appears as an 'I', and therefore even granting that consciousness appears to itself, it will appear in the form of 'I'. Hence 'what constitutes the inward self is not pure consciousness but the 'I'.<sup>6</sup>

Rāmānuja's second criticism of 'Śankara's distinction of self and egoity is an attack upon the notion that the unconscious 'Antaḥkaraṇa' can come to possess the character of a knower. Śankara held that since egoity or the character of a knower involves action, and consequently change, it could not belong to the unchanging consciousness. Action and change must be the property of limited consciousness and hence the qualities of 'Kartṛ', an agent, and 'Jñātr' must belong to the ego or the 'jīva', the lower principle of consciousness.<sup>7</sup> But to Rāmānuja it is manifestly absurd that the non-intelligent 'Ahankāra' or the 'Antaḥkaraṇa' could become a knower.<sup>8</sup> The agency of knowledge cannot belong to the unconscious Ahankāra. Nor can Śankara's theory of egoity as a reflection of the Pure Self be tenable. 'How, we ask, is this becoming a reflection of intelligence imagined to take place?' Does consciousness become a reflection of 'Ahankāra' or does Ahankāra become a reflection of consciousness? The former alternative is inadmissible since the quality of being a knower would not be

5. Pañcadaśī. X. 11-ff. Nṛtyaśālāsthito dīpah prabhūm sabhyāmsca nartakīm, dīpayed aviśeṣena tadābhāve' pi dīpyate.

6. R.B. 1. 1. 1. p. 35. 'Ahamartha eva pratyagātmā na jñapti mātṛam'.

7. S.B. 2. 3. 40.

8. R.B. 1. 1. 1. p. 32. 'Na jñātrtvam ahamkārasya' na kadācidapi jaḍasyāhamkārasya jñātrtva sambhavaḥ'.



allowed to consciousness and so is the latter, for the non-intelligent can never become a knower.<sup>9</sup>

The Advaita reply to the above is that the unconscious Ahankāra manifests the consciousness even as the hand manifests the light of the sun. But Rāmānuja retorts that the non-intelligent Ahankāra should manifest the self-luminous self has no more sense than to say that a spent coal manifests the sun.<sup>10</sup> The relation of manifestation cannot at all hold good between two contradictory natures of consciousness and 'Ahankāra'. The Advaita illustration of the hand and the sunbeam is untrue, for 'in reality the sunbeam is not manifested by the hand at all'.<sup>11</sup>

Moreover, the concept of a knower does not involve a concept of change. Rāmānuja denies the fundamental tenet of Śankara that to be a knower is to be changing and hence different from the unchanging consciousness. The ego as a subject of knowledge is not necessarily an active and changing principle. 'Nor can it be maintained that to be a knower is something essentially changing'.<sup>12</sup>

According to Rāmānuja, the Ātman is eternal, and its natural quality of consciousness too is eternal, but yet it is subject to contraction and expansion, which are due to the accidents of the 'Karma' of the person in the cycles of existence and are not the natural property of the self. The quality of an agent is not, however, essential to the self, but originated by 'Karma', the self is essentially unchanging'.<sup>13</sup> It is difficult to see here any difference at all between the position of Śankara and his critic Rāmānuja, when both virtually believe in the eternity of the self as well as of consciousness, but attribute change and action either to the unconscious 'Ahankāra' or to the mere 'accidents of Karma'. In fact 'Rāmānuja's two above quoted remarks, (1) 'Nor can it be maintained that to be knower is to be essentially changing', and

9. R.R. 1. 1. 1. p. 32. 'Kimahankāra Chāyāpattiḥ samvidah uta samvicchāyāpattir-ahankārasya'.

10. Śāntāgāro ivādityam ahāmkāro yadātmakah, svayamjyotiṣam atmānam vyanaktīti na yukti mat. Quoted by R.N. in 1. 1. 1.

11. p. 32.

12. R.B. 1. 1. 1. p. 32. 'na ca jñātrtvam vikryātmakam, jñātrtvam hi jñāna guṇāśrayātvam jñānam cāsyā nityasya svābhāvika dharmatvena nityam'.

13. R.B. 1. 1. 1. p. 32. (a) 'Svayamaparicchinnameva jñānam saṅkoca vikāśārham ityupapādayiṣyāmaḥ'. (b) Tacca na svābhāvikam api tu karmakṛtam ity avikriyasvarūpa evātmā'.

(2) 'It is subject to contraction and expansion due to accident of Karma, and the quality of an agent is not essential to the self, but is originated by 'Karma', are identical, which are meant by him to be different. If the self is admitted to be 'essentially unchanging', it matters little whether the character of change and egoity (knowership) is 'due to the Antahkaraṇa' or 'to the accidents of Karma'. The relevance of the argument consists in the recognition of two orders of consciousness, one of the status of the unchanging and egoless, and the other of egoity and action, which Rāmānuja too is virtually forced to admit.

Rāmānuja next criticises Śankara's notion of a 'Sākṣī-consciousness', a form in which the egoless consciousness is supposed to exist in deep sleep. To Rāmānuja 'Sākṣī' and 'ego' are identical concepts. He asks 'What is the meaning of a 'Sākṣin'? By a 'Sākṣin' is meant some one 'who knows about something by personal observation', and one who does not know an object cannot be called a Sākṣin'.<sup>14</sup> Mere consciousness cannot be regarded as 'Sākṣin'. Now though to be a Sākṣin is not to be devoid of knowledge yet there seems to be clear difference between the two concepts of an indifferent and unaffected witness, and the actual participator and the affected 'Bhoktā or the Jīva'. There is at least as much difference between a 'Sākṣī' and a Jīva as between an umpire and a player in a game of football.

The Sākṣī knows, but is not an actual and active participator, and hence is not affected by the vicissitude of the game. The concept of a Sākṣī-consciousness is necessitated by the need of a self-same consciousness in the midst of its changing modes 'vṛttis' which are the actual and active agents.<sup>15</sup> The active modes of consciousness and the quickly successive phases of ego-hood cannot themselves explain the conscious phenomenon, without the assumption of a Sākṣī-consciousness behind them.

Rāmānuja is right in emphasising the concrete aspects of consciousness, but he unjustifiably overlooks the unempirical background of his empirical superstructure, as most onlookers in a game notice only the winning and the losing player, and not the unaffected umpire.

14. R.B. 1. 1. 1. p. 36. 'Sakṣitvam ca sākṣāt jñātvam eva, na hi ajānataḥ sākṣitvam, jñātā eva sākṣī na jñāna mātram'.

15. Pañcadaśī 10. 9-19.

Besides, if there is no difference between a 'Sākṣī' and a 'Jīva' and if a 'Sākṣī' must always have an 'other' to look on, then this permanent state of the duality of the knower and the known would make omniscience 'Sarvajñatā' or the state of all-knowledge impossible. The imperfect knower 'jīva' must at sometime so completely know everything that there is no 'other' left outside and then he is called not a 'jīva' but a 'Sākṣī'.

*Ego-less consciousness and deep sleep :*

A study of deep sleep provides a fruitful background for a theory of the true nature of consciousness as a distinctionless eternal presence. Such an eternal consciousness as exists in deep sleep or in the fourth state 'Turiya' is consciousness, but not self-consciousness, because there are no objects in the dreamless sleep, in opposition to which there may arise the ego-consciousness 'Ahampratyaya'. Self-consciousness is the consciousness of the self as mediated through the consciousness of objects, as is the case in the waking and the dream state. But since this mediation is not possible where there are no objects, there is consequently no self-consciousness in dreamless sleep in place of which there is only a distinctionless or a 'nirviṣaya' 'cinmātra' presence. And conversely, where there is a mediation through the presence of objects, as in waking and dream states, there is also the presence of the differentiated consciousness in the form of the 'Jīva' which revels in the distinctions of the 'Aham' and 'Idam'. But there is then, no manifestation of the 'nirāśraya' and the nirviṣaya 'jnapti mātra cit prakāśa', which also is nevertheless present as the basic substrate.

Rāmānuja says that the 'I' consciousness is not very clear in deep sleep for lack of external objects.<sup>16</sup> He, therefore, accepts the main principle that the consciousness is due to the mediation of external objects, and that ego-consciousness is the one extreme of the polarity of consciousness of which the object-consciousness is the other extreme. So that where there is no possibility of the mediation there is no self-consciousness. The question, therefore,

16. R.B. 1. 1. 1. p. 36. 'tamogunābhibhavāt parāgarthānubhavābhāvāccāhamarthasya vivikta-sphuta pratibhāsābhāve apyaprabodhād aham-ityekā kārena ātmanah sphuraṇāt suṣuptāvapi nāham bhāva vigamaḥ'.

is whether in deep sleep there is unmediated consciousness or a mediated consciousness.

Rāmānuja accepts that there are no objects in deep sleep, and hence no possibility of any mediation. The only alternative left therefore is either to deny the presence of consciousness and thus to affirm a break in the continuity of consciousness or to admit the existence of an eternal consciousness, unmediated by external objects. Ego-consciousness must exist only in polarity with object consciousness. It must go in the absence of its objects. Rāmānuja cannot retain the one without retaining the other also. He destroys the object-consciousness but wants to retain the ego-consciousness. In deep sleep, either there is self-less consciousness, or there is a lapse of consciousness. Since the latter alternative is not acceptable, the former alone is in keeping with the doctrine of the polarity of subject-object consciousness. This self-less consciousness is not either a psychological self, or a particular consciousness, but a consciousness presupposed by all empirical and particular fluctuations of consciousness, which itself cannot be apprehended as an object.

# The Jaina View of Causation

By

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In this short paper I propose to deal with the theory of Causation in Jainism. This ancient religion has a distinctive metaphysics that is based on pluralistic realism; this basis may be traced even in the Jaina view of Causation.

The view is remarkable for the reason that it seeks to bring about a compromise amongst the various extreme doctrines of Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Buddhism, Vedānta, etc. The Naiyāyikas assert that the effect is an origination and is non-existent prior to its production,—view known as Ārambhavāda and Asatkāryavāda; Sāṃkhya holds that all effects are pre-existent in their causes—a view that is known as Satkāryavāda. The Jaina view is that an effect is neither an origination absolutely nor is it pre-existent absolutely; the effect is pre-existent in its cause from the point of substance (Dravya), but it is an origination from the point of modification (Paryāya). If the effect is taken to be absolutely pre-existent then what is there for the cause to produce? The cause thus causes nothing; again if the effect is absolutely non-existent like the sky-lotus then it could never be brought about. There cannot also be any definite restriction about the material conditions necessary for the production of an effect, for anything may come out of anything. We shall thus have to give up the use of accessories regularly needed for the production of a desired effect. The author of Aṣṭasāhasrī sums up the whole contention thus:—If the effect is absolutely non-existent like the sky-lotus or son of a barren woman, then it cannot be produced, again if the effect is absolutely existent like the ether, then there is nothing that could be produced; no one will be foolish enough to bring together various conditions in order to produce the effect which is already there on hand. Thus all practical activities will come to an end. It is therefore urged by the Jains that effectuation is possible of that only which is relatively existent; the material conditions are changed into the effect, this effect was pre-existent in the form of a substance though not present in the form of

modification, thus e.g. an effect like a pot is pre-existent in its cause viz. clay in the form of clay-substance, but not in the form of pot-modification, it is only after the clay substance has undergone the modification that the effect, pot comes to be, so far as this modification is concerned it is an origination, but so far as the substance is concerned, the effect is pre-existent, thus a compromise between the Sāṃkhya and Nyāya views is reached.

The Jaina view again is opposed to the one-sided views of the Buddhists, Naiyāyikas, and the followers of Sāṃkhya. The Buddhists maintain that every entity is momentary; the Naiyayikas and the followers of Sāṃkhya and Vedānta claim that certain entities are permanent. Now the Jains tell us that neither the momentary nor the permanent entity can be a cause. On both the views known as Kṣaṇikekantavāda and Nityekāntvāda causation is impossible. The Jains argue as follows: It is admitted on all hands that causation is established by means of co-presence and co-absence, now this is impossible to find when entities are momentary or permanent absolutely. If the entities are momentary then the cause moment cannot be viewed to be present along with the effect moment and so no agreement can be observed, and similarly the absence of the cause cannot be viewed along with the absence of the effect, for the cause is present when the effect is absent and the effect is present when the cause is absent. All that we gather under the doctrine of momentariness is that the absence of one leads to the presence of the other which is what we do not have in the case of co-presence or co-absence. If the cause moment is completely destroyed before the effect moment appears, then one might naturally ask, what remains of the cause that could be causally connected with the effect? Further under this view there cannot be any distinction between the material and accessory conditions, for since the cause moment is completely destroyed before the effect emerges, the non-existence of the material cause preceding the effect is the same as the non-existence of the accessory cause preceding the effect; there is nothing to distinguish between one non-existence and another. Hence no rule can be laid down that the effect emerges from the non-existence of the material causes and not from the non-existence of the accessory conditions.

On the other hand if an entity is taken to be permanent, then it will not be possible to determine by co-absence the relation between cause and effect for *ex hypothesi* the entity cannot be

absent. Again in an absolutely permanent entity there cannot be any change and consequently no causation, for change is the very essence of causation. Unless a substance is modified there is no effectuation. Threads cannot become a piece of cloth so long as they are not modified that way. It is the substance and its modification that are the objects of cognition by means of co-presence or co-absence. When threads are present the piece of cloth is present and when they are not present the piece is also not present. The thread substance leaves off its former form that was different from the piece of cloth, and retaining its threadness is modified into the form of a piece of cloth that was not present before. The form of the piece of cloth is different from the preceding form of threads, but threadness has not altogether disappeared.

The relation of causation may then be said to depend upon the contiguity of substance and its modification. The author of *Aṣṭasāhāsrī* says "Therefore that which does not retain its preceding form like that which does not shed its preceding form—in other words, the momentary and eternal entities—cannot be causes". In the former case there is no enduring substance that may retain its preceding form and be called a cause. In the latter case there is no shedding of the preceding form and taking up of a succeeding change and therefore there is no effectuation. Under the Jaina view, however, there is an enduring substance that is supposed to undergo modifications, and so effectuation is possible.

Another remarkable feature of the Jaina view is that causation is taken to be some kind of an energy or efficiency. Thus the Jaina view like that of *Mūnāṇsā* may be said to be very near the scientific dynamical conception of causation. The *Naiyāyikas* deny the existence of such an efficiency. They suggest that for the production of an effect all that is needed is the collocation of material and instrumental conditions. They find no use for efficiency. They say that a piece of cloth is made when the last thread is interwoven with the rest; for without the conjunction of the last thread the effect will not take place; by co-presence and co-absence we can infer that the only causes needed to produce a piece of cloth are the material and instrumental ones. When the collocation of all the conditions take place the effect is produced, when it does not take place there is no effect, hence the admission of efficiency is superfluous. Without the conjunction of the last thread the other existent threads do not produce the effect—a piece of cloth. Therefore this conjunction alone may be taken to be their efficiency in producing the effect. If it is asked "How can an object be the

efficiency of another?", then it will be replied that this is equally applicable if the efficiency is supposed not to belong to another object, for no cause can be an efficiency of its own. Again the Naiyāyikas ask "Is this efficiency eternal or non-eternal. If it is eternal then effects will take place at all times, and further the effect will be found without the help of the accessories, so such accessory causes will become superfluous. If the efficiency is non-eternal, then whence is it produced? If it is said that it is produced by the efficient cause, then the question arises as to how this efficient cause comes to have this efficiency; if the efficiency is produced by a preceding one, then there will be infinite regression. If the efficiency is produced by a non-efficient cause then why should not an effect as well be produced by a non-efficient cause?" The Naiyayika further asks "Is efficiency different or non-different from the efficient cause. If it is non-different, then we have either the efficient cause alone or efficiency alone. If it is different, then owing to the absence of aid it cannot be said that this efficiency belongs to the efficient cause. If however it is said that one aids the other, then does (A) efficiency help the cause, or (B) the cause help the efficiency? (A) In the former case does the aid of the efficient cause by the efficiency reside in (i) a different object or (ii) not? (i) If it resides in a different object then owing to the pre-supposition of another aid to designate the first aid we shall have to assume another efficiency, there will therefore be infinite regression. (ii) If the aid does not reside in a different object then the self-same object will be cause. (B) Where the efficient cause helps the efficiency it may be asked whether the cause does so being possessed of another efficiency or being devoid of it? In the former case is this efficiency different from the original efficiency or non-different from it? In both cases we shall have the defects that have been previously pointed out. If the cause aids efficiency being devoid of it, then the pre-supposition of efficiency is set at nought for as the aid is produced without efficiency, an effect as well may be so produced. Further is the efficiency one or many? If it is one, then many effects cannot be simultaneously produced, if many then the cause that has these different powers will have to have many powers to retain them and so there will be infinite regression. Again if the nature of the cause be supposed to produce an effect then it should be needed to produce the efficiency in the cause also and so an efficiency will be needed to produce another efficiency; this leads us to regression again".



The Jains refute all this as follows: Is the absence of efficiency determined due to lack of knowledge or due to the fact that efficiency is suprasensible? The former is not sound, for efficiency is known by means of inference which results from the incapacity of other causes to produce the effect. Without the knowledge of such an efficiency it is impossible for one to take up a definite collocation of materials to produce the desired effect. Again it may be asked if there is no efficiency how is it that even though all the circumstances calculated to bring about the effect are present the effect does not take place? Fire e.g. in the presence of a counteracting gem or charm does not cause blister. It may be asked here whether the counteracting agencies suppress directly the form of fire or of the accessories? The former will not do for the fire is directly observed in an unsuppressed form; neither the second will do for the accessory in the form of the contact of the finger with the fire is also noticed. The only conclusion we can then draw is that the gem counteracts the efficiency of the fire and so no blister is caused. If efficiency were not counteracted, why is it that the same fire causes blister in some man but not in another who wears the gem or repeats the charm? It cannot be said that since efficiency cannot be sensed it does not exist for then we shall have to throw overboard our belief in the existence of merits and demerits and God. If we can infer any peculiarity in causes by means of a peculiarity in the effect then similarly efficiency can be inferred.

As to whether the efficiency is eternal or non-eternal, the Jains assert that since substance is eternal its efficiency is eternal, but because modifications are non-eternal their efficiencies are non-eternal. Because of the eternality of the efficiency of substance it cannot be said that causation will take place always, for the Jains maintain that a substance alone cannot produce an effect. It is the substance that has undergone a modification that will produce an effect; modification is due to the aid of accessory causes, and so a substance cannot produce effects eternally for the requisite modification takes place at certain moments only in the presence of suitable accessories.

To the question "Does efficiency belong to the efficient or non-efficient entity?" they reply as follows:—Efficiency belongs to the efficient; if it is urged that this leads to infinite regression then it is suggested that such a regression is not a flaw for like the interaction between the seed and sprout the flow is eternal. The present

efficiency is manifested by a potent entity possessed of a prior efficiency and this latter by an entity possessed of a more prior efficiency and so on.

Again to question whether the efficiency is different or non-different from the potent entity is improper. For surely there is some difference between them. One difference lies in the fact that while the entity is perceived the efficiency is not perceived. It is rather conceived, for without it an effect cannot be explained. It is also non-different from the potent entity for it is impossible to find the efficiency existing separately from the entity. There is no contradiction in saying that efficiency is both different and non-different from the potent entity, for an entity possessed of identity-indifference falls under a different head altogether.

If it is asked whether the efficiency is one or many the Jains say that an object is possessed of many powers because they produce multifarious effects. Or rather it may be said that the multifarious effects of the same cause indicate that it is possessed of such different effects as light, burning of the wick, evaporation of oil etc. If it is said that the different effects are due not to different powers but to the difference in the accessories, then it will be urged that an object like an orange is not possessed of diverse qualities such as taste, smell, colour, etc., for these qualities are known by means of different accessories such as the palate, nose, eyes, etc. On this view an orange will have to be taken to be formless.

We now turn to an important application of the Jain view of causation, viz. to divine creation. Following the special view of causation, that the Jains hold, they refute the view that the world is created by God. Their arguments are as follows:—

Either the substance out of which the world is made existed from the very beginning or it did not so exist. In the first case the existent substance should limit the activity of God and so He would cease to be All-powerful; in the latter case, what material cause did God resort to in making the substance? If it is said that God alone is the material cause as some of the Vedāntins hold, then it may be said that since the properties of the material cause are to be found in the effect, the Universe should be expected to have such properties of God as Omniscience, Omnipotence etc. If it is said that God is the instrumental cause, as a potter is of a pot as

the Naiyayikas hold, then it is here implied that God should be an Agent, since all actions presuppose an agent, but it is unnecessary to take God to be an Agent for two reasons, (a) agency implies some kind of a body through which work is done and so God will become an embodied being. If it is suggested that God does not need a body but creates by His mere Will then it may be asked, "What is His Motive in creating the world?" If God created the world without any motive then the world being a product of caprice we should fail to find law and order in the world. If the motive is pity then we should expect no evil and pain in the world. If God created the world by his mere existence then it may be asked, "Is bare existence the cause?" If it is so then the bare existence of a goldsmith should lead to the production of a gold ring, for the bare existence of one is the same as that of another. (b) Again experience shows to us that it is not necessary to presuppose an agent always wherever there is activity; there are many effects such as rainfall that are produced without any agent. If it is said that the agency is the activity itself then it is clear that the reason adduced is doubtful for the opponents cannot show any defect in the supposition that any action may precede even without any agent. If it is said that this is opposed to the well-known logical dictum that there is no effect without a cause—there it may be said that this does not mean that God must be the cause and that something else may not be the cause of the universe. Some one may suggest that the perfect adjustment and design that are found in the world indicate that its creator must be an All-Wise and All-Powerful and Infinite Intelligent Being, inasmuch as an inert body cannot work according to plan and further no finite spirit has the power to create such a vast Universe. All this may be refuted by showing that the world is far from being perfect and properly planned. If God had created it then the wicked should never have prospered, there should have been no wastage and no calamities, gold should have possessed fragrance and sandal trees should have bloomed. As an Omnipotent and Omniscient being He should have foreknown and forestalled these imperfections and calamities. If the calamities are supposed to be due to merits and demerits then it should be admitted that these influence God in creating the universe and so He ceases to be All-powerful. Again this notion of plan or design is an anthropomorphic conception. If on the analogy of human experience God is regarded as intelligent then why should He not be regarded as imperfect since men are so. Further it may be said that since causal relation is established

by means of co-presence and co-absence it is impossible to determine that God is the cause of the Universe for God is Omnipresent and therefore it cannot be shown that where He is absent His effect viz. the universe is also absent. Moreover if the Universe is an effect we should like to know what "Effect" means. Does it mean the changeful? If so, then since God is creating by His different acts He is also changeful and therefore an effect and not a cause. If effect means a contingent event then it should be denied that the Universe is an effect for the world has always been. If effect means coming into<sup>1</sup> being of that which was not before then also the Universe is not an effect for it always has been.

For these reasons that are the ramifications of the principle of Causation, Jains disprove that the world is created by God.



# The Concept of Sthayibhavas in Indian Poetics

(A Psychological Scrutiny)

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The classical doctrines of Indian poetics have, most of them, their origins in the work of Bharata, the *Nāṭyashāstra*. Among such doctrines is the famous Rasa Doctrine of poetical appreciation, in connection with which Bharata lays down the following cryptic aphorism :

“ तत्र विभावानुभावव्यभिचारि संयोगाद्रसनिष्पत्तिः । ” (Nāṭyashāstra, VI, 34).

An expositor has explicated it as follows :

“ स्थायिनः विभावानुभाव व्यभिचारिभिः संयोगात् स्थायिनः रसत्वेन निष्पत्तिः । ”

Its purport has thus been rendered : “When the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and the *vyabhichāribhāvas* combine to awaken the *sthāyibhāva*, the awakened *sthāyibhāva* finally develops into *Rasa*.”

Bharata has said again :

“ विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिपरिवृत्तः स्थायीभावो रसनामलभते (नरेन्द्रवत्) । ”

(Nāṭyashāstra, p. 71.)

This means : “The *sthāyibhāva* when acted on (stimulated) by *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhichāribhāvas* obtains the title of *Rasa*.”

It is obvious that the *sthāyibhāva* is here presumed to be some fact or phenomenon connected with the *mental life* of the *Rasika*, or the appreciator of a work of art.

The passages cited above are the *locus classicus* of Bharata's famous *Rasa* doctrine, which became afterwards the central text for the development of the various theories and explanations in the hands of the Sanskrit Sāhityakāras or literary critics. It is obvious that the whole *Rasa* doctrine hinges upon the central concept of *sthāyibhāva*, which is the core of that doctrine. It is this *sthāyibhāva* (whatever its nature), which, when acted on or appealed to by certain factors called the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhichāribhāvas*, is said to develop into *Rasa* (poetical appreciation or aesthetic enjoyment) of a work of art. A sound understanding of the *Rasa* doctrine, therefore, depends in the first instance upon a clarification of this central concept of *sthāyibhāva* in that doctrine.

A reference to recognised writers on this subject reveals a remarkable lack of agreement among them about the exact psychological nature of the *sthāyibhāva*. Here are a few representative views :

Dr. S. K. De (*Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics*) has used a variety of expressions to render *sthāyibhāva* into English ; "the principal or permanent mood," (p. 27); "more or less permanent mental states," (p. 28); "permanent mood or sentiment," (p. 168, footnote 168); "dominant emotion," (p. 326); "dominant feeling," (p. 343); etc.

Pandit P. P. Sastri (*The Philosophy of Aesthetic Pleasure*) uses these phrases : "potential conditions of mind," (p. 18, footnote); "a permanent mental condition," (p. 39, p. 171); etc.

Prof. P. S. Naidu (*The Rasa Doctrine and the Concept of Suggestion in Hindu Aesthetics*, in the Journal of the Annamalai University, Vol. X, No. 1 (September, 1940), p. 8) opines : "The *sthāyibhāvas* are the propensities of Western psychology."

Dr. K. N. Watave (*The Psychology of the Rasa Theory*, in the Silver Jubilee Number of the Annals of the Bhāndārkar Oriental Research Institute, Vol. XXIII, 1942, p. 670) writes : "The *sthāyibhāva* is the 'Sentiment'. Our Sanskrit *sthāyibhāva* is neither an instinct, nor an emotion, nor a mood; although it has got an instinctive base and is a *primary emotion* in character."

It is obvious that these scholars have sought to identify the concept of *sthāyibhāva* in Indian poetics with some (corresponding) concept in Western psychology, e.g. *mood, mental state or condition, emotion, feeling, sentiment, primary, emotion, propensity, etc.* Now, if a concept of some mental fact or phenomenon as described by the Sanskrit literary critics is to be identified with the corresponding concept of some allied fact or phenomenon described by modern psychology, then this can be done in any *decisive* sense only after a direct and close, comparative *scrutiny* of the description of both the concepts given by competent and relevant witnesses, with a view to bringing out whatever *essential similarities* (and differences) there might exist between them. Similarities, then, if substantial, will make for their identity (and differences, if any, will have to be satisfactorily explained). The writers quoted above, apart from the thought-provoking suggestions that they have made, cannot be said to have done *this*, at least in a way that would satisfactorily decide the question about the exact psychological nature of *sthāyibhāva*. It is accordingly proposed, in this paper, to re-examine critically the descriptions of the *sthāyibhāva* in the Sanskrit works on literary criticism, with a view to ascertaining more definitely what fact or phenomenon as described in our modern psychology it approaches most in its essential nature.

## II

Dr. K. N. Watave (*Rasa-Vimarsha*, Doctorate Thesis in Marathi, published by New Kitābkhānā, Poona, pp. 136-138) has very usefully brought together the principal representative passages in the various Sanskrit treatises, which are meant to describe, though not to define always and strictly, the nature of the *sthāyibhāva*. On a close scrutiny of these, it appears that they can be classified under five or six main heads, emerging out of that scrutiny, of the dominant characters of the essential nature of the *sthāyibhāva*, as it was envisaged by these writers. Below are given these heads and the passages that would appear to fall under them :

### (1) *Innate Inclination or Disposition :*

‘जात एव हि जन्तुः इयतीभिः संविद्धिः परीतो भवति ।’ or ‘न हि एतच्चित्तवृत्ति वासना शून्यः प्राणो भवति ।’ or ‘वासनात्मना सर्वजन्तूनां तन्मयत्वेन उक्तत्वात् ।’ (अभिनवभारतो of अभिनवगुप्त)



सामाजिकानां वासनारूपेण स्थितः स्थायी भावः । ' (काव्यानुशासन of हेमचन्द्र)  
 ' .....स संस्काररूपेण स्थायितां गतः । ' (सङ्गीतरत्नाकर of शार्ङ्गदेव)  
 ' वासनारूपतया अतिसूक्ष्मरूपेण अवस्थिताः अविच्छिन्न प्रवाहाः स्थायि-  
 भावाः । ' (काव्यप्रकाशटीका of वामनशास्त्री शलकीकर)

(2) *Prevailing Predominance :*

' यथा नराणां नृपतिः शिष्याणां च यथा गुरुः । .  
 एवं हि सर्व भावानां भावः स्थायी महानिह ॥ ' (नाट्यशास्त्र of भरत)  
 ' सकलप्रधानो मनोविकार इति वा स्थायी भावः । ' (रसतरङ्गिणी of भानुदत्त)  
 ' एकः कार्यः रसः स्थायी रसानां नाटके सदा । '  
 (सङ्गीतरत्नाकर of शार्ङ्गदेव)  
 ' सुराजेव विराजेत सः स्थायी भाव उच्यते । ' (साहित्यकौमुदी of विद्याभूषण)

(3) *Capacity not to be eclipsed by other factors :*

' विरुद्धैरविरुद्धैर्वा भावैर्विच्छिद्यते न यः ।  
 .....स स्थायी..... ॥ ' (दशरूपक of धनञ्जय)  
 ' सजातीय विजातीय भावानभिभाव्यो.... ।  
 परानभिभाव्यो मनोविकारो वा....स्थायीभावः । ' (रसतरङ्गिणी of भानुदत्त)  
 ' विरुद्धा अविरुद्धा वा यं तिरोहितुमक्षमाः ।  
 आनन्दाङ्कुरकन्दोऽसौ भावः स्थायीति सञ्ज्ञितः ॥ '  
 (साहित्य दर्पण of विश्वनाथ)

' सजातीयविजातीयैरतिरस्कृत मूर्तिमान् ।  
 यावद्रसं वर्तमानः स्थायीभावः उदाहृतः ॥ (रसगङ्गाधर of जगन्नाथ)  
 ' न तिरोधीयन्तं स्थायो..... ॥ ' (साहित्यदर्पणटीका)

(4) *Capacity to attract, subdue or assimilate other factors :*

' अन्ये भावास्तान् (स्थायिनः) गुणतया श्रयन्ते । ' (नाट्यशास्त्र of भरत)  
 ' आत्मभावं नयत्यन्यान् स स्थायी लवणाकारः ॥ ' (दशरूपक of धनञ्जय)

‘ ....तै (अन्यभावैः) रसौ (स्थायी) पुष्यते परम् ॥ ’ (साहित्यदर्पणटीका)  
 ‘ अविरुद्धान् विरुद्धांश्च भावान् यो वशतां नयेत् ।  
 ..... स स्थायोभाव उच्यते ॥ ’ (साहित्यकौमुदी of विद्याभूषण)

(5) *Endurance—Stability—Permeation :*

‘ चिरं चित्तेऽवतिष्ठन्ते संबन्ध्यन्तेऽनुबन्धिभिः ।  
 रसत्वं ये प्रपद्यन्ते प्रसिद्धाः स्थायिनोऽत्रते ॥ ’ (सरस्वती कण्ठाभरण of भोज)  
 ‘ सक् सूत्रवृत्त्या भावानामन्येषामनुगामकः ।  
 .....स्थायी..... ॥ ’ (साहित्यदर्पणटीका)  
 ‘ तत्र आप्रबन्धं स्थिरत्वादमीषां भावानां स्थायित्वम् । ’  
 (रसगङ्गाधर of जगन्नाथ)  
 ‘ ....अविच्छिन्नप्रवाहाः स्थायिभावाः (काव्य प्रकाशटीका of शङ्कराकर)

(6) *Enjoyability—Delectability :*

‘ स्थायी एव तथा चर्वणापात्रम् । ’ (अभिनवभारती of अभिनवगुप्त)  
 ‘ आनन्दाङ्कुरकन्दोऽसौ भावः स्थायीति संज्ञितः ॥ ’  
 (साहित्यदर्पण of विश्वनाथ)

The following appears to be the broad upshot of the passages quoted above : The *sthāyibhāvas* are the innate, predominant or prevailing, unclipsable, assimilative, enduring and permeating, enjoyable, conative-dispositional factors in human nature. In brief, the *sthāyibhāvas* are the prevailing, innate, conative-dispositional factors in human nature.

III

If this upshot extracted from a scrutiny of the descriptions of the *sthāyibhāvas* in the works of the Sanskrit Sāhityakāras is representative and correct (as it is hoped it is), then it directly suggests (and invites) a *prima facie* comparison of the *sthāyibhāvas* with the Instincts or Propensities of western psychology to the students of that science. Below are accordingly given a few representative passages from the works of McDougall and Drever, the well-known British psychologists, who have done so much in

recent times to secure a proper recognition for Instincts or Propensities, as the prime, innate factors or the original basic constituents of human nature :

(1) McDougall defines Instinct as follows :

“We may, then, define instinct as an *inherited or innate* psychophysical *disposition*, which determines its possessor to *perceive*, and pay *attention* to, objects of a certain class, to experience an *emotional excitement* of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an *impulse* to such an action.” (An Introduction to Social Psychology, 23rd Edition, p. 23.)

(McDougall has also defined Instinct almost in similar terms in his later work, *An Outline of Psychology*, 4th Edition, p. 110. And he has defended the same general position in regard to Instinct in his *The Energies of Men*, 3rd Edition, pp. vi, 26, 64 and 118; but he has used in this book the term propensity instead of instinct to avoid certain controversial difficulties).

(2) McDougall describes the significance of Instinct in human life as follows :

“We may say, then, that directly or indirectly the instincts are the *prime movers* of all human activity; by the *conative or impulsive force* of some instinct (or of some habit derived from some instinct), every train of *thought*, however cold and passionless it may seem, is borne along towards its end, and every bodily *activity* is initiated and sustained. The instinctive impulses determine the *ends* of all activities and supply the *driving power* by which *all mental activities* are sustained; and all the complex *intellectual apparatus* of the most highly developed mind is but a *means* towards these ends, is but the *instrument* by which these impulses seek their *satisfactions*, while *pleasure* and *pain* do but serve to guide them in their choice of the means.” (Op. cit., p. 38.)

(3) McDougall also describes the relations of Instinct and Emotion,—especially how *emotions* inevitably appear in the wake of the operation of the instinctive impulses as the *affective reflection* of them,—as follows :

“*Emotion* is regarded as a mode of *experience which accompanies the working within us of instinctive impulses*. It is assumed that human nature (our inherited inborn constitution) comprises

instincts; that the operation of each instinct, no matter how brought into play, is accompanied by its own peculiar quality of experience which may be called a *primary emotion*; and that, when two or more instincts are simultaneously at work in us, we experience a *confused emotional excitement* [secondary or blended emotion], in which we can detect something of the qualities of the corresponding primary emotions. The human emotions are then regarded as *clues to the instinctive impulses*, or indications of the motives at work within us." (*An Outline of Psychology*, pp. 127-128.)

(4) A passage from Drever, quoted below, focusses most of the points in the passages quoted from McDougall above :

"When we seek the *motives* for the man's acts, we find that, they reduce themselves on analysis to certain *motives more or less characteristic of human nature in general*....Moreover, these motives are *innate*....The human being comes into the world with certain *active tendencies*....These active tendencies....may be designated *instincts*....These instincts are experienced as *impulses*, each accompanied by a *feeling or interest*, evoked by certain particular objects, situations, or other experiences, and manifesting themselves in more or less definite kinds of behaviour." (*The Psychology of Everyday Life*, 6th Edition, p. 20.)

The following appears to be the *main upshot* of these passages from McDougall and Drever: Instincts are the *innate prime movers*, the *dominant conative-dispositional* factors in human nature. These are the *enduring motive forces* behind all activities of man—*bodily and mental, intellectual, emotional and volitional*. They are *stimulated* by some concrete thing, aspect of environment or experience; and out of this their stimulation come into play all the *emotions and feelings* of men. All thought, activity or feeling arises only in connection with and is *subordinate* to one purpose, —the *satisfaction or fulfilment* in some way or sense of these native dispositions of man's nature, which is the grand *ultimate value*, the most delectable, of our human existence, in relation to which alone everything derives its value and enjoyability.

If we now carefully compare the main trend of the descriptions of the '*sthāyibhāva*' in the Sanskrit works on poetics, of which we have given a broad upshot towards the end of Section II of this paper with that of the definitions and descriptions of Instinct in the works of McDougall and Drever, of which also we have extracted

the main upshot towards the end of the last Section, it will be seen, I hope, that the two concepts, the *sthāyibhāva* and Instinct, seem to offer surprising similarities of their essential natures, so that we may almost recognise them as essentially, though broadly, identical concepts in psychological theory. The two, the *sthāyibhāva* and the instinct, are (1) the innate, (2) conative, (3) dispositional factors of the original endowment of the human nature. They are (4) the prime (non-secondary) movers behind all human activities, (5) to which all other activities in human life, intellectual, emotional and volitional, are subordinate and contributory, and (6) which are the ultimate source and basis of all the human emotions and feelings, which are the main stuff and content of our aesthetic life and enjoyment. It is for the readers of this paper to realise this broad identity for themselves. I, for one, feel convinced about it. The 'sthāyibhāvas' of Indian poetics are the 'instincts' or 'propensities' of Western psychology.

# Is Madhva a Monist ?

By

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## I

Sri Madhva bases his philosophy of Natural Dualism on the solid rock of the principle of contradiction. Brahman is *Svatantra*, a being not-dependent upon another,<sup>1</sup> and the world consisting of many entities coeval with God is *asvatantra*, for ever a being dependent upon another. Brahman is imperishable in nature. The eternal entities as Lakshmi, Avyakritakasa, the Vedic sounds, the Jivas etc., are *changelessly* eternal. Primordial matter changes, but is imperishable in essence.<sup>2</sup> The difference between the eternal entities and Brahman is not *Arôpita* or illusory; it is never contradicted or sublatale; on the other hand it is eternal and persisting even in salvation (*Mukti*). The difference is natural (*Svābhāvika*) and absolute (*Ātyantika*) not tainted by mixture of identity.<sup>3</sup>

This absolute difference between the world and Brahman is posited as a logical reasoning in proof of God's defectlessness. Brahman is defectless because He is absolutely different from the world which alone is defective. The absoluteness of this difference is further emphasised by the fact that the world and Brahman are irreducible one to the other at any stage of experience. This entire *Siddhanta* is summed up in a few stanzas in 3-3-1 *Anuvyakhyana*.<sup>4</sup>

This form of "Natural Dualism" is distinguished from the Cartesian and other discredited forms of Dualism by the admission—as in Ramanuja's system—of similarity between the World and Brahman; such similarity as makes possible close relationship between the two naturally different entities. The assumption that relation between two entities presupposes their identity of substance is condemned; and it is held that even purely different substances can become related.

The famous modern psychologist C. Spearman writes :  
Relations can be cognized between any characters whatever, simple

or complex, concrete or abstract, that have come to apprehension within any experience. (Page: 64). It is pointed out that the Jiva and Brahman are sometimes figuratively *spoken of as one* owing to their (Sthanaikya) occupying the same point of space; their (Matyaikya)—identity of interests, or their (Sadrisya) resemblance; in some figurative statements again the jiva is ignored on account of his dependence and inferiority and God is described as if He were the only existent. In some statements the jiva is figuratively described as if he were God himself, to indicate the presence of God in him. But all these figurative expressions (Gounaprayôga) only denote the glory of God and the intimate relationship between Him and the World and do not in the least take away from the absolute difference existing between the ultimate principles, God and the World. Lastly the difference is identical with its locus and exists in pairs. When we say the world and Brahman are different we mean that the world has difference from Brahman as its natural positive quality; and God has in turn difference from the world as His positive natural quality; so that even if the world were to perish it will not become identical with God as one of the two differences still persists. Thus Dvaita-Siddhanta maintains close relation between absolutely different—entities and makes room for an integrally United Kingdom (an organised union and not a unity) of essentially different parts. It rejects monism as leading to the conception of an imperfect Brahman—not supported by the Vedas—in one of three ways: pure monism which rejects the world as illusory involves the conception of a deluded God; pantheism makes God imperfect by identifying God with the defective world; doctrines of identity and difference are illogical and cannot save God from imperfection resulting from the acknowledged identity. The Natural Dualism of (related) paratantra—svatantra escapes from the chaos of an unrelated multiplicity and answers the problems of variety and free-will.

## II

A philosophy so, explicitly pluralistic is held to be 'a real example of monism' by Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar, our learned President of this section. I mention briefly five or six arguments clearly enunciated in his recent book 'The Dvaita philosophy and its place in the Vedanta' and his article 'Madhva's conception of Svatantra' in the Mysore University Journal Vol. IV part 2—pages 1-36. 1943.

(1) First comes our author's definition of monism as a doctrine of "One in many" (Page 242). I answer that a doctrine of One God immanent in a manifold world cannot be called monism, if it holds that the one and the many are absolutely and naturally different, one irreducible to the other. There must be identity or identity and difference between the two elements, (the one and the Many), postulated if the system can be called monism. The examples of monistic systems in the world, dictionaries, and the usage of the word in authoritative books bear out my remarks. Monism is a doctrine of One Ultimate Being,<sup>5</sup> not one Supreme Being absolutely distinct from many dependent beings. In Dvaita, the many beings acknowledged are inferior, *not in point of reality*—but in point of knowledge, bliss, and power, etc.

(2) The next argument of Mr. Raghavendrachar is: The World is less real than Brahman; because the world has God—given reality; God is the giver of the reality to the world; So, God is the sole ultimate reality. (pp. 200-201, 13, 10). I beg to submit in reply that God is not conceived in this system as the *Source* of the world's reality in the sense of material cause. God is the *efficient cause* of the world. The world has its own natural reality distinct from God's reality. God is the controller, not the *giver* of this distinct reality which the world has. All statements meaning that God 'gives' reality, etc., or that the world derives God's reality, etc., are purely figurative for *niyamana*, control from within (*Anadisvabhavaniamaka sakti*). The *niyamya*, (the dependent world) is as real as Brahman, the *niyamaka*. Both are *pāramārthika*. Nyayamrita page 95 is clear on this point. The conception of degrees of reality is criticised in Anuvyakhyana. 1-1-1.<sup>6</sup> The servant is as real as the master. The dependent world has therefore the same degree of reality as the independent God.

(3) The next argument is: God is the *Creator of all*; everything except God is created. God is the one from whom everything emerges. Even eternal things are created by Him. Therefore He is the one cause of the world and its reality. The doctrine of One Cause explained as the source of all the world is monism (pp. 1, 16, 18, 19, etc., of 'Madhva's Conception of Svatantra').

**Criticism :** This, I beg to state is a very misleading representation of Dvaita. In 2, 3, 15 of his Brahmasutra Bhashya, Sir Madhva states that the *jiva* is beginningless and eternal like God: The



jiva is held to be an eternal pratibimba (similar but inferior dependent being) of God who is the eternal bimba (in-dwelling ruler). Brahmasutra Bhashya 2.3.6 says that at the time of Creation there were many eternal entities *besides God*. Sri Nyayasudha 2.1.6. expounds in detail that God does make use of other eternal entities in Brahmānda-production and so the created world is the product of many causes, one chief efficient and many subordinate causes of which matter is the material cause and others are dependent efficient causes.<sup>7</sup> God as already stated is not the material source of the reality of the world. Dvāita maintains that the world has anadisiddha swarupa satta (तत्स्वरूपसना अनादिसिद्धा) unoriginated natural reality of its own not given by God, but controlled by God. The doctrine of many distinct causes with one Supreme Cause is Mono-theism not monism.

(4) This brings us to the next argument which consists in a curious idea of God's glory and 'inconceivable' power acintya-sakti. God, says our author, can do everything; He can create the world without any other causes. He can bring into being effects without causes. No cause can be without Him. He gives cause-ness to the causes. The existence of a second cause is a limitation to Him. Therefore He is the only cause and the system is monism (pp. 12, 16 Madhva's Conception of Svatantra).

I reply that we must distinguish between what God *can* do and what He *has done*. God, it is held, cannot do the logically impossible. That is, He cannot bring into being a real son out of an eternally barren woman while keeping the woman barren. A truly perfect God is a wise God, who *cannot* become identical with matter or sin, etc. Such apparent incapacity is virtue, a real glory.<sup>8</sup> So God cannot actually create an eternal thing. Granting that God can do anything and everything, the point is what God *has done*. God *can* negate the world and negate the causes beside Him; He *can* produce the world out of nothing; and remain an Advaita—murthi, the sole Reality. But Dvaita says God *has* used the other causes *invariably* and remained the supreme cause, not the sole cause of the world. Nyaya Sudha: p. 299. concludes this discussion by pointing out that God's glory is not affected by the admission of several dependent causes by the side of God.

(5) This leads us to the author's view of dependence :—  
Because the world is dependent it cannot be considered as a distinct

principle at all; there are many statements in Dvaita which consider God alone as the sole Tattva, principle. Srutis like Ekamevad-vitiyam; sarvam khalvidam Brahma, Purushaavedam Sarvam also mention God as the only Reality. Only the independent must be considered to be real. Hence the doctrine of a perfect independent principle is monism (p. 28, 27 of the article).

*Criticism* :—In Dvaita the conception of dependence is the explication of the ideas of (a) God's transcendence and (b) immanence. The explanations of both these ideas in Dvaita is antagonistic to a monistic scheme of thought. The transcendence of God consists in His being the eternal ruler of the world (Iswara) and in possessing infinite auspicious attributes too numerous to be known in full by any Cetana other than God. God is Sākalyéna ajneya, not fully knowable. This conception makes clear the essential difference between the World and Brahman. God's immanence—the conception of God as indwelling ruler—also is never explained as degrading into *identity with* the world in which He dwells. There are philosophers who think that utter dependence logically pushed, ends in actual identity and that such a theory is tacit or implicit monism. In my book "Sri Madhva's Tattva-vada" and the book of one of my learned teachers 'Is Madhva a monist?'—both in the press—this question is answered in detail. I now beg to state that Sri Madhva has nowhere stated that dependent reality is no reality or that Reality is ultimately one in his system. He has nowhere called his system Advaita, or himself an Advaitin. He has called himself a Bhedavadin. The fact that the world is extremely dependent upon God has given occasion to *figurative monistic expressions*, not actual identity (as in pantheism) or negation of dependent reality (as in Absolute monism which maintains that the world is illusory). Hence, Ekamevad-vitiyam is interpreted by Sri Madhva as 'God is Supreme and not differenced in Himself and without an equal or superior. Sarvam khalvidam is interpreted as "This Brahman is perfect": Purusha-evédam Sarvam means "all this is dependent upon Purusha." The intended teaching of all such apparent monistic passages is explained in Nyayasudha: page 124.<sup>9</sup> The passages referred to maintain that Vedic statements apparently teaching that God is the only reality, God is the giver of reality, etc., are all figurative expressions or imaginative ways of thinking the truths that God is one without an equal or superior; and that He is the maintainer of the reality of eternal and the efficient cause of the reality of non-eternals.

(6) The last point to consider is the strange theory of Svarupa Srishti, the actual creation of eternal things: the author maintains that the jiva 'changes' when he gets a new body or state of antahkarana; the Visishta 'The jiva with body' is created: When the Visishta is created, the Viseshya the jiva is also created. So, as every moment the jiva becomes connected with a new point of time, a new Visistha is produced: a new jiva also is produced. Nothing is uncreated. From Sri downwards everything is affected in some way or other whenever and wherever a change takes place in the world. Thus the creation of a change means the creation of all". God the sole changeless Reality is the only Reality; the system is monism (pages 17-20 of the article).

*Criticism:* This is a very misleading exposition. Dvaita maintains that the jiva, Vedic sounds, Lakshmi, Avyakritakasa, etc., are *Kutastha nitya—changelessly eternal*. The jiva as well as God; Akasa, etc., become connected with a new point of time every second. They become new Visishtas. Still neither the jiva nor God nor Akasa 'changes'. The Viseshya 'Jiva is not created when the Visishta—'the jiva with body' is created. On this line of argument, we have to say that God also is 'created' every second. The author uses the word 'creation' in a sense opposed to English usage. He translates the Sanskrit word 'Adhina' into created. But Adhina means dependent.

The learning of our learned author has not succeeded in establishing that the 'jiva', etc., are actually created, that is, that they come into existence out of a state of non-existence, according to Dvaita.<sup>10</sup> His whole position that Dvaita is monism has led him to the use of very ambiguous expressions. It is besides opposed to traditional accounts of Dvaita as found in authoritative English and Sanskrit works. 'The Monism of Dvaita' is a pure heresy.

## APPENDIX

- (1) T.S.T. (p. 2) स्वरूपप्रमिति प्रवृत्तिलक्षण सत्तात्रैविध्ये परानपेक्ष  
स्वतन्त्रम् ।

परापेक्ष अस्वतन्त्रम् ॥

- (2) N.S. 412. (सर्वं हि द्रव्यरूपेण नित्यं ; T.S.T. p. 4.

नित्या वेदाः । अत्र वेदा इत्युपलक्षणम् । पञ्चाशद्वर्णानां अव्याकृताकाशस्य च तथा  
भावात् ॥ T.S.T. (R) p. 7.

चेतनानां नित्यत्वं अत्यन्ताभावध्वंसयोनित्यत्वम् ।

T.S. श्रीनित्यमुक्ता ॥ T.S.T. (S) p. 14. स्वतन्त्र तत्त्वस्य विष्णोर्नित्यत्वं

परतन्त्रत्वेऽपि चेतनानां नित्यत्वं तथा ध्वंसात्यन्ताभावयोनित्यत्वम् ।

T.S.T. (S) कूटस्थतया इत्यस्य निर्विकारतयेत्यर्थो द्रष्टव्यः ।

- (3) A.V. 3. 3. 1. भेदाभेदेऽप्यभेदेन दोषाणामपि संभवः ॥

- (4) अशेषगुणपूर्णत्वं सर्वदोष समुज्झतिः ।

विष्णोरन्यच्च तत्तन्त्रमिति सम्यग्विनिर्णयः ॥

स्वतन्त्रत्वं सदा तस्य तस्य भेदश्च सर्वतः ।

अदोषत्वस्य सिध्यर्थं यदभेदे तदन्वयः ॥

तत्तन्त्रत्वं च मुक्तानामपि तद्गुणपूर्तयं ।

मुक्तानामपि भेदश्च न हि भिन्नमभिन्नताम् ॥

गच्छद्दृष्टं क्वचित्तस्याप्यभावोनुभवोपगः ।

पूर्वाभेदे दोषवत्वमीशस्येत्यतिभिन्नता ॥

नारायणेन मुक्तानामपि सम्यगिति स्थितिः ।

भेदाभेदेऽप्यभेदेन दोषाणामपि संभवः ॥

- (5) T.V.T. (p. 2) एके त्वेकमेव तत्वमिति मन्यन्ते । तदसत् ।

Chamber's Encyclopedia defines Monism as a philosophical theory that all beings may ultimately be referred to one category. Thus idealism, pantheism, materialism are monisms.

En. R. E. Vol. VIII p. 809. *Monism*:—Taking the term in its widest sense we might apply to every mode of thought which seeks to transcend the distinction between the physical and psychical and to reach an ultimate unity:—Classification—Idealistic monism; materialistic monism. In the 19th century, the term 'Monism' came to be used by the disciples of Hegel as designating their own peculiar mode of thought.

(6) N. S. 1. 4. 6. (p. 198) एवं श्रुति पुराण युक्तिभिः ब्रह्मणो निर्विकारत्वावगमान्न जगदुपादान कारणत्वं किं तु निमित्तत्वमेवेत्युक्तम् । A.V. 2. 2. 2. नित्यं नित्यशक्त्या स्वयेश्वरः । नियमयति नित्यं च । Sri Raghavendraswamin interprets giving of reality thus:—

“तत्सत्तादि प्रदं चेति—आकाशादि सत्ताशक्ति प्रतीति प्रवृत्त्यादि प्रबोधनं कुर्वादित्यर्थः ॥ p. 124. Parimala. N. (p. 95). यादृशं ब्रह्मणस्तत्त्वं तादृशं स्यात् जगत्पि । p. 96. त्रिकाल सर्वदेशीय निषेधाप्रतियोगिता सत्तोच्यते । A.V. 1. 1. 1. स त्रैविध्यं च मानं न सिध्येत् केनेति पृच्छते ॥

(7) N.S. (p. 299) इदमुक्तं भवति । यदुक्तमीश्वरस्य कारणोपादानादि नियमोऽस्ति न वेति । तत्रास्तीति ब्रूमः । तथाच प्रकृत्यादोनां कारणत्वं युक्तम् । स च नियमो न कुलालादेरिव तान्यपहाय व्यत्यस्य वा करणे शक्त्यभावनिबन्धनः । येन तस्य स्वातन्त्र्यं न स्यात् । तेषां च पारतन्त्र्यं न स्यात् । किं नाम स्वेच्छायत्तमेव । ततः स्वातन्त्र्यादिकमपि युक्तम् । न च तानि स्वाधीन सत्ता शक्त्यादिमन्ति । येनैश्वर्यं निर्गलं न स्यात् । किं तु भगवत्येव तदीयं सत्तादिकमायतते । ततस्तत्सा-चिव्यमतिशयेनैश्वर्यस्य द्योतकमेव ॥

(8) A. V. 3. 2. 10. नायुक्तमीशितुः किञ्चिदीशत्वस्याविरोधि यत् ।  
यदीशत्वविरोधि स्यात्तदेवायुक्तमञ्जसा ।

(9) N.S. (p. 124). सर्वाण्यपि हि वेदवाक्यान्यसङ्ख्येय कल्याणगुणाकरं सकलदोषगन्ध विधुरम्....ब्रह्म नारायणाख्यं प्रतिपादयन्ति । कानिचित्सर्वपरित्यागेन तस्यैवोपादानायाद्वितीयत्वेन । कानि चिचित्सर्वसत्ताप्रतीति प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तता प्रतिप-त्यर्थं सर्वात्मकत्वेनेत्येवमाद्यनेकप्रकारैः परमपुरुषं बोधयन्ति N. S. Parimala (p. 118). अद्वितीयत्वेनेति । एकमेवाद्वितीयमित्यादानीति भावः । सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म पुरुष एवेदं सर्वमित्यादोनातिभावः ॥

(10) V.T.V. (p. 110). भावदीपः स्वरूपोत्पत्ति भ्रमनिरासायाह ।

In this Sri Raghavendraswamin condemns Svarupa Srishti of the jivas.

N.S. (p. 431). इह आकाशस्य उक्तं जन्म घटादेरिव अभूत्वाभ-  
वनलक्षणमिति केचिदास्थिताः । तन्निराकरिष्यन् स्वमतं तावदाह ॥ .....  
तदेवं आकाशस्य अभूत्वाभवन रूपोत्पत्तिरयुक्तेति सिद्धम् । N.V. न प्रदेशः कथञ्चन ।  
प्रदेशः=अवकाशः । N.V.B. (p. 42). कथञ्चन=स्वरूपेण, विकृतरूपेण वा नोदेतोति  
संबन्धः । V.T.V.B.\* (p. 100). “ स्वरूपपरिणामरूपोत्पत्त्यपेक्षया (देहोत्पत्तिरमुख्ये-  
ति) भावः ॥

#### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

1. En. R. E.	.. Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.
2. A. V.	.. Anuvyakhyana.
3. N. S.	.. Nyayasudha.
4. N. V.	.. Nyaya Vivarana.
5. N. V. B.	.. Nyaya Vivarana Bhavabôdha.
6. N. '	.. Nyayamrta.
7. T. S.	.. Tattva Saṅkyāna.
8. T. S. T.	.. Tattva Saṅkyana Tika.
9. T. S. T. (R)	.. " " " (Raghavendra Tirthiya)
10. T. S. T. (S)	.. " " " (Sreenivasa Tirthiya)
11. T. V.	.. Tattva-Viveka.
12. T. V. T.	.. Tattva-Viveka Tika.
13. V. T. V.	.. Vishnu-Tattva-Vinirnaya.

# **Buddhism : The Conception of God**

**By**

**MISS K. SABERWAL**

*Lahore*

It is very doubtful whether Buddha Himself was willing to let his teachings be used as a foundation of a philosophical system. But every reasonable and intelligent human being has got a philosophy of his own.<sup>1</sup> Mahātmā Buddha also, in this sense, has got a philosophy. Lately Professor Bapat has attempted to distinguish the philosophy of Buddha from Buddhist religion and philosophy. Although Buddha tried to avoid metaphysics, yet the germs of all the four philosophical schools named Sūnyavādi or Mādhyamika, Vijñānavādi or Yogācara, Bāhyānumeyavādi or Sautrāntika and Bāhyapratyakṣavādi or Vaibhaṣika were found by the later interpreters, in his teachings. These are the four chief schools constantly mentioned by Indian critics of Buddhism, out of many other schools under both Mahāyāna and Hinayāna schools. As these schools were not religious schools they did not take up any question regarding the existence of God. This sometimes leads the students of Buddhism to conceive the idea that Buddhism is a religion without God. In fact those who approach Buddhism with a desire to find a personal God are sure to be disappointed. So far as Buddha himself is concerned, he was a practical moralist who found that there is too much Duḥkha or suffering in the universe. He was very much pained to see this. He went in search of the way which will make human beings get rid of pain or suffering and will lead them to something other than suffering or Duḥkha. Throughout his life, he was so busy with this problem and its solution that he did not try to take up other metaphysical questions at all. He was anxious to make human beings get rid of Duḥkha, and when he found the way for the same, he at once began preaching it to every one who came across him. He was so

1. Prof: Bapat's papers on Buddhist Philosophy Presented to the Indian Institute of Philosophy and referred to by Dr. Tawakly in his paper on comparative Philosophy Presented to the Punjab University Philosophy Conference held in 1940 at London.

enthusiastic about it that he was not at all anxious or willing to think over any other problem.

Early in his life he had shown here and there some doubt about the existence of God, but later on he kept quiet on the point. If he had developed some theory on this point he would have surely preached that too. If he positively believed in the non-existence of God, he ought to have taken up the problem of creation and given some solution of it which did not imply the existence of God. But as he left all these questions unanswered, it seems that for him the existence of God was something taken for granted. He was not of course in need of assigning God any place in his ethical or moral theory. In order to find out a way to get rid of Duḥkha, he was not in need of God or any other metaphysical assumptions. Therefore he never touched upon that problem.

Whenever any one asked Buddha such metaphysical questions his answer was, "Will a man, when he goes to a doctor in order to get his wound cleaned of an arrow ask the doctor to tell him the name or the shape of the person whose bow caused him that wound before allowing the doctor to touch the wound ?" <sup>2</sup>

He constantly allowed his disciples to ask him how to remove suffering but never to ask him metaphysical questions regarding the universe. He had certain knowable subjects for discussion and preaching and certain others he declared as Avyakhyā or unknowable subjects on which he would not speak. <sup>3</sup>

These were his real views. He tried to preach morality without metaphysics. Even his grand morality was based on the one question of Duḥkha. At the same time, we find in Mahāyāna scripture that Buddha himself sometimes talks of deities and the grace of gods. <sup>4</sup>

According to this scripture, Buddha also talked of Brahma and the world of Brahma, professing that he knew the path which leads to it. He also told Vashisthy a Brahman that he had entered that world and had been born within it. <sup>5</sup>

2. M. N. Chulmalunkya Sutta in Buddha Baḥan by Mahasthavir Jyāñātīloka Ceylon also.

3. M. N. Chūl Mālunkya Sutta.

4. Maha Parinirvāṇa 1, 31.

5. Tevigga Sutta 1, 43.



In Dhammpada it is stated that if you have understood the destruction of all that was made, you will understand that which was not made.<sup>6</sup>

On reading this, Max Muller felt inclined to say that even for Buddha, "a something existed which is not made and which therefore is imperishable and eternal."<sup>7</sup>

Man, it seems, has got a natural belief in the existence of a supreme being, whose grace he seeks at every step. Even, if he is strong enough not to seek his grace and depend on him, he believes in a creator of the universe, the Supreme Being. Buddha was so strong a man as to build a whole grand building of karma theory and Dukkha Nirodh upāya, without referring to the ruler of the world ; but his followers could not keep up to the same form of his teachings. Even by avoiding the metaphysical problems, they could not build an agreed permanent system successfully. Soon after his death his teaching led his followers to divide themselves into two different schools, Hinayān and Mahāyān.

Mahayanists believed in the idea of the Bodhi Sattva as helping all the fettered beings to liberate themselves. By and by they identified Buddha with the transcendental reality. Buddha was thus believed to be an incarnation of Buddhi-Tattva or the ultimate Reality.

Many previous incarnations of Buddha are also mentioned.<sup>8</sup> This ultimate Reality is believed to be manifesting itself in the universe as Dharma Kāya or the director of the world.

Buddha is often called the world-Honoured one.<sup>9</sup> Many other attributes which are usually assigned to God, the Supreme Being, are assigned to Buddha. Buddha is omni-present.<sup>10</sup> One can attain Devatva only by remembering Buddha, on one's death-bed.<sup>11</sup> Buddha is always anxious for the welfare of all creatures.<sup>12</sup> Before

6. Dhammpada Brahmana Vaggo, 383.

7. Intro. I.C.P. XLIV quoted by Oldenbury.

8. See Jatakas.

9. A.D.S. 4.

10. Ibid 3. 20.

11. Ibid 3. 31.

12. Ibid 4. 3.

being born, Buddha decides the place, time, parentage and loka of his birth. All that happens in his life is decided in advance.<sup>13</sup> Buddha is unique. There is no one like him in the universe. He had no Guru or Teacher.<sup>14</sup> Two Buddhas can not be born or exist in the world at one time.<sup>15</sup> Buddhist thinkers of Japan found the first principle of the universe in "Dharmakaya" or "the body of righteousness". This was identified with Buddha himself. The whole universe is a manifestation of Dharmakaya. It is the Divine Ruler of the universe manifesting Himself in the universe.

The doctrines of the Māhayān school clearly show that Buddha was assigned the dignity of an Avatara (incarnation of God).<sup>16</sup> Gods are referred to at many other places. The following passages will make the point quite clear :<sup>17</sup>

"That Arhat is here saluted, who has no counter-part, who, as bestowing the supreme happiness, surpasses (Brahman) the creator—who as driving away darkness vanquishes the sun—and as dispelling all burning heat surpasses the beautiful moon".<sup>18</sup>

"He shall become a universal monarch, a king of kings and even a ruler among the guardians of the world, an Indra, the ruler of the gods and even of the Yāma heaven".<sup>19</sup> ".....Bodhi Sattvas and the whole world with gods, men, evil spirits and genii, applauded the speech of Bhagavat".<sup>20</sup>

Thus the later development of Mahayan School of Buddhism showed clearly that there can be no religion or school of morality permanently accepted by the people, without a Supreme Reality.

We conclude that Buddha himself was generally except on one or two occasions, silent on the question of God. Hinayanists tried to follow Buddha in this respect.

13. Ibid 4. 4.

14. Ibid 4. 6.

15. Ibid 4. 6.

16. Adibuddha Vol. I 97 and Adibuddha Vol. 1. 93.

17. Buddhism 283 and n.

Dhamma-Cakka-ppavattana Sutta. 27. Abhidhammattha-Saṅgaha V. Kevaddha Sutta XI, Jataka 1. 47, 68 etc. Saṃgutta-Nikāya XI, Visuddhi Magga III.

18. Buddha Carita of Asvaghosha 1. 1.

19. Ibid 16. 110.

20. L. Sukkhavati Vyūhs 20.

# **Socrates's Conception of Civic Duty and the Basic Principle of Civil Resistance**

By

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The use of "Civil Resistance", in preference to other expressions—Civil Disobedience, Non-Co-operation, Pacifism and Satyagraha—as a part of the title of this paper is purposive. The dilemma which Professor A. D. Ritchie presents in his most interesting and thought provoking article on the Subject of "The Ethics of Pacifism", published in "The Journal of the British Institute of Philosophy" London (Vol. XV, No. 59, dated July 1940), is not so formidable as the learned Professor thinks it to be, and it is intended to show during the course of this present discussion, that an actual mean position which avoids this dilemma is both conceivable and possible. The difficulty in conceiving this "mean position" is perhaps in a large measure due to a confusion of thought resulting from the confusion in the usage of the aforesaid four expressions. As a preliminary to further discussion, it seems therefore necessary to distinguish clearly these other expressions from Civil Resistance, and in this way, precisely define the exact scope of this short study. Civil Disobedience, Non-Violent Non-Co-operation and Pacifism, all the three, by implication, are associated, at least in the imagination of those who decry these movements, with a passive and negative attitude of mind. Satyagraha, which means insistence upon and persistence in truth, being free from the association of either negation or passivity undoubtedly stands for a particular type of life and necessarily implies a definite set of ideas and sentiments. The personal life of its revered leader and past history of this movement have made this particular mode of living, this special set of ideas with their associated sentiments an integral and inseparable part of this concept. It is unnecessary to describe here the underlying principles of Satyagraha in detail by analysing the writings and utterances of its founder or scrutinizing his own personal life and the lives of his trusted followers, because it is

claimed that Satyagraha stands for some thing different from what has been designated as "Civil Resistance" in this paper, and therefore such a detailed treatment of that movement does not lie within its limited scope. This difference may sufficiently be indicated by pointing out, for the sake of an example, that regular devotion of one's time to hand-spinning or the exclusive use of hand-spun and hand-woven cloth and the allied conditions of encouraging the handicrafts and supporting of village industries, though an integral part of "Satyagraha-idealism" have nothing to do with "Civil Resistance" as such; the other part of our title, "Socrates's Conception of Civic Duty" also requires a few preliminary explanations.

Socrates the son of Sophroniscus, whose thoughts are rightly considered as the "loftiest expression of the spiritual life of ancient Greece" was born at the outskirts of Athens in 468 B.C. He lived in that City-Republic for full seventy years till 399 B.C., the year in which his earthly life came to an end. He spent his time in the service of truth, in close communion with men, charged no fees for his teachings and gave free instruction to every one who cared to listen to him. He wrote no books. His wisdom has however come down to us enshrined in the beautiful writings of his two friends—Plato and Xenophon. There has been an apparently endless controversy about the true relationship between the Socrates of the Platonic dialogues and the Historical Socrates. This question however need not detain us for long, because as Doctor Sir Patrick Duncan in his learned article on "Socrates and Plato", published in "The Journal of the British Institute of Philosophy" (Vol. XV, No. 60, dated October 1940), rightly points out, the problem, "where Socrates the son of Sophroniscus ends and the Socrates of the Platonic dialogues begins, is an insoluble problem". The following critical exposition of what has been named by us, in this essay "Socrate's Conception of Civic Duty", is based on an analysis of "Socrates's Dialogue with Crito", as reported for us by Plato and translated from Greek into English in 1783 A.D. by Samuel Johnson. In this thought provoking dialogue the illustrious Greek Philosopher is represented as declaring that though fortune frowned upon him, yet he would never part with the principles, he had all along professed. Those principles appeared always the same and he esteemed them equally at all times, so, if Crito's advice was not backed by the strongest reason, he must assure himself that Socrates would never comply, not if all the power of the people should arm itself against him or offer

to frighten him like a child by laying on fresh chains and by threatening to deprive him of the greatest good or oblige him to suffer the cruellest death.

In order to understand the full significance of this bold statement it should be considered with reference to the occasion on which it was made.

Socrates himself strictly adhered to the rituals as ordained by the state and exhorted others to do the same. But his love of wisdom, his 'thinking consideration of things' and above all his constant insistence on "one Great First Cause", began to exercise a strong influence on the thoughts and lives of a good many young Athenians. He met his eager disciples on the public market place, in private houses, in workshops and the gymnasium and his discussions gradually began to turn away their attention from mere religious symbolism, "to the soul of truth which it embodied". This new movement frightened the priests and the Politicians. They joined together and attacked him as an innovator who took pleasure in corrupting the youths of the city. He was tried and condemned by a majority of only six votes in the first instance. Had he responded to the Psychological environments of the city-state, accepted the verdict of the authorities and pleaded for a light sentence, no serious harm would have happened either to his person or to his property. This fact is fully indicated in the dialogue where Crito tells his master and friend plainly that he would be charged by the people for standing a trial that he might have avoided and that they would censure his conduct for 'making his defence. Not prepared to compromise his principles, Socrates bravely tried to justify himself instead of pleading for mercy, and thus having 'alienated' the sympathies of the councillors, was finally sentenced to death by a majority of eighty votes. The most wonderful and sublime speech delivered by Socrates on the occasion of his trial, which has been reproduced for us by Plato in "Apologia", as Sir Patrick Duncan in his article cited above rightly insists, "is not so much an answer to the specific charges brought against him as a profession of faith, a justification of his life".

Socrates had to wait in prison for thirty days after receiving this judgment of Capital punishment. During this period Crito succeeded in making plans for the escape of his master from the prison and, for this purpose, went to see him at night. He was surprised to find Socrates fast asleep and waited patiently by his

side and did not like to awaken him lest he should deprive him of those happy minutes. He awoke a little before day-break and Crito confessed that since he had become acquainted with him, he had always been delighted with his patience and calm temper and wondered how even in such extraordinary circumstances his looks appeared to be so calm and unconcerned. After a few other casual remarks on both sides Crito disclosed the real purpose of his visit. He informed Socrates that the time for the execution of the sentence had drawn very near and requested him to act on his advice and escape from the prison with his help. An escape from the prison in such circumstances was not taken in the same light by the ordinary citizens of the city-state of those days, in which it is regarded by the citizens of any of our modern states. Crito accordingly insisted that if Socrates died, then besides suffering the irreparable loss of a friend, which Crito would ever bewail, he was also afraid that a number of people who were not well acquainted with either of them, would believe that he cared more for his money than for his friend and that it was out of monetary considerations that he did not help his friend to come out of the prison walls. Socrates pointed out in reply to this appeal that they should not pay any heed to the opinion of the multitude but should only care for those sensible and well informed persons who knew how the case stood. Crito replied that it was not safe for him to ignore the others, because however misguided such persons might be, Socrates's own case had been sufficient to show the outrageous manner in which people could display their passions against those who were once run down by the vulgar opinion. Socrates lightly turned down this argument by pointing out that it was not the physical death in earthly life which mattered so much as the intellectual and rational life of the spirit and that the general public could not exercise any power whatsoever on the deeper life of the soul. Crito, extremely anxious to save the life of his 'guide philosopher and friend', made another fervent appeal which was mainly based on sentimental grounds. To this his philosopher friend calmly replied that Crito's good-will would be very commendable provided it agreed with right reason, but if it did not, then the stronger it was the more blame-worthy it would be, and added that in accordance with his well established life-long habit, he himself would only act in conformity to the true principles of morality and would not change this course for any consideration whatsoever. It was on this memorable occasion, during the very last hours of his life, that Socrates advanced the reasons embodied in the above

noted statement to justify his conduct of courting death in preference to escaping from a prison where he had been awaiting the execution of the sentence of capital punishment so unjustly awarded to him.

Our theme, upto this point has been mainly devoted to the development of Socrates's Conception of ethical value, and his implicit faith in what Kant much later called by the name of "The Categorical Imperative". This was however necessary to serve as a back-ground for the consideration of his views on "Civic Duty", because his views on that subject directly depended, as will be presently seen, on his conception of "Summum Bonum", or supreme good. It is not life, but good life, that one ought to court he declared, adding that good life consisted in nothing except honesty and justice.

But if "good life" consists in "justice" and Socrates knew that he had been very unjustly condemned to death by the Athenians and was fully conscious of the injustice of that sentence, then why should he have submitted to it? To solve this apparent dilemma one must remember the difference between "the laws" and the "administration of Justice". Socrates had not faith in the wisdom of the multitude. He knew that the people invested with state-authority at Athens had often been acting unjustly, as was perfectly clear from his own case. But he believed in the ultimate justice of the "Institutions and the laws of Athens" and considered his "Civic Duty" of never violating any of these laws, even to save his life, to be his supreme duty. According to him no city (and the city of that time stands for the state of today) could subsist when justice had lost its force, when it was perverted, overturned and trampled by private citizens. He accordingly said that if he consented to escape from the prison, he could very well imagine the laws of Athens to stand up against him to enquire from him as to whether he had not willingly submitted himself for a public trial. How could he think of disobeying the laws of Athens and thus destroy the Republic? Was not that Republic and were not those laws the authors of his being? Did not his father marry the lady who gave him birth in accordance with these very laws? Was he not nourished, brought up, and educated in accordance with their dictation? Were not those laws just which obliged his father to take care of him in his infancy and made arrangements for his education in fine arts or for the development of his body with the help of proper exercises? Could he maintain that both he and

his father were not nursed as children and subjects of those laws? And if that was true, could he think of asserting his power against the laws? But since he could not lay claim to any such right either against his father or against his teacher, so as to repay evil for evil, injury for injury, how could he think of obtaining that right against the state and its laws, so that if they endeavoured to put him to death, he would counteract and prevent them, and thus ruin the republic and its laws? Could he, who had ever been a follower of true virtue, consider such an action, just? Was he ignorant that the "city-state" was more worthy of veneration before God and man than his father, his mother and all his other relations put together? Was he not in duty bound to honour that "city-state", to yield to it and to humour it more than an angry father? Was it not his duty either to convert the "republic" to his own way of thinking by arguments or else to obey its injunctions and to suffer without grumbling all that it imposed upon him? If it ordered him to be whipped, or laid in irons, if it sent him to the wars, there to spend his blood, he was to do it without demurring; he could not shake off the yoke or flinch or quit his post; but in army, in prison, and at all other places he was to assist it with his wholesome counsel, because offering violence against the state established by law was an act of greater impiety than the act of offering violence against one's own parents. He had been obliged to the state for his birth, for his maintenance and for his education and it had done him all the good that it was capable of doing. Moreover the republic never failed to make a public proclamation that if its laws and customs did not please a man, he could, after mature and careful consideration, leave it with all his effects and go wherever he pleased. And if any private man could not comply with the customs and the traditions of the city and desired to remove and live elsewhere, not one of the citizens would hinder him or interfere with his departure. But if a citizen continued to live at Athens, after fully considering the way in which justice was administered there and after studying the state policy of that republic, then in effect, he was obliged and in duty bound to obey all commands issued by those who were in lawful authority, and if he did not do so then his disobedience would be considered unjust on threefold account: for not obeying those to whom he owed his birth, for trampling under foot those who educated him and for violating his faith after he had engaged to obey the laws of the state. He was, as if in honour bound, not to violate the treaty of obeying all the orders of the state in return for the advantages



that he had been receiving because of his citizenship of Athens, a treaty that he had not been forced to sign either by force or surprise or without time to think over it: for he had the whole period of seventy years to leave that city and get settled elsewhere, if he did not believe in the justice of the laws of Athens. Although he often praised the laws of a few other Greek city states, yet he got domiciled neither in any one of them nor in any other foreign country. In fact, he had been less out of Athens than the lame and the blind, which was an invincible proof that he liked the city and its laws; for nobody could like a city unless he found its laws agreeable at the same time. In conclusion Socrates represented the laws of Athens as standing up as an embodiment and incarnation of Justice itself, appealing to him to submit to their reason and not to put his life, his children or any other thing what-soever, in the balance against justice, so that when he went before the tribunal of God he might be able to clear himself before Him. Socrates said that he should not deceive himself, that if he acted upon the advice of Crito, he would neither better his own case nor that of his party; he would enlarge neither its justice nor its sanctity in this or in the other world. But if he died bravely, his death would be due to injustice, not of the Laws, but of men. If, on the other hand, he were to make his escape by repeating so shamefully the injustice of his enemies, he would, by violating his own faith injure his own person, his friends, his state and its laws, and in that case, after his death, the laws of heaven would not receive him with joy, knowing that he had endured to ruin their sisters, the laws of Athens. Thus silencing Crito Socrates bravely faced death for what he believed to be his civic duty. From this statement of Socrates's conception of Civic-Duty let us now turn to an examination of the basic principles of Civil Resistance.

The epithet Civil is intended to imply that the resistance so qualified is offered by an individual citizen or a group of citizens against the state to which the individual or the group concerned owes full allegiance. Such allegiance must be voluntary and the citizen or the group of citizens offering civil resistance, should, like Socrates, deeply love the state concerned and be unwilling either to change or renounce that allegiance by getting denaturalised and adopting the citizenship of some other state, or else by destroying the state concerned even if such a destruction be within their power,—an allegiance that must be based on a deepseated love and should be entirely free from the fear of the consequences of offering Civil

**Resistance.** All civil resistance must therefore necessarily be non-violent, though all non-violent resistance is not always civil. It may be noted further that although a civil-resister as such cannot resort to violence in his civil struggle against the state to which he owes his voluntary allegiance, he may or may not be an absolute believer in Pacifism. He may, like Socrates, be prepared to participate in wars if ordered by the state, and there "spend his blood without demurring", or else he may, unlike the Greek Philosopher, have implicit faith in non-violence and like Mahatma Gandhi may insist that even foreign aggression should be resisted non-violently. In the latter case, however, the non-violent resistance offered to an aggressor state will not form part of his activities of civil resistance and should be considered independently and separately, and in accordance with considerations which, strictly speaking, fall outside the scope of our present studies. But a civil resister, it may be objected, cannot remain non-violent in his struggle against the state unless he has a complete and an unwavering faith in the principles and practice of non-violence, irrespective of the occasion or the parties to a dispute. To this objection, it may be replied that it is not the faith in the Principles of non-violence so much as the sense of civic duty and the love of the state of which he happens to be a citizen, that guides his action in remaining perfectly non-violent in his struggle against some of the laws and orders of that state, the laws and orders which he believes to be fundamentally wrong and unjust, though still cherishing his unshaken love for the state responsible for those unjust laws and orders. He does not regard the laws of the state to be perfectly just, he unlike Socrates, does not consider them to be "sisters of the laws of heaven", in fact civil resistance is offered against those very orders and laws which are considered unjust and unreasonable. But then how can a citizen love a state while he considers at least some of its laws to be unjust? And further, if it is argued in reply to this question, that "the love of state" of the civil resister is not grounded in the righteousness of the laws but rather in the love for the fellow citizens, including those who happen to be in authority for the time being, one may further ask, are those fellow citizens "who happen to be in authority for the time being", and who are therefore responsible for unjust laws and unreasonable orders, not themselves unjust? How can the civil resister cherish any real love for them?

The conflict between love and logic implied in the questions noted above is in fact only apparent and not real. This may be

fully borne out by a careful study of Mr. Charles S. Pierce's most interesting and instructive book entitled "Chance, Love and Logic" (published by Messers Kegan Paul and Co., Ltd., of London in 1923). In this book on 268 page, Mr. Pierce while insisting on the creative element in true love quotes a passage from a book entitled "Human Nature in its Remaking", (published by the Oxford University Press of London in 1923). This passage clearly distinguishes between, what is called in that book, the "Greek notion of Justice" or what we may call here "the Socratic notion of justice", and the modern conception of justice, which instead of taking men "statically as they presented themselves refuses to accept the selves which have defects to be their real selves". Civil Resistance, we may add here, thus constitutes an appeal from "the actual Citizens in authority in the given state, for the time being", to "Those very citizens as they may be". These two allied notions of 'creative justice' and 'creative love' are based on the modern Psychological conception of Dynamic Personality. While mere intellectual discussion, it is suggested here, may fail to convert the opponents because of the present selfishness, present desire of safeguarding vested interest or prestige or due to other deep rooted prejudices, arrogance and pride, civil resistance by transforming the character of the opponents as well as by transforming the character of the civil resister to such an extent as may be needed in his own case, may bring about a final readjustment which may be fully in conformity with the principles of true justice. The physical self of the individual civil resister may perhaps perish in the struggle but such a risk is equally present even in violent resistance. Moreover with the single exception of the system of Lokayatas which insists that all moral conventions and ethical theories have been invented by clever weaklings, no other philosopher would seriously support the view that the preservation of one's earthly existence at all cost is the summum bonum of our life. The most beautiful description of the type of struggle involved in civil resistance is found in the following words of Spinoza re-quoted here from the book entitled "The Power of Non-violence" (page 193) by Richard B. Grigg; (George Poutledge and Sons Ltd., London 1935) :—

"He who strives to conquer hatred with love fights his battle in joy and confidence ; he withstands many as easily as one and has very little need of fortune's aid. Those whom he vanquishes yield joyfully, not through failure, but through increase in their power".

In this short paper the interest has been kept purposely confined to the case of civil resistance alone. Those who are interested in the consideration of the question of the application of non-violent force in a general way and in circumstances falling beyond the scope of this short study may please refer to the excellent exposition of Mr. Richard B. Grigg cited above, and may examine the arguments put forward by its learned author together with the abundant Psychological and biological data and cross references found in that book. In this book the author points out (Preface P.X.) that "Although the moral beauty of the method is an important and enduring factor in its power, there is not room to discuss it in this book, and, any how, I do not feel competent for that". It was to discuss the moral beauty of the method within the limited scope of civic duty that a modest attempt is made here to prepare the ground for the discussions of the wider issues involved in an absolute belief in and practice of non-violence in all possible circumstances. This wider task must however be left for some future occasion. A few suggestive questions to *indicate the inconclusive nature of this discussion* would perhaps form the fittest conclusion for this short essay :

1. What is that higher order and what are those better conditions for the attainment of which, within the given state, the civil resister is justified to carry on his struggle ?

2. Is it possible to attain and subsequently to maintain that supposed better order in isolation, without having a simultaneous change in the conditions of other neighbouring states ?

3. If the reply to the second question be in the negative, then one has to answer the further question about the method and technique of bringing the desired change in the neighbouring states, forgetting for the moment that owing to modern scientific developments, discoveries and inventions, almost the entire humanity has become the neighbour of every individual in the wider sense of the term ? These and a host of other similar questions connected with the problem of social organization and human personality would naturally suggest themselves to every one interested in this subject.

The two latest papers by Professor Whitehead entitled "Mathematics and the Good", and "Immortality" respectively, (published in the volume "The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead" in "The Library of living Philosophers", Northwestern University, Evanston and Chicago, U.S.A. 1941. Vol. III) perhaps furnish very suggestive

data for a reply to some of the aforesaid questions. The interesting distinction drawn by the learned philosopher between the "World of Values", and "The Creative World" and his insistence that "the essence of values is their capacity for realization in the world of change", require a special mention in this connection. If one believes with Professor Whithead that "The effective realization of Value in the world of change should find its counterpart in the world of Value", (Paper on Imortality, cited above), then one of the important tasks for the philosopher of tomorrow, would be to find a reconciliation for the two apparently conflicting worlds of to-day.

# The Beginning of Philosophical Ethics in Islamic Thought

By

DWIGHT M. DONALDSON

*Aligarh*

For Muslims the term *philosophy* (*falsafa*) came into use very soon after their military occupation of Syria, Egypt and Persia, when they recognized and appreciated the prevailing Greek culture. But in Islam philosophy found its first field of development in speculative theology, the obvious aim of which was to state the accepted dogmas of their religion so as "to bring them into agreement with the demands of contemporary knowledge".<sup>1</sup>

While the influence of Greek thought in the East must be regarded as an ancient phenomenon, which was particularly evident when Palestine and Arabia were buffer states between the Ptolemies and the Seleucidae, and which had penetrated far into the ancient Persian Empire and on into India, nevertheless, in relation to subsequent Islamic culture, very great importance is attached to the activity of the Christian scholars who first translated outstanding Greek texts into the Syriac language. They had begun this work in 300 A.D. and they carried it on progressively, primarily from the centers of Edessa, Jundai-Sábúr and al-Ĥíra, until approximately 700 A.D. This means that for 270 years before the birth of Muhammad the philosophical and scientific speculations of the Greeks were gradually being translated into the Syriac language. This translation work was going on throughout the 62 years of Muhammad's lifetime and continued for 68 years of early Muslim expansion and imperial organization. This latter period included the 38 years of the first four Caliphs—Abu Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uthman, and 'Ali—and the first 30 years of the 'Umayyad caliphate.

Accordingly, when we are told that Christian scholars and scribes, who worked under Arab patrons, began translating these existing Syriac translations of the Greek philosophers into the Arabic language in the period from 700—900 A.D., we should bear

in mind that this Arab quest of general knowledge from the Greeks was being made at the same time that the traditional sayings of the prophet Muhammad were being compiled. Ibn Isháq, whose records survive only as they are quoted by Ibn Hishám, died in 768 A.D. Málik ibn Anas, who compiled the *Muwatta*, "the first real appearance of Ḥadīth in literature", died in 795 A.D.; Ibn Hishám in 833 A.D., Ibn Sa'd in 845 A.D., Ahmad ibn Hanbal in 855 A.D., al-Bukhári in 870 A.D., and Muslim in 874 A.D. These dates have been cited because the fact that the writing of several of the Greek philosophers were translated from the Syriac into the Arabic language in the very same period that the sayings of Muhammad found their way into written Arabic may be found to be of importance in the study of the later developments in Muslim ethical literature as well as in *lāw* and theology. For not only were the above-named traditionists contemporary with the translators of Greek learning, but the early writers of the *adab* literature, the "humanities" or cultural writings, men such as al-Jāhiz (d. 868) and Ibn Qutaiba (d. 889), also belonged to this period. Others who related the saying of Muhammad, but more from the viewpoint of historians than of legists, were Abu Hanifa al-Dinawári (d. 895), Ibn Wadīh al-Ya'qúbí (d. 897), and al-Tabarí (d. 922). It will occasion no surprise, therefore, if we find sayings of Muhammad and his Companions that have become somewhat "Hellenized", particularly in chapters on 'ilm (scientific knowledge), 'aql (Reason), and akhlāq (Ethics).

The earliest problems that faced Muslim philosophers had to do with the metaphysical foundation for the science of Ethics. As they were likewise theological questions they have most generally been so considered, but the reader will recognize at once their striking importance for the Muslim system of Ethics, which is admittedly on a theistic basis :

1. Is it necessary to postulate divine righteousness, and if so, then how can it be appreciated and stated without imposing limitation of divine greatness ?
2. To what extent must man have freedom in order that he may be responsible for his actions ?
3. Is the Qur'án, as the word of Allah, to be considered as *eternal* in Allah's own being, or does it belong to the class of "things created" ?

4. How is the *unity* of Allah to be stated in relation to his attributes ?
5. What relations does Allah have with mankind and with the material universe ?

Foremost among the Muslim scholars who profited by the new learning from the Greek philosophers were al-Fárábí (950 A.D.) and Ibn Siná (980 A.D.). With a similar background for their studies, it may be said that these two intellectual giants laid the foundations for the structure of Muslim philosophy. "Al-Fárábí distinguishes between that which has a *possible* and that which has a *necessary* existence (just as Plato and Aristotle distinguished between the changeable and the eternal). If the possible is to exist in reality, a cause is necessary thereto. The world is composite, hence it had a beginning, or was caused. But the series of causes and effects can neither recede *ad infinitum*, nor return like a circle into itself; it must, therefore, depend upon some necessary link, and this link is the first being (*ens primum*). This first being exists necessarily; the supposition of its non-existence involves a contradiction. It is uncaused, and needs for its existence no cause external to itself. It is the cause of all that exists. Its eternity implies its perfection. It is free of all accidents. It is simple and unchangeable. As the absolutely good, it is at once absolute thought, absolute object of thought and absolute thinking being (*intelligentia, intelligibile, intelligens*). It has wisdom, life, insight, might, and will, beauty, excellence, brightness; it enjoys the highest happiness, is the first willing being and the first object of will (desire). In the knowledge of this being al-Fárábí sees the end of philosophy, and he defines the practical duty of men as consisting in rising, so far as human force permits it, into likeness with God".<sup>3</sup>

In addition to this brief summary, as given by Ueberweg, of al-Fárábí's basic principles, it is essential to point out that it was his firm belief that rules of conduct are taught by Reason. It is Reason that decides, most fittingly, whether a thing is good or evil, for the highest virtue consists in knowledge.<sup>4</sup>

That al-Fárábí derived this conception of Reason from his study of the works of Aristotle is plainly suggested in his definition of the term:<sup>5</sup> The noun, *al-'aql*, is used with many significations. The first is that which the general public says in regard to man,



that he is intelligent ('aql). The second is that which the Muta-kallims repeat according to their custom, when they speak of what "Reason" requires and of what "Reason" opposes. The third use of 'adl is that which Aristotle mentions in the *Kitáb al-Burhán* (Organon: the Apodeictic); the fourth is that which he mentions in the sixth book of the *Kitáb al-Akhláb* (Nicomachean Ethics); the fifth is that which he mentions in the *Kitáb al-Nafs* (De Anima); and the sixth is that which he mentions in the *Kitáb má ba'da 'l-ṭabí'a* (Metaphysics).

The use made by Aristotle of the term "Reason" (nous=ratio='aql) in the Nicomachean Ethics (Bk. vi), to which al-Fárabí referred, is clearly shown in his analysis of the intellectual virtues. Reason is the *intellect*, the function of which is to attain truth, by the use of deliberation, intelligence, judgment, and prudence.<sup>6</sup>

The freedom of choice that man has, in distinction from the lower animals, depends upon rational consideration. Thought, or the activity of the intellect, is the true sphere of freedom, "a freedom which is at the same time necessity, inasmuch as in the last resort it is determined by the rational nature of God".<sup>7</sup>

It is significant that we find that al-Nazzám (d. 845 A.D.) taught "that God could do nothing to a creature, either in this world or in the next, that was not for the creature's good and in accordance with strict justice. It was not only that God would not do it. He had not the power to do anything evil".<sup>8</sup> Orthodox Islam, however, was not destined to accept this conception of God's necessary moral integrity. This was because it was not thought to be in accord with declarations in the Qur'án,<sup>9</sup> which teaches rather that the being of Allah is not to be thought of as restricted in power, or limited in His freedom of willing, by any essentially continuous quality, such as justice, love, or truth.

If al-Fárabí could have developed al-Nazzam's conception of God's necessary moral integrity, in connection with his own teaching that the rules of conduct are taught by Reason and that men's highest duty lies in rising into likeness with God, he would have pointed out to the Muslim world an ethical system that might well have withstood the tendencies that soon developed towards legalistic subserviency on the one hand and mystical vagueness and antinomianism on the other.

But the wide scope of Greek philosophical writings, with their multifarious distinctions, proved to be overwhelming. Even these two master minds among Muslim thinkers were occupied and baffled by endless analysis and definition.

In illustration of the way in which finely drawn verbal distinctions came to be regarded as the philosopher's stock in trade, examples may be found in Ibn Siná's *Rasá'il fí Hikmat wa Tabí'yát* ("Essays on wisdom and Natural Dispositions"), though with Ibn Siná there is the redeeming feature that he is not verbose. In fact his very brevity and conciseness becomes something of a difficulty for the reader who may wish to ascertain the exact meaning of particular Arabic words which he uses as approximate equivalents for Syriac expressions, which had previously been employed in translation of finely discriminated philosophical terms in Greek, which themselves required interpretation according to Platonic, Aristotelian, or Neo-Platonic points of view. It is not surprising that philosophers became philologists and that surveys of the sciences were the order of the day.

In his short essay on *'ilm al-akhláq* ("Science of the Dispositions"), from the above-mentioned work,<sup>10</sup> Ibn Siná begins by acknowledging that Allah is "the one who enriches the soul (*nafs*) of the man who is devoted to His virtues (*faḍá'il*) and the means whereby he may acquire them for himself". This is in accord with al-Ghazali's much later declaration that "the perfection of the worshipper, as well as his happiness, lies in imitating (*takhalluq*) the qualities (*alkhláq*) of Allah the Most High, and in adorning himself with the meanings of His attributes and His names,—in that measure that may be considered within his right".<sup>11</sup> "It is a requisite in human life", Ibn Siná continues to say, that he who would attain perfection must seek for happiness in this world and in the next. It is incumbent upon him, moreover, to perfect his power of discernment by means of many sciences, each of which is explained fully in books that enumerate the sciences. He must perfect his power of action also in accord with the virtues, whose fundamental qualities are purity (*'iffat*), courage (*shajā'at*), wisdom (*ḥikmat*), and righteousness (*'Adálat*). Furthermore, he must avoid the vices which are directly opposed to these virtues".

As he proceeds to indicate these opposites, he finds it relatively easy to state that purity is opposed to lustful passion (*Shawáníya*) and that courage is opposed to anger (*ghaḍabíya*). But he finds it

more difficult to state inclusively and at the same time explicitly the opposite of wisdom and the opposite of righteousness. Later writers, notably Ibn Miskawaihi and Naşır al-Dín al-Ṭúsi, give the ordinary and general explanation that wisdom is opposed to folly (jahl), but Ibn Sina says that the vice opposed to wisdom is mere distinction or discrimination (tamyíziya), which is most interesting, in that it suggests that even this master of distinctions fully appreciated that in true wisdom there is a higher discernment that is actually opposite to the elaborate discrimination of terms. But when he undertakes to give the opposite of righteousness ('Adálat), he must first enumerate the many virtuous qualities that are included in the comprehensive term 'Adálat, such as generosity (sakhá), frugality (qaná'at), nobility (karam), tranquillity (ḥilm), steadfastness (şabr), etc. Each of these then needs to be defined and distinguished from other qualities, some of which are similar and some opposite.

This whole method of close definition is distinctly Aristotelian and it had a necessary task to perform. For once the Muslims were able to have access to Greek scientific literature the need was felt for a systematic analysis of their whole field of general knowledge. In the works of Aristotle the Muslim thinkers appreciated especially his precision of concepts, but they saw also, as Professor Horten has indicated,<sup>11</sup> that Aristotle "did not succeed in giving a comprehensive view of the whole universe under some monistic concept. The universe is not traced to a single origin. Matter is eternal and opposed to God in a dualistic system". It is obvious that for Muslim thought this was wholly unsatisfactory. True wisdom, as well as the teaching of the Qur'án, demanded some philosophical explanation that would relate the universe, and mankind within it, to the sovereign power of Allah. "

"It is here", Professor Horten observes, "that Muslim philosophy begins, following the Neo-Platonic model. The great notion of contingency brings into a unity the total of the actual. It is the light that explains the individual problems and allows them to be examined under the widest points of view. In the things of the world *being* and *existence* are quite different. The two are not internally and necessarily connected. Existence must thus be imparted to things by a self-existent Being and must be permanently maintained in them. The universe is a stream of being which, emanating from an inexhaustible source, extends to all that is not

God. This idea, which runs through the whole of Muslim philosophy down to modern times, is again and again formulated anew and developed".

## THE BEGINNING OF PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS

### Notes

1. M. Horten, "Encyclopaedia of Islam", art. "Falsafa".
2. D. B. MacDonald, "Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory", p. 78.
3. Ueberweg, "A History of Philosophy", vol. i, p. 412.
4. T. J. de Boer, "The History of Philosophy in Islam" p. 121.
5. Al-Fárábí, "Maqálat fí ma'ání al-'aql", text in Dietireci's "al-Fárábí's Philosophische Abhandlungen", Leiden, 1890.
6. Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics", Bk. vi, English trans. by F. H. Peters.
7. T. J. de Boer, op. cit., p. 122.
8. D. B. MacDonald, op. cit. pp. 140-141.
9. Qur'án.
10. Ibn Siná, "Rasá'il fí Hikmat wa Tabi'qát", Bombay A. H. 1318, pp. 98-101.
11. Al- Ghazáli, "al-maqsad al-asná fí sharh 'asmá' Allah al-husná", ("The Highest Aim in Explanation of the Excellent Names of Allah"), p. 22.
12. M. Horten, op. cit., ii, 48.

# What is Sin

By

MR. J. R. PURI

*Sangrur*

The Problem of sin has baffled the minds of men from the early beginnings of civilization. No great philosophy of the world worth the name failed to tackle this problem. Whether with the ancient Indian sages or with the great Greek thinkers or with the Chinese seers, this problem remained in focus of their attention. Even the present-day social philosopher has not failed to acknowledge its importance. And yet it is one of those ultimate problems of Philosophy, which have remained to this day a matter of controversy. Before we consider the modern forms in which this problem presents itself, it would, I think, be worth our while to know what some ancient great philosophies of the world have to say about it. For, it is only after we have surveyed some ground, howsoever hurried it may be, that we are able to form a rationalistic view of the whole matter.

## *The Hindu View.*

I shall confine my account to the Upanishads, for it is in them that Indian Philosophy reached its highest pinnacle. Though our problem is ethical, yet we shall have to take into account the Metaphysics of the Upanishads, since it is the view of Reality they take, which provides a basis for their ethics.

Now, the idea set forth by the Upanishads is the becoming one with the Absolute. Reality is one, and the aim of all our moral progress consists in our identification with the One. "May I enter thee, such as Thou art, O Lord : may Thou, O Lord, enter me . . . May I become well cleansed, O Lord". And again "Thou art my resting place". Throughout the process of the world we witness this infinitisation of the finite. The difference between man and all else is that while all seek the infinite, man alone has an idea of the end. The absolute is the deliberate goal of the finite self. That this goal is the most desirable ideal is brought out in many ways. For instance it has been called a state "far above hunger

and thirst, above sorrow and confusion, above old age and death". Just as the sun, the eye of the Universe, remains unaffected by the sorrow and misery of this world, so also the Atman though dwelling in all creatures dwells untouched by the sufferings of this world. It is a misfortune to live in the world of plurality and be subject to disease and suffering; and a return from the plurality into the One is the proper aim of man. It gives satisfaction to his whole being.

Whatever ethics we have in the Upanishads is subsidiary to this goal. And whatever action helps us towards this goal is deemed virtuous and what keeps us away from it is termed sinful. Morality is valuable only as leading to it. And the one who has reached this goal is said to have attained salvation or Moksha. Moksha literally means release, "release from the bondage to the sensuous and the individual, the narrow and the finite". This idea for which the moral nature cries in man can be attained only if the finite self transcends its narrow individuality and identifies itself with the whole.

It has been urged sometimes by the critics of the Upanishads that there is no scope for ethical endeavour, since man is divine in nature. This error results from a confusion of thought. God is in man, but He is not in man in such an obvious fashion that he can possess Him without effort or struggle. As Radha Krishnan puts it, "God is present as a potentia or a possibility. . . . The God in man is a task as well as a fact, a problem as well as a possession". And a little further "His divinity is not an actuality, but a part of God aspiring to be the whole. As he is, he is dust and deity, God and brute crossed. It is the task of the moral life to eliminate the non-divine element, not by destroying it, but by suffusing it with the divine spirit". Thus the problem of morality has a significance for man, whose life is a struggle between the finite and the infinite, the demoniac and the divine element.

As we said sometime ago, those actions which keep us bound to our finite existence, actions which serve as obstacles in our march towards the goal are sinful. We may now consider here what actions or general modes of behaviour are impediments in our way as accepted by all the various thinkers of the period.

By far the greatest obstacle in our moral life is the urge of the senses and instincts. The lusts and passions of the animal self

are to be kept in check, for they restrict the vital energies to the lower plane. The Katha Upanishad calls the self as the Lord who sits in the chariot called the Body. Buddhi or intelligence serves as the charioteer, mind is the reins, the senses are the horses and the objects are the roads. Now one whose senses run riot like the vicious horses of a charioteer is never able to reach the immortal state, but enters into the round of birth. The one whose senses are kept in control like the good horses of a charioteer is able to reach a state from which there is no return. Thus the drive of desire has to be checked; "when desire seizes the helm the soul suffers shipwreck". Man is endowed with reason, which reminds us of something higher than mere nature, something which gives meaning and purpose to our life. In spite of the indications of our rational nature, we make pleasure the end of our pursuits, our life is one of moral evil and of sin, unworthy of man. (Kant expresses the same idea in his Critique of Pure Reason, when he says "Man is not in the least elevated above mere animalism by the possession of reason, if his reason is only employed in the same fashion as that in which animals use their instincts"). Rational life will be consistent and marked by unity. "In it every course of action, before it is adopted is brought before the bar of reason and its capacity to serve the highest end is tested, and if found suitable adopted by the individual". A life led by the senses, on the other hand, will be a series of disconnected and scattered episodes without any end or purpose underlying them.

Another obstacle in our moral life is egoism or selfishness. An egoistic life is inconsistent with a rational life. Reason tells us that the individual is a part of the whole and has no interests apart from the interests of the whole. His deliverance will come only if he gives up the idea of his separate sensuous existence. In committing a selfish deed the soul imposes fetters on itself, which can only be removed by the reassertion of the life universal. Thus he is a bad man, who does the opposite. We must not conceive of ourselves as exclusive unity,—each an "ego sharply marked off from whatever lies outside the physical body and the mental history". From this egoism springs all that is morally bad. Moral life is a life of intense love for humanity, a life which seeks the infinite through the finite and not a mere selfish adventure for small ends.

And this brings us to yet another obstacle in our way, the obstacle of attachment to whatever is finite. Finite objects do not give us the satisfaction, for which our soul hungers. There is no satiety in things finite. The anguish of man consists in his separation from God, and nothing short of union with God can satisfy his soul's hunger. There are men who wish to realise the ideal of an absolutely worthy existence in the love of another being. So long as that other being is human, bound in space and time, the ideal can never be attained. "It is self-deception", says Radha Krishnan, "to seek the fullness of love and beauty in another human being, man or woman. The perfect realisation can only be in the eternal". It is this emphasis on the unstable character of finite things, which led people to detach themselves from the world and seek deliverance in retirement. Many there were who renounced their all, their wives and children, their homes and their goods and sought the salvation of their souls in poverty and purity of life.

The Upanishads, however, do not ask us to renounce all desire, but only selfish endeavours. Desire as such is not condemned, but only the animal desire, lust, the impulsive craving of the brute man. It all depends on the object. As Radha Krishnan puts it "If a man's desire is the flesh, he becomes an adulterer; if things of beauty, an artist, if God, a saint". The essence of renunciation consists in the spirit of disinterestedness which it produces, for we can only enjoy the world, if we are not burdened by the bane of worldly possessions. "Our enjoyment of the world is in direct proportion to our poverty".

The post-vedic period underwent a change in Indian thought. The insane asceticism into which the earlier renunciation had degenerated was condemned. Asceticism came to be considered as undesirable as worldly life. In fact it was realised that a fanatical asceticism, such as burning of bodies, was indicative of a form of selfishness rather than true renunciation, for it embodied the view that one's soul is more precious than all the worlds' souls put together. "The righteous man is not he who leaves the world and retires to a cloister, but he who lives in the world and loves the objects of the world, not for their own sake, but for the sake of the infinite they contain, the universal they conceal". Thus the objects of the world come to be regarded not as lures to sin, but as pathways to divine bliss. And Sankara points out that wealth is evil to the unregenerate, but not to the man of wisdom. The



body is the servant of the soul and not its prison. This interpretation of the spirit of the Upanishads is the most authentic, since it is given by their greatest commentator Sankara. "A philosophy of resignation, an ascetic code of ethics, and a temper of languid world weariness are an insult to the Creator of the Universe, a sin against ourselves and the world which has a claim for us", writes Radha Krishnan.

The Upanishads do not only emphasise the spirit of true religion, but also give us a code of duties, for without them the moral ideal would remain an uncertain guide. Restraint, liberality and mercy, right dealing, non-injury to life and truthfulness are laid down as right forms of conduct.

The fact that the Upanishads lay stress on knowledge as the means to salvation has led many critics to contend that the Upanishads in their enthusiasm for knowledge relegate the will to a subordinate place. This criticism results from a misinterpretation of the term "jnana" in the Upanishads. Knowledge is not mere cognition or intellectual ability. It is the soul-sense. It consists in the spiritual perception of the absolute. It was in this sense that Socrates seems to have used this word when he said "knowledge is virtue". For knowledge in the sense of the realization of the highest necessarily implies a virtuous and a pure life. Ramanuja interprets knowledge to be Dhyana, meditation or Upasana, worship. This kind of knowledge was only possible, after the disciple had undergone a long course of moral and spiritual discipline.

Just as the ideal of the intellect cannot be realised so long as we remain at the intellectual level, but can be found when we transcend that level and rise to intuition, even so the ideal of morality cannot be attained so long as we remain at the moral level. It can be reached only when we rise to religion. At the moral level, the two sides of our nature, the finite and the infinite are in conflict. At the religious level the exclusiveness of our individuality and the sense of our separateness are destroyed. The possibility of this religious realisation is the pre-supposition of all morality. Thus religion is the postulate of morality, and its inspiration. "Without religion morality becomes an eternal striving, a perpetual progress, an endless aspiration towards something we do not have".

As the intuitional level goes beyond the categories of the intellect, even so does the religious level pass beyond the distinctions of good and evil. He who has reached the highest can commit

no sin, for he is above all laws. Thus for a saint or a mystic the question of morality has no significance, for in his case it is not the individual who acts. His will has become identified with God's will. He has joined the whole and thus become the whole. The distinction between God and the individual no longer remains. The mystic is absolutely free and can choose with perfect impunity, but his freedom is not the madness of license. He is a law unto himself. Laws and regulations are necessary for those, who do not naturally conform to the dictates of conscience, but for one who has risen above the selfish ego, morality becomes the natural condition of his being. There is no possibility of evil-doing in him. As Kant puts it "No imperatives hold for the Divine will or in general for a holy will; ought is here out of place, because volition is already of itself necessarily in union with the law". Thus the mystics or the saints go on doing their daily work, diffusing virtue as the star diffuses light and the flower perfume, without even being aware of it. The Upanishads declare that every man has in him the potentiality of rising to his full divine stature, and can realise it, if he strives for it.

#### *The Ancient Greek View.*

It was that remarkable band of early Greek teachers known as the sophists, who concerned themselves for the first time in a systematic and scientific manner with the problem of Ethics. Their aim was mainly, however, practical. It was the aim to train the young men of Athens to be efficient citizens. To instruct them in the duties of citizenship they found it necessary to inquire into the basis of social morality. It was really Socrates, in a sense the greatest of the Sophists, who studied the ethical problems in a dispassionate way. He may be distinguished from the other Sophists by the fact that he was not a professional teacher, but claimed only to be a student of moral science. When acclaimed by the oracle to be the wisest man of Greece, he replied that he was as ignorant as the others, only he knew that he was ignorant, whereas the others did not, and in this lay his superiority. This not only goes to show his modesty, but also his keen earnestness about the problem and the difficulty of which he was quite aware.

He was fully convinced of one thing, and that was the unsatisfactoriness of the current views of the moral life of his time. More than anyone else he realized that true morality must be founded on a scientific basis. "Virtue", he said "is knowledge".

He believed that knowingly one would not pursue the evil, for that would be to his own disadvantage. And if he did so, it only showed that he had no knowledge of the end. On the contrary, if any one did the right act by accident, it was not in the full sense of the term morality at all. Thus with Socrates sin was synonymous with ignorance; for whatever was not of knowledge was of sin.

It was, however, his illustrious disciple Plato, who dwelt at length on the problem. Plato put forward a metaphysical view of the universe on which he tried to base his ethical philosophy. He interpreted virtue and vice, goodness and evil in terms of his celebrated theory of Ideas or Forms. Reality, he maintained, consisted of Forms, Types or Ideas. The word 'idea' may be somewhat misleading to the layman. As Plato understood it, it did not mean something which goes on in our heads, but rather a real something, in fact the most real of all things. Idea was not meant to signify what modern Psychology calls concept—the product of abstract thinking—but rather a spiritual entity. The existent world was a shadow or at best a realization through imperfect medium of the world of Ideas. 'Ideal' perhaps comes nearer to the Platonic meaning.

One may glean an exposition of his theory of Ideas in almost all the Dialogues of Plato, but it is primarily in the *Phaedo*, the *Republic* and the *Parmenides*, that he takes pains to expound his theory. He makes a sharp distinction between the objects of sense and the objects of thought. The objects of sense perception may be said to "become" rather than to "be." For example, he says, when we perceive two things as being equal, they never are really and absolutely equal. A more minute observation enables us to see inequalities in them. Thus objects actually perceived are never absolutely equal, but indefinitely approach the idea of Equality. They are tending towards equality, becoming equal rather than are equal. This applies to every quality perceived by the senses. When several objects are judged to be white, none of them is absolutely white, for there are shades and grades of whiteness. Thus equality and whiteness as presented by the senses are relative, but there is that quality of equality or whiteness, which all the appearances represent in a more or less inadequate way. It is that common characteristic, the absolute Idea of Equality or whiteness, which is the true object of knowledge. This Idea is eternal unchanging and identical. It is the true and the abiding reality.

But though Forms or Universals are the true objects of knowledge in terms of which we apprehend the objects of our Sensory experience, how do we get to know these Forms? If nothing that we see is absolutely equal or absolutely white, how do we come to have knowledge of equality or whiteness at all? Obviously it must have come through some independent means, through which we possess a knowledge of these Universal Forms. And, this knowledge must be prior in time and in logic to the knowledge of sensory experience. Plato accounts for such knowledge through the Doctrine of Reminiscence. If the soul possesses such direct knowledge of Forms independently of sensory experience, it can only be, because the soul has had a previous existence. When unencumbered by flesh, it has had a direct vision of the eternal Reality. Thus Socrates and Plato believed in pre-existence; and reminiscence means that knowledge of Forms is the revival of an earlier and purer experience. Socrates constantly speaks of the body as a hinderance in the way of the knowledge of absolute Truth or the knowledge of Forms. True knowledge could only come, if we could rid ourselves of the body. Hence his own absorption in certain trances which he regarded as moments of exaltation in which he came in direct and absolute contact with Reality.

It was, in particular, in the *Meno* that Plato propounded his views on virtue and sin. The dialogue begins with a discussion on the nature of virtue between Meno and Socrates in the characteristic dialectical style. Meno asks Socrates whether virtue is acquired or natural in man. Socrates replies that he is unable to answer that question, for he does not know what virtue is. This surprises Meno, who says that it is common knowledge as to what virtue consists in. Man's virtues come in in such things as the ability to manage the affairs of the state, in serving the public, and in defending one's country against an enemy. A woman's virtue, on the other hand, consists in the ability to manage well the affairs of her family, to look after the house and the children and so on. And similarly in every action and in every kind of business some peculiar virtue belongs to each person, and the same holds true about sin. Socrates retorts by saying that he was in quest of one virtue, but that he had been given a whole swarm of virtues. He had not been told about the nature of virtue at all, only the various virtuous acts had been enumerated. He asks Meno to tell him in what all these virtuous acts have in common, for that must be

virtue. And further, Socrates brings his adversary to realize that all virtuous acts contain such characteristics as courage, temperance, wisdom, magnanimity and many more of the kind. This, however, brings them face to face with the same difficulty; for while in search of one, they had found many virtues. Many more attempts are made to discover what the essence of all virtuous deeds is, but all these attempts meet the same fate. Ultimately Meno comes to acknowledge his ignorance and pleads to Socrates to initiate him into the secrets of virtue. Socrates then tells him that it is the priests and the poets, who have a real knowledge of virtue, for these men are spiritual, and have a direct contact with divine things. These people tell us that the soul of man is immortal, that it may change its garb, called the body, but it never dies, and for this reason we ought to live throughout our lives with all sanctity. It is our past life of purity, which we faintly recollect in our present life, that is called learning or knowledge. Thus all inquiry and learning is reminiscence. No new knowledge of which we have had no experience in our past pure life, is at all possible. He distinguishes between knowledge and "right opinion". Knowledge is that in which the end is in view and is, therefore, a sure and stable guide, but right opinion is without the end in sight. It therefore does not abide. It is valuable so long as it remains with us, but there is nothing to bind or fasten it to us.

Among the followers of Socrates there arose two distinct ethical schools, known as the Cynics and the Cyrenaics. Both these Schools had been influenced in different ways by the character of Socrates. The cynics were struck with his independence and freedom of want, and this they made their ideal. The cyrenaics, on the other hand, had been impressed by his tact and skill in making the most of his surroundings. The cynics were consequently led to asceticism with whom pursuit of pleasure became the chief sin, while the Cyrenaics were led to Hedonism with whom virtue consisted in the pursuit of pleasure.

### *The Modern Presentation of the Problem.*

The present age is noteworthy for its scepticism. There is no code of duties or even general moral philosophy to which we are attached. This has made it all the more difficult to distinguish between virtue and sin. In any case its relative character was never more apparent than today. One man's virtue is another man's sin. A variety of divergent currents flow in different direc-

tions thereby giving different explanations of the existence of evil and sin in the world. This is in consequence of the lack of any religious belief, which is typical of the post-war period. According to Professor Joad, the generation which has grown to maturity since the last war is suffering from spiritual starvation, suffering from a "repressed will to believe", as he puts it. As is natural, man reflects in troubled times on the problem of evil. Such reflection was characteristic of the last Great War. The emphasis then, however, was on God. War was seen as God's punishment for human sin. Today we note a singular shift of emphasis. It is not God, but man who is responsible for the present ills of the world. It is man, who has failed to control his life and use his opportunities. Thus the problem of sin has shifted from a religious or a metaphysical background to an economic or a psychological one. Let us take each of them in turn.

Socialism is increasingly becoming the craze of the day. It teaches us that bad conditions are the cause of human wretchedness and of human wickedness. Poverty, as Shaw insists, is the supreme sin, supreme, because it is the source of all others. "Now what does Let Him Be poor mean? It means let him be weak. Let him be ignorant. Let him become a nucleus of disease. Let him be a standing exhibition and example of ugliness and dirt. Let him have rickety children. Let him be cheap and drag his fellows down to his own price by selling himself to do their work. Let his habitations turn our cities into poisonous congeries of slums. Let his daughters infect our youngmen with the diseases of the streets, and his sons revenge him by turning the nations manhood into Scrofula, cowardice cruelty, hypocrisy, political imbecility and all the other fruits of oppression and mal-nutrition". And Shaw goes on to conclude that since poverty is the root of all evil, money is the source of every virtue.

In more recent times, however, it is psychology which has captured the imagination of the people, and in particular, psychoanalysis. In one book after another, the psycho-analysts have exposed to us the hidden springs that work our natures. The sources of the springs, it seems, lie outside our control. Previously we could rely on self-control, depending on the faculty called the Conscience. Human beings being fallible, Conscience permitted them a certain amount of indulgence. It gave the passions a certain amount of rope. When the permitted indulgence was over, the end of the rope reached, conscience would rap on the counter. "Time's up, gentlemen, no drinking after 10-30" she would say.

If they did not heed to the advice, they had a bad time from conscience, suffering remorse.

But now it is all different. Now it appears that the part of us we can control, the part over which conscience rules, is not the part that matters. Even conscience itself is only a sublimation of a feeling of guilt. If then, we are not in the last resort responsible for the actions to which our passions incline us, what becomes of the notion of moral evil? Obviously, it goes by the board. You cannot blame people for the contents of the unconscious, if only because they do not know what the contents are. No more can you blame them for the influence of these contents on consciousness, or for the distorted and perverted or sublimated versions of them which appear at the conscious level.

Now the contents of the unconscious depend very largely on one's early training. The first two years of one's life are the most important according to Adler determining the unconscious Life Goal, which is later to prescribe the motives and direct the course of all our subconscious activities. According to Freud they fill our body-souls with all those desires, which later get us into trouble with society if expressed, and with ourselves if we suppressed them. For this suppression leads to disastrous results to our personality. Just as a fresh-flowing stream, dammed at its source overflows itself and creates a marsh, even so our suppression results in the formation of "complexes". It is these suppressions, perversions and frustrations, from which originates all moral evil.

Now these two views—in spite of all the service they have done to mankind—have certainly indulged in exaggeration. They are revolts against some of the current evils of our social system, but like most revolts they go to extremes. They have undoubtedly exposed some of the weak links of our social structure but it is preposterous to read all the evils of the present-day world in terms of either the one or the other of these theories. Man has from times immemorial indulged in acts of sheer beastliness, acts for which no adequate explanation can be given and long before the class-war had assumed the present proportions. Nor can we accept the psychologists' view as a complete explanation. If defective early education is the cause of all moral evil then our generation should have been far more virtuous than its predecessors, since it has received training in accordance with considerably improved and advanced educational theories. And yet it is we who behave like fiends, glorying in violence and indulging in wholesale murder of innocent people without remorse.

Perhaps we can study the problem only in an abstract way in terms of the motive and the consequence of the act. Is the consequence more important in our judgment of the act or the motive? In ethical terminology the problem may be formulated thus: Which is the object of moral judgment, the intention or the motive? The utilitarians, notably Bentham, Mill and Sidgwick are responsible for the view that the consequence is the important factor in our judgment of the act. If the act results in the general welfare of the people, the act is good, irrespective of the motive underlying the act. Thus if two men act in precisely the same way, one out of fear and the other out of compassion, their actions are equally good. They may not be equally good men, but that, says Mill, is irrelevant to the question. A good man may do a bad action, and a bad man may do a good action. The question simply is this—are their actions good or bad?

Here Mill seems to be labouring under a confusion. He seems to interpret motive in terms of feeling whereas the proper ethical significance of motive is the end or the goal, which induces us to act in a particular way. If motive is to be understood in this latter sense, then it is on the motive that the moral judgment is passed. Mill's error seems to lie in the fact that he thinks the moral judgment is to be passed on things done, whereas the moral judgment is properly passed not on these, but on the person doing. If it were not so, we should pass moral judgments on such physical phenomena as storms, floods, earthquakes and so on. The object of moral judgment is voluntary action. Whatever is not willed has no moral quality. The other school, which lays emphasis on the motive is supported by the intuitionist writers, of whom Martineau may be taken as a fair representative. If the motive which induced one to act in a particular way is good, then the act is good, no matter whether the result is beneficial to society or not. On the other hand, if the motive is bad, the act which accrues from it is also bad, even if apparently it does good to someone.

Martineau draws out an elaborate list of motives of conduct and arranges them according to merit. He places reverence at the top and censoriousness, vindictiveness and suspiciousness at the bottom. Between them lie a great variety of passions. This scheme is open to two criticisms. In the first place, it implies that the human mind is not an organic unity, but an aggregate of distinct faculties. This psychological division is false and is against the current conceptions of psychology. Secondly, Martineau confuses



the different senses of the term "motive". Motive is not to be interpreted as a state of feeling but rather as an end or aim. Thus if a list of motives had to be given, it should have taken the form of a classification of ends to be attained.

### *The Conclusion.*

From a general survey of all the various views we have covered one thing is evident. It is evident that sin is not an absolute concept. It is something relative and subjective. It is relative, even as morality itself is, to the time in which the individual lives. Sin as we understand it is not what the same as the ancient Hindus or the ancient Greeks understood by it. It is relative to the environment. It is relative to the metaphysical theory of Reality accepted by us. It is relative to the extent of knowledge attained. Sometimes a new discovery of science will alter our judgment of right or wrong in a particular case. For instance in primitive times wanton killing of insects did not arouse any moral censure. In the humanitarian age that followed, it came to be considered sinful. But later still, in our own time, the discovery that house-flies carry disease has changed the act into a moral one. Sin, thus, is a relative term. The only universal element, in terms of which we can understand it, is the motive underlying an act. If in doing anything we mean well, our act is virtuous, otherwise it is sinful. Kant calls it the "goodwill". A goodwill is more than a mere good intention in as much as it involves a determined effort to produce a good result. But we cannot take into account the actual result achieved, for in the production of the result many other forces are at work. "Our thoughts are ours, their ends none of our own". Sometimes with the best efforts we achieve quite the contrary of what we aim. This change in the result may be due to the interference of Divine Agency, and we may say with Shakespeare "There is a divinity that shapes our ends, rough hew them how we will". Or, it may be due to the interference of some non-intelligent forces of Nature. It remains, nevertheless, true that we cannot consider the actual results achieved when morally judging an act. Goodwill is all that matters. As Kant put it "it is the only jewel that shines by its own light". We cannot give it a content, for to give it a content would mean introducing a changing and a variable factor. There is no act, which in itself is virtuous or sinful, it is the motive which endows it with a moral quality. "There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so".

# Bergson's Ethical Outlook

By

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Bergson's "Creative Evolution" secured for him a permanent place in the metaphysical firmament. His "Two sources of Morality and Religion" does the same for him in the moral sphere. It is the purpose of this paper to examine Bergson's Ethical Outlook with a view to showing how fundamental and revolutionary are his contributions to moral problems.

Bergson's moral philosophy follows from his metaphysical presuppositions. In this he represents a revival of the metaphysical ethics introduced by Kant in a new setting of intuitionism. His anti-intellectualism forces him to seek the source of morality not in reason but in intuition. The *elan* is conceived as manifesting itself in moral geniuses after breaking through matter or by triumphing over it. These geniuses are the mystics. They are like a new music springing into the world. The love of God emanates from them. They are impelled to bring about a regeneration of all nature. They feel an urge to transform the whole humanity into a new species, creative, loving and free, or to lead it back into pure *elan*.

The mystics are the reformers of morality and religion. They effect change through a kind of inner force. But it is not a constraint or a drive. It is in the nature of an appeal. Those who ever come in contact with these privileged personalities or even those who simply follow their lives and teachings realize the nature of the appeal. They feel attracted. The appeal embodies that super-intellectual emotion with which the mystic was fired to serve humanity. Such an emotion is not a mere surface stirring. It means the upheaval of the human personality to its very depths, the stirring of the soul itself. It is a glow which is pregnant with new ideas and hence constitutes the source of new morality. It is a fresh emotion which by taking some preexisting 'notes as harmonies' produces 'the fresh notes of a new instrument'.

Humanity responds to the call of these moral geniuses because such a call *awakens* feelings by sympathetic vibration. Feelings are never introduced into us. They lie dormant in us. Moral preachers give out the stimulus, humanity responds to it. Bergson remarks: "Life holds for them unsuspected tones of feeling like those of a new symphony and they draw us after them so that we may express it in action".

The mystic morality naturally knows no bounds for it extends to the whole humanity. It is the morality of the open soul. It presupposes an open society whose membership includes all humanity. It is found in its full-fledged form, according to Bergson, in Christian mysticism. It is complete *only* in Christ and those who imitated him.

Opposed to the open morality of the mystics is yet another type of morality originating from man's social relationships. These are the obligations imposed by society on its members by virtue of their position or status in society. The obligations exert a kind of pressure or force. And since the obligations cohere together they impart even to a trivial obligation the force of the whole block of obligations. We feel the pressure of the force on our failure to observe a rule of society. Bergson calls it 'the totality of obligations'. It is, in his own words, 'the quintessence of innumerable specific habits of obedience to the countless particular requirements of social life'. 'It is a virtual instinct'. Obligation, for Bergson, is a state akin to inclination. Says he, 'Obligation is in no sense a unique fact, incommensurate with others, looming large like a mysterious apparition'. He charges the intellectualist like Kant for confusing the sense of obligation with "the violent effort we now and then exert on ourselves to break down a possible obstacle to obligation".

It is difficult to agree with the suggestion of Bergson. For God (and here we agree with Kant) duty will be inclination, for to Him there is no sense of duty. But for human beings there is a great difference between the two. Experience tells us that often duty runs contrary to our inclinations. For so long as man is a finite being his will falls short of the Perfectly Holy Will. Obligation cannot altogether be likened to inclination.

But that obligation wields the pressure of 'the totality of obligation' is indisputable. The obligations appear in the form of

the categorical imperative. The command must be obeyed. But while Kant suggests an *a priori* rational source to it, Bergson suggests an *a posteriori* instinctive basis. For example the ant must work for the ant-hill. She is impelled by an instinctive urge. But the nature of the command is the same in both the cases: 'You must because you must'. Thus, says Bergson, 'conceive obligation as weighing on the will like habit each obligation dragging after it the accumulated mass of others, and utilizing thus for the pressure it is exerting the weight of the whole: here you have the totality of obligation for a simple elementary moral conscience'

Bergson's analysis of conscience is thus both new and unique. It is quite different from the one which the theological and even the intentional ethics postulates. Conscience cannot be reduced to mere '*habit* of obedience' for, it is something like a faculty or an inner sense which enables us to distinguish right from wrong. It cannot be reduced to mere 'totality of obligation', and here perhaps the opponents of Bergson are justified in their criticism. This is the nature of the second type of morality that Bergson postulates. It is limited to the members of its own group. It is a closed morality as it issues from 'closed souls'. Hence it presupposes a closed society. This is the morality of 'My Station and its Duties' which Bradley discusses in his 'Ethical Studies'.

It would be wrong to conclude from the preceding discussion that the two types of moralities exist apart. The two amalgamate into a unitary whole. In this process of fusion the closed morality passes something of its compulsive force to the morality of the mystic which in its turn 'diffuses over the first something of its perfume'. The closed morality encloses each time something of the spirit of the open morality and the people are made to conform to this by the social pressure.

The pressure carries with it the appealing power of the open morality. The two forces may be likened to mechanism and teleology. One pushes from behind, the other attracts from the front. They account for the conservative and dynamic forces in morality and religion. This dualism however, should not be mistaken for a final one. The two moralities represent the freshets and the stagnant water of the enclosing banks from the same river of life ('*Elan Vital*'). It is for this reason that Bergson holds all morality to be in essence, in a very broad sense of the term, biological. It is an *ethical monism*. It is directly related to his "monistic

spiritualism", for the material and the vital aspects of creation like the two moralities are the manifestations of the same Cosmic 'Elan.

The explanation of evil is a baffling problem to all monistic systems of ethics, Bergson's system not excepted. Bergson reduces all evil to suffering which, according to him, is not willed by God. But 'it is no solution', as one of his reviewers remarks, 'to reduce all evil to suffering and to say that suffering may not have been willed, and in any case is one feature of an indivisible movement of which eliminating one element would mean suppressing all others, and for the rest to abuse the intellectualist for asking improper questions'. It would have been in confirmity with his metaphysical views if he had defined it as the swerving away of life from its course of evolution or its retrograde movement towards matter.

Whatever be the limitations of Bergson's treatment of ethical questions, his analysis of morality is both pertinent and valuable. The distinction between the two types of moralities and their two-fold source is both new and unique. His analysis has laid down the standard of his ethics as 'progressive'. The current morality is always progressing towards the dynamic as if in a chain, reaching not as Fichte would suppose to the infinite, but developing towards the realization of its Ideal. The ideal is the establishment of a contact with the creative force of which life is a manifestation. Such a contact is possible only through an imitation of the mystic in whom the 'elan succeeds in triumphing over matter. Such a triumph means infinite joy for it lies at the terminus of an infinite progress.

# Crisis and Delinquency

A Psychological Analysis

By

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It is well-known that any durable and major order of social unrest steers the normal propensities of the juvenile mind in the direction of criminal behaviour. The phenomenon is explained by the disturbances that are bound to occur in the even tenor of youthful life on account of the measures that must be taken under the exigencies of modern warfare. Evacuation from a threatened city, the break up of a family upon its members taking up different types of war-work, relaxation of parental control, the conditions of life in black-out and in improvised shelters, all conspire to loosen the moorings of habits and customs that fasten the growing personality to the stable order of social relations.

Yet it must be conceded that the conditions of social unrest merely stress the criminal patterns of conduct and suppress those that are socially approved. The seeds of criminality lie latent in the personality and germinate when in a favourable social soil. This is illustrated by the sharp rise in the figure of thefts and burglaries by the young people during the first world war and the immediate decline of the number upon the declaration of peace. The following table illustrates the point :

CHART No. 1

*Number of Adolescents indicted of Theft and  
Burglary in England :*

1913.	1917.	1919
14,325.	24,407.	13,999.

A similar phenomenon is being observed under the conditions of the present war. Mr. S. K. Ruck, a former Assistant Director of the Borstal Association, says : "One child out of 80 throughout the country (England) between the ages of 10-14 is found guilty of indictable offence". The influence of the war-conditions will be

manifest from the following figures collected from the courts of Birmingham<sup>1</sup>:

CHART No. 2

	1939.	1940-41.
Simple delinquency.	1985	2680
More serious cases.	1266	1672

The fact that such increase coincides with the social changes contingent upon the war need not lead to the conclusion that these are the necessary effects of war. The roots of these delinquencies lie in a specific *Anlage*, familial and personal. The emergence of the criminal behaviour pattern under the social stress is a fact of the same order as an increase in the frequency of physical diseases and mental disorders under unfavourable conditions. In both of these cases, the environment but serves to activate the disposition which is already in existence.

An analysis of the disposition or the *Anlage* of certain types of delinquency, especially theft and burglary, is likely to be of two-fold interest. It will reveal the mechanism through which the normal attitudes and impulses acquire a criminal taint. It will also enable the state in the very beginning of any social unrest to segregate the individuals who may possess the taint. Society would in this manner be saved from the inroads of crime.

It is possible to define the profile of the personalities that are prone to larceny and burglary. The study of a large number of Borstal cases has served to bring out the common features that are associated with the growth of a criminal behaviour-pattern.

The usual age at which the criminal tendencies begin to become better 'structured' and defined is the period of adolescence. The Borstal cases that are surveyed here belong to the age-group from 17-20. But the growth began much earlier.

The tension of adolescent crisis is accentuated by the familial conditions. The analysis of the cases reveals the fact that there is always some type of maladjustment among the members of the family. Mental diseases in the form of epilepsy, 'fits', schizophrenia, manic-depressive insanity and other orders of neuropathic conditions are frequent. One of the members of the family of the youthful burglar is often found to be an inmate of a mental hospital. Intemperance of the father or the mother is sometimes a complication in addition to these. Bad temper and drunkenness are very

frequently the disturbing conditions. In several of the instances, the youth, being of illegitimate birth, is denied the common social status and amenities. These constitute the immediate social milieu in which young thieves grow up.

A probable neuropathic disposition in which anomalies arise in the life of emotion, is thus accentuated by the conditions of the family milieu. A greater emphasis is placed in this way upon the subjective life comprising mainly of the affective states. This would usually be expected to lead to the inhibition of the behaviour-patterns that secure adaptation. A chronic condition of (i) indolence would thus emerge. Even when the youth is given a piece of work his performance would be (ii) unsteady. He would usually make an indifferent worker. The stress on the subjective life, again, would render the *ego-feeling* more vivid. The various ego-impulses of which self-assertion, sex and subjection are important would begin to play a dramatic rôle. The youth would in turn be impertinent, amorous and entirely at the disposal of a stronger personality. The process of adaptation to the environment of work would, thus, be uneven. At the same time, a pre-occupation with the subjective life of emotions would render the world outside less significant. The youth would be expected to develop a diminished sense of fact. He would grow up into a chronic liar.

The same conditions would explain the 'unsteadiness of attention and the frequent changes in moods that characterise the would-be thief. These oscillate with the alterations of the inner emotional states which must wax and wane from their very nature. The stress on emotions again would render the sense of the ego more vivid and, therefore, functionally more important. Narcissism and vanity which so often characterise the youthful delinquent would grow upon the personality.

The quality and the course of emotions would determine the general disposition of the personality. If the emotions are of the 'explosive' type, such as anger or deep remorse that find expression in sudden and intensive physical and organic changes, a manic state would gradually mature. And with it will come its opposite the depressive state that arises when the vehemence of emotions and the physical changes leave the mental personality in a depressive condition so that some kind of a balance of energy might be restored. On the other hand the vivid emotions may inhibit the movements. The personality slowly withdraws into its inner core of sentiments, relishing them and even gloating over them. There



is a break between the mind and the world of facts. A schizoid temperament settles upon the personality.

The consummation of the subjective states into cycloid and schizoid temperaments has certain other consequences. The pre-occupation of the growing boy with his inner states precipitates, in some cases, an intense selfishness and egoism. It also compels him to seek loneliness in other cases. In both of these instances the checks that the companionship of fellow men exercise over the impulses that ever tend to run off at a tangent, diminish to a minimum. Thus the emotions that are the common associates of the impulses have their full sway. The ideas and beliefs follow the lead of emotions rather than of facts.

This situation accounts for the entire lack of veracity that the youthful thief so often displays. For, the beliefs out of contact with facts naturally become lies. And when these lies become more bizarre they develop into delusions and even hallucinations.

At the same time the ego-feelings that are often exaggerated in all of these cases make the mental personality excessively sensitive. Remorse and reprimand alike evoke explosive responses. The suicidal tendencies that are stimulated by self-pity and remorse so often for this reason make their appearance in the early life of the youthful delinquent may be explained in this way. The homicidal tendencies may in a like manner be viewed as the reaction of the sensitive ego against reprimand, rebuke and all orders of humiliation. The various personality-processes of the individual build up in this manner a well-organised syndrome.

The following chart prepared on the basis of data of a number of case studies by East and Hubert will represent the profile of personality of the youthful delinquent who commits thefts<sup>2</sup>:

#### CHART No. 3.

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| I. Age                                 | 14-16.  |
| II. Home Conditions :                  | (i) Psychopathic <i>Anlage</i> in parents, grand-parents or collaterals—esp. Schizophrenia and Manic-depressive states. |
|  | (ii) Tensions: Loose morals of at least one of the parents. Drunkenness. Parents living separately.                     |
| III. Personal Habit of the Delinquent. | Indolence, Insubordination. Lying. Unsteady at jobs.  |

IV. Mental Estimates.	Intelligence —	Mediocre to good.
	Mental type —	Schizoid or cycloid.
	Attention —	Unsteady.
	Mood —	Changing.
	Personal attitude —	Vain.
	Unusual traits —	Delusions, hallucina- tion, suicidal and homicidal tenden- cies. *

It is possible with a picture of this type to isolate the adolescent personalities at the beginning of any social crisis. The reason why all of these personalities reach out towards a criminal consummation is not far to seek. Weak as the influence of society and the physical environment may be, they tie down the impulses to a life of fairly fixed routine. A rapid social change frees the youthful person from whatever restrictions he has been subjected to. The feeling of protest that the anomalies of family life breed now comes to the forefront. This expresses itself by breaking the social laws, especially those of property. As a matter of fact, the first step in the career of theft is usually taken with the property of parents. A relative immunity from punishment in the first instance and a process of substitution in which all propertied persons are placed in the position of parents finally launch the youth in the regular career of crime.

At the very beginning of any social unrest, all youth of uncertain mental personality should be enlisted in a scheme of productive work which has a social use and which would keep the youth tied to a life of routine. The socially eccentric propensities would in this way be checked at the very outset. Reward and punishment, creation of new loyalties round the plan of work and opportunities for new friendship that prevent the self from lapsing into its subjective seclusion, all serve to restore a normal balance that contribute to the security of the individual and the society alike.

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# Normative Gestalt

By

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## I

The Gestalt concept has come to stay. It is a fruitful one in the field of psychology. Already in the hands of its leading exponents it has proved its value in revealing the nature of such mental processes as memory, perception, learning etc. The history of the Gestalt school is in fact a record of boldness, initiative and practical success. One is therefore tempted to ask whether this concept is not capable of wider application. Can we extend it to other fields? Can it explain other facts and solve other problems?

Above the region of the mind which psychology studies, in the realms of the human spirit manifested in art, religion and morality, the gestalt principle, as it is understood now, is incapable of application. In the world of values it is powerless to explain things. Its limitations become quite evident. Before it can gain the status of a universally significant principle it has to free itself from these limitations and be born anew. And when it does that, it will take on a wider role, becoming, in a real sense, a clue to the understanding of the varied facts of human life. The possibility of achieving this and the consequent attainment of a normative status by the gestalt-concept (which, at present, is only a psychological principle) are indicated in this brief essay.

## II

Gestalt has two meanings; besides the connotation of *shape* or *form* as a property of things, it has the meaning of a *concrete individual* existing as something detached and having a shape or form as one of its attributes. The idea behind it is that the same general type of dynamical process which leads to the *formation* and *integration* of wholes will also *explain* their specific properties. The existence of such a dynamical process is the assumption of gestalt psychology.

It believes that the processes of sense-perception, learning, striving, thinking, acting and so forth do not consist of independent elements but are determined in a situation as a whole. The content of any experience cannot be given through the exhibition of a manifold of elements; it is always a *whole* and contains subordinate wholes that appear distinct from each other and from the general system. These subordinate wholes are distinguished among themselves by their different kinds and degrees of organization. Their various members possess a significant connection with one another and with the greater totality. These "configurations" may be experienced simultaneously or as continua in time. In the formation of these units, it is not the local properties of given stimuli but *the relations of these properties to each other* (the total constellation of stimuli that are decisive. These units are called Gestalten.

"In Gestalt psychology" says Köhler (p. 84. *The place of value in a world of facts*), "we distinguish three major traits which are conspicuous in all cases of specific organization or gestalt. Phenomenally the world is neither an indifferent mosaic nor an indifferent continuum. It exhibits definite segregated units or contexts in all degrees of complexity, articulation and clearness. Secondly such units show properties belonging to them as contexts or systems. Again the parts of such units or contexts exhibit dependent properties in the sense that, given the place of a part in the context, its dependent properties are determined by this position.

May I use an old example once more? A melody is such a context. If it is in a minor, for instance, minor is a property belonging to the system, not to any note as such. In this system the note *a* has the dependent trait of being the tonic with its static quality."

### III

The dawn of gestalt problem was first in the field of sense-perception. When it was felt later that the principle was capable of extension, it was made use of in other fields also—memory, association, learning, volition, etc. Köhler's and his associates' observations in the field of optical perception are well-known. "To Gestalt Theory", says K. Koffka (p. 162 *Psychologies of 1930*) "the problem of space-perception in all its aspects is of fundamental importance. . . . . Our organized behaviour takes place within an organized spatial field. Consequently to understand the

organization of this field is a main task of the Gestalt psychologist." And in the field of sense-perception the phenomenon of group-formation is a striking one—groups which are clear, stable and optically real. "It is not," says Köhler (p. 147 *Ibid*), "arbitrary and abstract thinking that makes these groups or spots or rectangles or things in my visual field. I find them there as optical realities not less real than their colour, black or white or red, etc. "The demand is for a configuration of the perceptual field, a completing of a spatial whole.

In volition too we can recognise the dynamic, emotionally tinged qualities of the experienced totality. To take a trivial instance, this instinctive urge seeking completion in lines and forms, is seen to operate when a pencil in a bored person's hand goes to work on some piece of paper. Or (to take an instance given by Prof. Kurt Lewin) when I have stuck a letter in my pocket, telling myself that I should place it in a letter box when I pass one in the street, a tension is set up which is relieved when I post the letter. If I see a postman and hand him the letter, then also the tension is relieved. Here too is the completing of a whole, a 'closing the gap.'

This urge to completeness, it is pointed out, comes out of the dynamic nature of consciousness. The self seeks that completeness; it is an inner need for unity. In the sensory field the completion is spatial, in the volitional field it is teleological. Lines and forms are completed in the former; purposes are completed in the latter. The concept of gestalt explains systems of lines or configurations in the perceptual realms and systems of purposes in the volitional field.

#### IV

The gestalt experience is the product of organization of external stimuli into configurations. The given outer stimuli are formed into a totality and a pattern by the inner dynamic principle in us that demands this pattern-formation. It is the interplay of subjective tendencies and the content of external stimuli that evolves a configuration and gives rise to gestalt-experience. It is not enough if we have a group of objective stimuli; the subject's dispositional conditions must also be adjusted to meet them. F. Sanders observes (p. 192. *Psychologies of 1930*)<sup>1</sup>, "These dispositional features of the soul, with their dynamic which strives for actualization, being themselves a totality, an organic system of un-

consciously active forces and impulsive tendencies, may according to Dilthey's precedent be called *structure*. Thus structure in our sense is not, as so often in present-day psychology, used synonymously with Gestalt. Structure denotes the set of psychodispositional constants conditioning the *Gestalten* of experience. How much of this conditioning complex which is called structure is to be regarded as psychical and how much as physical, is a matter of indifference; in the personal identity of the experiencing subject these operate inseparably together." Gestalt-experience, therefore, results when the inner dispositional "structure", and the outer coherent pattern, act and react upon each other.

## V

But this account of Gestalt-experience in sense-perception and volition (and its extension in the fields of learning, memory, etc.) only describes a positive psychological experience. It is not applicable to other realms of human experience, e.g. the normative realms of art and morality. It cannot explain the nature of artistic experience or moral behaviour. For instance, we have seen that the demand of the gestalt-principle in the perceptual field is merely for a closed spatial system, regular, orderly and self-sufficient. But this closed spatial system may be artistic or inartistic, beautiful or ugly. By itself it tells us nothing about its æsthetic qualities. The complete and the closed space, i.e. the perfect gestalt may sometimes be ugly. The incomplete itself may be beautiful, e.g. open spaces and semi-circles. The imperfect in gestalt may be the perfect in beauty. Beauty is not the same as order and system.

Again, in the field of volition, the demand of the gestalt-principle is merely for an effective volitional system, efficient and non-disturbing. Purposes must be fulfilled. But whether the purposes are worthy or unworthy, moral or immoral, is not of any account here. Efficient work may be immoral and inefficiency may go with morality. The perfect gestalt in volition may go with the imperfect in goodness and vice-versa.

In both cases therefore, i.e., in space and in action, the demand of gestalt is that there should be no gaps. Gaps produce emotional tensions that put the person in an unstable psychological equilibrium. So gaps should be avoided; systems of lines or of purposes must be completed, and order, regularity, and stability established. But closing the gap, or completing the system tells us nothing about the æsthetic nature of the figure or the moral nature of the action.

The gestalt-concept as it is, is *narrow* in its scope. Its emphasis is on mere "closing the gap" and its aim is to relieve emotional tension.

## VI

Nevertheless, Gestalt may lead to the concept of the norm so that it may be applied in the normative fields also if its positive implications are brought out and developed. If the negative emphasis of the concept may be said to be on the avoidance of gaps, of the incomplete in objects and acts, its positive aspect is in the stressing of the *formation of figures* and a unified totality. Köhler has shown in his works how from the mass of apparently unrelated material presented to consciousness, forms as articulated wholes are evolved. Spots and lines in space group themselves into patterns almost in spite of ourselves. To see them in any different group involves special effort; in the first moment of relaxation we get the original pattern again. It is as if some forces were holding the parts of the original configuration together.

"...From a perfectly even sequence of strokes or impacts a rhythm emerges, which subordinates every sound to a definite temporal series. This incorporation of all items in an all-supporting rhythm occurs quite by itself, often with irresistible constraint, like a work of unconsciously operative forces of the soul." (P. 195. *Psychologies* of 1930).

This figure forming activity, as the Gestalt school points out, is operative in the optical and the volitional fields. Optical organizations of all sorts (illustrated in great detail in the works on Gestalt Psychology) bring the sensory fragments in the perceptual field not merely into *completion* but also into *coherence*. Melo-difying, rhythmifying and figure-ground forming are all means to this end. And even in such a simple volitional task like memorising, formulations of one sort or another present themselves automatically and solve our problem.

In this positive doctrine of the Gestalt school, that in the perceptual and the volitional fields there is more than a mere "closing the gap", we have an indication of the normative factor. It points out the direction in which the concept of Gestalt has to be modified before it can be applied to the normative fields of experience.

## VII

That the dynamic of the soul seeks not mere completeness but a configuration is the principle that makes gestalt capable of nor-



mative application. The lack of completeness, of course, produces psychological tension, restlessness and excitement. The unorganized strives for organization. But the dynamic tendencies are not directed merely towards this conclusion which when attained may give a sense of completeness and rest. They also aim at a positive configuration or formulation in accordance with certain holistic *standards*, and therein lies their groping towards the normative. This ends in creating out of a variety of elements, not necessarily complete even in themselves, a form-totality which in possessing certain ideational properties seems to satisfy an ideal. In a configuration there is always an immanent plan, the actualization of which gives the repose and liberation characteristic of an ideal-fulfilment. The properties displayed by the form-total in space for instance, are symmetry, balance, architectonic, harmony, proportion, etc.

These reveal the nature of the form-ideal towards which the dynamical processes of the soul are striving. The Gestalt-ideal is not merely the unorganized striving for mere organization; it is also the imperfect seeking perfection in the light of a standard.

Another aspect which is closely bound up with this, is the recognition of the part played by the subjective factors, the *inner* dynamic as distinguished from mere spatial distribution or outer pattern-forming. It is from this point of view that Köhler himself thinks that the word "Configuration" is not quite adequate as a translation of the German word, "Gestalt". The word "configuration" seems to suggest elements *externally* put together in a certain manner. But if we remember this, there is no harm in using the word "configuration". This subjective emphasis by the Gestalt-school is a welcome reminder of the personality's active part in all processes. It also leads to the concept of the normative in these activities.

## VIII

Yet in spite of these normative aspects implicit in the concept of gestalt as handled by the psychologists of that school, it is incorrect to say that it has the status of a normative concept. It can develop into one and become capable of explaining facts in the higher levels of experience, if it can liberate itself from certain limiting conditions. These limitations are the following :

*Firstly*, the concept as used by the psychologists, though it does not ignore the inner structural tendencies of the soul as a

factor in gestalt-experience, tends to emphasise the outer, objective stimuli that form the pattern. The emphasis should shift to the inner dynamic of consciousness which evolves the pattern from the mass of unrelated material supplied. The operative forces of the soul that give the configuration should be emphasised and their nature studied. Ideals and standards are of the self: they lie in the self and not outside. Why certain patterns have value and why certain systems are good cannot be understood by studying the mere objective factors and stimuli. They can be understood only in the light of the ideals that are operative in us.

*Secondly*, Gestalt as used by the psychologists still roams about the lower levels of experience and has not emerged out of the field of sense-perception and volition. It is confined only to cognition and conation and is hence *partial and narrow* in its reference. A normative category, on the other hand, should do justice to our *total* experience which includes also emotional attitudes and feeling-tones and tendencies. It would then touch the realms of art, morality and religious consciousness.

*Thirdly*, the positive gestalt, touching only portions of our experience aims at securing release from tension: the pleasure that it gives is *sensuous pleasure*. A normative gestalt-experience, on the other hand, being a total-experience gives a complex of enjoyment. It is not sensuous pleasure which is directly conditioned by the cognitive and the conative moods, but joy. This enjoyment is the touch-stone of value-realisation. When a pattern perfects itself into a beautiful form, or a self-less action expresses a noble purpose, or a divine consciousness reveals the real to saintly soul, the joy that comes is not mere relief or rest but a pure, non-sensuous bliss. In the whole realm of values this bliss is present so much so that it is often difficult to distinguish the nature of one value-attainment from another. Aesthetic ideals share the characteristic of moral ideals, and moral ones of religious ideals. It is not without reason, then that in Indian thought *Rasa* (æsthetic joy) and *Ananda* (spíritual bliss) are placed side by side.

*Fourthly*, in the psychological configuration the subject and the object of experience are *opposed* and a sense of their separateness persists. Perception, for instance, is possible only by the sundering of subject and object. But in the sphere of values, the disappearance of the subject-object dualism is a *sine-qua non*. Aesthetic perception, for example, is the blending of our individual

personality with the object (Refer, the æsthetic principle of Empathy). In the moral sphere, self-forgetting and sympathy are essential. So too in the sphere of religious realization. While psychological configuration rests on dualism and separateness, value-realization is based on sympathy and union of subject and object.

These considerations reveal the limitations of the Gestalt concept as used in psychology; they also indicate the lines of further possible development of the concept in order to make it a normative concept, a significant principle of wider application,

# Types of Sensory Phenomena in Mystic Life

By

MR. RAJNARAIN

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A classification of sensory phenomena in mystic life that has come down to us from early times is that based on the nature of the sense-modality involved in the experience. Visual experiences were called 'visions', and auditory 'auditions'. Amongst visual experiences themselves, experiences of light formed a separate sub-class and were designated as 'photisms'. Similarly, verbalized experiences were segregated from auditory experiences in general and called 'locutions' or 'voices'. Collective terms for experiences of other sense-modalities did not come into use in mystical literature as these were not numerous enough, a fact which does not, however, mean that these were not recognized as so many different types of sensory experiences.

Western mystics have spent considerable ingenuity in differentiating three main types of visions, viz., Intellectual, Imaginary and External. An external vision is said to be the perception of some naturally invisible external object, by means of the natural organ of sight. The marvellous in these visions consists in the actual apparition of the object and not in its perception which takes place in normal manner. The object to be perceived must be external, not necessarily corporeal (that is of flesh and blood), located in space, an object naturally invisible. In other words, an external vision has always the impress of a hallucination, if not always the dimensions of a true sensorial hallucination.

An imaginative vision has been defined as 'a sensible representation, produced, either when awake or asleep, in the imagination by God.' It differs from the external vision in as much as while the latter requires a sensible outside object with its effect on our eyes, the former is produced wholly within the soul, in the imagination, and is in no wise localized or outwardly projected.

Miss Underhill has drawn a distinction between active and passive imaginary visions. In the passive type the self merely looks on but does not participate in the action of the vision. The active type, on the other hand, expresses a change in the self, and generally accompanies some psychological crisis in the spiritual

history of the mystic. In this type, 'which always has a dramatic character, the self seems to itself to act, not merely to look on. Such visions may possess many of the characters of dreams; they may be purely symbolic; they may be theologically "realistic"—entailing a journey through Hell, Purgatory, and Heaven, an excursion into fairyland, a wrestling with the Angel in the Way. Whatever their outward form, they are always connected with inward results.' Such are the imaginary visions described by St. Francis of Assisi and St. Catherine of Siena at the moment of their stigmatization; the heavenly visitor who announced to Suzo his passage from the "lower school" to the "upper school" of the Holy Spirit, and the experience of Mystic Marriage of St. Catherine of Siena.

Passive imaginary visions are again held to take on two main forms: (a) symbolic and (b) personal. 'In the symbolic form there is no mental deception; the self is aware that it is being shown truth "under an image". Many of the visions of the great prophetic mystics—e.g. St. Hildegard—have so elaborate a symbolic character that much intellectual activity is involved in their interpretation. This interpretation is sometimes "given" in the vision, as in the case of Rulman Merswin's vision of Nine Rocks. Symbolic visions are very often complex in the sense that vision and audition freely interpenetrate in the experience. St. Mechthild of Hackorn's visions bear this out.'

In the personal form the imagery placed before the mind is at once so vivid, so closely related to the concrete beliefs and spiritual passions of the self, and so perfectly expresses its apprehensions of God, that it is not always recognized as symbolic in kind. An example of this type of vision is Margaret Marie Alacoque's vision of the Sacred Heart. Consider again the following description of an imaginary vision of Christ by St. Teresa: "Now and then, it seemed to me that what I saw was an image; ;but most frequently it was not so. I thought it was Christ Himself judging by the brightness in which He was pleased to show Himself. Sometimes the vision was so indistinct, that I thought it was an image; but still, not like a picture, however well painted, and I have seen a good many pictures. It would be absurd to suppose that the one bears any resemblance whatever to the other, for they differ as a living person differs from his portrait, which, however well drawn, cannot be like-like, for it is plain that it is a dead thing."

So much for the nature of the imaginary vision and its sub-varieties. Before we pass on to discuss the character of the last

type of visions, we have to address ourselves to a question that naturally arises in connection with imaginary visions, viz.: If an imaginary vision is a mental picture or images produced in the imagination, how does it differ from the natural pictures of the same sort produced in the minds of ordinary men? The mystic's reply to this question is contained in the following points of difference between imaginary visions and natural visions.

(i) The *beginning* and *duration* of the natural image are more or less dependent on our will. The supernatural image on the other hand, appears suddenly without preparation or presentiment; it disappears in the same manner. It is entirely independent of our will. This is also true of outward visions.

(ii) The *nature* of the natural image or of its object is never beyond the compass of the mind of the individual. The supernatural image transcends experience.

(iii) The *clearness* of a natural image may vary with an effort of will and the attention given to this or that detail. A supernatural image remains the same, according to the design of God, and if He wishes to hide from us certain details, every effort on our part would be quite useless to discover them. This is what happened to St. Teresa. "Though I saw him speaking to me," says she, "and though I was contemplating his great beauty, and the sweetness with which those words of his came forth from his divine mouth,—and though I was extremely desirous to behold the colour of his eyes, or his stature, so that I might be able to describe them, yet I never attained to the sight of them, and I could do nothing for that end: on the contrary, I lost the vision altogether."

(iv) The *effects* of the natural image are different. Natural memories, even those that leave the greatest impression, sooner or later become effaced; supernatural visions are unforgettable.

#### *Intellectual Visions.*

(i) *Their Nature.* Intellectual visions are characterised by a total lack of all sensible form. 'Whilst in outward visions only corporeal beings, or at least aerial and sensible forms, and in the imaginative visions only mental images, are perceived, intellectual visions, on the contrary, all the objects are supersensible and spiritual, such as God, the Holy angels, human souls, the mysteries and truths of faith. Even when some of these objects are in themselves corporeal and sensible, such as Our Lord, the

Blessed Virgin, and the saints, in the intellectual vision they appear abstracted from all sensible form.' Among the truths and facts revealed in intellectual visions, some entirely *surpass* the natural powers of the mind, such as the understanding of the mysteries of faith or of the secrets of God—others, although natural in themselves, surpass these powers in their mode of manifestation.

(ii) *Intellectual vision different from intellectual knowledge.* If an intellectual vision is a perception divested of all sensible form, then, how it may be asked does it differ from intellectual knowledge? The answer is, in the following respects:—

(a) By its *object*, which is transcendent, at least in the mode of its manifestation.

(b) *Form.* It is a sudden and immediate intuition without either labour, delays, or successive progress, or calculations of human knowledge. It is a knowledge received and not acquired; it is passive and not active, like all mystical states.

(c) *Duration.* Intellectual knowledge disappears; visions may last a very long time and may even become almost permanent.

(d) *Effect.* Visions lead to an increase in humility and self-abasement.

(iii) *Intellectual vision and Sense of Presence.* If intellectual visions are free from all sensible form and yet last a very long time and even become permanent, as is remarked above, do they not amount to a consciousness of the Presence of God? No. The presence of God, in the words of St. Teresa, is a great grace, but it is not a vision. 'Intellectual vision is distinguished apparently from that more or less diffused consciousness of Divine Immanence by the fact that although unseen of the eyes, it can be exactly located in space. The mystic's general awareness of the Divine is here focussed upon one point—a point to which some theological or symbolic character is at once attached. The result is a sense of presence so concrete, defined, and sharply personal that it carries more conviction than bodily sight.'

### *Three Types of Auditions.*

Corresponding to the three kinds of visions described above, western mystics have distinguished three types of auditions, viz.: Outward, Imaginative, and Intellectual. The first have as their object external words or sounds clearly localized outside. The

sounds or words seem to be heard by the mystic's outward ear. Such for example were the words which guided the destinies of St. Joan of Arc, and in which the Figure on the Cross spoke to St. Francis of Assisi.

Imaginative locutions are purely internal and have their seat in the imagination: we imagine we hear without hearing in reality. They possess the character of "distinct interior words." It is customary to distinguish genuine imaginative locutions from spurious ones. The genuineness of the words can be tested as much by the sense of certitude, peace and interior joy which they produce, as by the fact that they force themselves upon the attention of the mystic in spite of its resistance, and bring with them knowledge which was not previously within the field of consciousness. In other words, they are really automatic presentations of the result of mystic intuition, unlike the spurious locutions which are merely rearrangements of thought, which the mind self-recollected forms and fashions within itself. These latter have been called by Philip of the Trinity, St. John of the Cross and other mystical theologians "successive words." True auditions are usually heard when the mind is in a state of deep absorption without conscious thought. Sometimes, however, mystical intuition takes the form of a sudden and ungovernable rush of knowledge from the depths of personality. Then auditions may break in upon the normal activities of the self with startling abruptness. It is in such cases that their objective and uncontrollable character is most sharply felt.

However they may appear, they are, says St. Teresa, "very distinctly formed; but by the bodily ear they are not heard. They are, however, much more clearly understood than if they were heard by the ear. It is impossible not to understand them, whatever resistance we may offer. . . . The words formed by the understanding effect nothing, but when our Lord speaks, it is at once word and work. . . . The human locution (i.e. the work of imagination) is as something we cannot well make out, as if we were half asleep: but the divine locution is a voice so clear that not a syllable of its utterance is lost. It may occur too, when the understanding and the soul are so troubled and distracted that they cannot form one sentence correctly: and yet grand sentences, perfectly arranged, such as the soul in its most recollected state could never have formed, are uttered: and at the first word, as I have said, change it utterly."



Purely intellectual locutions are only so called metaphorically. They have nothing sensible in them, either to hearing or to imagination; they are the pure expression of intellectual ideas or concepts without any image. The pure spirit speaks them and repeats them to itself; it may also communicate them to other spirits. The messages conveyed in this wise bring with them an infusion of new knowledge or new life. "Intellectual words" are a form of inspiration. The revelations of St. Bridget of Sweden were received in this manner.

# **New Plans of Examination: A Psychological Approach**

By

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## **I**

### *Critique of the Usual Type of Examination*

#### **(i) Variability of Judgment :**

In 1913, Professor Starch, a well-known worker in the field of educational psychology, had an answer book of a high school student in geometry examined by 115 teachers of mathematics at different high schools.<sup>1</sup> The marks ranged between 28 and 92. A similar situation was found in several other fields of study. It was felt that a more objectively valid procedure was needed.

#### **(ii) Complexity of Judgment :**

The questions in the usual type of examination are such that they have to be answered in the essay form. No simple judgment of value is, therefore, possible. The attention of the examiner oscillates between the materials presented, the style of writing and the plausibility of presentation. Any one of these features may determine the award.

#### **(iii) Emphasis on Language :**

It follows, then, that the essay-type of examination favours those possessing better linguistic equipment. The linguistic ability, however, is only one out of the many capacities that success in life or in the university demands. Hence, a test which puts a premium on the language is not necessarily a fair test.

#### **(iv) Undetermined Difficulty of the Test :**

The old type of examination must keep its question paper secret. Not only the specific items in the paper, but also its general form, remains unknown. How far a particular question paper is suitable for a group of students is not objectively determined. There is no standard of the difficulty of the paper apart

from the subjective feeling of the examined. This fact also stands in the way of accepting the examinations as objective measures of ability.

(v) *Want of Internal Correlation between the several items of a paper in the essay type of Examination :*

The essay-type of examination paper gives a summative view of a number of specific achievements. Success in one item bears no relation to success in another. This can be expressed in the statement that the *self-correlation* of the essay type of examination is very low. As a matter of fact, according to Gates, the value of the  $R$  (=correlation) in the papers considered by him is only .36.<sup>2</sup> This implies that a paper of this nature does not bring into play a unitary set of mental functions.

(vi) The examination reveals several cross-sections of mind in an order that depends on mere chance. (a) It does not exhibit the course of growth, the curve that represents the pattern of development. (b) Nor, does it exhibit the plane of maturation of the mind due to training. For this can be exhibited by (i) the capacity of organization of the material and (ii) by the use that can be made of the material learned.

It can, thus, be said that several of the defects of the type of examination in use to-day arise from the *manner* in which the examination is conducted rather than upon the *very nature* of the examination itself.

## II

*Interview and Personal Estimate as Substitutes for Examination :*

(i) *Theory of Interview :*

The human personality, it is said, has several dimensions. Its tastes, and trends, the direction of its aims and the expanse of its emotions cannot be adequately described in objective terms. They are to be seized upon by a personality with insight and experience. Hence, interview or personal contact with the examinee becomes a necessary factor in examination.

The basis of this programme lies in two trends of thought :

(a) It is believed that man acquires a kind of insight and experiences in dealing with a particular type of men. It becomes, thus, possible to estimate a specific order of personality-value

without any detailed examination. (b) A trend of psychological thought that began with the concept of "*Beurteilung*" lends support to this procedure. The concepts of "purposive" knowledge, of phenomenological observation and of "understanding" supply a psychological theory for the procedure of Interview.

(ii) The validity of interview would rest on the theoretic side then upon the acceptance of one or the other of these hypotheses. The practical efficacy of the procedure, however, lies in matching the results arrived at with another independent estimation. And the method of Interview becomes doubtful on this latter ground. The following data presented in tabular form will educe the point.<sup>3</sup>:

TABLE I

*Correlation between Interview and Examinations :*

5 Boys' School	..	·42,	·35,	·21,	·14,	·27.
7 Girls' School	..	·47,	·30,	·45,	·22,	·61, ·03, ·10.
9 Mixed School	..	·48,	·31,	·30,	·16,	·16, ·12, ·11, ·15, ·19.

The facts quoted above clearly indicate that interview is not a satisfactory method for estimating a person's general ability or intelligence. Yet this method is much in vogue both in the sphere of academic and of vocational selection. Another set of facts quoted from the work of the same author would show the unsoundness of this procedure.

TABLE II

*Correlation between Interview and the Mental*

*Tests applied to six Groups of persons :<sup>4</sup>*

Groups	I.	II.	III	IV	V	VI.
	·08	·16	·29	·40	·16	·06

The conclusion to be drawn from these figures is that if interview be regarded as reliable, the mental tests should be adjudged to be unreliable and vice versa.

This criticism applies to the method of interview if we look upon it as procedure for measuring intelligence or general ability. It is frequently used, however, as a measure of a quality different from intelligence. For instance, it is said to give us a measure of (i) a person's '*presentableness*', (ii) his '*social adaptability*' and (iii) of his '*general tact and demeanour*'. The criticism does

not apply to such uses of interview. The difficulty, that the terms mentioned above are not definable or easily measurable, cannot, however be surmounted.

### III

*The Usual Type of Examination and the Psychological Examination:*

(i) *The Nature of the Psychological Examinations :*

The psychological examinations attempt to present the materials studied in a subject in the form of Mental Tests usually in the form of (a) Completion tests, (b) Multiple-choice tests, (c) True-false tests, (d) Reconstruction tests and (e) Analogies tests. The better known forms of Psychological examination are: The Thorndike psychological examination, the American Council Psychological examination, the Thurstone Psychological Examination and the Ballard Psychological examination.

(ii) *General Objections against Psychological examinations :*

(a) Such examinations test mainly the accuracy of information. But the whole range of a subject of study cannot be translated into separate items of information.

(b) The psychological examination does not bring out the capacity of organisation, that is to say, of combining the material in an order other than that in which it is learned.

Peters and Martz attempted to match the data of a variety of examination types against (a) a final examination marks, (b) personal discussion and quizzes, that is to say, short examination, and (c) teacher's estimate of achievements. The authors conclude that in the case of secondary schools the essay type of examination gives the highest co-efficient of correlation and the multiple choice test a close second. For the lower grades, the different types of examination do not vary greatly in their validity.<sup>5</sup>

Another study conducted by Corey reports the work of 102 students of Education who were given a three hour examination on the subject. The paper comprised (i) *Essays*, (ii) *multiple choice* and (iii) *matching exercises*. The correlation between the essay and the rest was found to be .93. The Reliability Co-efficient of the essay type is .88. That of others is .82. But the correlation between the Army Alpha and the Essay is .39; that between the

former and the new type is  $\cdot 62$ .<sup>6</sup> The high value of the second correlation can be explained by the fact that both the item possess common features.

The conclusions that have to be drawn from these facts are that :

- (i) Psychological examination cannot be a substitute for the usual type of examination all through.
- (ii) The essay type of examination matched against the Psychological examination does not show less reliability.
- (iii) The Psychological examination from its very nature would involve more rote-memory work, more interest in information rather than in its organisation than the essay type of examination.
- (iv) There is nothing, however, against its use as a supplementary source of information regarding the personality of the pupil. For, it can be suited to the mental level of the student and it brings out native intelligence along with the information.<sup>7</sup>

#### IV

##### *Mental Tests as Instruments of Examination :*

Mental tests have been used from the time of its inception in the beginning of the present century to about 1915 mainly for the purpose of detecting defect and subnormality.<sup>8</sup> After that, suggestions were put forward for using the tests for the positive purpose of assessment of intellectual abilities. We shall consider the achievement in this direction :

(i) Mental tests have been used by a large number of institutions for selecting students for the award of scholarships and for admission to institutions.<sup>9</sup> Such use is largely for the purpose of elimination. Nothing can thus be inferred in regard to the positive application of the tests from this fact.

(ii) *The value of Intelligence Test scores as measures of probable scholastic success :* The value of intelligence test scores is not higher when we look upon them as indicators of probable academic success. Oddell calculated the co-efficients of correlation

between college marks, high school marks and intelligence scores.<sup>10</sup> The values of the co-efficients range between .20 to .50. The correspondence is not high enough. Edds and MacCall worked out correlations between (a) Otis group intelligence test scores, (b) Cross English test scores, (c) high school grades and college marks.<sup>11</sup> The high school marks have higher correlation than the other scores.

Wagner reviews the data of studies in correlation between the various measures of scholastic achievement at the college and (i) High School averages, (ii) Intelligence tests comprising the Army Alpha, Terman and Otis.<sup>12</sup> He comes to the conclusion that the high school average is on the whole superior to the mental test with respect to their predictive value. Kellogg attempts to determine the relative values of intelligence tests and matriculation marks as ways of estimating probable success in college.<sup>13</sup> He discusses the problem with reference to a group of students who took the introductory course in psychology of McGill University, Canada, in 1926-27. The following co-efficients of correlation are significant: (i) The correlations between the matriculation marks and those gained at the end of the Freshman Year is .747. (ii) The correlation between the Army Alpha test scores and the Thurstone Psychological examination for College students' scores was only .173. (iii) Between the intelligence test scores and the marks of the Sophomore and Junior years there was a higher correlation.

This view in regard to the intelligence tests as substitutes for entrance examinations is not confined to the workers in the United States and Canada. It is shared by many competent authorities on the continent also. I shall present only three more studies in support of the view mentioned above. Dietz on the basis of a careful study concludes: "Intelligence tests are inadequate as sole basis for selection".<sup>14</sup> Sterzinger in Vienna calculates the correlation between certain mental tests and school marks.<sup>15</sup> The following table gives his results:

TABLE III

*Correlation between School Marks and Certain Mental Tests:*

(1)	School marks and	simple cancellation	..	.27	
(2)	”	”	complex cancellation	..	.37
(3)	”	”	rote memory	..	.21
(4)	”	”	logical memory	..	.34
(5)	”	”	sentence building	..	.42

All the correlations are of small value and cannot form the basis either of selection or of prediction.

Lommatzsch puts himself the question "Are entrance examination intelligence tests best forecasters of academic achievement?"<sup>16</sup> The data were obtained from a school for girls in Dresden. The ranks of students at the time of admission in particular subjects and at the end of the first school year were compared. The correspondence was just as close when the intelligence data were not considered as when they were. The author raises the question whether from the point of view of economy mental tests in this field are worth the trouble that they demand.

These conclusions should not cause surprise to a psychologist.

(i) The mental tests were formulated for the purpose of *elimination* of children who failed to exhibit a minimum standard of ability. It was *not intended* by Binet and Simon as a measure of success. (ii) Again, the mental test scores cannot from the nature of the assumptions implicit in the tests, reflect the *various grades of ability* beyond the threshold of success. We may put the idea in another form :

We can have, to use a present-day favourite term in psychology, the different type of *ability-profiles* corresponding to the low scores; we can form no graduated scale of such profiles corresponding to the higher values of intelligence-quotient. (iii) The tests are formulated to *adjudge person's capacity to adapt themselves* to things of the usual environment. They are not calculated to bring into relief the specific aptitudes which the specialised studies of modern academic life demand. These seem to me to be the principal reasons for the discrepancy of results to which I have drawn attention.

(iii) *The Difficulty of securing Uniformity* : If we turn now to the practical question of application of mental tests as substitutes of examination we must have a well-defined set of tests implicating a definite method of measurement.

(a) There are in general four methods of calculating Intelligence : (i) The I.Q., (ii) The C.I., (iii) the Percentile score and (iv) the standard deviation. These values do not correspond to any marked degree. A careful choice should be made of which of these we have to select,



(b) Secondly, tests should be formulated and the conditions of the application of the tests should be determined in the setting of provincial conditions and linguistic groups.

(c) Thirdly, the tests should be formulated on the basis of laboratory experiments on specific psycho-physical abilities. And, they should be standardised on the basis of a good sampling of the school population. It is usually thought that a battery of tests can be formulated by mere adaptation of items from different tests.

This procedure involves two difficulties :

(i) A translation often distorts the meaning of the tests.

(ii) "Scaling" and "Scatter" of the original tests do not hold good for the new tests.

(d) It follows then that new tests have to be formulated and standardised. But even then, as the foregoing considerations show, they would not be *substitutes* for examination.

They can, however, be employed as parts, essential parts if you please, of a total pattern of examination. Today the Essay type of examination holds the field. It has to be supplemented and not necessarily replaced by something else.

The recruiting officer does not select a person as a soldier on the basis of weight alone. In that case, the army would be an association of immensely fat persons. Examinations likewise should not select merely on the ground of the Essay type of examination. Teacher's estimate, the periodic records of work, Examination and tests should form the different dimensions of academic ability. Taken singly none serves as a good measure.

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